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Abstract 
 
The emergence of mobile money and other new forms of payment has 
changed the sovereign foundations of money. Starting as a DFID funded 
project in Kenya, mobile money has now spread to many countries including 
Malaŵi. This thesis looks at the regulatory issues that mobile money poses, 
and the risks that this alternative form of payment poses to the financial 
system. The thesis argues that the traditional regulatory architecture of 
supervising the financial services is ill-suited to supervise mobile money. 
There are essentially two models of mobile money: telco-led and bank-led. 
The first is an innovation by telecommunication operators and utilises the small 
messaging service. There is no requirement to own a bank account. The bank-
led model is linked to a bank account. The regulatory approaches to these two 
models are different. Unlike the telco-led, the bank-led model is under 
prudential regulation. This has manifested itself in the way the services have 
developed. The telco-led model had thrived while the bank-led model has 
fizzled indicating that for mobile money, less regulation may be an enabler. 
Mobile money is now considered a key developmental tool to achieve financial 
inclusion among the poor, rural based, unbanked, and underbanked. As 
opposed to traditional additive forms of financial inclusion, mobile money, 
especially the telco-led, is transformative. It employs a different approach 
where the consumer does not have to have a bank account or even travel to 
a bank to access financial services. In Malaŵi, the financial regulatory 
framework largely embodies the command and control model. Mobile money, 
however has largely been regulated using light-touch, with regulation following 
innovation. This thesis proposes an approach based on the concept of really 
responsive regulation. This approach, is best suited to embrace mobile money 
as it passes through the different phases of its evolution.  
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1.  REGULATING MOBILE MONEY IN MALAŴI 
1.1. Introduction 
Across Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), a region that has faced infrastructural 
challenges for fixed phone lines, the introduction of mobile technology has 
seen the region “leap-frog the land-line en route to the 21st century.”1 Mungai 
captured it very well when she said that in Africa, “the mobile phone comes 
first; before electricity, water, toilets or even food.”2 On its part, Malaŵi has 
witnessed an exponential surge in mobile phone users3 with the emergence 
of two dominant mobile network operators (MNOs), Telekom Networks Malaŵi 
(TNM) and Airtel.  TNM was the first player in the mobile phone business and 
largely benefitted from the unbundling of the communications sector.4 The 
Bharti Group of India owns Airtel.5 By 2013, when mobile-money (m-money) 
was first introduced in Malaŵi, there was only 0.22% penetration of fixed lines 
while MNOs had managed to achieve 80% signal coverage and 38% 
penetration.6 
 
With the advent of mobile phones has come a horde of add-on services. One 
such service is m-money. The two MNOs have launched Airtel Money7 also 
                                                     
1  William Jack and Tavneet Suri (2011) Mobile money: the economics of M-PESA 
(National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts) p3 
<http://www.nber.org/papers/w16721>. 15 December 2016.  
2  Christine Mungai (2015) ‘The mobile phone comes first in Africa; before electricity, water, 
toilets or even food’ Mail & Guardian Africa (Johannesburg, 3 March 2015) 
<http://mgafrica.com/article/2015-03-03-mobile-come-first-in-africa-before-electricity-
water-toilets-or-even-food>. 9 March 2017. 
3  MACRA (2015) Subscriber trends 2000-2014 (Malaŵi Communications Regulator 
Authority). 
4  Author’s personal knowledge having worked for the Department of Posts and 
Telecommunications. 
5  Airtel (2017d) 'Bharti Airtel’ (Bharti Airtel) <http://www.airtel.in/about-bharti/about-bharti-
airtel>. 30 January 2017. It was previously known as Zain and Celtel - Anon (2008) 
'Celtel morphs into Zain’ (TeleGeography) 
<https://www.telegeography.com/products/commsupdate/articles/2008/08/04/celtel-
morphs-into-zain/>. 30 January 2017. Anon (2010c) 'Airtel swallows Zain’ (Vanguard 
Media Limited) <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2010/11/airtel-swallows-zain/>. 30 January 
2017. 
6  MACRA (2014) Strategic Plan 2015-2020 (Malaŵi Communications Regulatory Authority, 
Blantyre) p8 <http://www.macra.org.mw/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/MACRA-Strategic-
Plan-2015-2020.pdf>. 12 March 2017. 
7  Launched on 29 February 2012 – Airtel (2013) 'Airtel Money launch in Malawi’ (Airtel) 
<http://africa.airtel.com/wps/wcm/connect/africarevamp/malawi/home/personal/airtel-
money>. 15 December 2016. 
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called Khusa M’manja and TNM Mpamba.8 Khusa M’manja literally means 
‘money in the hands’ in the local language. Khusa is colloquial for money and 
m’manja means ‘in the hands.’ Mpamba means ‘start-up-capital.’ It is also a 
colloquial term for money. Both have strong similarities with the M-Pesa,9 an 
m-money service provided by Safaricom in Kenya.10 M-Pesa is short for Mobile 
Pesa.11 Pesa means money or cash in Swahili.12 MNOs are uniquely placed 
to offer m-money services. They already are in the mobile telephone business, 
they have experience with agent distribution who sell airtime (credit) and they 
already have a well-built brand and marketing structure in place.13  In offering 
these add-on-services, the MNOs have demonstrated a radical business 
gambit by adding a lucrative second stream of revenue in addition to the 
existing communications backbone.  
 
Developing countries have seen a boom in the growth of the m-money service 
where it has acted as a tool for achieving financial inclusion (FI) and a key part 
of the development agenda.14 As opposed to traditional banking, where efforts 
to increase the number of the banked is purely additive, m-money is 
transformative.15 It targets those who the banking sector normally ignores.16 
Transformational banking also means that the banking facilities are not limited 
                                                     
8  Launched in May 2013 - Anon (2013d) ‘TNM launches Mobile Money Mpamba to build 
great Malawi nation’ Nyasa Times (2 May, 2013) <http://www.nyasatimes.com/tnm-
launches-mobile-money-mpamba-to-build-great-malawi-nation/>. 28 December 2016. 
9  M for Mobile and Pesa is Swahili for Money. M-PESA therefore translates to “Mobile 
Money” see Peter Etelej (2011) 'About M-PESA’ <http://blog.theonlinekenyan.com/about-
mpesa>. 28 March 2013. 
10  Also, available under the same name Tanzania, but as will be seen later, with limited 
success.  
11  Nick Hughes and Susie Lonie (2007) ‘M-PESA: mobile money for the “unbanked” turning 
cellphones into 24-hour tellers in Kenya’ 2 (1-2) Innovations 63 p71  
<http://www.mitpressjournals.org/doi/pdf/10.1162/itgg.2007.2.1-2.63>. 15 December 
2016. Etelej (2011).  
12  Ibid. 
13  Simone Di Castri (2013) Mobile Money: Enabling Regulatory Solutions (GSMA, London) 
p12 <http://www.gsma.com/publicpolicy/wp-
content/uploads/2013/02/GSMA2013_Report_Mobile-Money-
EnablingRegulatorySolutions.pdf>. 20 February 2017. 
14  Malcom Webb and others (2014) Mobile money regulation (WebbHenderson, Sydney) p1 
<http://webbhenderson.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/06/Mobile-Money-Regulation-April-
2014.pdf>. 9 February 2017. 
15  David Porteous (2006) The enabling environment for mobile banking in Africa (Report 
Commissioned by Department for International Development (DFID), Boston) p17 
<http://bankablefrontier.com/wp-
content/uploads/documents/ee.mobil_.banking.report.v3.1.pdf>. 14 September 2016. 
16  ibid. 
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in space and time. Customers can be registered by agents outside the normal 
banking hours, and far from any banking premises.17 Customers can also 
transact in the comfort of their homes and at any time of their choosing. As 
long as the mobile service is available, customers can potentially transact 
without limit. While being a welcome development, this potentially means that 
the service can also be used for money laundering and illicit financing. Chapter 
3 discusses this further. The statistics that support the case for m-money are 
sobering. While the high-income countries had 91% household penetration of 
deposit accounts in 2010, SSA only had 12%.18 The average across other 
regions was 40%.19 The region also had a low auto-teller machine (ATM) 
density of five per 100,000 adults as opposed to twenty-nine for all developing 
countries.20 These statistics are evidence that the traditional model of FI has 
failed to work in SSA. 
 
M-money turns a phone into a mobile wallet.21  It allows a user to send and 
receive money, make withdrawals and purchase goods and services.22 
Through agents employed by MNOs, customers exchange their cash for 
electronic value (e-value) or electronic money (e-money).23 The cash given to 
the agents is deposited into a trust or pool account in a bank. 24 The value of 
m-money, a form of e-money, should always match the deposits.25 The m-
money service acts as a conduit to get money in and out of the financial system 
in a simple but also user-friendly manner.26 Although m-money performs this 
                                                     
17  ibid p34. 
18  CPSS (2012) Innovations in retail payments (Bank for International Settlements 
[Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems], Basel, Switzerland) p33 
<http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d102.pdf>. 20 February 2017. 
19  ibid. 
20  ibid. 
21  Airtel (2013). 
22  ibid. 
23  Bill Maurer (2012) ‘Regulation as retrospective ethnography: Mobile money and the arts 
of cash’ 27 (2) Banking and Finance Law Review 299 p306 
<http://www.imtfi.uci.edu/files/docs/2012/bankingfinance_law_review_27.2_maurer.pdf>. 
15 December 2016. 
24  ibid. 
25  Hughes and Lonie (2007) p69. 
26  Ernesto M Flores-Roux and Judith Mariscal (2010) ‘The Enigma of Mobile Money 
Systems’ (79) Communications & Strategies p52 
<ftp://ftp.repec.org/opt/ReDIF/RePEc/idt/journl/CS7903/CS79_MARISCAM_FLORES-
ROUX.pdf>. 14 February 2017.  
- 4 - 
 
seemingly simple task, in reality the ecosystem is significantly complex. 27 It 
includes various actors, such as MNOs, customers, banks, retailers and 
merchants.28 This diversity needs to be taken on board when designing a 
regulatory framework for m-money.29 Webb et al argue that what m-money 
needs is “a carefully considered regulatory framework that facilitates rapid 
deployment and easy access to m-money, while also appropriately protecting 
the integrity and stability of the financial system.”30  
 
Now, deposit-taking is a mainstay of the banking business. By taking money 
direct from consumers, m-money issuers are wading into banking territory. 
Banking regulation in Malaŵi dominates financial regulation. Banks dominate 
the country’s small financial sector.31 Financial regulatory authority is 
concentrated within the Reserve Bank of Malaŵi (RBM).32 The financial 
services law has therefore largely focussed on the formal financial sector. M-
money has a potential to positively impact on the FI agenda by providing 
financial services to the unbanked sections of the population but in doing so it 
raises regulatory and competition issues.33 
 
This thesis aims to study the regulatory framework of m-money by looking at 
the pre and post FI phases. Williams has argued: 
[T]elecom regulators are passive to regulating mobile money, which 
is a positive. However, the financial regulators regulate mobile 
money based on how they perceive mobile money, either as a core 
or non-banking service.34 
                                                     
27  ibid. 
28  ibid. 
29  Di Castri (2013) p34. 
30  Webb and others (2014) p1. 
31   Anon (2017) 'Index of Economic Freedom (Malawi)’ The Heritage Foundation 
<http://www.heritage.org/index/country/malawi>. 10 March 2017. 
32  Section 3 Financial Crimes Act, Act No. 14 of 2017 (Malaŵi, 2017). 
 Section 8 Financial Services Act, Act No. 26 of 2010, Malaŵi (Malaŵi, 2010) 
<https://www.rbm.mw/Home/GetContentFile/?ContentID=3743>. 13 December 2016.  
33   Michael U Klein and Colin Mayer (2011) Mobile banking and financial inclusion: The 
regulatory lessons (Policy Reserach Working Paper, The World Bank) p4 
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/docsearch/document-type/620265>. 14 
February 2017. 
34  Idongesit Williams (2013) ‘Regulatory frameworks and Implementation patterns for 
Mobile Money in Africa: The case of Kenya, Ghana and Nigeria’ (ICT Conference, Accra, 
Ghana)  p1 
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In Malaŵi, the central bank, regulator of the financial sector considers m-
money as a non-banking service.35 This choice has huge ramifications for the 
regulatory approach taken to supervise m-money. The central bank has listed 
m-money as a key developmental tool towards achieving FI.36 The target for 
the m-money service is the poor unbanked and under banked in rural areas.37 
The question that arises is whether the traditional financial regulatory 
architecture is best suited to regulating a new form of money such as m-
money. Klein and Mayer argue that this may be the most important regulatory 
struggle facing an emerging service such as m-money.38 They argue that 
ideally, the best way is to desegregate the service into its constituent 
components and then structure the regulation to mirror this.39 This leads to the 
question: what type of regulation would best suit each component? In the case 
of m-money, although it is an emerging service, lessons from other financial 
services are crucial in formulating a regulatory framework for the service.  
 
1.2. Problem Statement 
For m-money services, there is a distinction between the telco-led40 and bank-
led41 models. Telco-led are associated with light-touch while the bank-led are 
associated with prudential regulation. Light-touch is a reference to a regulatory 
environment which is not strictly controlled or supervised. Both the central 
banks of Kenya and Malaŵi allowed m-money services to operate through a 
‘Letter of No Objection.’42 This instrument was issued in the absence of a 
                                                     
<http://www.academia.edu/download/42068100/Regulatory_frameworks_and_Implement
ation20160204-17000-9tcws1.pdf>. 17 February 2017. 
35  Interview with Staff at the Reserve Bank of Malaŵi (RBM) Headquarters (6 August 2015). 
36  Interview with Staff at the Reserve Bank of Malaŵi (RBM) MicroFinance Division (19 
August 2015). 
37  Rajanish Dass and Sujoy Pal (2011) ‘Exploring the factors affecting the adoption of 
mobile financial services among the rural under-banked’ (European Conference on 
Information Systems, Helsinki) <http://aisel.aisnet.org/ecis2011/246>. 26 April 2017. 
38  Klein and Mayer (2011) p5. 
39  ibid. 
40  Such as M-Pesa, Airtel Money and Mpamba. 
41  Such as WIZZIT and MTN Money in South Africa. 
42  Kenya has since enacted the National Payment System Act 39 of 2011 of the Laws of 
Kenya 2011) 
<http://kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/Acts/NationalPaymentSystemsAct__No3
9of2011.pdf>. 19 February 2016. Section 12 expressly for authorisation of payment 
service providers. 
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statutory framework for regulation and licensing “as an interim means of 
permitting mobile money services to operate.”43 The Kenyan and Malaŵian 
models of m-money are telco-led. They are called telco-led because they are 
set up by telecommunications operators and run as an add-on service.44 Bank-
led models involve non-banks and banks working in partnership.45 Under 
Malaŵi’s Finance Services Act (2010), Airtel and TNM are not financial 
institutions.46 They are MNOs regulated under the Communications Act.47 
However, Airtel Money and Mpamba are financial services.48 Both MNOs are 
dominant players in the communications sector. Will the creation of m-money 
services potentially expose the financial system to risk, from both prudential 
and conduct of business fronts, and result in having companies that are too 
big to fail?49 As noted, the regulation of m-money potentially includes more 
than one regulator. Is plurality of regulators helpful for such an emerging 
service?  
 
In Malawi, there is excitement about m-money although it has not reached 
critical levels of market penetration. As indicated earlier, the central bank has 
authorised m-money to operate through a Letter of No Objection. Therefore, it 
                                                     
 Rasheda Sultana (2009) ‘Mobile banking: Overview of Regulatory framework in emerging 
markets’ (4th Communication Policy Research, South Conference) Negombo, Sri Lanka 
p9-10 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1554160>. 14 February 
2017.  
 Gerald Nyaoma (2009) ‘Regulating mobile money: The Case of M-Pesa in Kenya’ 
(Global Policy Forum, Nairobi, 16 September 2009), <http://www.afi-
global.org/sites/default/files/GPF_Gerald_Nyaoma.pdf>. 20 January 2017.  
 Guidelines for Mobile Payment Systems (2011) (Reserve Bank of Malaŵi) 
<http://www.rbm.mw/documents/payment_systems/Mobile%20Payments%20Systems%2
0Guidelines.pdf>. 13 March 2017. 
43  Webb and others (2014) p2. 
44  Bill Maurer (2011) ‘Mobile money regulation: A story arc of best practices and emerging 
realizations’ Notes from the Field, December 2011 
<http://faculty.sites.uci.edu/wmmaurer/files/2011/12/Note_Dec2011_IMTFI.pdf>. 15 
December 2016. 
45  Sultana (2009) p12. 
46  Section 2 Financial Services Act (Malaŵi, 2010).  
47  Communications Act, Act No. 41 of 1998, Chapter 68:01 of the Laws of Malaŵi (Malaŵi, 
1998) 
<http://www.malawilii.org/files/mw/legislation/act/1998/41/ca1998176_pdf_64840.pdf>. 8 
February 2016. 
48  Section 2 Financial Services Act (Malaŵi, 2010). 
49  For the concept of too big to fail, see generally James R. Barth and Class Wihlborg 
(2016) ‘Too big to fail and too big to save: Dilemmas for banking reform’ (235) National 
Institute Economic Review 
<http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/002795011623500113>. 9 February 2017. 
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is not that the service is not regulated at all, but rather, the regulation is partial, 
ad hoc, not backed by specific legislation and essentially reactionary in nature. 
MNOs have formed in-house companies50 to run the service but ultimate 
control remains with the MNOs. As a new service, m-money presents 
regulators with a challenge. Most are slow to appreciate that they are dealing 
with a fundamentally new species of electronic payment instruments.51 Unlike 
other payments methods, the means of effecting the m-money payment 
system are through the mobile phone device.52 Regulating the service as if it 
were just a financial service overlooks the technical aspects of the service. 
The danger with this approach is an improperly regulated service. Unless 
properly regulated, the attainment of critical mass and interconnectivity of the 
m-money ecosystem could pose problems for the national payment system. 
There is also the potential risk posed by an increase of m-money on money 
supply, which may be inflationary.53 However, a balance needs to be found 
that allows the service to roll out without being unduly suffocated by a stringent 
regulatory framework. 
 
This research aims to demonstrate that the current regulatory framework for 
m-money in Malaŵi, based on the traditional architecture of financial service 
regulation, does not address the specific issues and challenges posed by m-
money as an emerging service. The research aims to propose the principles 
of an appropriate regulatory framework for m-money in Malaŵi by analysing 
the local context and taking cognizance of the need not to over-regulate nor to 
create regulatory risks for an emerging industry. The importance of m-money 
                                                     
50  Airtel Money and TNM Mpamba. 
51  Simon L Lelieveldt (1996) ‘How to regulate electronic cash: an overview of regulatory 
issues and strategies’ 46 Am UL Rev 1163 p1166 <http://heinonline.org/hol-cgi-
bin/get_pdf.cgi?handle=hein.journals/aulr46&section=39>. 17 March 2017. 
52  ibid p1168. 
53  Jack and Suri (2011) p11. 
 George Ngigi (2012) ‘M-Pesa linked to rise in inflation’ Business Daily (14 February 
2012) <http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/M-Pesa-linked-to-rise-in-inflation/-
/539552/1327538/-/13rogmr/-/index.html>. 23 February 2017.  
 See also Will Mutua (3 June 2012) 'How M-Pesa disrupts entire economies’  
<http://memeburn.com/2012/03/how-m-pesa-disrupts-entire-economies/>. 28 March 
2013. 
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is not only in its role as a development tool for achieving FI, but also the reality 
that it is a service that in most developing countries has come to stay.54  
 
1.3. Hypothesis  
The research is premised on the assumption that the current regulatory 
architecture of the financial service is incoherent and not ideally suitable for an 
emerging and hybrid service such as m-money. Therefore the service requires 
a different regulatory approach. 
 
1.4. Research Question 
The central question this thesis asks is; how can mobile money be effectively 
regulated to achieve financial inclusion, financial stability, and financial 
integrity?  
 
The research question aims to analyse the development aspects of m-money 
and how this can lead to FI without posing a financial risk. In tackling the 
central question, the following questions are considered: 
1. How does m-money fit into the financial system? 
2. What risk does an unregulated m-money service pose, to consumers and 
the financial system?  
3. How can the law achieve financial stability and integrity as well as FI? 
4. How can the regulator discharge its duty so that the interests of consumers 
are balanced with those of m-money issuers? In an industry where the 
regulated are a ‘monopoly of two’, how can the regulator negotiate the 
regulatory space? 
5. To what extent is the focus on development and provision of financial 
services for the poor? Is there a contradiction between efficient regulation 
of m-money and services for the poor?  
                                                     
54  Kevin P Donovan (2012) ‘Mobile Money, More Freedom? The Impact of M-PESA’s 
Network Power on Development as Freedom’ 6 International Journal of Communication 
2647 p2647 <http://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/1575>. 20 January 2017. 
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6. How does the global anti-money laundering regime affect the operation of 
m-money? 
 
1.5. Research objectives 
The overall objective of the proposed research is to propose an effective m-
money regulatory framework in Malaŵi. The specific objectives of the research 
are to: 
1. Analyse the m-money payment system, and its relation to the national 
payment system and financial system in general; 
2. Identify the risk of an unregulated or partially regulated m-money 
service and how the law can mitigate against the risk; 
3. Analyse the link, tension, and relationship between FI and risk to the 
financial system 
4. Suggest a regulatory balance between the various stakeholder 
interests 
5. Analyse the development aspects of m-money, their effects on FI and 
the impact on rural consumers. 
6. Assess the impact of ant-money laundering regimes on the 
development of m-money 
 
1.6. Research argument  
This research is premised on the assumption that the current regulatory 
architecture of the financial service is not ideally suitable for an emerging and 
hybrid service such as m-money. The introduction of m-money did not witness 
an accompanying regulatory shift to embrace it. The same old rules were 
essentially realigned to accommodate the new service. Considering the 
increase in usage of mobile phones in Malaŵi, 55 m-money is likely to become 
a service that more Malaŵians embrace. It can no longer remain regulated as 
                                                     
55  Henry Lancaster (2015) Malawi - Telecoms, Mobile and Broadband - Statistics and 
Analyses (Paul Budde Communication Pty Ltd,  
<https://www.budde.com.au/Research/Malawi-Telecoms-Mobile-and-Broadband-
Statistics-and-Analyses>. 11 October 2016. 
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a peripheral financial service. Therefore, there is a need for an effective and 
efficient m-money regulatory framework, which would protect consumers, 
allow innovative growth, and ensure financial soundness. Consumer 
protection is crucial in a country like Malaŵi with low literacy (65.96%),56 and 
financial literacy levels (57%).57 The fear is that those who are not financially 
literate are vulnerable and much more open to market abuse.58 Considering 
that m-money is a tool for FI, an effective regulation needs to look at how the 
framework would be in a post-FI agenda.59 This thesis argues for a regulatory 
framework that takes cognizance of the fact that the m-money service is not 
only a communications service but a financial service as well. Its uniqueness 
requires a unique regulatory approach.  
 
1.7. Methodology and justification 
This thesis adopts an issues-based analytical framework. The first issue that 
the framework addresses is what is being regulated? This includes the 
commodity, the service, and the institutions. The second issue looks at who 
the regulators are. This involves an analysis of the regulatory approach of each 
regulator and how they relate to each other. The last issue looks at which other 
players are also contesting the regulatory space.  
 
Choice of jurisdictions  
The thesis compares m-money operational frameworks in Malaŵi, Kenya, 
Tanzania, and South Africa. General reference is also made to the United 
Kingdom (UK). All the four countries have had some relationship with the UK 
over the course of their existence and the English Common Law forms part of 
the legal system in all the four countries. The main emphasis however, is on 
the m-money services in Malaŵi and Kenya. The motivation for choosing 
                                                     
56  73.02% male and 59.03 female - UNESCO (2016) 'Malawi’ (UNESCO Institute for 
Statistics) <http://uis.unesco.org/en/country/mw>. 17 February 2017. 
57  Phillip Dzikanyanga (2016) ‘Reserve Bank of Malawi to launch financial literacy strategy’ 
Nyasa Times (20 May 2016) <http://www.nyasatimes.com/reserve-bank-of-malawi-to-
launch-financial-literacy-strategy/#sthash.vWN1Njlb.dpuf>. 17 February 2017. 
58  Porteous (2006) p31. 
59  85% are unbanked – Pascaline Dupas and others (2016) Banking the Unbanked? 
Evidence from three countries (NBER Working paper No 22463, National Bureau of 
Economic Research, Cambridge, Massachusetts) p10.  
<https://web.stanford.edu/~pdupas/BankingTheUnbanked.pdf>. 9 March 2017. 
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Malaŵi is that it is the researcher’s home country. It is hoped the research can 
be of use to the financial service regulation industry. Kenya was chosen 
because it is where M-Pesa originated. M-Pesa has gone through a 
metamorphosis having attained FI goals and is now grappling with the post-FI 
issues. This cycle and the challenges facing Kenya are invaluable to Malaŵi, 
which has just embarked on m-money services in a formalised way. Tanzania 
was chosen because M-Pesa was exported there, but with limited success. 
However, it will be argued that the growth pattern of the service in Tanzania is 
reflective of how the m-money service is likely to be replicated in other 
jurisdictions. Therefore, while Kenya provides a standard for Malaŵi to aim at, 
Tanzania presents a route-map of how to get there. 
 
South Africa has been chosen because although it also faces FI challenges, it 
has adopted a bank-led model. South Africa therefore offers an ideal 
comparator to the telco-led model. South Africa also boasts the strongest and 
most effective economy and legal system60 with probably the most advanced 
financial regulatory framework on the African continent.61 The apparent failure 
of the bank-led model in such an advanced economy continentally, provides 
lessons on where the future trajectory of m-money services may lie.  
 
Main mode of research  
There was a field visit to Malaŵi that was done to collect data, which was not 
available online. It was also used to triangulate data as well as conduct 
interviews. Triangulation is important to validate data, especially where it is 
sourced from industry players.62 In terms of data collection methods, the mixed 
                                                     
60   Both Malaŵi and South Africa belong to the Southern Africa Development Community 
(SADC), which has ambitions for economic integration – SADC (2014) 'SADC Overview’ 
(Southern Africa Development Community (SADC)) <http://www.sadc.int/about-
sadc/overview/>. 17 March 2014. For a discussion on economic integration in Southern 
Africa see Henock Nokaneng Shima (2009) ‘The concept of economic integration with 
specific reference to Southern Africa ’ (PhD Thesis, University of Pretoria)  
<http://upetd.up.ac.za/thesis/available/etd-03282009-130922/unrestricted/00front.pdf>. 
17 March 2014. 
61  Bank Circular 619 issued by the South Africa Reserve Bank (SARB) allowing banks to 
open mobile phone-operated bank accounts (within certain transaction and balance 
limits) without having to undertake face-to-face KYC (know your customer) procedures - 
Sultana (2009) p12. 
62  Bob Matthews and Liz  Ross (2010) Research methods: A practical guide for the social 
sciences (Pearson Education Limited (Longman), Harlow) p217. 
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methods of qualitative and quantitative methods are used. The mixed methods 
have been lauded as the ideal “approach to knowing the social world.”63 The 
purpose of the study was not just to analyse data but also to socially associate 
the data with its respondents. Reports of regulators and other stakeholders 
were therefore useful in this exercise.  
 
The interviewing mode chosen was semi-structured interviews. Interviews 
have the ability to allow the respondents to personally communicate and to be 
interactive.64 The questionnaire used as the primary data collection was 
comprised of two parts. The first was in a structured format and sought to 
gather data that would be common to all respondents. The second part was 
tailored for each specific respondent and included open-ended questions. 
Only semi-structured interviews allow a researcher to probe further because 
of their open-ended nature.65 Semi-structured interviews allow the collection 
of basic data which can form the basis for comparison and secondly, they allow 
the respondents to expand on issues depending on their nature of business.66 
 
These interviews were recorded, with the consent of the respondents, and 
eventually transcribed. Some interviewees opted to remain personally 
anonymous but agreed to be identified through their organisation. In some 
cases, some interviews had to be translated. Field notes were made which 
assisted in contextualising the transcribed notes. Because transcribing the 
interviews verbatim was found to be too time-consuming, a system was 
devised to divide the interviews into 5 minute sections. A summary would 
therefore be made of what transpired in the section, but if necessary, a 
verbatim transcription would be made if it was found useful.67 Interviews were 
conducted with the following: 
a) Communications regulator  
b) Financial regulator (central bank): 2 sets of interviews 
c) Financial intelligence Unit  
                                                     
63  ibid p40. 
64  ibid p196. 
65  ibid p210. 
66  ibid. 
67  ibid p198. 
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d) M-money issuers: Airtel money and Mpamba 
e) Malawi Switch Limited (Malswitch) 
f) Village bank trustee 
g) Pensioner 
 
The choice of respondents was made based on the thesis aims. As a thesis 
researching on the regulation of m-money, the first choice was to interview the 
regulators involved in the supervision of money, m-money, and MNOs. The 
second category involved the actual operators of the m-money service. This 
yielded valuable data about both services.  Malswitch was chosen because of 
the central role it had played as the main switch of the payment system. A 
trustee of a village bank was chosen to collect data on the operations of local 
financial clubs and the challenges they face. Case studies were developed 
from interviews and interaction with the trustee and a pensioner. The 
advantage of using the case study method is that it allows for in-depth 
exploration of the issues being researched on.68 The data collected was coded 
and this proved useful in drawing relationships and comparisons between 
different data sets, especially when analysing the two dominant MNOs.69  
 
Apart from the case studies, the following criterial formed the basis of 
collecting data and information:  
A. The process of being granted authority to operate.  
 This was to analyse the process from the viewpoint of each issuer as 
well as the regulators 
B. Service progression: customer base, revenue growth, transaction growth. 
 This was to compare as well as to aggregate statistics  
C. Thresholds for concerting MNO subscribers to m-money customers 
 This was to assess how successful the issuers have been in converting 
customers and to triangulate with data obtained from the regulators 
D. Interconnectivity plans 
                                                     
68  ibid p128. 
69  ibid p400.  
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 This was to analyse the plans, if any, that the issuers and regulators 
have for future interconnectivity 
E. Challenges that the service has faced since its launch, how it has 
overcome them plus its future plans 
 This was to analyses the challenges faced by the issuers as well as the 
regulators 
F. Payment of interest and proceeds from the pool account.  
 This was to appreciate how the pool account operates and the 
regulations that govern any interest earned  
G. Protection of the deposits in the pool account 
 This was to assess the protection mechanisms that have been put in 
place by the issuers as well as the financial regulator to protect the pool 
account 
H. How the m-money payment system links to the national payment system. 
 This was to analyses how the m-money payment system operates as 
well as how it links with the national payment system. 
I. Customer due diligence requirements and how they are implemented 
 This was to assess the anti-money laundering measures that are being 
implemented by the issuers as well as the regulators 
J. Exclusivity of banking and agency service by m-money providers 
 This was to assess if any of the issuers has exclusivity contracts and 
the position of the financial regulator on this. 
 
Apart from the data collected from the field, the research also analysed 
documents available at the University of Warwick, online, in books, journals 
and collected from the field visit. The documents were divided into primary and 
secondary sources. The primary category included primary legislation, 
secondary legislation, directives, and guidelines. The secondary category 
included bills, recommendations, books, articles, reports and other written 
works. As a study done in an internet age, a lot of research was done online. 
This method was chosen because a study in regulation is primarily a doctrinal 
study. There is a wealth of literature available on m-money in general, but not 
much on Malaŵi. This not surprising as the service is new to the country. The 
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thesis looks at how an effective regulatory framework can be harnessed from 
the diversity of regulators within the financial and communications arena.  
 
1.8. Significance 
Malaŵi is not only a least developed country, but also one that is land-locked.70 
This presents logistical problems and poverty is a key challenge.71 The 
number of Malaŵians financially included has been low for some time. In 2008, 
19% of the adult population was banked and 55% was financially excluded.72 
By 2014, there was a slight increase in the percentage of the banked 
increasing to 27% while 51% were still financially excluded.73 The number of 
financially included includes those with bank accounts plus those with access 
to formal financial services even though they may have no accounts. Access 
to financial services seems to be the preserve of the rich.74 High levels of 
inflation have also prevented poor people from accessing finance.75 However, 
m-money is slowly changing this and offering some financial products to the 
poor. The success in Kenya of M-Pesa, which managed to recruit 50% of the 
adult population in under four years, has given hope of replication in other 
countries.76 If M-Pesa’s success can be replicated in Malaŵi, even if not to the 
same extent, the mobile phone can become a prime driver to lift people out of 
poverty.77 Looking at the issue of whether m-money is development oriented 
or a capitalist encroachment, it would seem that for Malaŵi, the goal is 
                                                     
70  UNOHRLLS (2011) 'Landlocked Developing Countries (LLDCs)’ (United Nations Office of 
the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing 
Countries and Small Island Developing States) 
<http://www.unohrlls.org/UserFiles/File/UN_LLDCs_Factsheet.pdf>. 21 January 2014. 
71  Alka Bhatia and Peter Mwanakatwe (2016) Malawi 2016 (Africa Economic Outlook, 
OECD Development Centre,  
<http://www.africaneconomicoutlook.org/sites/default/files/2016-
05/Malawi_GB_2016%20WEB.pdf>. 9 March 2017. 
72  Finscope (2014) FinScope Consumer Survey Malawi 2014 (Finmark Trust, Midrand, 
Johannesburg) p19 <http://www.finmark.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/FS-Malawi-
2014-Launch-presentation.pdf>. 5 May 2017. 
73  ibid. 
74  Peter Dittus and Michael Klein (2011) On harnessing the potential of financial inclusion 
(BIS Working Papers No347, Bank of International Settlements, Basel) p1 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/work347.pdf>. 20 February 2017.  
75  Bhatia and Mwanakatwe (2016) p2.   
76  Dittus and Klein (2011) p1. 
77  ibid p2. 
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development. Whether this is, what is achieved in the end may depend on how 
the service matures and how the regulatory framework responds. 
 
Although m-money initially targeted the unbanked, this is no longer the case. 
A variety of ‘niche-market’ services such as electricity and water, car fuel and 
pay television subscription have been added to the service.78 This means 
more Malaŵians, banked and unbanked, are likely to resort to using the m-
money service to transact. It is therefore highly significant that the regulatory 
state of flux be resolved so that m-money, while providing for FI poses no risk 
to the financial system and consumers. It is hoped that this research can prove 
to be ground breaking and be a basis for further research in this field.  
 
1.9. Limitations of the study 
The research was conducted over a three-year period (2014-2016) and 
presents a snapshot of that time. It does not include developments that have 
occurred after 2016. One notable development has however, been 
acknowledged, albeit as a footnote. This is the enactment of the Financial 
Crimes Act (2017)79 which has replaced the Money Laundering Act (2006).80 
 
Initially the research was not designed to include a field trip. The inclusion of 
a field trip was after it was realised that some data and material could not be 
accessed online or made available when requested. The initial field was 
conceived to include an ethnographic study of two specific target groups: 
agents of m-money as well as consumers. However, it soon became apparent 
that there was not enough time to conduct a meaningful ethnography study 
                                                     
78  TNM (2017) 'Mpamba, TNM Mobile Money’ (Telekom Networks Malawi) 
<https://www.tnmmpamba.co.mw/>. 12 March 2017. Airtel (2013).  
 Selipha Kihagi (2013) 'Malawians to pay for fuel services using Airtel Money’ 
(HumanIPO) <http://www.humanipo.com/news/36717/malawians-to-pay-for-fuel-services-
using-airtel-money/>. 12 March 2014. 
79  Financial Crimes Act (Malaŵi, 2017). 
 FIU (2017) 'Malawi Parliament passes Financial Crimes Bill into Law’ (Financial 
Intelligence Unit) 
<http://www.fiumalawi.gov.mw/Parliament%20Passes%20FC%20Bill.html>. 9 March 
2017. 
80  Money Laundering Proceeds of Serious Crime and Terrorist Financing Act, Act No. 11 of 
2006 (Malaŵi, 2006) 
<http://www.rbm.mw/documents/pisu/Money%20Laundering%20Act%202006.pdf>. 31 
March 2014. 
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within the window period that was allocated to the field trip. The plans for an 
ethnographic study were therefore shelved for future research. 
 
Unlike in Kenya where Safaricom is the dominant MNO,81 Airtel and TNM 
compete for domination of the mobile phone market. Unlike Safaricom, which 
makes its data readily available, the Malaŵian MNOs tend to keep information 
to themselves. Therefore, data had to be sourced and triangulated from 
several sources, including reports of the communications regulator and 
newspapers. The financial regulator did not have the data required, mostly due 
to lack of statutory backing to enforce such requests for information. This 
sometimes meant that the data provided by the MNOs could not be 
independently verified. Regulations being worked on by the central bank82 that 
will make it mandatory for the m-money issuers to provide monthly and annual 
reports may be one way of having a central point of collection of data.  
 
1.10. Structure of the thesis 
Chapter 1: Regulating mobile money in Malaŵi 
This is the current chapter. It introduces the thesis, discusses the contextual 
background of the study and the main research question. It outlines the 
research objectives and provides the methodological framework on which the 
study is based on. It also presents the main argument and outlines how the 
thesis is presented. 
 
Chapter 2: Regulatory approaches 
This chapter provides the theoretical and conceptual framework of the study. 
It analyses the various approaches to regulation and narrows down to 
approaches that may be useful in regulating m-money. This chapter also 
provides a background analysis of the notion of regulatory space and how this 
                                                     
81  IFC (2011) IFC Mobile Money Study 2011 - Summary Report (International Finance 
Corporation, Washintton DC) p18 
<http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/fad057004a052eb88b23ffdd29332b51/MobileMone
yReport-Summary.pdf?MOD=AJPERES>. 15 December 2016. 
82  E-Money regulations, Reserve Bank of Malaŵi. 
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is used throughout the thesis. Regulatory space is the lens through which the 
analysis of regulatory issues is done throughout the thesis.  
 
Chapter 3: Emerging forms of money 
Chapter 3 starts to answer the question; what is being regulated? It looks at 
money and mobile money as commodities to be regulated. To place the study 
into context, it analyses the evolution of money, central banks, the regulation 
of money and the financial services. It flags out the regulatory issues 
surrounding money. It then examines the emergence of new forms of money 
and the regulatory risks mobile money poses. It concludes that while mobile 
money is used within its ecosystem, it lacks the pivotal characteristic of fiat 
money of not being legal tender.  
 
Chapter 4: Operational framework of mobile money 
This chapter analyses the development of the mobile phone and how this has 
uniquely led to the success of the mobile money service, especially in Sub-
Saharan Africa. It also examines the factors that have led M-Pesa to be very 
successful in Kenya but not in other jurisdictions like Tanzania. It suggests that 
mobile money developments are more likely to follow the Tanzania growth 
model as opposed to the Kenyan one. It also examines the differences in 
operation between telco-led and bank-led models and concludes that the 
regulatory choices are the reason for the success of the former.  
 
Chapter 5: Payment systems and m mobile money 
A key central bank function is being the gatekeeper of the payment system. 
This chapter analyses the national payment system. It looks at how mobile 
network operators have used mobile money as a solution to the remittance 
dilemma. It examines how the mobile money payment system interacts with 
the national payment system. It also looks at the role of the central bank in 
regulating operations of m-money and the challenge it faces to avoid over-
regulating a nascent industry.  
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Chapter 6: Mobile money and Financial Inclusion 
This chapter analyses financial inclusion (FI) in the Malaŵian context and how 
mobile money fits into this agenda. It discusses the nexus between FI, poverty 
reduction and development. Using evidence of a case study of a local village 
bank, it argues for a redefinition of the concept of FI to reflect the local context. 
 
Chapter 7: Regulatory framework of mobile money 
This chapter analyses the existing regulatory framework in which mobile 
money operates. In analysing the plurality of regulators involved with mobile 
money, it concludes that the traditional banking architecture is ill suited for 
mobile money and that the plurality of regulators may lead to a lack of 
regulatory focus and regulatory arbitrage. 
 
Chapter 8: An alternative regulatory framework for mobile money 
This chapter contains the proposed alternative framework for a regulatory 
system for m-money in Malaŵi. It provides the rationale for having a defined 
regulatory and theoretical framework. The framework is developed from 
emerging trends as applicable to Malaŵi and in view of the current situation of 
financial service and communication regulation in Malaŵi. It proposes an 
autonomous agency model of regulation with a specialised unit integrating the 
various regulatory functions and the institutional changes that may be required 
to achieve this.  
 
Chapter 9: Conclusions  
This chapter provides a conclusion for the thesis and looks at the next steps 
including how the proposal developed in chapter 8 may be implemented. It 
looks at expected implementation challenges and how they can be overcome. 
This chapter ends with flagging out regulatory issues that may mark the next 
phase of the research project. It therefore provides the possible openings for 
the next stages in this research. 
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2. REGULATORY APPROACHES 
2.1. Introduction 
The term regulation refers to a set of binding rules issued by a private or public 
body.1 In its most generic form, it represents an “intervention between the 
parties to a transaction.”2 Fleuriot argues regulation aims at “maintaining a 
balance (or equilibrium)” and the task of the regulator is to maintain the various 
balances among the different actors.3 Ogus refers to it as the “sustained and 
focused control exercised by a public agency over activities that are valued by 
a community.”4 These are “obligations imposed by public law designed to 
induce individuals and firms to outcomes which they would not voluntarily 
reach.”5 It is the threat of some form of punishment or sanction that underpins 
regulatory enforcement.6 As was noted in the preceding chapter, market 
failures are the motivation for regulating economic activities.7 According to 
Dumez and Jeunemaitre, “regulation will be preferred to laissez faire whenever 
the cost of regulation is less than the transaction costs due to regulation plus 
the market failure costs.”8  
 
Three things are associated with the need for regulation; (a) correcting 
information asymmetry, (b) maintaining trust in the financial system and (c) 
                                                     
1  Kenneth Kaoma Mwenda (2006) Legal aspects of financial services regulation and the 
concept of a unified regulator (World Bank, Washington DC) p5. 
2  César Córdova-Novion and Deirdre  Hanlon (2002) ‘Regulatory Governance: Improving 
the Institutional Basis for Sectoral Regulators’ 2 (3) OECD Journal on Budgeting p60 
<https://www.oecd.org/gov/budgeting/43505850.pdf>. 15 February 2017. 
3  Pierre Fleuriof (1997) 'Financial regulation as the safeguard of balances in a global 
context’ in Alain  Jeunemaitre (ed) Financial Markets Regulation (MacMillan Press Ltd, 
Basingstoke), p34. 
4  Anthony I Ogus (1994) Regulation: Legal form and economic theory vol 152 (Clarendon 
Press Oxford, Oxford) p1 citing Philip Selznick and Philippe Nonet (1978) Law and 
Society in Transition: Toward Responsive Law (Harper and Row, New York) p363. 
5  Anthony Ogus (2009) ‘Regulation Revisited ’ (2) Public Law p333 
<http://repub.eur.nl/pub/16031/A.%20Ogus,%20Regulation%20Revisited.pdf.>. 19 
January 2017.  
6  ibid. 
7  Herve Dumez and Alain Jeunemaitre (1997) 'Financial regulation: From economic 
analysis to practical experience’ in Alain  Jeunemaitre (ed) Financial Markets Regulation 
(MacMillan Press Ltd, Basingstoke) p4. 
8  ibid p5. 
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avoiding systemic risk, or contagion.9 All these are considered public goods.10 
In most economic enterprises, there is information asymmetry between the 
consumers and the suppliers in favour of the latter.11 This is more so where 
consumers are dealing with institutions that have a network or web of 
interconnected ties, which the average consumer cannot fathom.12 Statutory 
requirements obliging suppliers to disclose information related to their service 
or product are part of this correction.13 Apart from consumer interests, there 
are also state interests at play such as ensuring system security and good 
financial management. Trust is a prerequisite for consumers to procure the 
service.14 To gain trust, a system must be seen to be working in a fair and an 
orderly way. 15 On the other hand, trust can only be built if the consumers have 
confidence in the system. Therefore, the two operate as one continuous cycle, 
a break in one causing the whole cycle to crumble. Systemic risk is crucially 
important in financial services because risk has a tendency to adopt a domino 
effect, or lead to contagion. The collapse of one firm may instil fear within the 
financial system leading to a collapse of other related firms.16 Firms engaged 
in banking and quasi-banking services are at greater risk of systemic risk than 
others.17 Because of the domino effect of extending loans to consumers from 
deposits, banking is considered in some cases too important to fail.18  
 
The domino effect arises when there is default in loan repayment. The bank 
will not have enough money to pay all its depositors on demand. Ordinarily of 
course, depositors will not descend on a bank and ask for their deposits unless 
                                                     
9  ibid p4. 
10  Marc Quintyn and Michael W Taylor (2002) Regulatory and Supervisory Independence 
and Financial Stability (International Monetary Fund, Washington DC) p8 
<https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2002/wp0246.pdf>. 1 February 2017. 
11  Dumez and Jeunemaitre (1997) p4. 
12  Boon‐Chye Lee and Olujoke Longe‐Akindemowo (1999) ‘Regulatory issues in electronic 
money: A legal‐economics analysis’ 1 (1) Netnomics 53 p60 
<http://link.springer.com/article/10.1023/A:1011445620486>. 12 March 2017. 
13  Dumez and Jeunemaitre (1997) p4. 
14  ibid p4-5. 
15  ibid p4.  
16  ibid p5. 
17  Avinash  Persaud (2015) 'Why Do We Regulate Finance?’ in Reinventing Financial 
Regulation (Apress, New York) p13. 
18  ibid. 
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they have cause for concern or expect it to fail.19 Knowledge of adverse news 
about the bank may trigger this.20 Cause for concern in one bank can quickly 
spread to other banks. The inter-bank market also means problems in one 
bank can easily spread to other connected banks.21 Prudential rules are 
usually set up to ensure the stability and integrity of the financial system and 
in doing so minimising systemic risk and protect depositors.22 Persaud has 
however cautioned that to equate the emergence of regulation with market 
failures is to oversimplify the matter.23 He argues that the corollary would be 
that where there is no market failure, there would be no need for regulation.24 
Yet, in practice, regulation occurs with or without market failures.25  
 
2.1.1. Public interest theory 
Shleifer argues that the regulatory theory of public interest or helping hand is 
premised on the fact that markets fail when they are left to their own devices.26 
Posner argues that the theory evolved on the assumption that markets are 
extremely fragile and are likely to operate inefficiently if not regulated.27 He 
says regulation is a manifestation of existing imperfections in the market.28 
Shleifer says regulation can be used to discourage anti-competitive 
behaviour.29 The theory, which Morgan and Yeung refer to as the welfare 
economic approach aims at “promoting the general welfare of the 
                                                     
19  Douglas W Diamond and Philip H Dybvig (1983) ‘Bank runs, deposit insurance, and 
liquidity’ 91 (3) Journal of Political Economy 401 p401 
<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdfplus/10.1086/261155>. 27 April 2017. 
20  Persaud (2015) p14. 
21  ibid. 
22  Dumez and Jeunemaitre (1997) p5. 
23  Persaud (2015). 
24  ibid p8. 
25  ibid. 
26  Andrei Shleifer (2005) ‘Understanding Regulation’ 11 (4) European Financial 
Management 439 p440 
<http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/shleifer/files/02_eufm00121.pdf?m=1360042225>. 19 
January 2017. 
27  Richard A Posner (1974) ‘Theories of Economic Regulation’ 5 (2) Bell Journal of 
Economics and Management Science 335 p336 <http://www.thecre.com/oira/wp-
content/uploads/2016/03/Posner.pdf>. 1 February 2017. 
28  Posner (1974) p336. 
29  Shleifer (2005) p444. 
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community.”30 Posner however argues that this theory is flawed. He argues 
that: 
Were this theory of regulation correct, we would find regulation 
imposed mainly in highly concentrated industries (where the danger 
of monopoly is greatest) and in industries that generate substantial 
external costs or benefits. We do not.31 
 
He argues that the theory ignores the “linkage or mechanism by which a 
perception of the public interest is translated into legislative action.”32 What is 
perceived to be in the public interest may not be what is on the mind of 
politicians and the legislature. In fact, it begs the question, how is the public 
interest measured? Who decides that a particular legislation is in the public 
interest? It is this vagueness of the theory that may have led to Posner’s 
critique. Posner’s evaluation is that there is no positive correlation between 
monopolistic market structure and regulation.33 It is submitted that, however 
measured, financial stability is in the public interest. In this regard, regulating 
a service such as mobile money (m-money) is likely to be in the public interest.   
   
2.1.2. Capture theory 
The regulatory capture theory was first posited as an economic theory in the 
seminal work by Stigler.34 It is premised on the concept that regulation is a 
cost, which must be managed.35 According to Posner, the capture theory is 
the antithesis of the public interest theory.36 This theory essentially argues that 
in any regulatory environment, the rules that regulate the state of play 
eventually end up favouring the industry, or at least the strong players in the 
industry. According to Posner, “regulation is supplied in response to the 
demands of interest groups struggling among themselves to maximise the 
                                                     
30  Bronwen Morgan and Karen Yeung (2007) An Introduction to Law and Regulation 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge) p18. 
31  Posner (1974) p336. 
32  ibid p340. 
33  ibid p336. 
34  George J Stigler (1971) ‘The theory of Economic Regulation’ The Bell journal of 
Economics and Management Science 3 <http://hsecon.tripod.com/stigler-regulation.pdf>. 
1 February 2017. 
35  Ibid. 
36  Posner (1974) p341. 
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incomes of their members.”37 The arena within which these interest groups 
contest is referred to as regulator space, discussed below. 
 
Capture is achieved by the subtle power that the industry exerts on the 
regulator, which in time results in the regulator regulating the industry by the 
dictates of the industry.38 However, the regulator is unconscious of this fact, 
believing instead that the regulation is good for the public.39  The result is that 
the regulator and the regulation have in effect been captured by the industry. 
Quintyn and Taylor summarised it thus: 
Agencies that suffer from capture come to identify industry interests 
with the public interest. Just like political pressure, industry capture 
can undermine the effectiveness of regulation. Rules may be 
formulated with a view to minimize industry costs, rather than strike 
an appropriate balance between those costs and public benefits. 
Rules may also be applied inconsistently, with individual firms 
winning case-by-case exemptions from regulatory requirements.40 
 
Capture is possible because regulation is like any other commodity, affected 
by the economic factors of supply and demand.41 Seen as an economic cost, 
it is to the advantage of the interest groups who wish to minimise costs to have 
a regulatory regime that is least costly. Using Stigler’s work as a basis, 
Peltzman argued that “what is at stake in regulatory processes is a transfer of 
wealth, [This is] rarely in cash, but rather in the form of a regulated price.”42 
Shleifer says the result is that there is capture not only of the regulator, but 
also of the “political process of regulation.”43 Instead of breaking down 
monopolies, regulation instead sustains them.44 The capture theory has been 
criticised on the basis that it wrongly assumes that the regulator and the 
                                                     
37  ibid, p335-6. 
38  Stigler (1971) p3. 
39  ibid. 
40  Quintyn and Taylor (2002) p9. 
41  Posner (1974) p344. 
42  Sam Peltzman (1976) ‘Toward a more general theory of regulation’ 19 (2) The Journal of 
Law and Economics 211 p213-4 
<http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/pdfplus/10.1086/466865>. 1 February 2017. 
43  Shleifer (2005) p441. 
44  ibid. 
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regulatee were supposed to be at polar ends of the regulatory matrix, with 
power concentrated in the regulator. Scott, Hancher and Moran argue that 
where this power is decentralised and dispersed, the notion of capture does 
not even arise.45 These views are discussed below under regulatory space. 
However, to argue that capture does not occur, would be to ignore the reality 
of the dynamism and highly contested nature of the regulatory space 
environment. 
 
2.2. The regulatory spectrum  
In effect, there are two bi-polar aspects to regulation. Either there is no 
regulation at all or there is a degree of regulation. However, no regulation is a 
form of regulation. It arises out of a deliberate construction of a market in which 
other interests such as state or consumer cannot intervene, with power left to 
those involved in the market. The choice not to regulate is therefore, a 
regulatory choice. Where regulation is done positvely, it is perceived differently 
by different sections of society. For the industry, there is a view that there is 
over-regulation and red-tape.46 On the other hand, according to Ogus, the 
public seems to have “a perception of regulatory failure in relation to 
entrepreneurial excesses and financial distress and a call for more rigorous 
controls.”47 Balancing these two competing views lies at the centre of the 
continuous reforming of regulation. Different approaches to regulation can be 
analysed to identify the stages of development on the regulatory journey, and 
sometimes these approaches overlap, creating a regulatory spectrum.48 The 
starting point is the realisation that in certain industries, the command-and-
control theory of regulation may not be ideal and that law can only regulate 
                                                     
45  Colin Scott (2001) ‘Analysing Regulatory Space: Fragmented Resources and Institutional 
Design’ Public Law 329 
<http://researchrepository.ucd.ie/bitstream/handle/10197/6785/AnalysingRegSpace.pdf?s
equence=2>. 1 December 2016. 
 Leigh Hancher and Michael Moran (1998) 'Organizing Regulatory Space’ in Robert 
Baldwin, Colin Scott and Christopher Hood (eds) A Reader in Regulation (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford). 
46  Ogus (2009) p341. 
47  ibid. 
48  Anthony Ogus (1995) ‘Rethinking self-regulation’ 15 (1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 
97 p100 <http://ojls.oxfordjournals.org/content/15/1/97.full.pdf>. 19 January 2017. 
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through some other form of regulation, which involves an element of self-
regulation. How this self-regulation is achieved is where theories differ.  
 
The main theories are responsive regulation and reflexive regulation. The 
thesis of responsive regulation is based on changes that occur within the law 
due to internal dynamics within the legal system while reflexive regulation 
considers changes both from internal and external social forces or variables.49 
Reflexive regulation is most associated with the theory of autopoiesis, but it is 
argued that autopoiesis is also the basis for the emergence of responsive 
regulation theory. The problem may arise from the fact that they both arise 
from the need to move away from command-and-control towards some form 
of self-regulation, mainly because of regulatory failure. Teubner says this 
failure arises due to (a) incongruence between the regulator and the regulated 
system, (b) over-regulation and (c) over-socialization by the regulator, which 
leads to capture.50 
 
In looking at regulation, there is also need to look at the behaviour of the 
actors. Black argues that the neoclassical economic theory that man is always 
a “utility maximiser” no longer always holds true and that there are other social 
factors that can make a regulatee abide and play by the rules other than pure 
economic gain.51 Regulators need to build new frameworks which are different 
to the way economists perceive financial markets otherwise there is a risk of 
regulatory mirage, a false image of the financial market and its constitute 
elements.52 According to Black, there must be a “social conception of financial 
markets so that regulators regulate markets responsively.”53 However, as a 
                                                     
49  Selznick and Nonet (1978) p20. 
  Gunther Teubner (1983) ‘Substantive and reflexive elements in modern law’ Law and 
Society Review 239 p245, 258 & 259 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3053348>. 18 
November 2016.  
50  Gunther Teubner (1986) 'After Legal Instrumentalism? Strategic Models of Post-
regulatory Law’ in Gunther Teubner (ed) Dilemmas of law in the welfare state (Walter de 
Gruyter, New York) p311. 
51  Julia Black (2013) ‘Seeing, Knowing, and Regulating Financial Markets: Moving the 
Cognitive Framework from the Economic to the Social’ LSE Law, Society and Economy 
Working Papers 24/2013 p6, 9 <www.lse.ac.uk/collections/law/wps/WPS2013-
24_Black.pdf>. 19 January 2017. 
52  ibid p2. 
53  ibid. 
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caveat, profit-motive or the survival instinct must never be underestimated. 
Maytz argues that regulation “in principle motivates behaviour which is 
dependent upon personal initiative, innovation and positive commitment.”54 
Where the law comes into direct conflict with the profit motive or in questions 
of business survival in the face of bankruptcy, there is little chance of the law 
being obeyed 55 How a regulatee will respond to regulation is more complex 
than simply the profit motive and includes normative values,56 social licence,57 
the nature of their interactions with the regulator and their ability and capacity 
to comply.58 Furthermore, the effect of power relations needs to be factored 
in, as “enforcement of regulatory rules is as much about power as it is about 
interpretation.”59 
 
2.2.1. Command-and-control 
The Command-and-control concept has its origins in the military.60 In law, it is 
largely associated with the Austinian theory prevalent in criminal law.61 Ogus 
says, where a regulated party fails to comply with laid down rules, this may 
lead to sanctions, but usually as a last resort.62 However, this presents a 
problem because in truth regulatory breaches do not result in penal sanctions 
but attract some form of sanction, which is civil in nature.63 Ogus argues that 
the use of criminal law terminology did not happen by chance, at least in 
England. It followed a period where enforcement of regulation was via criminal 
or quasi-criminal legislation and agencies.64 The Crown created inspectorates 
to supervise various economic activities, but denied these agencies 
prosecutorial powers.65 Ogus says, the agencies therefore “developed an 
                                                     
54  Quoted by Gunther Teubner (1993) Law as an autopoietic system (Blackwell Publishers, 
Oxford/Cambridge) p91. 
55  ibid. 
56  Whether they agree with the regulatory requirements or not. 
57  Their interpretive framework and ‘peer pressure.’ 
58  Black (2013) p19. 
59  ibid p45. 
60  David S.  Alberts and Richard E.  Hayes (2006) 'Reader Orientation’ in Understanding 
Command and Control (CCRP Publishing, Washington DC) chapter 2. 
61  See generally John Austin (1832) The Province of Jurisprudence Determined (John 
Murray, London). 
62  Ogus (1994) p79. 
63  ibid p80. 
64  ibid p80-1. 
65  ibid p81. 
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enforcement strategy in which ultimate resort to the courts played only a small 
role.”66 The result is a model in which legislation is enacted under which those 
to be regulated must obey the dictates as prescribed under pain of sanction. 
This sanction is usually a fine, but it may sometimes be of a criminal nature. 
The Financial Services Act (2010) of Malaŵi has provisions for administrative 
penalties.67 Failure to pay or comply with an administrative penalty may lead 
to criminal conviction.68 The United Kingdom’s (UK) Financial Services Act 
(2012) also has provisions where a person may be found guilty of an offence.69 
 
Command-and-control is associated with rigidity, heavy-handedness or rules-
based regulation and statutory law backed enforcement. It manifests itself in 
most prescriptive legislation. Black laments that unfortunately this has been 
equated “with nit-picking bureaucracy in which compliance with detailed 
provisions is more important than the attainment of an overall outcome.”70 
Command-and-control, which Baldwin et al refer to as “deterrence and 
compliance”71 is usually contrasted with principles based regulation (BPR) 
also known as light-touch regulation and self-regulation.  
 
2.2.2. Principles Based Regulation 
Black defines PBR as an approach that is 
[M]oving away from reliance on detailed prescriptive rules and 
relying more on high-level, broadly stated rules or principles to set 
the standards by which regulated firms must conduct business.72 
 
                                                     
66  ibid. 
67  Section 75 Financial Services Act (Malaŵi, 2010). 
68  Section 75(3) ibid. 
69  Section 92 Financial Services Act (United Kingdom : Chapter 21, 2012) 
<http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2012/21/pdfs/ukpga_20120021_en.pdf>. 2 June 
2016. 
70  Julia Black (2010) The Rise, Fall and Fate of Principles Based Regulation (LSE Law, 
Society and Economy Working Papers, London School of Economics and Political 
Science p3 <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/32892/1/WPS2010-17_Black.pdf>. 27 April 2017. 
71  Robert Baldwin, Martin Cave and Martin Lodge (2011) Understanding regulation: theory, 
strategy, and practice (Second edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford) p259. 
72  Julia Black (2007) ‘Principles Based Regulation: Risks, Challenges and Opportunities’ 
(Principles Based Regulation, University of Sydney, Sydney) p3 
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Apart from moving away from detailed rules, PBR focusses on outcomes and 
increases responsibility on senior management.73 The underlying argument is 
that it is management, not regulators, who are best placed to determine what 
needs to be done to achieve set outcomes.74 The duty of the regulator is 
therefore to define these outcomes, and vet the people who take up senior 
management positions.75 As an approach, PBR attained recognition when the 
Financial Services Authority (FSA), the then sole unified regulator in the UK, 
embraced it as its preferred regulatory approach.76 It origins however, can be 
traced to the times when Alan Greenspan was Chairman of the Federal 
Reserve (US)  and Gordon Brown was Chancellor of the Exchequer (UK).77 
PBR allows flexibility and encourages innovation by firms thereby enhancing 
completion.78 Instead of ticking boxes, or engaging in creative compliance,79 
firms focus more on substantive compliance by emphasising on and improving 
their own conduct.80 Regulators are also able to innovate and rapidly respond 
to the regulated environment. 81 
 
Black says since PBR is “based on responsibility, mutuality, and trust,” any 
breakdown on the underlying assumptions lead to paradoxes.82 Therefore, 
despite being a higher form of regulation, these paradoxes make PBR 
vulnerable. 83 Black has identified seven paradoxes: 
i. Interpretive caused by impreciseness of principles.84 
                                                     
73  ibid. 
74  ibid p5. 
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ii. Communicative caused by the regulator not being clear on its guidance.85 
iii. Compliance caused by conservativeness by firms.86 
iv. Supervisory and enforcement caused by over-enforcement.87 
v. Internal management caused by overloading of senior management.88 
vi. Ethical caused by an erosion of ethics.89 
vii. Trust caused by its breakdown.90 
 
Black says the trust paradox is probably the ultimate one in that “PBR can help 
create trust, but it itself has to be founded on trust if it is ever to operate 
effectively.”91 As FSA’s Hector Sants stated, PBR “does not work with 
individuals who have no principles.”92  The PBR approach by the FSA was 
based on a broader risk based regulation (RBR) approach under the Advanced 
Risk Responsive Operating Framework (ARROW).93 Black has however, 
argued that there is a dissonance between RBR and PBR and it is unclear 
how the two approaches interact.94 She argues that for RBR, risk, not rules, is 
the starting point while for PBR it is principles.95 In RBR, rules only come 
during enforcement to mitigate risk.96 The lack of complementarity and 
mismatch highlight a critical regulatory lacuna.97 As Gray rightly observes, the 
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problem with risk is to distinguish between “knowable and ex ante 
ascertainable risk and genuine unknowns and uncertainty.”98 
 
The main criticism of PBR is that it encourages firms to backslide leading to 
erosion of adequate consumers and stakeholders’ protection.99 The other 
criticism is that principles by nature lack certainty and predictability.100 The 
balance therefore seems to be between the latitude that the regulators can 
provide for firms to innovate and the engagement of the regulatees, especially 
at senior level with regulatory issues.101 According to Black, it is the “presence 
of the shotgun behind the door” that ensures compliance in PBR,102 and which 
may counter the view of it as “lax regulation.”103 
 
While PBR was seen as the solution pre-2007-8 financial crisis, it was later 
isolated as the source of the problem, after the crisis.104 Lord Turner of the 
FSA testified before the House of Commons Treasury Committee, in its 
enquiry after the 2008 financial crisis, that the FSA had been criticised before 
the crisis for adopting a regulation strategy that was deemed heavy-handed 
instead of being more light-touch.105 Although light-touch is deemed attractive 
to investors, Tomasic argues that it leads to “regulatory arbitrage” which may 
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lead to a “race to the bottom” with regulators competing to offer the bare 
minimum supervision.106 
 
So, although the post-crisis regulatory financial framework has moved from 
PBR, the approach is still favoured in the regulation of m-money, but the name 
commonly used is light-touch.107 In PBR or light-touch regulation, outcomes 
define principles and senior management is given some latitude. According to 
Black, lessons learnt from the last financial crisis are that there is a need for a 
more “intensive and sceptical supervisory process that looks at how systems 
operate in practice.”108  
  
2.2.3. Self-regulation 
Black says self-regulation essentially combines a definition of two concepts, 
“disciplining of one’s own conduct by oneself and regulation by a collective 
group of the conduct of its members.”109 It therefore stands in sharp contrast 
to command-and-control.110 At the centre of self-regulation is the concept that 
the best way of regulating any industry is to have the industry participants 
themselves come up with their own rules to regulate their conduct.111 As Black 
puts it, self-regulation disciplines own conduct through tailor-made 
regulation.112 Teubner has argued, “the only way of regulating complex 
organizations from the outside is to grant them a high degree of autonomy and 
to lay down only general structural guidelines to regulate the context of 
action.”113 Autonomy is key to self-regulation. Witteveen says, “rather than 
centralized regulation by distant bureaucracies, self-regulation promise[s] 
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dialogically formulated and locally effective regulation by actors with a stake in 
the work processes and their outcomes.”114 Since the various actors within the 
regulatory arena have differences in the resources and power that they 
possess, and sometimes these actors compete to gain an advantage and self-
regulation usually reflects this contestation.115 
 
There are three forms of self-regulation; enforced, consensual and co-
regulation.116 Ayres and Braithwaite have argued that enforced self-regulation 
is an element of responsive regulation.117 Ogus posits that consensual 
regulation requires bargaining within the various actors before the regulation 
can be rolled out.118 Black says co-regulation requires “industry-association 
self-regulation with some oversight or ratification by government.”119  
 
Since self-regulation is premised on the regulated industry making the rules, 
Witterveen argues that self-regulation as a concept leads to a paradox.120 He 
asks, “how can one obey the rule and at the same time be a law unto 
oneself?”121 Ogus also warns that some actors may use self-regulation if they 
feel threatened by regulation and feel there are “considerable benefits” to be 
gained “if they are allowed themselves to formulate and enforce the relevant 
controls.”122 Ogus further criticises self-regulation on the basis that self-
regulatory organisations (SROs) may not consistently enforce rules against 
recalcitrant members.123 Furthermore, powerful actors within the industry may 
influence the SRO to restrict entry of new members and “enable incumbent 
practitioners to earn supra-competitive profits.”124 However, this is based on 
the assumption that self-regulation and public regulation are discrete 
concepts. Ogus argues that actually they are not and are part of “a spectrum 
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containing different degrees of legislative constraints.”125 Therefore, while 
there may be a fear that self-regulation may lead to reduced oversight, Baldwin 
et al argue that in fact it benefits from the expertise and efficiency within the 
industry.126 
 
2.2.4. Responsive regulation 
Responsive regulation is based on the concept that the regulator is more likely 
to get compliance from the regulatees if the regulator has the means to enforce 
compliance.127 Ayres and Braithwaite are the main proponents of the theory of 
responsive regulation and the escalation pyramid aptly summarises the 
theory.128 Understandably, Braithwaite calls the pyramid “the most distinctive 
part of responsive regulation.”129 The pyramid has several layers of enforcing 
and ensuring compliance. The broad base is made up of persuasion while the 
apex is the most punitive (licence revocation).130 Much of the effort should 
focus on persuasion but there must be no fear to escalate the punishment 
although the incidences of such must reduce as one moves up to the apex.131 
However, the base should never be mistaken as representing a state of 
deregulation. Ogus calls it “a base of benign advice,” implying that any advice 
given has to be seriously considered by the regulated.132 The regulator 
therefore has some latitude between the base and the apex to secure 
compliance.133 The presence of the “benign big gun” aids this compliance.134 
Quintyn and Taylor argue that the regulator’s power “is much more persuasive 
if they can threaten to remove the licence.”135 Mascini and Van Wijk 
summarise responsive regulation as “the assumption that enforcers should not 
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shift to coercing before it has become clear that persuading does not work.”136 
Responsive regulation requires “broad political participation and institutional 
redesigns that ensure adequate representation of various interests in the core 
organisations of society.”137 
 
Witterveen says “responsiveness is an institutional virtue: it requires an 
adequate and purposive institutional reaction to the problems and challenges 
it is facing.”138 He says, “responsive regulation is more problem-centred than 
rule-centred, more persuasive than coercive.”139 Cooperation is therefore the 
essence of a responsive legal order.140 So in essence, the regulatory 
framework is one that is based on cooperation by all actors. Any rules are 
made on a reflective basis on the needs of the industry and the society. 
However, should any of the actors fail to play by the rules; the regulator retains 
the power to enforce those rules.141  Witterveen argues that the “willingness to 
consider new solutions to recurring problems” is a key distinguishing feature 
of responsive regulation.142 
 
Braithwaite insists that ideally all negotiations ought to start at the base but 
has acknowledged that there may be situations where there may be a need to 
start at another level.143 He says the pyramid is a dynamic model made up of 
presumptions.144 Therefore, this presumption can be overridden depending on 
the severity of the breach.145 Black has argued that responsive regulation as 
formulated by Ayres and Braithwaite does not go far enough. Regulation must 
be responsive “in the sense of understanding how markets and market actors 
are operating, how regulators should respond to (or even anticipate) those 
operations, and recognising the effects that the regulators’ own edicts and 
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activities are having on their operation.”146 She calls for “developing a socially 
enriched way of seeing and knowing markets [as] central to the ability of 
market regulators, including financial regulators, to be able to regulate in a 
‘really responsive way’”147 Black and Baldwin have called regulation that 
responds in this way, “really responsive regulation.”148  
 
2.2.5. Reflexive regulation 
Reflexive regulation is a theory proposed by Teubner based on the legal theory 
of autopoiesis.149 Maturana and Varela first developed autopoiesis as a 
biological theory.150 Luhmann applied the theory to the law in his proposition 
of systems theory.151 Rogowski argues that at the centre of systems theory is 
the realisation that “society is a system of communication” which has 
undergone functional differentiation and is no longer segmented and 
stratified.152 It may be argued that even the systems or subsystems within 
society have undergone second order functional differentiation.153 Luhmann 
therefore provides a paradigm shift in the way the legal system relates to other 
societal systems.154 In systems theory, law, economic, politics are all social 
systems and while relating to each other, they are in effect closed systems.155 
                                                     
146  Black (2013) p2. 
147  ibid.  
 Robert Baldwin and Julia Black (2008) ‘Really responsive regulation’ 71 (1) The Modern 
Law Review 59 p69 <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1468-
2230.2008.00681.x/full>. 18 November 2016. 
148 Baldwin and Black (2008). 
149  Teubner (1993). 
150  Francisco G Varela, Humberto R Maturana and Ricardo Uribe (1974) ‘Autopoiesis: the 
organization of living systems, its characterization and a model’ 5 (4) Biosystems 187 
<http://homepages.math.uic.edu/~kauffman/MUV.pdf>. 19 january 2017. 
 Humberto R Maturana and Francisco J Varela (1980) Autopoiesis and cognition: The 
realization of the living (Springer Netherlands, Dordrecht). 
151  Niklas Luhmann (1991) ‘Operational closure and structural coupling: the differentiation of 
the legal system’ 13 Cardozo L Rev 1419 <http://heinonline.org/hol-cgi-
bin/get_pdf.cgi?handle=hein.journals/cdozo13&section=94>. 19 January 2017. 
 Niklas Luhmann (1990) 'The Autopoiesis of Social Systems’ in Essays on self-reference 
(Columbia University Press, New York). 
 Niklas  Luhmann (2004) 'The Location of Legal Theory’ in Law as a Social System 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford). 
152  Ralf Rogowski (2013) Reflexive Labour Law in the World Society (Edward Elgar 
Publishing Ltd, Cheltenham) p3. 
153 For example, in law one can find functional subsystems such as contract law, 
administrative law, commercial law etc. 
154  Ana Lourenço (2010) ‘Autopoietic Social Systems Theory: The Co-Evolution of Law and 
the Economy’ 35 p35 Austl J Leg Phil 35 <http://heinonline.org/hol-cgi-
bin/get_pdf.cgi?handle=hein.journals/ajlph35&section=6>. 19 January 2017. 
155 See generally Luhmann (1991). 
- 37 - 
 
They are normatively closed but cognitively open to each other. 156 It means 
while each system may be influenced by its environment (cognitively open) 
only the system itself can trigger and institute any changes to the system 
(normatively closed).157  
 
A system is cognitively open if it has the possibility of observing its 
environment or the world beyond its boundaries but this observation is 
conditioned by its own code or programming.158 The effect of the environment 
on cognitively open systems is therefore indirect.159 A system is normatively 
closed when the only norms it recognises and understands to be valid are 
those norms which it itself has produced.160 Simply put, the legal system, as a 
closed system, can only internally communicate in a language, which only it 
understands, and similarly the economic system can only communicate 
internally in a language that only the economic system understands. The law 
communicates in terms of the language of the law whilst economics engages 
in the “language of prices.”161  Any form of inter-system communication is 
therefore noise and can only be received if it is coded, decoded, and recoded 
by the system using its own communication code.162 For a system to evolve it 
needs to be cognitively open, otherwise it would forever be inward looking, 
using its own code as a point of reference. However, each system depends on 
its own self-referentiality, self-reproduction and recursivity to maintain its 
autopoietic nature.163 This does not mean that systems do not influence or 
affect each other, as according to Teubner, changes in the system reflect “an 
internal dynamic, which, is affected by external stimuli and, in turn, influences 
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the external environment.”164 Lourenço argues that because of this, 
autopoietic theory is therefore also a theory of cognition.165  
 
As Black has rightly observed, the theory of autopoiesis is a complex one,166 
and this thesis does not intend to delve into it much further. The overview is 
however crucial in understanding reflexive regulation which is premised on this 
theory. Teubner posits that responsive law cannot achieve its aim unless it is 
reflexive.167 Lourenço argues that “cognitive openness is a condition for the 
responsiveness of regulation” since the perturbations between systems, allow 
systems to respond to these perturbations, but any such response is self-
driven by the system.168 According to Selznick and Nonet, the broad view of 
responsive law is that it is a “purposive, oriented undertaking” of the law to 
become part of society.169 The closed nature and autonomy of systems mean 
that since their points of self-reference are internal, intervention by direct 
legislation is unlikely to succeed.170 Black states that:  
[L]aw cannot simply require the economic system to act in the way 
the law demands. It has to regulate by observing and recognising 
the autopoiesis of other systems; by assessing their process of self-
production and self-reference and adapting its intervention 
accordingly.171 
 
Reflexive regulation may be said to be Teubner’s response to responsive 
regulation. It calls for inducing action not through commands but through 
decentralised mechanisms of self-regulation by the system that the law intends 
to regulate.172 Teubner argues that although responsive law combines two 
elements, substantive and reflexive, only the latter can truly develop into a 
neo-evolutionary theory of law.173 Rogowski says: 
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 [T]he legal system becomes consciously reflexive when it 
recognises that the societal domains which it purports to regulate, 
and to which it seeks to respond, are themselves independent 
autopoietic systems.174  
 
Reflexive regulation calls for a change of regulatory focus; from supervising 
the outcome of regulatory processes to concentrating on putting place proper 
self-regulatory mechanisms.175 It means the instruments and means used to 
regulate must be different. According to Teubner, the law must view “itself as 
a system-in-an-environment” and must “take account of the limits of its own 
capacity as it attempts to regulate the functions and performances of other 
social subsystems.”176 Teubner argues that: 
[L]aw must improve its knowledge of the processes, function, and 
structures within the field of regulation. It must develop scientifically 
grounded models of the surrounding systems, and tailor its norms 
accordingly.177  
 
Recursivity is central to any self-referential system.178 Simply put, only 
economics can truly regulate economics since economics can only use 
economics as a point of reference. The problem arises from the fact that the 
domain being regulated is not just an economic domain but also a social, 
political, cultural, and legal one. According to Teubner, any control by the law 
of a social action must be “indirect and abstract” determining only the 
“organizational and procedural premises of future action.”179 Put another way, 
the law can influence change, but the influence must trigger an inward reflexive 
action in the other system that the law wishes to affect.180 To facilitate internal 
change within any system, what is required are not authoritative prescriptions 
by the law but structural premises that can facilitate the internal restructuring 
                                                     
174  Rogowski (2013) p33. 
175  Teubner (1983) p239 
176  ibid p280. 
177  Teubner (1993) p81. 
178  See Luhmann (2004) p78.  
179  Teubner (1983) p255. 
180  To appreciate the complexity of regulation of systems see John Paterson and Gunther 
Teubner (1998) ‘Changing maps: Empirical legal autopoiesis’ 7 (4) Social & Legal 
Studies 451 <http://sls.sagepub.com/content/7/4/451.short>. 2 February 2017. 
- 40 - 
 
of and within the system itself.181 So in order have a “conceptual readiness” 
that takes advantage of societal emerging “opportunity structures,”182 
Teubner’s thesis is that responsive law needs to be reflexive.183 In a way, 
reflexive law is not only Teubner’s response to responsive law but is a 
deconstruction and reconstruction of a new theory from it, effectively his 
interpretation and development of responsive law. 
 
2.3. Analysis of the regulatory approaches 
If command-and-control and self-regulation are seen as extreme ends, then a 
regulatory continuum can be constructed to illustrate how the various theories 
discussed above fit. In command and control, the state retains all the 
regulatory power. It is actively engaged, through state agencies in supervising 
the regulated market. Historically, the problem with this approach seems to be 
an attempt to regulate through changing the norms without addressing 
contextual dynamics of the environment. Because of its form, this has 
traditionally been through legislation, without reaching into the contextual 
dynamic of the system being regulated. On the other hand, self-regulation 
seems to suffer from some level of ambiguity. As an ideology, self-regulation 
seems to have two meanings, depending on which side of the Atlantic one is 
standing on. In America, self-regulation is understood in the neo-liberal context 
to imply that the state has no control.184 It stands on the extreme opposite end 
of command and control. Once the necessary requirements for entry have 
been satisfied and the relevant body issues a licence, then regulatees are 
pretty much left to manage their own affairs. In most ways, it came to imply 
deregulation.185 Full autonomy is therefore the hallmark of this ideology.   
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On the other hand, this seems not to be the understanding of self-regulation 
in Europe. The approach seems much subtler. The objective of regulation 
seems to be the centrepiece in formulating theory based on self-regulation. 
What needs to be regulated and in whose interest, become key regulatory 
issues. Teubner, Black, Braithwaite and others look at self-regulation as one 
giving the regulatees some level of autonomy but with the regulator retaining 
power to supervise. Self-regulation is therefore a way of allowing the industry 
to innovate without leaving it to its own devices. The theories of responsive 
and reflexive regulation neatly fall into this ideology.  
 
On the regulatory continuum, reflexive regulation and responsive regulation 
would be elements of self-regulation. In reflexive regulation, there is constant 
engagement between the regulator and the regulatee that dispenses with the 
need to conceive the pyramid enforcement structure of responsive 
regulation.186 The constant communication between the regulator and 
regulatee allows the setting up of the regulatory boundaries within which the 
regulatee can self-regulate. However, this does not imply that there is no 
engagement in responsive regulation. Indeed, as demonstrated by the 
pyramid enforcement structure proposed by Ayres and Braithwaite, most of 
the time is spent on persuasion.187 If this fails then there is escalation up the 
pyramid. This escalation is in itself a form of communication. On the other 
hand, in reflexive regulation, there does not need to be escalation because the 
regulator is constantly engaged in self-regulation of its own rules while the 
regulatee is also engaged in self-regulation according to the regulatory 
boundaries set by the regulator. Both the regulator and the regulatee are 
therefore each engaged in self-regulation and each influences the other 
thereby diminishing the need for punitive intervention. Reflexive regulation 
therefore seems to be the higher level of responsive regulation.188 The figure 
below illustrates the regulatory continuum. Throughout the continuum, the 
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regulator may adopt the hard or light-touch approach or a variety of both. The 
regulatory framework is therefore always in a dynamic state.   
  
Figure 1: Regulatory continuum 
 
However, is the regulatory continuum the wrong way of analysing the 
regulatory framework? For a start, is there a real difference between 
responsive and reflexive regulation? Teubner himself acknowledges that 
reflexive regulation is the superior form of responsive regulation.189 In 
responsive regulation, the pyramid structure is the central point.190 This 
illustrates that while the regulatees are allowed room, the regulator retains the 
benign gun of enforcement.191 At the centre of responsive regulation is the 
regulator’s readiness to embrace change.192 On the other hand, Teubner 
argues that once both the regulator and the regulatee are fully engaged in self-
regulation, there is no need for the regulator to enforce regulation, as the 
regulatee is always aware of what has to be done.  Ayres and Braithwaite 
require regulation to respond to the needs of the industry it is regulating to be 
effective. Although reflexive regulation draws its origins from systems theory 
and autopoietic theory of law, it is argued, that in effect, it has much more in 
common with responsive regulation. In fact, responsive regulation may be the 
dominant theory with reflexive regulation the theory that has evolved from it. 
However, both theories seem to concentrate on the regulator and the 
regulatee. Unfortunately, these are not the only stakeholders populating the 
regulatory arena. So, is there another theory that tries to address this shortfall? 
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Black and Baldwin seem to have further evolved the theory of responsive 
regulation to address these concerns. Black argues that regulation must not 
only respond to the dynamics of the regulator and regulatee but the entire 
market as a whole.193 Anticipating how stakeholders will respond is key to 
this.194 Black argues that for regulators to really respond there is need to 
develop mechanisms of analysing the market from all angles, including their 
social context.195 If markets do this, this leads to really responsive 
regulation.196 So really responsive regulation calls for a paradigm shift in the 
way the regulation framework is designed and formulated. 
 
In the end it is submitted, there is not much difference between 
‘responsiveness’ and ‘reflexivity’. What is important is who holds the balance 
of power in a regulatory balance and this will ultimately decide which theory is 
dominant. If the regulator is too submissive to the regulatee, this shifts the 
balance towards the extreme end of self-regulation. If the centre of power 
resides in the regulator alone, then it shifts towards command and control. 
When the regulator starts to cede authority in response to market needs then 
the shift is towards responsive and reflexive regulation. However, the level of 
involvement of the market players will determine whether the regulation is 
responsive or really responsive. The regulator must understand the day-to-day 
operations of the regulated environment otherwise; the power will shift to the 
regulated. Therefore, regulation must respond to the market. It must 
understand the market and anticipate issues that may arise due to the 
regulatory framework being employed.197 Regulation is not a two-way 
engagement between the regulator and regulatee, but must involve all market 
players and stakeholders. The regulatory task is to reach a higher level of 
responsiveness but that task will inherently be problematized by the fact that 
the regulators often fail to obtain a real understanding of the culture of the 
regulated.198 This is partly an institutional problem because most regulators 
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are state organs and act in the civil servant mode, which is at variance with 
the business approach of the regulated. Apart from the service or goods 
providers, there is usually no involvement of other stakeholders and market 
players. One of the challenges therefore is the need of change to understand 
the culture of the regulated market. Real responsiveness requires a much finer 
and thorough understanding of the regulated environment.  
 
It is submitted that really responsive regulation is the theory that stands out for 
its ability not only to evolve and respond to the environment, but also to include 
in the regulatory process all stakeholders and market players. It is submitted 
that in really responsive regulation, the appropriate regulatory fit in the 
contemporary culture of the regulated environment is the main issue. The 
system is not static but is engaged in a process of continuous learning. The 
process means that new responses help to calibrate the system bit by bit. To 
achieve this, a crucial aspect is a reliable and robust information system. The 
regulator needs regular meetings with all the market players and stakeholders, 
which can act as reservoirs of information. The regulator can also broaden the 
information base, which the regulatees are required to provide. Where the 
system only provides for market players participation, the regulator needs to 
deliberately include all other stakeholders such as consumers and 
counterparties. The difference therefore is that with really responsive 
regulation, there is a shift in approach from macro norms to information norms. 
Santos may have captured the regulatory dilemma well when he said, “the 
solution lies neither in the state nor in the market, but rather in a third type of 
organization form – collaborative networks involving firms and secondary 
associations.”199 Stakeholder collaboration is therefore, crucial.   
 
                                                     
199 Boaventura De Sousa Santos (2005) 'Law, politics, and the subaltern in counter-
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Figure 2: Really responsive regulation approach 
 
Figure 2 illustrates that really responsive regulation is the approach that best 
describes the proper balance that the regulation must aim to attain. As the 
figure shows, there are forces that will attempt to pull the framework towards 
the command and control or self-regulation. However, where the regulator 
adopts collaboration of all stakeholders within the framework, it is submitted 
that it will have a greater chance of withstanding these forces. In doing so, the 
regulator will also avoid dangers posed by industry capture. Collaboration is 
therefore one efficient way of minimising capture and decentralising regulatory 
power. Cunningham and Sinclair have referred to regulation that “embraces 
flexible, imaginative and innovative forms of control” as smart regulation.200 
Their conception is based on a revaluation of Braithwaite’s pyramid 
enforcement mechanism. In effect therefore, smart regulation is what Black 
would term really responsive regulation.201 It based on the notion of “regulatory 
pluralism,”202 using a combination of various policy instruments including 
command and control, self-regulation and voluntarism.203 The smartness or 
really responsiveness lies in the fact that the regulation can combine several 
complimentary instruments to achieve the desired outcome. Baldwin et al have 
observed that really responsive regulation is not without its problems as it 
makes “severe informational, analytical and resource demands” on the 
                                                     
200 Neil Gunningham and Darren Sinclair (2017) 'Smart Regulation’ in Peter Drahos (ed) 
Regulatory Theory: Foundations and Applications (Australian National University Press, 
Canberra) p133. 
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regulator.204 However, this can be overcome if the regulator adopts a different 
mind-set and adapts the approach to suit the economic and cultural 
environment in which they operate. It is therefore an approach, which is 
continuously learning. There is no requirement to have a specific regulatory 
model for each of the FI phases. Bit by bit, the model calibrates and adjusts 
as the phases evolve. 
 
2.4. Regulatory space 
Hancher and Moran coined the term regulatory space to describe the arena, 
which is populated by different players, including the regulator, regulatee, 
courts as well as consumer groups.205 To Hancher and Moran, space matters 
because “regulation occurs … in particular places.”206 However, they argue 
that regulatory space is not a physical phenomenon but an “analytical 
construct” used to analyse “the range of regulatory issues.”207 The issues that 
any particular regulatory space present will therefore define the type of 
regulatory framework that is developed. However, the issues that preoccupy 
the occupants of any regulatory space are not static and their dynamism leads 
to a continuous evolution of regulatory issues.208 This also leads to a 
subsequent dilemma, what “is to be regulated, and by whom?”209 This may 
require a regulator to evolve or the coming in of a new regulator. It may also 
require a reorganisation of the regulatory framework. Ogus says regulation is 
a process that involves a continuous “interaction, even a game, between the 
various actors, decisions being made by reference to the perceived costs and 
benefits of alternative strategies.”210 The concept of space inevitably lends 
itself to “occupation” and unequal power relations between participants.211 
Resultantly, there is a furious contest for advantage by the occupants.212 
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According to Hancher and Moran, those organisations which have access to 
resources: 
[W]ill dominate regulatory space and the organisation that 
command the necessary resources at the historical moment when 
regulation is initiated has a good chance of exercising a continuing 
dominant influence.213  
 
The regulator no longer monopolises regulatory authority in a regulatory 
space.214 Understanding the dispersion or fragmentation of resources and the 
different power dynamics is key to understanding the concept of regulatory 
space.215 Understanding the organisational dynamics and the relationships 
between organisations are central to understanding regulation.216 In its 
simplest form, “regulation is by and through organisations.”217 How the 
regulator manages these relationships defines the regulatory framework. 
Because of the division of resources and power among participants, the 
relationship is largely horizontal as opposed to vertical.218 The regulator that 
adopts a “co-operative” model is likely to succeed in overseeing a functioning 
framework.219 It is submitted such collaborative model fits into the theory of 
really responsive regulation discussed above. 
 
Viewed this way, Hancher and Moran argue that the idea of “regulatory 
capture” is synonymous with a view of a regulatory arena in which there is a 
dichotomy between the “public regulatory authority” and the regulated and that 
the two sides must remain apart.220 Where you have co-operation, the notion 
of capture does not arise. In fact, Scott argues that the fact that “regulatory 
authority is dispersed” makes “capture of multiple institutions” difficult.”221 
Furthermore, Scott argues that once the concept of dispersed authority is 
                                                     
213 ibid p159-60 
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216 Hancher and Moran (1998) p155. 
217 ibid p161. 
218 ibid p162. 
219 ibid. 
220 ibid p150. 
221 Scott (2001) p338. 
- 48 - 
 
accepted, then “strict enforcement” could never have been the intended 
method of regulating.222  
 
Within the regulatory space, timing is very important. Those organisations and 
institutions that can seize the moment or already have influence within a 
would-be regulatory space will always be at an advantage. The concept of 
regulatory space therefore helps to identify the regulatory issues of concern. 
Development, financial inclusion (FI) and financial stability are the broad 
themes. Within these themes, the issues that arise are the commodity, the 
service, and the institutions. The table below provides a summary of the 
approach the thesis undertakes in analysing these issues.   
 
 
Table 1: Thesis conceptual framework approach 
 
The main issue seems to be how law and regulation are defined. For example, 
law is increasingly seen as a mix of hard and soft law such that law as applied 
to regulation is not always command and control, but rather of autopoietic legal 
forms. Similarly, to suggest that the issue is purely between law and 
economics is succumbing to the law and economics ideology. Regulatory 
space is a complex space, which includes various types of institutions, 
including political, legal, social, cultural, and economical, with different forms 
of power. Forms of regulation must be both responsive and reflexive 
considering these complexities in space, time, and power.  
                                                     
222 ibid p343. 
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2.5. Regulatory approaches to m-money 
According to Córdova-Novion and Hanlon, since “financial markets are 
characterised by high levels of systemic risk, regulation of financial services is 
highly influenced by prudential considerations.”223 This results in regulatory 
emphasis being placed on financial stability and integrity as opposed to 
consumer protection or competition.224 However, because of its low risk, m-
money regulation is predominantly one that is based on conduct of business. 
The sections below briefly discuss conduct of business and prudential 
regulation, but these are further discussed in the next two chapters in relation 
to specific aspects of financial regulation. 
 
Business conduct regulation 
This looks at how the institution conducts its business. Issues such as 
consumer protection and money laundering are therefore topical.225 Other 
than systemic risk, consumer protection ranks second as a “fundamental 
rationale for financial regulation.”226 Consumer protection includes having a 
system that ensures the integrity of any data stored and transferred.227 Klein 
and Mayer say with business conduct, regulators have two choices; they can 
allow commercial law to govern the relationship between the consumers and 
the institutions, or deliberately “set standards for the integrity of system 
operations and to review their practice.”228 Issues like mandatory disclosure 
may help to address this.229 The problem with relying on commercial law is 
that m-money involves a complex layer of actors. Apart from the MNOs, there 
are the m-money issuer, agents, customers, and those relying on it for 
procuring and selling of goods and services. Commercial law would therefore 
                                                     
223 Córdova-Novion and Hanlon (2002) p59. 
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be ill equipped to resolve all the possible issues that may arise and special 
regulations may need to be promulgated to address these.230 
 
Prudential regulation 
This is more concerned with the operational soundness of financial 
institutions.231 It delimits the area within which banks and other prudentially 
regulated institutions can operate.232 It deals with issues such as capital 
adequacy reserves as well as liquidity requirements.233 It also includes the fit 
and proper test requirement for senior management.234 It is mainly concerned 
with the risk taken by institutions regarding their investments and assets. 235 In 
2015, a Directive for the ‘fit and proper test’ was issued under the Financial 
Services Act of Malaŵi (2010).236 Under the Directive, the Registrar of financial 
institutions has to approve a list of shareholders and management of firms 
dealing with securities markets.237 The test itself is two-fold. The person must 
have proper qualifications and must meet an eligible criteria which includes; 
not being declared bankrupt, convicted of a financial related offence or 
otherwise disqualified on grounds of professional misconduct.238 In prudential 
regulation, the essential issues boil down to; is the client’s money available 
should the client wish to withdraw it?239 Fear of systemic risk and contagion 
are therefore at the heart of prudential regulation.240 Such risks may be 
endogenous or exogenous.241 The system must be able to contain risk from 
within and keep out risk from outside.  
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As will be discussed later, how m-money is used will determine whether it falls 
under prudential regulation. M-Money is fully backed up by deposits in a bank. 
Compared to rules under which banks are only required to keep a fraction of 
deposits, the requirement to have full liquidity means m-money is subject to 
more onerous regulations.242 Should the regulator have a say on how the 
banks can invest deposits from m-money accounts? The current position in 
Malaŵi is that banks are free to use such deposits as they would with any other 
deposits.243 The crucial issue to realise is that MNOs do not create money by 
issuing electronic value in the form of m-money. In this regard, m-money 
operates as prepaid value.244 The only thing m-money can answer for is that 
because it does not require physical transmissions, it affects the velocity of 
money but it does not pose a risk to the money supply.245 
 
In summary, most of the regulation of m-money will cover business conduct. 
Unless the m-money issuer starts to invest funds deposited by customers, 
prudential regulation will apply to the banks where the money is deposited.  
  
2.6. Existing regulatory issues around m-money 
M-money is a recent entrant in the financial market and usually there is no pre-
existing regulatory framework in place to supervise the service. In their report 
on regulating m-money in Malaŵi, Buckley et al recommend a proportionate 
and risk-based approach.246 According to Laurer and Tarazi, this is when “the 
costs to the regulator, the institutions, and the consumers are proportionate to 
the risks being addressed, taking into consideration as well the anticipated 
                                                     
242 Michael Tarazi and Paul Breloff (2010) Nonbank E-Money Issuers: Regulatory 
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benefits.”247 The regulatory approach chosen can either be an enabler or act 
as a constraint and barrier.248 The approach adopted in regulating most m-
money schemes has been described by Skinner as “an innovative mixture of 
‘light-touch’ and caution.”249 Heyer and Mas say this allows the operator a 
degree “of freedom in structuring the business model, service proposition and 
distribution channels.”250 It is however submitted, this approach only deals with 
the pre-FI phase of m-money. In a regulatory environment where the financial 
sector is supervised by an approach other than light-touch, once FI is 
achieved, light-touch may no longer be adequate to safeguard the interest of 
the consumers and the financial integrity of the market.  
 
There is also the risk posed by an increase in money circulation in the financial 
system. According to Jack and Suri, as m-money “becomes more widely 
acceptable as an easily transferable store of value,” it adopts the features of 
fiat money.251  This then means m-money could increase the effective money 
supply, and may have inflationary effects.252 Ngigi says, m-money services 
have the effect of increasing “the pace of monetary transactions” because of 
an increase in cash circulation, “looping more people into the financial sector 
and leading to demand goods and services outstripping supply.”253 Inflation is 
not caused by the injection of m-money into a local economy, but by the lack 
of an equivalent injection in the amount of goods and services, resulting in 
money chasing too few goods. Regulating m-money so that there is an 
equilibrium in the circulation of money is therefore crucial for the stability and 
integrity of the financial system.  
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For the m-money services to grow, it needs an enabling environment, or at 
least a non-hindering one.254 Porteous says such an environment entails 
openness and certainty at the early stage.255 The former imports an attraction 
that allows and encourages new entrants into the market so as not to stifle 
innovation while for the latter, the regulatory and policy framework much not 
be susceptible to arbitrary changes, which may prejudice prospects for new 
entrants.256 Porteous argues that the regulator has to balance between 
avoiding “over-reacting and stifling market development” and “under-reacting 
to potential large scale risks until it is too late.”257 An enabling environment 
must also delicately balance between being an enabler and offering stability. 
M-money targets low-income people who usually fall outside the formal 
financial sector.258 Regulators therefore have a challenge not to come up with 
barriers that will prevent the emergence of cost-lowering business models to 
assist those outside the formal financial system.259 At the same time, they must 
define the role of MNOs and their agents, as these were not previously subject 
to financial regulation and supervision.260 The regulatory framework needs to 
have a built-in mechanism that allows for responsiveness of both the industry 
as well as the regulator, taking into consideration the various regulatory issues 
at play. 
 
Maurer refers to the concept of “regulation as retrospective ethnography” and 
argues that instead of looking at regulation as proscriptive or restrictive, there 
is a need for the regulators to “look backwards, learning from the past 
problems, ranging from small inconveniences to systemic failures” and prevent 
such issues in the future.261 Peachey says, “regulators are not futurologists.”262 
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Jenkins says, they should instead “take a relaxed, mature approach and let 
the channels emerge.”263 It can be argued that what Maurer and Peachey are 
advocating is essentially what responsive and reflexive regulation calls for, 
inward reflection and response while appreciating limits of regulatory influence  
 
In providing an enabling environment, the regulator must also bear in mind the 
need for flexibility in creating m-money ecosystems. The regulatory 
environment must be one that enables the growth and flourishing of such an 
ecosystem. However, the regulator needs to recognise that even ecosystems 
have a built-in mechanism to protect themselves up to a point. The challenge, 
without engaging in futurology, is to balance flexibility against external 
hazards. For an effective m-money ecosystem, there is need to rope in a 
cross-section and a wide range of players. These include the MNOs, banks, 
agents, shops, service, and utility providers.264 Generally, the MNOs have 
been the ones interconnecting the nodes of the ecosystem. Therefore, 
although the regulation has evolved this way, the regulator has to provide an 
enabling environment under which an m-money ecosystem may develop and 
take root, grow and flourish.265 This can be achieved by providing some 
regulatory latitude that allows for innovation.266 Regulation may act as a 
constraint in the development of the m-money service if it is too restrictive.267 
For a service that is just starting up, less regulation (light-touch) or much more 
self-regulation, may spur the growth of the service. The task of the regulator 
is to check when the critical mass has been achieved to ensure that the system 
is not only financially inclusive but also stable and does not pose a risk to the 
financial system and consumers.   
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To prevent MNOs from creating money and causing runaway inflation,268 
regulators must ensure that m-money is fully backed up. In Malaŵi, the 
balance on pool accounts must always be equal to the outstanding balance of 
all holders of the m-money.269 This ensures there is an equilibrium of money 
supply. There is also another reason to be cautious with m-money. Although 
it was never intended to be used as a bank (storage), it has had this 
unintended consequence in that customers may sometimes store their m-
money in it.270 In Malaŵi, where distances are far and travel is not always safe, 
it would certainly be attractive to ‘buy’ m-money from an agent and redeem it 
at the destination for a minimal transactional fee. The service could also 
become a useful vehicle to canvass savings,271 a direct challenge to the 
banking system.  
 
Currently m-money is regulated through a light-touch approach, allowing the 
service to grow and gain traction. The regulation is currently a two-way 
arrangement between the regulator and the regulatees. Although light-touch 
describes the approach, the relationship between the parties seems to be still 
premised on command and control, with the regulator issuing guidelines that 
govern the m-money service. Stakeholders are currently not included in the 
regulator arena. As argued above, really responsive regulation must evolve 
continuously and embrace change. It must be able to employ a combination 
of instruments depending on the developments and need of the industry. Light-
touch seems to be ideal to allow the service to grow and contribute to the FI 
agenda. However, the regulation will have to constantly evolve as FI is 
achieved, the service has matured and its risk portfolio has changed. In 
considering this, it is important to take into consideration the local context. 
Setting up too fine and sophisticated a system will not work if there are not 
enough resources to implement it. On the other hand, there is a danger that 
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letting things loose may lead to a crisis. The balance is to achieve the 
appropriate regulatory fit applicable to Malaŵi. The needs are clear. The 
system must extend the consumers’ engagement with the medium of m-
money but at the same time, there is need to safeguard both the consumer 
and the national interest. It must consider the culture, economic and socio-
political context.  
 
M-money needs to be regulated as a unique service combining elements of 
the financial and communications services. While it is definitely a financial 
service, it does not fit the bill as a banking service, as some key ingredients 
are missing such as interest on savings. Some literature says that for lack of 
a better word, m-money is at least a quasi-banking project.272 If the law can 
appreciate and recognise this unique and complex nature of m-money, then 
the law can formulate a regulatory strategy acceptable by the m-money service 
and one, which essentially allows for the self-reproduction of the service. 
Really responsive regulation is therefore an approach that embraces this 
plurality and flexibility. 
 
2.7. Conclusion 
In Malaŵi, there has not been any meaningful analysis of regulation, especially 
in the financial sector. This is not surprising because although regulatory 
theory and regulation have been around for some time, it is a relatively new 
field of study in Malaŵi.  The only work that has been published is a project 
report by Beckley et al.273 While, this report is useful in providing some 
nuanced insights, it does not adopt the same conceptual and analytical 
framework as this thesis. The report is primarily a project report and does not 
delve into the theoretical and conceptual underpinnings of m-money. 
Therefore, while a lack of literature was a handicap, it provides an opportunity 
to start filling in this gap and lay a foundation for future research.  
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So, which regulatory approach would be ideal for Malaŵi in relation to m-
money and its contemporary culture? Looking at the situation in Malaŵi, it 
would seem that because of the level of development of the legal system and 
its limited ‘regulatory experience’, the country’s legal system, is still largely 
stuck in what Teubner describes as the “classical model of law as a body of 
rules enforceable through adjudication.”274 It therefore needs to move on from 
this, especially in the financial sector, so that the law can largely play a 
facilitative role.275 One individual theory or approach, it is submitted, cannot 
provide the perfect solution. Real responsive regulation, it is submitted, would 
embrace the evolution of m-money through the various FI phases. The 
ecosystem of m-money with several stakeholders makes this approach ideal 
in regulating the service. The fact that the approach evolves with changes in 
the environment and time also means that it can keep up with changes in the 
m-money service.  In the greater scheme of things, a shift of the whole financial 
regulatory framework to really responsive would be recommended. However, 
this is outside the scope of this work.  
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3. EMERGING FORMS OF MONEY1 
3.1. Introduction 
When mobile money (m-money) was introduced in Malaŵi, the immediate 
question was whether anything other than fiat money could be money. Fiat 
money refers to the money that circulates in countries under the legal decree 
of the issuing country.2 The biggest problem of regulation of money arises 
because of the way in which money or credit supply in various forms has 
expanded in ways which national and global regulators find difficult to control. 
Braithwaite and Drahos have referred to money as “the root of all financial 
regulation.”3An analysis of money and m-money is therefore a fitting place to 
start unpacking the regulatory issues of m-money. The underlying question for 
the regulation of emerging forms of money, such as m-money, is the extent to 
which they create new or different risks, and whether forms of control would 
endanger the very prospect of financial inclusion (FI) they seem to promote. 
The issue of FI is discussed in chapter 6.  
  
The historical development of money illustrates that there were other forms of 
money issued by non-state authorities in the past before the advent of fiat 
money. One example is the Hanseatic League (1400-1800), a commercial 
non-state confederation of cities in Germany.4 Another example is the Maria 
Theresa Thaler (dollar), used in world trade from the 15th century issued by 
the Empress of the Astro-Hungarian Empire.5 It was used in trade across parts 
of the Mediterranean and Arabia, and Thaler coins were as late as 1974 found 
on the East African Coast.6 The German Mark only replaced the Thaler in 
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1873.7 It would seem the emergence of the Mark, the Spanish Peso, and 
Pound Sterling herald the emergence of world currencies. Although the United 
States Dollar is arguably the dominant currency, it was only introduced in 
1875, and as a way of delinking the new country from the British dominion.8 
Recently there has been the emergence of new forms of money such as 
Bitcoin and m-money. The emergence of new forms of money which are not 
state-issued has raised questions as to whether anything that does not have 
state guarantee can effectively serve as money, and if so how can they 
maintain their value? 
 
This chapter looks at the origins of money and the evolution of the central 
bank, as an issuer of money and regulator of financial services. This chapter, 
aims to analyse the similarities or differences in the regulatory issues between 
fiat money and m-money. This chapter is divided into three main sections. The 
first looks at the origins of money and the emergence of central banks, the 
second section discusses the emergence of regulation of money and the 
regulatory issues around money, and the third section analyses various 
emerging forms of money with a focus on m-money and the regulatory issues 
it raises  
 
3.2. Origins and nature of money 
Money has been around for millennia although its origin has been the subject 
of academic debate for centuries. 9 There are two main theories of how money 
emerged. The dominant theory states that money is a creation of the market, 
emerging out of barter and serving fundamentally to facilitate commodity 
                                                     
7  Robert A Leonard (1994) ‘Money and Language’ (55) Money: Lure, Lore, and Literature 1 
p4 <https://www.unc.edu/~salemi/Econ006/Leonard.pdf>. 13 September 2016. 
8  ibid p5. 
9  Carl Menger (1892) On the Origins of Money (2009 repr) (Ludwig von Mises Institute, 
Auburn, Alabama) p45 
 Glyn Davies (2002) 'From Primitive and Ancient Money to the Invention of Coinage, 
3000-600 BC’ in A History of Money: From Ancient Times to the Present Day (University 
of Wales Press, Cardiff) chapter 2. 
 Nigel Dodd (2014) The Social Life of Money (Princeton University Press, Princeton, New 
Jersey) p15. 
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exchange.10 States only embraced money because of the power it gave them, 
such as the monopoly to issue legal tender.11 The alternative theory says 
money actually is the deliberate and positive creation of the state and that 
barter succeeded money and was not the precursor.12 Proponents of this 
theory assert that the essential nature of money is credit or debt.13 There are 
two common strands of thought within this theory: the idea that money 
originated as a unit of account for debt and the proposition that money creation 
involves the simultaneous creation of money and debt. A detailed discussion 
of these theories is outside the scope of this work but a reading of Graeber’s 
work14 is recommended. Suffice to say, this theory posits that debt is the real 
money. Under this theory therefore, the regulation of debt becomes crucial 
since an unregulated debt market can lead to inflation. This thesis adopts the 
dominant theory of the evolution of money.  
 
Money has changed form and although it may have been a different 
commodity in different societies, it has always maintained the same basic 
function: serving to facilitate exchange and trade. As societies developed and 
civilisations flourished, money also evolved with time. Money is a “sign which 
represents the value of all merchandise.”15 Take the example of a farmer in 
the old days. Suppose he harvested corn and put it into bags, ordinarily, he 
would go to the marketplace to exchange his produce with goods, which he 
needed. However, suppose he wanted a rabbit to cook. He would then have 
to take a portion of the corn in exchange for the rabbit. However, what if the 
hunter wanted eggs instead? An exchange was not possible unless the farmer 
first exchanged with another person who had something that the hunter 
desired. Even if the hunter wanted the corn, how much corn would be 
exchangeable for the rabbit? What is clear is that in the marketplace, everyone 
                                                     
10  Michael Hudson (2004) 'The Archaeology of Money: Debt versus Barter Theories of 
Money's Origins’ in Randal L. Wray (ed) Credit and State Theories of Money (Edward 
Elgar, Cheltenham) p99. 
11  David Graeber (2011) Debt: The First 5,000 Years (Melville House, Brooklyn, New York) 
p49. 
12  Hudson (2004) p107. 
13  Graeber (2011) p22.  
14  ibid.  
15  Charles de Secondat Baron de Montesquieu (1748) 'Of Laws in Relation to the Use of 
Money’ in The Spirit of Laws (2001 repr) (Batoche Books, Ontario) p407. 
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is looking for something and they are prepared to exchange their produce or 
wares. However, supply and demand do not always “quantitatively coincide.”16  
In the marketplace “there may be many people wanting, and many possessed 
those things wanted” so barter will only occur where there is a “double 
coincidence”.17 The coincidence of wants is crucial in a barter economy.18 As 
this is not always possible, then a third, somewhat, neutral commodity may 
just be the answer.  
 
If “X” refers to this neutral commodity, then the farmer may demand a certain 
multiple of X to trade with his bag of corn. On the other hand, the hunter may 
demand a fraction of X to exchange with his rabbit. The farmer can then 
exchange his bag of corn for a certain multiple of X and since the hunter is 
also looking for a fraction of X, it allows the farmer and hunter to trade directly. 
Assuming the corn exchanges at 5X and the rabbit at X, the farmer can trade 
with the hunter and still have 4X left for use to exchange for other commodities 
he needs or keep the change. It is this commodity, X, that became money. 
Money took up the function as a medium of exchange.19 It also offered a 
means of setting up the standard of value.20 Using the above example, 
therefore, it can be said that the value of a rabbit would be a fifth of that of a 
bag of corn; or a bag of corn would procure five rabbits. This allowed each 
commodity brought to the marketplace to be converted to its money equivalent 
and thereby to set up its price. Money became a “common denominator or 
common measure of value in terms of which [to] estimate the value of all other 
goods so that their value becomes capable of the [easiest] comparison”.21 
Money also allowed goods and services which could not be subdivided to be 
monetized, such as the product of a tailor.22 
 
                                                     
16  Menger (1892) p20. 
17  William Stanley Jevons (1875) 'Barter’ in Money and the Mechanism of Exchange (D. 
Appleton and Company, New York) p3. 
18  Braithwaite and Drahos (2000) p88. 
19  RTS (1854) Money; its nature, history, uses, and responsibilities (The Religious Tract 
Society, London) p75. 
20  ibid. 
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22  ibid p6. 
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For a commodity to perform the function of money, it had to be readily saleable 
or liquid.23 Liquidity is a measure of how quickly and easily something can be 
traded and is “determined by the demand and supply of immediacy.”24 When 
compared, other commodities brought to the marketplace are all less liquid 
than the commodity that functions as a money making it an attractive 
commodity to all.25 If one comes to the marketplace with anything other than 
money, then one places themselves at a disadvantage, compared to the one 
who comes to the marketplace with a “stock of money”.26 As a unit of 
exchange, it also provides a solution to the question: at what rate will an 
exchange be made.27 It performs another key function, as a store of value. A 
trader can sell his goods at the marketplace but need not buy anything. He 
may keep the money until the day he wants to buy something. This allows one 
to temporarily convey and transform value from one form to another using 
money as a common denominator.28 
 
Money in the classical sense must perform three core functions; “medium of 
exchange (making payments), store of value (purchasing power) and unit of 
account (the standard measure of value).”29 The ability to maintain its 
purchasing power over time is an attribute of good money.30 The first items of 
the commodity to serve as money were precious metals and rare articles or 
stones.31 Although the Egyptians, Chaldeans, and Assyrians had used metals 
for thousands of years, King Alyattes of Lydia (Turkey) created the earliest 
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known minted coin in 600 BC.32 However, there is evidence of the Zhou 
Dynasty in China perfecting bronze casting and making replicas as a form of 
money in 1100 BC.33 China is also accredited with the invention of paper 
money.34 The natural hierarchical position of the early rulers made it possible 
to have decrees whereby any issued coins would circulate within each 
dominion as money. This control was vital in establishing coins as a form of 
organised money.35 The natural scarcity of precious minerals plus the cost of 
their extraction and processing ensured stability of value.36 They benefited 
from the fact that precious metals were both homogeneous and fungible.37 
There was a one to one match in value between the commodity and the value 
of money it represented. The money could never be more than it was worth.38 
In a way, selling and buying is bartering. However, unlike other commodities 
of barter, money offers convenience in trading.39 It gives the holder a 
bargaining advantage and control as he has what everyone in the marketplace 
covets, resulting in the superiority of the buyer (who has the money) over the 
seller (who covets the money).40 It is also a store of surplus value. 
 
Coinage served two important purposes; an assurance that the coins were 
genuine and that through general circulation they served as a recognisable 
demonstration of the authority of the state.41 It soon became clear that the 
coins were susceptible to wear and tear.42 They were also costly to produce 
since the value in the metal usually represented the value of the coin.43 The 
valuable coin was also susceptible to being lost or destroyed.44 Although the 
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coin was valuable, in trade it served no valuable utility except as a medium of 
exchange such that if a cheaper payment system was devised, and accepted, 
it could serve the same function.45 This eventually led to the introduction of 
paper money, mostly riding on the industrial revolution that led to the 
development of the printing press as well as coins made of cheaper metal.46 
  
3.2.1. Evolution of central banks 
Normal et al say early forms of banking can be traced to “the mid-seventeenth 
century [when] a network of … goldsmith ‘bankers’ was issuing notes and 
lending funds.”47 These notes were also called gold certificates.48 The 
issuance of these certificates was in exchange for gold deposits.49 Cooper 
says the gold was in the form of coins, “checked as it was deposited, and the 
depositor issued with a paper certificate of deposit.”50 The certificate was 
evidence that the holder had a certain amount of gold deposits with the issuing 
bank and could “present the certificate back to the bank, who would, on 
demand, exchange it for the same amount of gold coins originally deposited.”51 
The shrewd gold-bankers soon realised that the traffic of gold deposits and 
gold-withdrawals either cancelled each other or favoured deposits.52 They 
started issuing paper to merchants who needed finance for their businesses. 
53 Therefore, very early on, the gold bankers harnessed the power of creating 
money by the process of issuing paper against gold deposits based on the 
belief that its depositors would not turn up and withdraw the gold.  This marked 
the development of the “lending business” by banks, “out of the deposit 
business.”54  
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According to Norman, initially, these banks could “not redeem on each other, 
offering to transfer funds only across their own accounts and/or refusing to 
accept notes issued by other banks.”55 Arrangements by banks to start 
accepting each other’s notes are the basis of the modern day inter-bank 
settlement or payment system (chapter 5). The process was gradual though, 
with acceptance of notes issued by “banks within their local area.”56 However, 
not all banks allowed claims on other banks, and these “pressures on banks 
to accept claims on each other” soon led to a need for a better system of inter-
bank settlement, and the establishment of central banks.57  
 
The earliest recorded bank to emerge as a central bank is the “the Swedish 
Riksbank.58, It was established in 1668 to lend the government funds and act 
as a clearing house for commerce.”59 The Bank of England was founded as a 
private company in 1694 to buy government debt.60 Braithwaite and Drahos 
say that the bank was established essentially to finance a war against the 
French.61 Bordo says other banks followed later in Europe based on the same 
principle: chartered to raise funds for the government “though some were 
established to deal with monetary disarray.”62 The establishment of the 
Banque de France, for example, in 1800 was primary for currency stabilisation 
resulting from the financial turmoil of the French Revolution.63 Therefore, from 
inception, the government favoured these central banks.64 The banks soon 
developed a higher “financial standing relative to other banks.”65 As central 
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banks started issuing their own money, this was considered “a superior form 
of money to the notes of any other bank.”66 
 
Commercial banks also soon realised that they need someone or something 
to help them during times of financial distress. According to Cooper, the central 
bank, as a bank of banks became the solution to “support troubled institutions, 
and [create a] system of firewalls to prevent trouble at one bank from 
spreading into a general panic throughout the entire system.”67 They became 
the lender of last resort (LOLR).68 The idea of an LOLR had existed in relation 
to sovereigns, but with regards to central banks, it was the formulation of Henry 
Thornton69 and Walter Bagehot70 in the 19th century that established it as a 
cornerstone in central bank business. In return for this fiscal support, Cooper 
says the banks “gave up the right to issue their own gold depository certificates 
[in favour of] only one permitted type of depository certificate … printed by the 
government” with all banks depositing their gold with the central bank.71 On 
the other hand, since the central bank came to “represent the ultimate source 
of liquidity” commercial banks found in this some form of insurance.72 To avoid 
moral hazard, central banks, began to exercise some control over these 
banks, or as is called today, regulate and supervise the banking system.73  
 
The relationship between central banks and the government meant the 
government through them had monopoly on printing money.74 This also 
provided the government with another tool of monetary control. While before, 
the government had to recall all coinage to issue new coins, with the new 
system all it needed to do was a simple adjustment to the amount of gold that 
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was now exchangeable with the circulating certificates.75 In doing so, 
governments avoided the unpopular decision of debasing the currencies by 
reducing the metal content on re-issue. 76 Through fiat, the state could create 
or destroy money.77 Cooper says, all that was required was “a short 
parliamentary decree announcing a new rate of conversion to gold.”78  
 
Such money is not backed up by any valuable deposits but by the power of 
the issuing state.79 Since the government now had a monopoly over money 
printing, it also meant it could “print itself some more money to pay off its debts” 
but because this was not backed by any gold deposits, the eventual result was 
inflation and devaluation.80 Politically this proved to be less messy. In the old 
days, kings would engage in currency debasing for profiteering. They would 
withdraw money and issue new money with a reduced content of the metal in 
the money, but present it as containing the same value, with the sovereign 
keeping the rest and making a profit and plundering their subjects.81 
Debasement, therefore, is not a new phenomenon. It is as old as the history 
of coined money.82 Monopoly in power to issue coinage by the sovereign 
meant that there was no opportunity for an honest competitor to check the 
sovereign’s profiteering.83 Although central banks became to be controlled by 
the government, this was a gradual process of assuming control.84 Norman et 
al have reduced the core functions of the central bank to: 
a) Bank of bankers; 
b) Monitoring (regulating) commercial banks; 
c) Monopoly of currency issue; 
d) Conducting monetary policy; 
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e) Lender of last resort (LOLR).85 
 
However, these functions evolved over time. For example, central banks were 
not initially tasked with supervisory and regulatory functions. According to 
Grossman, very few central banks were “given a monopoly of domestic note-
issue at the time of their founding” and the Bank of England, for example, only 
got this 150 years later.86 Grossman also argues that even the role of bankers’ 
bank and LOLR came in later.87 However making the central bank an LOLR 
was fundamental as it discouraged it from competing with commercial banks.88 
By being a bankers’ bank, the central bank is the anchor of the payment 
system by having mutual obligations of banks settled in central bank money89 
Since banks hold accounts with the central bank, they use these to settle 
payment obligations, just as customers do with their banks.90 A more detailed 
discussion of the payment system and the role of the central bank is provided 
in chapter 5. 
 
Being a bank of bankers meant that the central bank was a repository for 
banks thereby acquiring large reserves and effectively serving the functionality 
of LOLR during financial distress.91 The LOLR function has been criticised by 
Norman et al for “encouraging more risky lending inadvertently” destabilising 
the very “credit system” which the central bank was created to stabilise.92 To 
ensure that this tendency by bankers to engage in moral hazard is monitored, 
regulation of the banks becomes paramount, especially in relation to the 
creation of credit within the banking system.93 For example, in the years 1825-
1857, there were major panics in England, which were caused by the central 
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bank’s refusal to aid commercial banks in financial distress.94 The central bank 
responded to criticism but to discourage risky lending by banks, adopted the 
responsibility doctrine.95 Bordo says: 
[This] required the bank to subsume its private interest to the public 
interest of the banking system as a whole. The bank began to … 
lend freely on the basis of any sound collateral offered – but at a 
penalty rate to prevent moral hazard. The bank learned its lesson 
well. No financial crisis occurred in England for nearly 150 years 
after 1866. It wasn’t until August 2007 that the country experienced 
its next crisis.96 
 
However, Campbell and Lastra have insisted that what central banks do is 
“provide liquidity, not capital.”97 This is meant to be “over a short period of time” 
and any long-term assistance must be left to the relevant treasury organs.98 
They have therefore aptly termed it emergency liquidity assistance (ELA).99 
Timely injection of emergency and adequate liquidity will ordinarily arrest 
impending financial crises.100 From the theory espoused by Thornton and 
Bagehot, they isolate four LOLR/ELA pillars: 
i. ELA must be given to banks which although illiquid are however, 
solvent; 
ii. Liquidity must be freely provided, but at a penalty rate; 
iii. Any institution with “good collateral” must be accommodated; 
iv. The central bank must make it known that all ELA is discretionary and 
not obligatory.101 
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3.2.2. From the gold standard to fiat money  
The gold standard arose out of a need for an international monetary system 
up to the outbreak of the First World War.102 According to Bordo, the classical 
gold standard was a way in which “each country defined its currency in terms 
of a fixed weight of gold.”103 This price was supposed to be fixed,104 or rather 
“pegged within narrow bands” called “gold points” within which it was allowed 
to fluctuate.105 Earlier ‘standards’ had used a bimetallic system of gold and 
silver.106 Bordo and Kydland say gold was eventually chosen “because of its 
intrinsic value and desirable properties.”107 By the end of the nineteenth 
century, most major currencies were based on the gold standard.108 After the 
end of the Second World War, at the Bretton Woods Conference, an 
agreement was reached to peg all major world currencies to the United States 
Dollar ($).109 This followed a failure to reconstitute the gold standard after the 
outbreak of war and following the depression of the 1930s.110 The Dollar itself 
was then set at a fixed price of $35 per ounce of gold thereby creating what 
Cooper describes as a unitary global “gold standard monetary system.”111 By 
1971, most Dollars in global circulation were not backed by any actual gold 
reserves.112 Fearing that the holders would demand conversion into gold, the 
US stopped using the Dollar as a gold certificate thereby sounding a death-
knell to the gold standard.113   
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The demise of the gold standard heralded the birth of fiat money.114 Fiat money 
is the name given to “the new currency regime, without a gold exchange 
rate.”115 While with the gold standard, devaluations were in relation to gold 
reserves, fiat money can be created “from thin air” and the government is 
under no liability to pay out anything as an equivalent sum of money.116 Fiat 
money is usually distinguishable from other forms of money on the basis that 
it is legal tender.117  It means one can use such money to settle pecuniary 
debts and obligations within a particular jurisdiction in which the said money is 
issued and that it would be deemed unlawful for anyone to reject it.118 Normally 
when used, the term money refers to fiat money. Sometimes the words cash 
or paper money and coins are used to distinguish it with other forms of money. 
 
An example of the paper money of England, Malaŵi and US brings the point 
home. The notes issued by the Bank of England have the words: “I promise to 
pay the bearer on demand the sum of [X] Pounds”. The note issued by the 
Reserve Bank of Malaŵi says: “Promise to pay the bearer the sum of [Y] 
Kwacha”. The note issued by the Federal Reserve in the United States is 
worded somewhat differently manifesting the legal character of the note: “This 
note is legal tender for all debts, public and private.” Graeber says money can 
be reduced to just that, “the promise to pay something of the same value as 
an ounce of gold.”119 Of course, with the abandonment of the gold standard, 
the something has value based on the trust that the public has in the state 
issuing it.120  
 
With fiat money, it is no longer essential that money exists as a chattel or a 
physical concept.121 Graeber argues that money now is an abstract concept 
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although it may still be issued in physical form by the state.122 State authority 
now defines, through legislation, what is to serve as money within the 
jurisdiction of the state. Proctor describes three elements comprising the legal 
definition of money: 
(a) “It must be expressed by reference to a name and 
denominated by reference to a unit of account prescribed by 
the law. 
(b) The currency and unit must be intended to serve as the 
generally accepted measure of value and medium of 
exchange within the state. 
(c) The legal framework for the currency must include a central 
bank or monetary authority responsible for the issue of the 
currency, appropriate institutional provisions for its 
management through the conduct of monetary policy and the 
oversight of payment systems.”123 
 
3.2.3. Standards and qualities of money  
As has been noted above, the standard test of classical money is three-fold: a 
medium of exchange, store of value and unit of account. These three attributes 
satisfy the requirement for economic money. However, to satisfy the 
requirements of legal money, state sanction and a legal framework enabling 
the issuing of currency needs to be in place. This section looks at the 
framework comprising the standards and qualities of money and then 
develops a framework for assessing whether any commodity can function as 
money based on this framework.  
 
The table below illustrates the qualities and elements of money. While a crucial 
quality of money is stability, in reality, fiat money will face exchange rate 
fluctuations when traded with other currencies. An example would be the 
sudden plunge of the British Pound on the announcement of the referendum 
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result that Britain would leave the European Union.124 Therefore, while it may 
maintain its face value, its real value (purchasing power) may be affected by 
a whole array of factors.125 
 
 
Table 2: Qualities of money126 
 
From the above table, a framework may be drawn (table below) on identifying 
money and this framework will be used later in assessing whether m-money 
fits the billing. The basis of compassion for the framework is fiat money or 
cash.  
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- 74 - 
 
 
Table 3: Framework for identifying money 
 
3.3. Regulating money  
Although historically, there have been non-sovereign forms of money, 
sovereigns and countries now monopolise the power to issue money and 
control its circulation.127 The more important factor has always been the 
authority behind the issue, manifesting itself in proof of value. As discussed 
above, after the demise of the gold standard, the public has trust in the value 
of the currency because it has trust in the sovereign issuing it. Currency 
issuance has now been delegated to central banks as state agents. This 
sovereign power is however limited to the jurisdiction in which the sovereign 
exercises legal and political control. This allows state regulation of money 
issued within each jurisdiction. The Permanent Court of International Justice 
made the principle that a state has monetary sovereignty sacrosanct in 
international law in 1929 in the Serbian Loans Case when it said: “it is indeed 
a generally accepted principle that a state is entitled to regulate its own 
currency.”128 
 
Part of this sovereign power includes the power to withdraw money from 
circulation and issue new money. In modern times, the monetary policy of most 
central banks includes mopping up excess liquidity to control money circulation 
and to check inflation. It is the power to regulate the supply of money that 
creates value. Jevons said, money, like any commodity, will only be valuable 
and useful “when supplied in moderate quantities, and at the right time”129 The 
                                                     
127 Friedrich August v Hayek (1990) Denationalisation of Money - The argument refined: An 
Analysis of the Theory and Practice of Concurrent Currencies (3rd Ed) (Institute of 
Economic Affairs, London) chapter III. 
128 Case Concerning the Payment of Various Serbian Loans Issued in France (France v. 
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sovereign power, however, works on the presumption of pre-existing trust. The 
subjects or citizens have to trust that the sovereign will guarantee the value 
and stability of the money. Trust and confidence are intrinsically linked to the 
stability of value.  
 
The case of Zimbabwe demonstrates a scenario where loss of trust can be 
costly. First, the national currency was debased and eventually abandoned 
and replaced by the US Dollar.130 Due to a shortage of Dollars, Zimbabwe has 
started printing bond notes, effectively introducing a new currency despite the 
central bank’s insistence that this did not mean a return to the Zimbabwean 
dollar.131 Since the bond notes are issued at par value to the Dollar, “the 
challenge would be ensuring businesses and employees use them.”132 
Already there is scepticism that “if they are difficult to get rid of and you can’t 
spend them in shops”, people may not “accept them.”133 Therefore, the 
imprimatur of the state underlines the issue of authentication and social 
acceptance. It is submitted both are important, but fundamentally, it is social 
acceptance, which may allow the operation of non-state money. An example 
of a currency based on social acceptance and trust is the Bristol Pound.134 The 
Bristol Pound is not issued by the Bank of England (or Bank of Bristol) but still 
operates within the city of Bristol. It has attained social acceptance. The Bristol 
Pound can be traded electronically within Bristol as a private currency.135  
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A discussion of the regulation of money inevitably must be done in conjunction 
with the regulation of the banking and financial system. Money oils the engine 
that drives this system. As Padoa-Schioppa says: 
Why do we dub banking as a “system”, while we do not use this 
notion for the steel or chemical industries, or even for the insurance 
and securities industries? Firstly, banks are interconnected through 
the payment system, whose essential feature is currency-specificity. 
It refers to the circulation of one and the same money, which is 
completely fungible throughout the economy.136 
 
In relation to the financial system and the central role played by the central 
bank, he adds: 
A financial system may, and usually does, remain segmented to 
some extent. However, if a liquidity need emerges in a specific 
segment of it, it is always the central bank that bears ultimate 
responsibility. Hence, all the answers to why banking is a “system” 
have to do with the singleness of the currency and the central bank. 
This also shows that – with or without formal supervisory functions 
– the central bank is a key part of the financial system and 
responsible for its smooth functioning.137 
 
It may be argued that regulation of money, the banking, and financial system 
is a three-pronged exercise because of the centrality of banking within the 
financial system and the role of money within both the banking and financial 
system. The fact that central banks are issuers of money makes them the 
premier institution in ensuring financial stability, and in monitoring “the quality 
of their counterparts.”138 
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3.3.1. Regulating the financial sector 
Governments regulate the financial sector for two main reasons: consumer 
protection and to maintain financial integrity and stability,  clear public goods 
that justify a more elaborate framework of regulation and supervision.139 Singh 
describes financial stability as “a catch-all phrase referring to a whole host of 
factors, both positive and negative, that have an impact on the efficiency with 
which an economy or financial system performs.”140 This is achieved “through 
cooperation between the central bank, other safety-net players and financial 
regulators.”141 The ability to accurately assess financial risk by the central bank 
is a precondition for financial stability as well as integrity.142 Prevention of fraud 
and ensuring that the markets are not tainted or associated with proceeds of 
crime is crucial in maintaining financial integrity.143 Quintyn and Taylor have 
summarised the objectives of regulation as, avoiding monopolies, promoting 
financial stability and consumer protection.144 They argue that unlike other 
sectors, financial regulation requires a more elaborate framework because of 
the central role that the sector plays in the economy.145 
 
Although at times used interchangeably, the terms regulation and supervision 
mean different things despite the fact that for most countries, their functions 
are subsumed into one agency.146 Supervision has to do with promoting and 
ensuring safety and soundness of institutions.147 According to Burton and 
Brown, the supervisor’s role is a “continuous oversight to ensure that [financial 
institutions] are operated prudently and in accordance with statutes and 
regulations.”148 This supervision may be in situ or ex situ.149 In situ entails 
sending supervisors to examine and assess the condition of institutions and 
                                                     
139 Quintyn and Taylor (2002) p8. 
140 Dalvinder Singh (2007) Banking Regulation of UK and US Financial Markets (Ashgate 
Publishing, Aldershot, Hampshire) p2. 
141 ibid p3. 
142 ibid. 
143  ibid p22. 
144  Quintyn and Taylor (2002) p8. 
145  ibid p8. 
146  As in the UK, or Malaŵi (Part II of the Financial Services Act, Malaŵi says the Registrar is 
to Regulate and Supervise Financial Institutions) – see also Mwenda (2006) p5  
147 Maureen Burton and Bruce Brown (2014) The financial system and the economy: 
Principles of money and banking (Routledge, Abingdon, Oxon) p52. 
148 ibid. 
149  Mwenda (2006) p5. 
- 78 - 
 
ascertain if they comply with laid down regulations.150 On the other hand, 
regulators are tasked with preparing and issuing regulations and promoting a 
culture of compliance.151 Burton and Brown say regulation aims at establishing 
“a framework for … behaviour that fosters the maintenance of a safe and 
sound [financial] system and the fair and efficient delivery of services to … 
customers.”152 One may look at regulation as an effort to restrict some activity 
which would occur but for the regulation.153 In summary, regulation: 
(1) Defines permissible activities; 
(2) Determines reserves that financial institutions must hold in relation 
to any deposits; 
(3) Ensures fair treatment of consumers of financial products and 
services.154  
 
The regulation of financial market players is now a priority; especially post the 
2007-8 financial crisis. There have been varied arguments along the years on 
which type of regulatory system is ideal for the financial system. The trend at 
least in most developed economies has been to have independent financial 
regulators. This is because the financial system today encompasses all market 
players such as those involved with banking: insurance, securities, lending, 
and pension. Most jurisdictions have moved to, or moved between regulatory 
models based on twin peaks, multiple peaks [or] single peak model.155 Up to 
2012, the United Kingdom’s Financial Services Authority (FSA) was the most 
notable single peak model.156 The Financial Services Act 2012 replaced the 
FSA with the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and Prudential Regulation 
Authority (PRA).157 The Act also established the Financial Policy Committee 
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(Occasional Paper Series, Financial Services Authority, London) 
<http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.468.6859&rep=rep1&type=pd
f>. 12 January 2017.  
157 David Blair (2013) 'The FSA is dead; long live the FCA, the PRA and the FPC’ 
<http://www.osborneclarke.com/connected-insights/publications/the-fsa-is-dead-long-live-
the-fca-the-pra-and-the-fpc/#sthash.PzXxYUIX.dpuf>. 3 March 2014. 
- 79 - 
 
(FPC).158 The FPC, a committee of the Bank of England, has not been given 
direct regulatory powers but Blair says it is responsible for “macro issues 
affecting economic and financial stability and for responding to any threats 
which it identifies.”159 Since the FPC has not been given regulatory powers, 
the UK has moved from a single peak to a twin peaks system of financial 
service regulation; separating prudential and conduct regulation.160 This would 
make the UK in line with other jurisdictions like the Netherlands, South Africa, 
and Australia.161 Taylor in his seminal work laid the foundation for the adoption 
of a twin peaks system in the UK.162 He later argued that the United States 
ought to consider adopting the twin peaks model as “prudential and conduct 
of business regulation don’t mix.”163 However, the current existing US model 
has been described as a sectors-based model which is also found in China 
and Hong Kong.164 The twin peaks, single peak and sector model are regarded 
as the main regulatory models and most jurisdictions gravitate around them.165 
It must be pointed pout however, that despite its name, the twin peaks model 
adopted in the UK is not Taylor’s blueprint. While Taylor advocated for distinct 
peaks, there is a much closer collaboration between the PRA and FCA. 
 
Burton and Brown say, in most countries, states regulate the financial system 
because it “is vital to a healthy economy.”166 States regulate the financial 
sector for two basic reasons: consumer protection and to maintain financial 
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stability.167 The former is achieved by providing a framework of rules that can 
help prevent excess and failures of a market left entirely to its own whims and 
devices and the latter is seen as a clear public good that justifies a more 
elaborate framework of regulation and supervision.168 Singh argues that 
financial stability is a key rationale for regulation.169 
 
Taylor has argued that financial stability and consumer protection lead to 
prudential supervision and conduct of business (CoB) regulation.170 This is the 
basis on which the traditional twin peaks model of regulation is based.171 He 
further argues that in complex financial products, self-regulation may not work 
because it assumes that “participants to a transaction possess appropriately 
equal knowledge, information and bargaining” which is not the case.172 
Regulation can address this information imbalance in favour of the 
unsophisticated consumer. Kremers and Schoenmaker have expanded the 
two objectives into five: 
i. “Monetary stability; 
ii. Financial stability (macro-prudential); 
iii. Soundness of financial institutions (micro-prudential); 
iv. Orderly and well-functioning markets and fair treatment of consumers 
(CoB) 
v. Competition policy.”173 
 
In effect, however, the first three would fall under what Taylor refers to as 
systemic protection or prudential regulation and the last two would be in the 
ambit of CoB.174 It is however submitted that regardless of the model adopted, 
any regulatory framework must put in place at least the following:  
(a) Authorisation of their operation; 
(b) Rules of operation; 
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(c) Supervision and compliance processes; 
(d)  Rules or principles of conduct of financial services business; 
(e) Investigation of breaches; 
(f) Cooperation and exchange of information with other regulators.175  
 
As was discussed above, Goodhart says at the time of their creation, “there 
was … little, or no, consideration, or attention, given to the possibility of 
[central] banks playing a supervisory role in relation to other banks.”176 
However, when central banks assumed the role of LOLR, they had to exercise 
prudence, which meant evaluating the soundness of their counterparties.177 
This served a dual purpose. It ensured that central banks only lent out to 
counterparts that had the capacity to repay and it provided confidence in the 
financial system that all the market players were financially sound.178 Even 
without a formal supervisory mandate, Padoa-Schioppa says this placed the 
“central bank in a natural position to address financial stability concerns.”179  
 
According to Padoa-Schioppa, being an LOLR through which the central bank 
provides “final liquidity remains a most powerful rationale for the role of central 
banks in promoting and providing for financial stability.”180 Taylor has argued 
that the roles of LOLR are in fact two, giving rise to different regulatory 
concerns. He says, the first is a direct result of Bagehot’s theory of the central 
bank “as a provider of general liquidity to the market.”181 The second relates 
to the central bank providing liquidity to financial institutions in distress.182 
Padoa-Schioppa argues, “the role of the central banks in financial stability is 
part of their genetic code … as an inseparable component of their role as the 
banker’s banks and of their monopoly on ultimate liquidity.”183 This raises an 
interesting issue of whether the role of the central bank is principally an 
economical one or as an agent of the state? It is submitted that with the 
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modern central bank the roles have become subsumed and are virtually 
identical.  
 
However, the restriction of who could issue money and how is arguably one of 
the earlier efforts to start regulating money and the financial services. Fear of 
contagion within the financial system has been a key driving force behind the 
involvement of central banks in regulating the sector. The G-10 defines 
systemic financial risk as: 
The risk that an event will trigger a loss of economic value or 
confidence in, and attendant increases in uncertainty about, a 
substantial portion of the financial system that is serious enough to 
quite probably have significant adverse effects on the real 
economy.184 
 
Contagion may also arise when the market perceives risk, also referred to as 
psychological contagion.185 This may arise despite ring fencing or firewalls 
created as long as the perceived risk relates to subsidiary or counterparty.186 
This is common with conglomerates or interlinked businesses.187 Therefore, 
financial stability is not so much about avoiding financial crises but rather also 
about managing systemic financial risk.188 Schinasi suggests that managing 
the following functions is key in avoiding systemic financial crises: 
a) Market participants through their private risk management (first 
line of defence) 
b) The authorities through banking supervision 
c) Market surveillance 
d) Systemic risk management189 
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In most countries, the central bank is charged with prudential regulation.190 
Padoa-Schioppa says there are always debates for and against the separation 
of the central bank from this role on the argument that “conflicts of interest may 
arise when combining the two responsibilities of monitory policy and 
supervision.”191 Goodhart and Schoenmaker observed a trend indicating the 
separation between monetary policy and supervision, whereby the central 
bank was left to concentrate on monetary policy and independent regulators 
were tasked with regulation and supervision.192 Padoa-Schioppa says, this 
may have been necessitated by a fear of “excessive concentration of power in 
a central bank endowed with a highly independent status.”193 Even with 
prudential regulation, there seems to be a separation of functionalities with the 
central bank in charge of the macro and the micro being overseen by 
supervisory agents.194 Padoa-Schioppa has cautioned against the “danger of 
a hard separation” between micro and macro as it may lead “to a situation in 
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which neither central banks nor supervisory agencies would be able to perform 
their functions satisfactorily.”195 Goodhart agrees that there are no 
“advantages [to] be obtained from separating these functions, and hiving off 
certain micro supervisory and insurance functions to other official institutions 
(separate and distinct from the central bank).”196  
 
While prudential regulation and supervision may have started out as unified 
undertaking, together with monetary policy and financial stability, under the 
early central banks, it is now increasingly becoming clear that there has been 
an unbundling of activities.197 Even where the central bank may still be 
involved in prudential regulation, as is the case of the UK, this is done through 
an independent body and not the central bank itself. There is, therefore, a 
distinct division of functions even if all three functions are within the same 
agency. However, even where the central bank is not the [lead] financial 
regulator, its involvement is still paramount; especially post-financial crisis. 
Schinasi lists three “key elements of crisis resolution: 
a) Legal framework for bankruptcy and closeout procedures for 
financial contracts 
b) Exit strategies for insolvent institutions (large and small); and 
c) Lender of last resort function in the central bank”198 
 
Regardless of the regulatory framework or model adopted, there is a need for 
clarity between the roles and responsibilities of the various regulatory 
agencies.199 Ideally, the regulatory framework needs to be embedded in 
positive law and the autonomy and independence of the agencies clearly spelt 
out.200  
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3.3.2. The regulatory issues involving the financial services 
Goodhart says the rationale for the evolution of the role of regulation involving 
money “is to assure stable and smoothly-functioning financial and payment 
systems.”201 Since money is the oil that lubricates the financial and payment 
systems; then regulating money is key. The central bank’s role in regulation is 
not only because of its monopoly of currency issue, but also in arresting moral 
hazard.202  
 
Genuineness of money and stability value 
Central bank money is legal tender in most countries. This typically comprises 
notes and coins. While the coins may have metallic value, the notes usually 
have no intrinsic value. The role of the central bank is, therefore, to determine 
what will serve as legal tender as well as set its value. The central bank must 
ensure that the only money circulating is that it has issued or authorised. An 
example of a currency that is legal currency but not legal tender is the Scottish 
Pound. Interestingly although widely accepted in Scotland, it is not even legal 
tender in Scotland.203 Ostensibly, there is a direct correlation between genuine 
currency and value. The corollary is that influx of counterfeit money will dilute 
the value of money and destabilise the currency. According to Goodhart, the 
combined effect of designating “a currency as legal tender together with fixing 
its value in terms of some other asset, e.g. gold or another currency” is central 
to regulation and helps to stabilise its value.”204  
 
Maintaining financial stability 
Financial institutions play a central role, which is different from other 
institutions. Goodhart puts it like this: 
[T]he failure of banks causes people to seek to hold their liquid 
assets in currency, thereby precipitating a general run on bank 
reserves. The failure of an engineering company, for example, 
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though it may embarrass its creditors, is unlikely to have secondary, 
“contagion,” effects of the same order as a bank failure could and 
did, at least until some form of insurance was thought to be in 
operation.205 
 
In the ideal world, the supply of money is supposed to be fixed and controlled 
by the central bank. However, in practice, this is not the case. With commercial 
banks creating money based on deposits and derivative and other security 
instruments, it may mean that on occasions when financial institutions are in 
distress, they may face a liquidity risk. In the worst-case scenario, the central 
bank will pump in final liquidity as LOLR.206 The central bank usually does this 
to avoid panic in the financial system as well as contagion.  Panic in one bank, 
for example, can quickly spread. The case of Northern Rock is a testimony of 
a bank run that occurred, despite the Bank of England’s assistance of liquidity 
leading which developed into a full financial crisis and its nationalisation.207 
Campbell and Lastra have wondered, though, whether the “stigma” associated 
with this type of assistance, following a premature disclosure in the press that 
Northern Rock was in financial distress may have played a role.208 
 
Central banks have the vital role of ensuring that they supply liquidity to banks 
in distress to avoid shock or contagion. However, they must guard against 
moral hazard by putting in place systems that discourage banks from risky 
lending.209 Moral hazard may arise because of the assurance that the central 
banks will rescue a financial institution in distress.210 At times, the central bank 
must provide this liquidity to save the financial system. This is common in 
relation to the so-called too big to fail (TBTF).211 It may, however, be argued 
that there may be cases where the central banks must withhold final liquidity 
and allow an institution to go under to protect the market. Provision of a deposit 
                                                     
205 ibid p61-62. 
206 Schooner and Taylor (2010) p53-6. 
207 Hyun Song Shin (2009) ‘Reflections on Northern Rock: the bank run that heralded the 
global financial crisis’ 23 (1) The Journal of Economic Perspectives 101 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/089533009797614045>. 4 October 2016. 
208 Campbell and Lastra (2009) p487. 
209 Schooner and Taylor (2010) p60-3.  
210 ibid p60. 
211 ibid p63-4. 
- 87 - 
 
insurance scheme may be one such policy tool.212 Provision of extra liquidity 
to other financial institutions during such a time may also in a way calm the 
market and ease panic.213 However, is the TBTF concept in itself morally 
hazardous? In the US, the intervention by the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC) while breaking up some firms led to the creation of even 
larger firms, which are themselves now declared TBTF.214 Goodhart says,  
[Ultimately as an LOLR], a central bank has to be involved in 
supervisory matters. The choice then rests between centralizing the 
administration of such function in the central bank, or of having a 
multiplicity of supervisory agencies.215  
 
As a trust-based system, a central bank has to ensure the soundness of 
counterparts.216 Participants of the financial system have trust in it because 
they trust that the central bank will supervise compliance and ensure all the 
other players play by the rules to the benefit of all.217 Put in another way, to 
ensure there is no free rider, it is in the interest of all other players to have 
regulation in place.218 This also includes any entry restrictions on who can and 
cannot be allowed to become a member. 
 
Consumer protection 
With the evolution of financial services and complex financial products, there 
is information asymmetry between providers and consumers of these services. 
Mwenda says regulation needs to address such things as “unauthorized 
disclosures, insider dealing and money laundering” to boost “investor and 
consumer confidence.”219 Taylor says consumer protection is premised on 
protecting “individual investors, depositors and policyholders to the extent that 
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they cannot reasonably be expected to protect their own interests.”220 It is 
submitted that in relation to developing countries, where financial literacy is 
still relatively low, the burden on the regulator to address the information 
imbalance is greater. Mwenda argues that the regulator can deliberately tilt the 
balance “in favour of consumers … by imposing … minimum standards of 
business conduct.”221 Where the regulator is seen to be enforcing compliance 
by the market players, consumer confidence is promoted and maintained.222 
It also instils trust in the system. 
 
Setting up deposit insurance schemes and mandatory adequate capital 
reserves are important in protecting consumer funds.223 Ultimately, though, it 
may also require a speedy resolution framework. Unfortunately, in some 
developing countries like Malaŵi, this is not the case. For example, the 
Finance Bank of Malaŵi started winding up procedures in 2005, but the 
processes have not been finalised to date.224.  
 
3.3.3. The regulatory issues involving globalised money 
Most global currencies are now no longer restricted within the jurisdiction of 
the issuing authority.225 Cohen calls it the de-territorialisation of currencies.226 
The development of the Eurodollar market is an excellent example of this. A 
Eurodollar is created when a deposit is dominated in Dollars but outside the 
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US.227 The challenge that emerges with such globalised money is which 
regulator has jurisdiction over such Eurodollars. Traditionally, where the 
deposit is situated will determine who the regulator will be. The host regulator’s 
laws will determine the regulatory framework of the Eurodollars.228 So in effect, 
the US Federal Reserve has no control over the Eurodollar market. 
Eurodollars represent an obligation to pay actual dollars.229 This presents an 
immediate problem as the host regulator may not have the state sanction over 
the currency. However, do Eurodollars actually exist or are they just a 
bookkeeper’s creation? The Eurodollar market is a good illustration that money 
is now no more than an accounting exercise of balancing the books. There are 
in fact no actual Dollars being shipped across the continents to satisfy the 
demand of the Eurodollar market.230 With an increased interdependence of 
global finance, the Eurodollar deposit account represents an international 
mirror of domestic deposits. The Eurodollar is however, not the only 
Eurocurrency, but it is the dominant one.231 To be traded as a Eurocurrency, 
a currency must be easily convertible.232 To be convertible, a currency must 
be freely interchangeable with other currencies, used in global trade,  and 
stable.233 The advent of Eurocurrencies together with derivatives and other 
financial instruments as well as the expansion of debt has transformed the 
stability otherwise associated with money. The question then becomes 
whether new forms of money exacerbate this problem. 
 
3.4. Emerging forms of money 
New forms of money seem to emerge from a reversal of the concept of 
monetary sovereignty. Traditionally states and central banks have issued and 
controlled money. In doing so, money has been used in the power relations 
between those with power and those without it. Emerging forms of money 
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seem to be challenging the monopoly of central banks, decentralising issuing 
of money and leading to what can be described as liberation of money.234 It is 
imperative to point out at the outset that although electronic banking is a rapid 
developing means of processing payments, this is not a new form of money 
but rather, as Kelley puts it, “a new way to access a number of traditional bank 
services with traditional money” using new technologies.235 For this reason, 
the discussion that follows excludes it. 
 
3.4.1. Electronic money and virtual currencies 
While the terms electronic money (e-money) and virtual currency may 
sometimes be used interchangeably, the two are technically different. E-
money “is a digital representation of fiat currency used to electronically transfer 
value denominated in fiat currency.”236 It maintains a one to one ratio with fiat 
money.237 It is an electronic representation of a currency, which serves as legal 
tender.238 The most known examples of e-money are debit and credit cards. 
Another example of e-money is m-money, discussed below. There is also 
another form of value, airtime, which may be said to be a derivative of e-
money. Although it has many attributes of e-money, it is not issued as e-
money. The European Banking Authority (EBA) defines a virtual currency a 
“digital representation of value that is neither issued by a central bank or public 
authority but is used as a means of exchange and can be transferred, stored 
or traded electronically.”239 It can be digitally traded as, and functions as 
money, but is not legal tender.240 Since any state authority does not issue it, it 
has no state guarantee and operates as money on the basis that the 
community, which uses it, accepts it.241 The European Central Bank has 
provided this definition: 
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A type of unregulated, digital money issued and usually controlled 
by its developers, and used and accepted among members of a 
specific virtual community.242 
 
The famous internet based payment system, PayPal is not a virtual currency. 
While a virtual account is created of users, PayPal does not issue any currency 
within the PayPal community and funding is via “credit transfer from a bank 
account or by a credit card payment”.243 PayPal operates within the banking 
system and its regulations.244 Apple Pay is also like PayPal and is thus not a 
virtual currency. It works by cloning credit or debit cards and facilitating 
payment by bringing the Apple mobile device near the point of sale (POS) 
terminal.245 It employs a new technology called near field communication 
(NFC), which just requires a tap for information transmission.246 A more 
famous example of virtual currency is Bitcoin. Bitcoin is also a type of what are 
called cryptocurrencies and is discussed below. 
 
3.4.1.1. Cryptocurrency 
This is a decentralised virtual currency, based on a mathematical formula that 
is protected by cryptography.247 Cryptography ensures that the digital currency 
is secure and protected from being interfered with by third parties. It also 
prevents the duplicate or multiple uses of the same currency so that once it is 
used in a transaction it cannot be used again.248 There are already estimated 
to be over a hundred cryptocurrencies in operation.249 The most famous 
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cryptocurrency is Bitcoin. Despite its name, there are no coins in Bitcoin. It 
comprises “unique strings of numbers and letters that constitute units of the 
currency.”250 Bitcoins have no value in themselves and are not issued and 
backed by any central bank. While central banks use monetary policy to 
regulate the currency they issue, Bitcoin achieves this by a clever complex 
mathematical algorithm.251 This is done through what is called block-chain 
technology.252 The block-chain or Nakamoto consensus protocol (named after 
its inventor) ‘regulates’ transactions in Bitcoins among users.253 The 
production of new Bitcoins is through a block-chain led process called 
mining.254 This process allows Bitcoins to be introduced into the system 
depending on demand. The demand is measured by the energy expended in 
digitally mining the Bitcoins using computing power.255 The protocol reacts to 
changes in mining power and will discourage further mining by increasing the 
level of difficulty in mining new Bitcoins.256 In this way, the algorithm supervises 
the value of Bitcoin as a currency.257 Bitcoin is internet-based, requiring no 
intermediation by banks.258 It is privately owned, but not by one individual, but 
all the anonymous participants of this distributed payment system.259 The 
distributed ledger is what makes Bitcoin unique.260 Its value lies in the fact that 
people will accept it as payment. Social acceptance is, therefore, crucial for its 
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existence. Since it can be accepted, it can be bought and paid for using 
cash.261  
 
Normally operations in the digital domain always leave a trace or a footprint. 
However, thanks to cryptography, The EBA says Bitcoin allow users to trade 
with “a high degree of anonymity”.262 In this respect, Bitcoin mimics cash. 
When one gets a banknote, the note does not contain an information trail. The 
closest one can get is to identify, if possible, the last holder of the note. 
Because of this, Bitcoins have become attractive to criminals including those 
dealing in illicit financing.263 The recent Ransomware attack, where hackers 
got into the systems of several global institutions, including the UK’s National 
Health Service (NHS), threatening to permanently lock data unless a ransom 
was paid in Bitcoins is a further testimony of this.264  
 
Bitcoins can be subdivided and split into smaller denominations and each split 
denomination carries with it a unique digital signature as part of its encryption 
that makes it impossible to forge.265 To avoid double spending, Bitcoin uses a 
time-stamp as part of its encryption.266 Double spending is possible in digital 
currencies because digital information can be easily copied and edited.267 
Once processed, Bitcoins transactions are irreversible.268 Vendors adore this 
because it ensures that they are paid and are not exposed to the risk of 
fraud.269 On the other hand, if a Bitcoins owner were to be defrauded, the 
irreversibility of the transaction would mean this would be irrecoverable. In a 
way, this is no different from losing cash to an unknown fraudster or thief.  
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Unlike e-money, which is cash-tied, a virtual currency like Bitcoin may suffer 
from the instability of value.270 In terms of its algorithm, Bitcoin is a finite 
currency with a concrete ceiling of 21 million Bitcoins.271 It may be argued that 
as the concrete ceiling is approached, the value of Bitcoins is likely to rise. 
However, should a competing and more successful cryptocurrency emerge; 
the opposite may well be the result.  
  
3.4.2. Mobile money  
M-money, despite its name, is not part of mobile banking. It is not an extension 
of one’s bank account accessible by the mobile phone or other internet based 
gadget. It uses the mobile phone as a payment device. As stated earlier, m-
money is a telco-led service and does not require a bank account.272 M-money 
services are set up by telecommunication companies and operate as add-on 
services to the normal telecommunication services. There is a direct 
correlation between m-money and access to a mobile phone.273 It follows, that 
m-money is likely to be more widespread where there is a good mobile 
network.274 
 
The use of the mobile phone to access financial services and transactions was 
an event waiting to happen. The mobile phone achieves this using the 
interactive short messaging service (SMS), a data-messaging channel 
available on phones using the Groupe Speciale Mobile or Global System for 
Mobile Communications (GSM) platform275. The mobile phone essentially 
mimics key ingredients that are essential for the offer of banking services. The 
subscriber identification module (SIM) can authenticate users.276 Chapter 4 
provides a detailed discussion of m-money operations. 
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Maurer has described the system in this manner: 
[An agent] starts by depositing cash via [an] MNO into a pooled 
account at a bank that is partnered with the MNO. The MNO next 
creates for the [agent] an e-money account equivalent to his share 
of the pooled account on deposit with the bank, which he can 
access via his mobile phone. He now has a share of electronic 
credits with the MNO. When a customer wants to send money to 
another person, the customer can come to the [agent] and provide 
cash in the amount to be transferred to another person, plus a 
commission. The [agent] receives the cash and transfers to the 
customer’s mobile phone some of his own e-money on account with 
the MNO. The MNO records the transfer of e-money to the [agent’s] 
customer. The [agent] can then deposit the cash in his bank 
account, which will top up his supply of MNO-issued e-money. This 
maintains a one-to-one correspondence between the money on 
deposit in the bank and the e-money in the system.277 
 
Put simply, customers give fiat money to an agent who issues them with m-
money in the form of “a code. The code can then be given to [an agent] 
anywhere else in the country, and redeemed for cash.”278 To emphasise the 
need to match m-money and the physical money, Hughes and Lonie say, it 
“must exactly match the real money or we could find ourselves in the 
unfortunate situation of creating currency.”279 In fact were it not to match, it 
would also create runaway inflation, as there would be m-money, which cannot 
be backed by deposits. The pooled funds are held in a bank in the name of 
the m-money issuer and not individual customers.280 The system works under 
the peer-to-peer (P2P) platform.281 Subject to any interoperability constraints, 
                                                     
277  Maurer (2012) p306. 
278  Brendan Greeley (2013) 'One Good Paper: Monopoly Power in Mobile Money’ 
(Bloomberg Businessweek) <http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-03-13/one-
good-paper-monopoly-power-in-mobile-money>. 28 March, 2013. 
279  Hughes and Lonie (2007) p69. 
280  Di Castri (2013) p15. 
281  ibid. 
- 96 - 
 
this allows anyone with a mobile phone to send money to another person with 
a mobile phone.282 The m-money application resides on the phone’s SIM.283  
 
Jenkins says despite its manifestation, m-money is real and not “pseudo 
money”.284 Hughes and Lonie have called the m-money service “turning cell 
phones into 24-hour tellers.”285 Jenkins says m-money has the benefit of 
reducing “the cost and risk inherent in dealing with cash”.286 The range of 
transactions and services, which can be accessed by the mobile phone, are 
limitless thereby resulting in significant implications for economic activity 
across the world.287 Maurer says m-money “represents a collision of two 
ubiquitous technologies, each with similar but internally contradictory set of 
symbolic associations and social practices.”288 He argues both represents 
modernity: m-money an “index of technological savvy” and the flashing of 
money a symbol of importance.289 Using m-money, therefore, helps bring into 
the formal system money that is kept in the informal system. Imagine the 
impact of raking into the formal economy all those millions of Kwachas that 
Malaŵians have kept in their safe deposit boxes buried deep into the 
ground.290 
 
As noted in chapter one, Malaŵi has seen the emergence of two m-money 
services: Airtel Money and Mpamba. The ingenuity of m-money as a service 
lies in the fact that its interface is the same as that of regular every day text-
based communication. If one can procure goods and services, it invariably 
means one can also receive payments for goods and services sold. Since 
there is no requirement to possess a bank account,291 this is what makes m-
money a game-changer in the FI matrix. 
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3.4.2.1. Analysis of m-money using the Framework for identifying money 
Utility and value 
The greater the number of those accepting payments via m-money, the more 
m-money mimics the qualities of cash. Within its ecosystem, m-money is 
accepted as a medium of exchange. It is not accepted because it represents 
a valued commodity, but it begets its value from its utility. Although it is a digital 
representation, that representation manifests itself as a store of value. One 
can transfer the value to another person, P2P, and the person who receives 
such transferred value are at liberty to deal with it in any manner. The storage 
of value is also closely tied to the fact that it is a representation of cash.  
 
Unit of account 
M-money has a one to one ratio with cash deposited in a bank. This ensures 
that it serves as a unit of account. The expression of the value of m-money is 
the same as that of cash. As noted above, the m-money issuer opens a pool 
account with a bank where cash from customers is deposited.292 The issuer 
then issues out m-money backed by these deposits and the m-money 
circulates within its ecosystem. Customers exchange cash for m-money and 
vice-versa. M-money therefore retains the same properties of a unit of account 
as cash does.  
 
Portability 
The ubiquitous nature of the mobile phone has meant that m-money can also 
be carried virtually anywhere. It is phone-tied with its information embedded in 
the SIM and computer servers of the m-money issuer. Compared to cash, it is 
safer to carry around. When one produces a wallet full of notes, one attracts 
attention. When one produces a mobile phone, no one pays attention. 
Although mobile phones are increasingly valuable and can be stolen, the 
security features for the service will protect the m-money in such instances. In 
this case, m-money is not only portable but also a convenient way of carrying 
money around.  
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Homogeneity 
As it has a one-to-one ratio with fiat money, m-money is homogeneous. It 
maintains the same value by representation, ensuring uniformity across time 
and space. It is easily divisible into smaller units. In Malaŵi, the currency is 
divided into Kwacha and Tambala. It is possible to divide m-money into 
Kwachas (K) and Tambalas (t), as well as to aggregate it. K1=100t. 
 
Cognoscibility 
Within its ecosystem, m-money is easily recognised and accepted. The 
recognition manifests itself after a transaction has been completed and 
someone has been paid. In this way, it may be said the recognition is ex-post 
facto. It is credited after the transaction. On the other hand, with cash, once it 
is presented, it is cognizable at that level, even before the vendor puts it into 
the cashbox. This in a way is like payment via e-money generally, such as in 
the case of debit cards. 
 
Legal tender 
Although easily accepted within its ecosystem, there is nothing to obligate 
anyone to accept payment via m-money. Outside the ecosystem, it is not 
acceptable at all. It thus lacks a key feature of fiat money: no state authority to 
make it legal tender. It can be said that while it may be regarded as ‘social 
tender’ it is definitely not ‘legal tender’. 
 
3.4.3. Airtime 
The Cambridge Dictionary defines airtime as “the amount of broadcasting time 
that someone has on television or radio.”293 For mobile phones, which are 
radio devices, this is the amount of talk-time that one has. With technological 
advances, airtime is now not restricted to talk-time only but may also be used 
for text messaging and data transmission. With time, airtime has emerged not 
only as a means of communication but also as a form of value which can be 
transferable. For example, popular among mobile phone users in Sub-
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Saharan Africa is a P2P facility called me-to-you (Me2U/M2U) which allows 
transfer of airtime between users. 294 This can be for gratis but may also be in 
exchange for cash or another form of payment.295 This has led others to 
suggest that airtime is a form of money or alternative currency.296 Airtime is 
also unique in that can be transferred without loss of value through the P2P 
scheme. This is how Sambaza, the M2U service by Kenya’s Safaricom,297 was 
described by Day when it was launched:  
What [Safaricom] has actually done is to create a new currency - a 
cyber-currency that can be sent anywhere in the country at the 
press of a button, without needing a bank account or incurring high 
bank charges.298 
 
While this may seem like an exaggeration of what airtime is, it underscores the 
fact that it has value, which can be transferred. 
 
3.4.3.1. Analysis of airtime using the Framework for identifying money 
Across Africa Airtel has a regional mobile telephony product called ‘One 
Network’.299 This allows seamless use of Airtel services within its footprint. 
One can purchase airtime in country X, travel to country Y, and use it. Better 
still, one can be in country D and purchase airtime in country E if one has the 
means. This aspect makes airtime unique and easily transferable across 
borders. Initially, Airtel, like Telekom Networks Malaŵi (TNM) used to 
denominate airtime units in Dollars. Procurement was in local currency but the 
value was fixed at a set rate of the Kwacha to the Dollar. Following complaints 
                                                     
294  Airtel (2016) 'Me2U’ (Airtel, Malawi) 
<http://africa.airtel.com/wps/wcm/connect/africarevamp/malawi/home/personal/voice-
and-text/phone-services/me2u>. 21 January 2016.    
 TNM (2013) 'Me2u Service’ (Telekom Networks Malawi) 
<http://www.tnm.co.mw/index.php/me2u.html>. 21 January 2016.   
 Safaricom call theirs ‘Sambaza’: Safaricom (2017) 'Sambaza’ (Safaricom, Kenya) 
<https://www.safaricom.co.ke/personal/calls-sms/prepay/sambaza>. 17 February 2017.  
295  As where two persons are in a remote area far from any airtime vendor and one of them 
needs to top up his or her airtime 
296  Porteous (2006) p23.   
297 Safaricom (2017). 
298 Peter Day (2005) ‘Mutual benefits of profits from poverty’ BBC News (4 July 2005) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/4648049.stm>. 17 February 2017. 
299  Airtel (2017) ‘One Network Countries’ (Airtel Ghana) 
<http://africa.airtel.com/wps/wcm/connect/africarevamp/Ghana/Home/personal/premier/o
ne-network/PG_One-Network-Countries/>. 29 January 2017. 
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by consumer groups as well as the local communications regulator, this has 
stopped and the airtime units are now in Kwacha.  
 
The dollarization of airtime had its benefit as it allowed it to maintain a unit of 
value across borders. One Dollar of airtime had the same value in country X 
as it had in country Y although the local monetary value varied. This 
transmission of value does not go through any foreign exchange regulatory 
agency or intermediary but via the telecommunication network. This illustrates 
that airtime can serve as a medium of exchange. However, although it serves 
this purpose, its use as a medium of exchange is ancillary. 
 
Utility and value 
The value of airtime is in its usage as a communications enabler. It is primarily 
coveted because, without it, one’s mobile phone is just another useless 
device.300 It is only the phone (connected to the right network) that will 
recognise the value (credit). Its value, therefore, comes from its usage, its 
utility. However, airtime can store value and this is almost perpetual.301 As 
noted above, the value can also be transferred without loss through the P2P 
facility. 
 
Medium of exchange 
The value in the airtime has an equivalent value in cash. Instead of sending 
cash, one may send airtime to a relative in the village. Therefore, in places 
where cash may not be easily remitted, it can operate as an effective medium 
of exchange.302 The recipient may redeem the airtime from whosoever needs 
it (commodity of want) or exchange it for goods and services. However, the 
value is not always one-to-one with cash. The use of airtime as a currency has 
been found to be common in Tanzania. Camner and Sjöblom have described 
the process as follows: 
                                                     
300 This may not be necessary true however in the age of Wi-Fi technology and for the so-
called smart phones which are able to connect to this technology and still operate, on a 
reduced level though. 
301  Porteous (2006) p23. 
302  ibid. 
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The sender buys an airtime voucher, scratches it in order to see the 
code then texts the code in a text message to the person supposed 
to receive the money. It is then up to the recipient to go out and sell 
the code to people who wants [sic] to buy airtime, or resellers and 
shops that in turn will sell it to people wanting airtime. The value of 
the voucher is reduced when selling it the second time, most often 
by 10% but in some cases even up to 40%.303 
 
The airtime code seems to mimic tradable and negotiable financial instruments 
used in the discounting or factoring business.This is interesting because 
Tanzania has the m-money service, M-Pesa.304 Despite M-Pesa being 
cheaper in transactional fees, Camner and Sjöblom say “this informal way of 
sending money through airtime vouchers has been generally accepted as a 
value transfer service in Tanzania.” 305 There has not been documented 
evidence of a similar widespread occurrence in Kenya, where M-Pesa 
originated.  
 
Unity of value and homogeneity 
Airtime also maintains uniformity of value. It is homogeneous over space and 
time, mainly because it is expressed in terms of the unit used for cash and not 
in terms of time-units.306 Airtime can also be unbundled into smaller parts. It is 
possible for one who has Kwacha 100 (K100) worth of airtime to transmit this 
to 10 people, airtime worth K10 each. There is no service charge for this 
service making it perfectly divisible. Although the MNOs provide coupons with 
specific values, airtime agents have devised means of breaking the values in 
the coupons further. For example, suppose the minimum value of a coupon is 
K50. Agents can load this into their phone and then sell a fraction to a customer 
who may not have K50. The balance can then be sold to other customers or 
                                                     
303 Gunnar Camner and Emil  Sjöblom (2009) Can the success of M-PESA be repeated? – A 
review of the implementations in Kenya and Tanzania <http://emil.sjoblom.com/pdf/M-
Pesa_implementations_Ke_Tz.pdf>. 15 December 2016.p7-8. 
304 M-Pesa is short for Mobile Pesa. Pesa is a Swahili (spoken in both Kenya and Tanzania) 
word for money. M-Pesa then directly translates to Mobile Money. 
305 Camner and Sjöblom (2009). 
306  Porteous (2006) p23. 
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combined with other vouchers to create a higher value. This is possible 
because the MNOs sell the vouchers to the agents at a discount.307 
 
Portability and cognoscibility 
Airtime is phone-tied with its information embedded in the SIM and servers of 
the MNO. Presented as a coupon, the airtime is easily recognisable in Malaŵi. 
However, the coupons merely contain the airtime code. Commonly, however, 
the coupon has grown to represent airtime. The production of coupons mirrors 
what the mint does when producing money and the unique number of the 
coupon is akin to unique banknote serial numbers. Furthermore, the coupon 
producer needs a database, which links with the MNO servers so they can 
recognise and accept as value any airtime validly issued. Conversely, the 
system must be able to reject unofficially issued coupons. On its own, airtime 
is cognizable when shown as a balance on one’s phone or when transferred 
P2P. 
 
Legal tender 
Airtime is not traditionally used to pay for goods and services even within the 
mobile phone ecosystem. It cannot be redeemed for cash at par value.308 In 
fact, its face value masks the fact that airtime is usually sold via agents at a 
discount. It means no one can be obligated to accept it in settlement of any 
debt. It is not legal tender. Unlike m-money, it is not even considered as ‘social 
tender’. Its lack of acceptance as social tender may prove fatal to any 
developments on the money ladder.309 In most countries, airtime also attracts 
a tax,310 something that is not normally associated with money. 
 
                                                     
307 Personal experience having been an agent before, at Chancellor College in Zomba 
(2006-2008). 
308 Porteous (2006) p23. 
309 ibid. 
310 James M. Kenani, Stan G. Kaunda and Chiyembekezo Chafuwa (2014) ‘Taxation policy 
and performance in Malawi since independence’ (Inaugural ECAMA Research 
Symposium, Lilongwe) <http://www.slideshare.net/IFPRIMaSSP/taxation-policy-and-
performance-in-malawi-since-independence-by-sg-kaunda-j-kenani>. 17 February 2017. 
 Porteous (2006) p24. 
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3.4.4. Analysing m-money and airtime using the money framework  
The table below summarises the discussion in 3.4.2.1 and 3.4.3.1 using fiat 
money as the standard. 
 
 
Table 4: Analysis of m-money and airtime 
 
M-money fails to satisfy the requirements of fiat money, as it is not legal tender. 
Airtime fails because it is not primarily a medium of exchange and is not legal 
tender. However, if one removes the legal tender column, m-money would be 
included in the category of money. Airtime, however, would not fully qualify, 
because as it has been noted, its use as a medium of exchange is accidental 
or ancillary. From the discussion of money, it can be said that m-money and 
airtime are forms of value. M-money is e-money as it is backed on a one-to-
one ratio with fiat money. Airtime is not e-money as it lacks this characteristic. 
In answering the question whether m-money and airtime are money, it may be 
said that in the classical sense they are not. However, as Bitcoin has proved, 
the future may lie in the decentralisation of sovereign monetary power. Being 
legal tender may no longer be the yardstick for money. It can be said that m-
money and airtime are emerging forms of money. How successfully they will 
fulfil the function of money will depend on how they develop. As has been 
shown earlier, the evolution of money has been a constant attribute of money 
from its origins. With advances in technology, demands of society and 
changes in procurement habits, money will continue to evolve.311  
 
                                                     
311 Kelley Jr (1999) p22. 
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3.4.5. Cash and digital currencies contrasted 
As noted earlier, the main difference between cash and the digital currencies 
is that the former is legal tender and the only obligatory method of payment 
within a jurisdiction. Apart from fulfilling any legal requirements, cash is subject 
to prudential regulation. A country’s central bank will usually be charged with 
monetary policy including setting up its value and fixing its supply. The table 
below summarises the differences between cash and digital currencies  
 
 
Table 5: Differences between virtual currency and e-money312 
 
                                                     
312 Source: ECB (2012) p16. 
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3.4.6. The regulatory issues involving m-money 
The departure point in formulating a regulatory strategy for m-money is to 
access the risks that clients and consumers may be exposed to as well as 
risks that the service poses to the financial system.313  
 
3.4.6.1. Genuineness of money and stability value 
As an electronic form of value, the genuineness of the m-money is tied to the 
integrity of the whole financial system. Trust in the system is of paramount 
importance.314 If the m-money is within the ecosystem, and the integrity of the 
ecosystem and payment system are secure, issues of genuineness do not 
arise. It is at the point of cashing out that problems could arise. These 
problems would relate to either fraud or corruption in the data (see 3.4.6.5 and 
3.4.6.6 below). Since m-money is directly tied to cash, the only risk of stability 
of value would be that of cash itself. M -money does not suffer from fluctuations 
in value on its own. 
 
3.4.6.2. Maintaining financial stability and integrity 
M-money is private money issued by private entities. However, it is issued on 
the backbone of central bank money. The issue that would arise would be if it 
was issued without deposits backing it up. If this were to happen, then m-
money issuers would in effect be creating and injecting new money into the 
system and this would affect supply and financial stability. It may be argued 
that this would be no different from what the old bankers used to do; issuing 
gold certificates as credit without any gold deposits to match. One would also 
argue that it is the same as what the central bank does, issuing fiat money 
against no liabilities. However, therein, lies the difference. M-money issuers 
are not banks and are not authorised to issue money unless it is backed on a 
one-to-one ratio with money in a pool account. 
 
                                                     
313 Porteous (2006) p31. 
314 Olga Morawczynski and Gianluca Miscione (2008) 'Examining trust in mobile banking 
transactions: The case of M-PESA in Kenya’ in Chrisanthi Avgerou, Matthew L. Smith 
and Peter van den Basselaar (eds) Social dimensions of information and communication 
technology policy (Springer, Boston) p289. 
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M-money works on the principle of full liquidity of deposits in a bank. However, 
the bank holding this money is at liberty to use it as part of its loan portfolio.315 
Since the funds in a pool account are not demand deposits, there is a risk that 
banks may engage in moral hazard. The risk is that banks may not exercise 
the same prudence compared to other deposits and investments. This 
potentially exposes the system to a liquidity risk if a bank has lent out most of 
the money deposited against the m-money and for whatever reason m-money 
users want to cash out en masse. There is no restriction in how banks lend m-
money deposits. However, this risk may be balanced by the fact that m-money 
comprises a small fraction of bank deposits.316 Increases in m-money deposits, 
however, may change the risk profile. 
 
The values of transactions in m-money are naturally small, reflective of its main 
clientele, the rural population. However, because the m-money system is 
connected to the main financial system via the pool account, any risks that the 
service may potentially pose on the financial stability and integrity of the 
financial system need to be addressed.  As stated earlier the ability by the 
central bank to timely assess the risk posed by a financial institution is crucial 
to maintaining financial stability and integrity.317 
 
Assessing risk 
Due to non-stringent identification requirements for m-money accounts, and 
no requirement at all for procuring a SIM, there is a potential risk of m-money 
being used for illicit means. Even though the amounts transferred are 
restricted; both in value and daily transaction, m-money may act as a laundry 
or mixer of funds in such a manner that what comes in cannot be connected 
to what comes out. Furthermore, the fact that the units of value can be 
subdivided would make it easy for funds to be channelled to several sources 
as well as to have funds channelled from several sources and consolidated 
into one account. The ultimate recipient may get cash out.  
 
                                                     
315 RBM Headquarters (Interview, 6 August 2015).  
316 Di Castri (2013) p8.  
317  Singh (2007). 
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As a global response to money laundering and terrorism financing concerns, 
the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an inter-governmental body was 
established in 1989.318 Issues of proceeds of money laundering and terrorism 
financing have been on the international agenda for some time but the 9/11 
terrorist attacks on the United States319 may have accelerated the need to 
ensure that the financial sector is not used a conduit for illicit purposes. The 
FATF sets standards and promotes “effective implementation of legal, 
regulatory and operational measures for combating money laundering, 
terrorist financing and other related threats to the integrity of the international 
financial system.”320 The FATF has been behind the enactment of municipal 
anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism legislation as 
well as many regulatory reforms.321  
 
The setting of financial intelligence units (FIUs) is one of the successes of the 
FATF. The FATF issues recommendations (soft law), which are now 
recognised as an international standard.322 The first guidelines were issued in 
1990 and there have been four revisions with the latest one done in 2012.323 
The reason m-money has been earmarked is that since it was not initially taken 
to be part of the formal financial sector (and therefore not regulated), it poses 
a risk as a potential conduit for money laundering and terrorism financing. De 
Koker says Recommendation 14 of the FATF (2012) now requires that money 
or value transfer service providers, which includes m-money, “be licensed or 
registered and subject to effective systems for monitoring and ensuring 
compliance with the relevant FATF measures.”324  
 
                                                     
318  FATF (2016) 'Financial Action Task Force’ (FATF) <http://www.fatf-gafi.org/>. 15 
December 2016. 
319 This refers to the attack organised by international terrorist organisation Al Qaeda on the 
United States using planes as simultaneous ‘bombs’ that took place in a coordinated 
manner on September 9th, 2001 (9/11/01 or simply ‘9/11’). 
320  FATF (2016). 
321  ibid. 
322 As well as in the controversial issue of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 
323  FATF (2016). 
324 Louis de Koker (2013) ‘The 2012 Revised FATF Recommendations: Assessing and 
Mitigating Mobile Money Integrity Risks Within the New Standards Framework’ 8 WASH 
JL TECH & ARTS 165 p14. 
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In Malaŵi, the FIU was established as the lead operating agency under the 
Money Laundering, Proceeds of Serious Crime and Terrorist Financing Act 
(2006) [MLA].325 Although autonomous, it works closely with law enforcement 
agencies326 and may enter into cooperative “agreements or arrangements with 
any domestic government institution regarding exchange of information.”327 
The FIU may also have cooperative agreements and arrangements with 
similar bodies in other jurisdictions.328 All financial institutions are now obliged 
to conduct a customer due diligence (CDD) before entering into any business 
transactions with a potential customer.329 The FIU may apply for a search 
warrant if it reasonably believes that an offence may have been committed.330 
A new Financial Crimes Act (2017) has been passed.331 It renames the FIU to 
the Financial Intelligence Authority (FIA). However, due to the period in which 
it was passed, and the lack of availability of a bill prior to its passing, except 
for some comments made in passing, the Act is not discussed and is one that 
will inform future research. For purposes of this work, the FIU is still referred 
to, notwithstanding that its powers have now been taken over by the FIA.332 
 
In relation to operations of the pool account, the FIU is not involved in its 
oversight. The FIU’s Director, Atuweni Phiri says the FIU views this as “a 
prudential matter that falls under the Reserve Bank of Malaŵi.”333 Therefore, 
m-money operators are not required to make reports to the FIU regarding the 
operation of the pool account.334 However, the operators are under an 
obligation to submit reports to the FIU on transactions involving amounts from 
K1,000,000.00 (£1= K882.61)335 and above as well as suspicious 
transactions.336 In practice, though, this does not happen because m-money 
                                                     
325 Section 11(1) Money Laundering Act (Malaŵi, 2006). 
 The Money Laundering Act has been replaced with the Financial Crimes Act (2017). 
326 Section 11(2)(d) ibid. 
327 Section 11(2)(q) ibid. 
328 Section 12 ibid. 
329 Section 24(1) ibid. 
330 Section 41 ibid. 
331 February 2017. 
332 Section 3 Financial Crimes Act (Malaŵi, 2017). 
333 Interview with Atuweni Tupochire Phiri, Director, Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) (7 
August 2015). 
334 ibid. 
335 XE (2017). 
336 Phiri (Interview, 7 August 2015).  
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has a ceiling of K200,000.00 which means such transactions will not be 
reported to the FIU unless they are deemed suspicious.337 It would seem when 
the law was being enacted, the high K1 million threshold did not envisage low-
value services like m-money. The FIU is negotiating with operators to lower 
the threshold for the purposes of m-money.338 It is however, aware that such 
an arrangement would not have the sanction of the law and would largely 
depend on the goodwill of the operators to keep their end of the agreement.339 
The biggest challenge that the FIU faces is to get operators who are 
competitors to sign up to such an agreement, as they are under no obligation 
legally to do so. Under the Act, there is no framework to regulate m-money. 340 
The FIU Director had indicated that there were plans to review the Act and 
formulate a new legal framework, which would include new forms of money, 
and payment including m-money.341 A quick review of the new Act and the 
regulations made under it discloses that m-money has not been explicitly 
included other than as a general subset of electronic funds.342 
 
Unlike the central bank, the FIU does not have any authority to issue 
regulations.343 However, Phiri says, when the central bank was coming up with 
its guidelines for mobile payments, the FIU provided input.344 This does not 
mean that the FIU is not involved at all. For example, at the point when the 
central bank gives an operator the go ahead to do a pilot, Phiri says, the FIU 
will undertake a know your customer (KYC) audit.345 The audit is, however, 
limited to money laundering issues.346 The FIU issues guidelines on minimal 
KYC requirements.347 At the heart of this is the requirement for any financial 
                                                     
337 ibid, Section 28 Money Laundering Act (Malaŵi, 2006). 
338 Phiri (Interview, 7 August 2015).  
339 ibid. 
340 ibid. 
341 ibid. 
342 Financial Crimes Act (Malaŵi, 2017). 
 Financial Crimes (Suppression of Terrorist Financing and Proliiferation) Regulations, 
2017, Government Notice No. 11 of 2017 (Malaŵi)  
343 Phiri (Interview, 7 August 2015). The new Act has not provided these powers either. 
Regulations can only be issued by the Minister of Finance – section 144 Financial Crimes 
Act (Malaŵi, 2017). 
344 Phiri (Interview, 7 August 2015).  
345 ibid. 
346 ibid. 
347 ibid. 
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institution to undertake a CDD or conduct a KYC audit before such customer 
can have access to financial services.348 This extends to m-money services 
and the central bank requires that one must satisfy the KYC requirements laid 
out in the law.349  
 
The KYC requirement is for all financial institutions, such that for one to 
register for the m-money service, one needs to produce some form of 
identification.350 The central bank requires that one must satisfy the KYC 
requirements laid out in the MLA.351 The author’s own experience shows that 
registering with Mpamba is more onerous and cumbersome as compared to 
Airtel Money. The reasons provided for the myriad of information sought was 
to ensure regulatory compliance. It can be concluded that both mobile network 
operators are conducting some sort of CDD, although the information sought 
and demanded seems to vary.352 Although the KYC requirements of Mpamba 
were more demanding, it can be said that both mobile operators are not strictly 
following the KYC requirements provided by the FIU. This can be seen as a 
good sign that shows that the m-money issuers are using a risk based 
approach in their assessment. Being an entry point, it is important that this 
process is user-friendly. It should not pose as a barrier to FI.  
 
It has been argued that a possible solution lies in the introduction of a national 
identity system, which the country has just embarked on, after the passing of 
the legislative framework for its implementation.353 The FIU believes that a 
                                                     
348  Jennifer Isern and Louis De Koker (2012) AML/CFT: strengthening financial inclusion and 
integrity (CGAP Focus Notes, CGAP, Washington DC) 
<http://dro.deakin.edu.au/eserv/DU:30020790/dekoker-amlcft-2009.pdf>. 14 November 
2016. 
349 ibid. 
350 What exactly this comprises in a country without a formal national identity system is an 
area requiring more research. This is because it may be prone to misrepresentation and 
can easily be taken advantage of by people with money laundering and terrorism 
financing motives. 
351 Guidelines for Mobile Payment Systems (Malaŵi, 2011) p12. 
352 Whether this is due to a difference of interpretation of the Money Laundering, Proceeds 
of Serious Crimes and Terrorist Financing Act’s ‘know your customer requirements’ or 
not is yet to be researched. 
353 Malaŵi_Government (2015) 'Commencement of Universal and Compulsory Birth & Death 
registration and Issuance of Certificates’ (Government of Malaŵi) 
<https://www.facebook.com/malawigovernment/posts/439708072882359>. 21 July 2016. 
 National Registration Act (Malaŵi, 2010) <https://www.globalintegrity.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/01/Malawi-NATIONAL-REGISTRATION-ACT.pdf>. 21 July 2016. 
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system similar to the South Africa’s Regulation of Interception of 
Communications and Provision of Communication-Related Information Act 
(RICA) would best serve the FIU but this can only work where a national ID 
system is in place.354 Under the RICA, every mobile phone user must register 
their phone number.355 It is seen as one of the initiatives to prevent crime and 
money laundering as well as combat terrorism financing.356 Under the RICA: 
Users must provide their name and surname, and bring proof of 
identity in the form of an identity document or passport, as well as a 
proof of a physical address in the form of either a bank statement or 
utility bill. Persons living in informal settlements may bring a 
letter/affidavit from a school, church, or nearby retail store. The 
registration has to be done face-to-face with RICA agents.357 
 
The advantage of RICA is that it removes anonymity and makes m-money 
transactions traceable as they can be matched with a unique subscriber 
number, time and date of transaction and location.358 Cash on the other hand 
is for most parts the perfect mask.359 The challenge, as noted above, is that 
until recently, the country did not have a national ID system in place.360 The 
FIU encourages a KYC regime based on risk-based assessment (RBA).361 
The FATF provides the model and requires countries to use an RBA to 
formulate local regulations.362 However, Phiri says:  
The problem with FATF guidelines is that they are rule-based. They 
require that financial institutions be treated the same way. For 
example, Mpamba must be treated similarly to Standard Bank, 
which is not practically possible.363  
                                                     
354 Phiri (Interview, 7 August 2015).  
355 Nicola Jentzsch (2012) ‘Implications of mandatory registration of mobile phone users in 
Africa’ 36 (8) Telecommunications Policy 608 p611 
<http://doi.org/10.1016/j.telpol.2012.04.002>. 14 November 2016. 
356 ibid p608. 
357 ibid p611. 
358 Di Castri (2013) p18. 
359 ibid. 
360 Yvonnie Sundu (2016) ‘APM says national IDs will transform Malawi’ The Nation (28 
October 2016) <http://mwnation.com/apm-says-national-ids-will-transform-malawi/>. 14 
November 2016. 
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Therefore, the onus has shifted to institutions to show the FIU that they have 
done an RBA on their customers as well as a KYC.364 However, even where 
there is no national ID system in place, opening m-money accounts still require 
some form of identification. This allows m-money transactions to be matched 
over time. The uniqueness of subscriber numbers to which the m-money 
accounts are tied also means over time; the service can develop a user profile 
of its customers.365 Unlike cash, even where the KYC system is imperfect, the 
m-money system is not as elusive.366 
 
Balancing the risk 
Between FI and financial stability/integrity, which then should drive the 
regulatory agenda for m-money? There are two divergent schools of thought 
over this. The first argues that there is need to ensure that the rules of FI are 
such that they ensure financial stability and financial integrity. An extension to 
this is that FI inevitably leads to financial stability and integrity since all covered 
under one roof.  The other argues that the rules that ensure financial stability 
and integrity should not lead to financial exclusion. The FATF President Bjørn 
Aamo summarised the relationship between FI and its work in this way: 
Financial exclusion represents a real risk to achieving effective 
implementation of the AML/CTF367 recommendations… Financial 
inclusion and AML/CTF pursue mutually supportive and 
complimentary objectives: the application of measures which 
enable more citizens to use formal financial services will increase 
the reach and the effectiveness of AML/CTF regimes.368 
 
                                                     
364 ibid. 
365 Interview with Webster Mbekeani Head, Mobile Money Division, TNM (20 August 2015). 
366 Di Castri (2013) p19. 
367 Anti-money laundering and counter terrorism financing. 
368  Bjørn S.  Aamo (2012) ‘FATF's focus on financial inclusion: protecting the integrity of the 
global financial system’ (Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion Conference on 
Standard-Setting Bodies and Financial Inclusion: Promoting Financial Inclusion through 
Proportionate Standards and Guidance) Basel, 29 October 2012, <http://www.fatf-
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Stringent KYC requirements, which though necessary for financial stability and 
financial integrity may be a barrier to FI. This in turn harms the AML/CTF 
efforts. There is therefore a need to strike a balance in assessing this risk,369 
especially in countries where asking for too much biometric data may prove a 
barrier. The FATF now calls for a risk-based approach where a country must 
“identify, assess and understand” their money laundering and terrorism 
financing risks.370 
 
Viable KYC procedures need to consider the circumstances surrounding most 
African households. The Universal Postal Union estimates that only 21% of 
African households receive mail at home, 49% have mail access and 30% 
have no access at all.371  Isern et al argue that even verification of address is 
not easy and they commend South Africa for adopting a flexible approach to 
identification and verification.372 South Africa has introduced “a compliance 
exemption that relaxes requirements for a category of clients known as ‘mass 
banking clients’: those clients with small balances and small size 
transactions.”373 Maurer refers to this approach as “proportionate KYC” which 
allows mobile banking customers online registration without the need to 
physically appear before a person or produce proof of identification374. He 
argues that since KYC and CDD require the production of acceptable identity 
documents, lack of these “documents is often one of the most powerful barriers 
to financial inclusion.”375 Porteous argues that transformational models such 
                                                     
369  Porteous (2006) p31. 
370  de Koker (2013) p9. 
371  Development of postal services in 2011: A few key figures (2011) (Universal Postal 
Union,  
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df>. 10 May 2017. 
372  Jennifer Isern and others (2005) ‘AML/CFT Regulation: Implications for Financial Service 
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as m-money whose target is people less likely to have a formal address require 
flexibility in their application of KYC requirements.376  
 
In Malaŵi, there is no system of marked physical addresses. A small 
percentage has access to postal addresses but with the advent of the mobile 
phone, most Malaŵians are less likely to use the postal services for personal 
mail deliveries. It is therefore not possible to produce traceable physical 
addresses. In Nigeria, a country with similar identification problems to Malaŵi, 
recognition has been made of the potential barrier that a stringent KYC regime 
may prove and has adopted a strategy to restructure the KYC regulation to a 
risk-based tiered framework.377  
 
However, the need to recognise the risk associated with a systemic failure of 
the financial system must be appreciated. Mwenda has argued that a key 
institutional aspect of financial regulation and supervision is reducing 
contagion and maintaining consumer confidence in the financial system.378 
Indeed once the informal sector grows, the distinction between the formal, the 
informal sector is blurred, and a point is then reached where the morphed 
system may potentially pose a systemic financial risk. For financial regulators, 
it is the maintenance of sound banking and payment systems that occupy their 
focus.379 Since the financial regulator usually focuses on the banking industry, 
the danger is therefore from exogenous risk, such us an improperly regulated 
m-money service.380 In reality however, the low ceiling in transaction value 
means that the risk of m-money being used for such illicit purposes is very 
low.381 Looked at from this perspective, because of its low limit, and the fact 
that transactions leave a digital trail, m-money is a key AML/CFT tool.382 The 
FATF also recommends that each country assesses its own risk: 
                                                     
376  Porteous (2006) p34. See also generally Di Castri (2013). 
377 Francis N. Ngwu (2014) ‘Promoting Formal Financial Inclusion in Africa: As Institutional 
re-examination of the Policies with a Case Study of Nigeria’ Journal of Banking 
Regulation p9. 
378  Mwenda (2006) p3. 
379  Porteous (2006) p32. 
380  Maurer (2012) p306. 
381 Di Castri (2013) p9. 
382 ibid. 
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There are circumstances where the risk of money laundering or 
terrorist financing may be lower. In such circumstances, and 
provided there has been an adequate analysis of the risk by the 
country or by the financial institution, it could be reasonable for a 
country to allow its financial institutions to apply simplified CDD 
measures.383 
 
3.4.6.3. Consumer protection 
The m-money system operates on trust.384 First is the trust consumers have 
in their own phone. Then is the trust they have of the MNO. It is argued that 
the trust consumers have in the m-money service is premised on the trust they 
have in the MNO. The fact that they can also transact in m-money leads to a 
growth in confidence. A growing m-money ecosystem is key to building trust 
and increasing financial inclusiveness.385 There is a direct correlation between 
the unbanked, the rural poor and the financially excluded (chapter 6 discusses 
the country’s FI agenda). Protection of consumers of m-money becomes not 
only an economic or legal function but a social function as well. Consumer 
protection in relation to banks usually aims to address information 
asymmetries. It is therefore, argued that the differences between consumers 
and service providers in the m-money industry are even bigger.  
 
Most MNOs in developing countries seem to be flourishing thereby giving an 
assurance that they are here to stay. However, insolvency on the part of the 
m-money issuer, the MNO or the bank hosting the pool account may leave 
customers with worthless values of m-money. As noted earlier, m-money is 
private money. Although there are two m-money issuers in Malaŵi, one cannot 
exchange the two monies. There is in fact a privatisation of money at play.386 
                                                     
383  FATF (2012) International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the 
Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation (updated October 2016) (Financial Action Task 
Force) <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf>. 20 
February 2017. 
384 See generally Morawczynski and Miscione (2008).  
385 Di Castri (2013) p7. 
386  Maurer (2012) p307. 
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They can only be exchangeable using cash as an intermediary. However, this 
leads to loss of value due to transactional costs.  
 
Currently, m-money issuers are not regulated on the same level as banks and 
other prudentially regulated institutions.387 Would an increase in the regulatory 
threshold result in greater consumer protection? Alternatively, is it likely to 
harm the very consumer it is trying to protect? Would a deposit insurance 
scheme be the answer? Alternatively, should the central bank require m-
money issuers to have similar capital reserves requirements like banks? For 
researchers, these are regulatory issues, which a post-FI era may pose. In 
chapter 9, the issue of deposit insurance is canvassed.  
 
3.4.6.4. Operational risk 
This is a risk associated with failure of operations including cessation of 
business of the MNO, m-money issuer, the bank, or any combination of these. 
Even a temporary loss of service can adversely affect the service.388 M-money 
operates using a telecommunications backbone. Any failures in the backbone 
invariably affect m-money transactions. In addition, any failure in the chain of 
operations can pose a risk. This includes the risk posed by m-money agents, 
the bank that holds the pooled funds, the m-money issuer, and the MNO. If 
any link were to cease function or derail, it would affect the whole chain and 
pose an operational risk. Chapter 4 looks at m-money operation. 
 
3.4.6.5. Fraud 
So far, there have been no reported cases of fraud involving m-money. If fraud 
was perpetrated on the service, it may have catastrophic results for the entire 
system. This is because the system is built on trust. People trust that the m-
money value they have is directly tied to cash. People trust that when they 
have exchanged their cash with m-money, it will indeed be worth the value. 
There is trust that no one will interfere with what they have acquired.  There is 
                                                     
387 AFI (2010) Enabling mobile money transfer: The Central Bank of Kenya’s treatment of M-
Pesa (Alliance for Financial Inclusion) <http://www.gsma.com/mobilefordevelopment/wp-
content/uploads/2013/09/enablingmobilemoneytransfer92.pdf>. 15 December 2016. 
 Greenacre, Malady and Buckley (2014). 
388 Porteous (2006) p31. 
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also an implicit trust that if one approaches an m-money agent to cash out, the 
m-money in one’s phones constitutes good value. If someone were to break 
down the encryption system of m-money, it would lead to many customers 
losing out on their funds. The system must protect “information in transit” from 
third party attempts to steal or interfere with it.389 It must also be able to identify 
the parties. A breakdown of trust would be irreparable. 
 
3.4.6.6. Data security and integrity 
As a digital form of money, m-money faces risks associated with the security 
of its data. This may be interference by third parties like in the case of theft or 
fraud described above or failure or corruption in the system. MNOs keep data 
about their customers. Apart from their names and numbers, this may also 
include when and where transactions are conducted, and what has been 
purchased and its value.390 Having system back-ups is one way of mitigating 
against data loss, which can occur.391 Airtel Money, for example, claims that 
their product “is safe, secure and reliable. It runs on a dependable network 
with little or no breakdowns.”392 The author’s experience, however, is that this 
may not be entirely correct. Malaŵi has for some time now been experiencing 
intermittent power supply which affects not only the quality but also availability 
of telecommunication services.393There may also be a system failure. How to 
protect the system as well as ensure recovery is, therefore, vital. Redundancy 
of equipment and databases may be a solution but duplication has a cost.394 
Physically separating data of m-money accounts from mobile phone users 
would be one way of ensuring data integrity of both in case there is a problem 
with either.395 Hopefully, for a company like Airtel, which experienced system 
                                                     
389 Klein and Mayer (2011) p15. 
390 Di Castri (2013) p30. 
391 Klein and Mayer (2011) p13. 
392 Airtel (2013c) 'About Airtel Money’ (Airtel Malaŵi) 
<http://africa.airtel.com/wps/wcm/connect/AfricaRevamp/Malawi/Airtel_Money/Home/Per
sonal/About_airtel_money>. 23 March 2015. 
393 Anon (2003) 'Power Failure Rocks Malawi's Telecoms’ (PANA Press) 
<http://www.panapress.com/Power-Failure-Rocks-Malawi-s-Telecoms--13-475501-18-
lang1-index.html>. 29 June 2016.  
394 Author’s experience in designing a database system for monitoring the electricity grid. 
395 Klein and Mayer (2011) p13. 
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failure due to fire that destroyed its equipment,396 some lessons would have 
been learnt about ensuring the integrity and safety of data. Problems of power 
supply are beyond the MNOs and something that the whole Southern Africa is 
grappling with.397  
 
The second issue is related to the integrity of the data. Unlike most other 
transactions, electronic transactions rely on electronic verification. This is 
usually in a form of electronic signature which is evidenced by either a unique 
subscriber number, a personal identification number (PIN), or biometric 
identification.398 A well designed system should reject any data that does not 
meet the specified thresholds.399 If the system wrongly rejects or accepts data, 
this can leave agents and others in the ecosystem open to possible legal 
challenges.400 The system should therefore be designed to minimise 
interference and to operate on the highest level of accuracy. 
 
Another issue that may affect data security and privacy is customer literacy. 
Mistakes by customers may lead to data rejection. Customers also need to be 
advised to secure any passwords and PINs.401 Therefore, although customers 
are ultimately responsible for keeping their PINs and passwords private, 
customer education is one way of ensuring PIN and password security.402 
Because of the sensitivity of the data stored by MNOs, regulators may require 
them to implement enhanced data protection measures to prevent theft or 
fraud.403 In doing so, however, regulators need to be aware of what is feasible 
in the Malaŵian context. 
 
                                                     
396 Anon (2007) 'Malawi Mobile Phone Network goes off the air’ (ClickAfrique) 
<http://www.clickafrique.com/Magazine/ST010/CP0000002372.aspx>. 29 June 2016. 
397 Michael  Malakata (2015) 'Power problems disrupt Africa's telecom sector’ (PCWorld) 
<http://www.pcworld.com/article/2926892/power-problems-disrupt-africas-telecom-
sector.html>. 29 June 2016. 
398 Porteous (2006) p31. 
399 ibid. 
400 ibid. 
401 Di Castri (2013) p30. 
402 ibid. 
403 ibid. 
- 119 - 
 
3.4.6.7. Resolution risk 
In the case of resolution, the question that arises is how protected is the pool 
account to ensure that consumers can redeem their m-money? The trust 
account needs to be ring-fenced against creditors not only of the bank but also 
of the parent MNO.404 However, as the funds are comingled within the bank, 
this leads to two problems. If the bank were to become insolvent, the trust 
account is likely to be part of the pool of resources, which creditors may have 
access. If the mobile service provider were to become insolvent, it is unclear 
if the pool account would not be available to creditors. In fact, it is unclear 
whether this pool account operates under Trust law, where there is a fiduciary 
duty to hold the funds for the benefit of customers.405 In practice, the 
customers are not the true beneficiaries of the pool account. Unknown 
charities are. Trustees appointed by the MNOs decide who should benefit from 
the proceeds.406 At this point, it is unclear if ring fencing of the account alone 
would protect it in the event of a failure of the bank. It is argued that ring fencing 
would only be of use in the event of a failure of the MNO or the m-money 
issuer. 
 
The failure of the parent MNO may prima facie not affect the trust account as 
the m-money issuer is a separate company. However, since m-money rides 
on the rail of the telecommunications backbone, failure of the parent company 
would also lead to the failure of the m-money service. Ring fencing the pool 
account is therefore a key regulatory issue to be considered. Another would 
be a system guaranteeing depositors’ funds. However, there would be a need 
to balance this with placing onerous financial obligations on the m-money 
issuers which may end up making the service more expensive and 
unaffordable to its target group. The issue may be complicated where a 
catastrophic failure in the system results in failure of the MNO itself. In such a 
case, even if the customers were to have protection, how would their interest 
be protected where there is unreliable data to back up their claims? It is 
                                                     
404 Klein and Mayer (2011) p5. 
405 Di Castri (2013) p15. 
406 Mbekeani (Interview, 20 August 2015).  
 Interview with Bigboy Mkoloma Product and Development Manager, Airtel Money (7 
August 2015). 
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submitted that having a separate database housed physically away from the 
servers of the m-money issuer would help in the event of such a catastrophe. 
 
3.4.6.8. Investment risk 
MNOs are precluded from investing m-money deposits.407 Therefore, any 
investment risk is at the hands of the bank where the pool account is domiciled. 
Where there are no specific rules to regulate how such deposits may be 
invested, the bank is at liberty to intermediate the funds as it would any other 
deposits. It is only restricted by the general prudential rules that govern 
deposits in general.408 To mitigate against this, regulators may limit investment 
of such deposits to those considered safe and highly liquid.409 Regulators 
could also direct that deposits be diversified and spread over several banks to 
minimise any impact that a single investment failure may have.410 Since m-
money is fully backed by deposits in a pool account, any investment failure by 
the bank would affect the supply of m-money. In the event of a major 
investment failure affecting a pool account, two things would immediately 
result. The first would be that if this were not made known, the m-money would 
be circulated without a full backing of fiat money. This would mean that money 
has been created which cannot be backed up by any deposits or reserves. 
The second would be a scenario where the m-money essentially loses its 
value because it cannot be redeemed at par value. This would lead to a 
collapse of the m-money system. 
 
3.4.6.9. Systemic risk 
Systemic risk has to do more with the banking system than m-money itself. 
Since m-money is created on the back of deposits, the stability of the banking 
system is vital for the operation of m-money. There is no risk in the issuance 
of the m-money itself and no fear that this would affect money supply.411 
Prudential requirements put in place for the banking service are therefore 
                                                     
407 Di Castri (2013) p15. 
408 Klein and Mayer (2011) p16. 
409 ibid. 
410 ibid p26. 
411 Porteous (2006) p37. 
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sufficient to mitigate any liquidity risks.412 Although the MNOs issue m-money, 
this issuance is not the creation of money in the banking sense.413 This is 
because the m-money is not issued against fractional reserves.414 Traditionally 
the intermediation of deposits into loans is the basis of money multiplication or 
creation.415 M-money is issued against full liquidity on a one-to-one ratio of 
funds deposited in a pool account.416 Money manifests itself in different forms 
and the term money is used to collectively define these monetary 
aggregates.417 Money can be broadly separated into money for making daily 
payments and money for settling obligations but the latter is not readily 
available in the near future.418 The first category, referred to as M1 or narrow 
money includes fiat money, demand posits and other forms that can be easily 
converted to cash.419 Mobile money forms part of M1.420 Therefore, to mitigate 
the risk to m-money customers the following three steps need to be followed: 
a) Backing up the m-money with 100% liquidity deposited in a prudentially 
regulated bank 
b) Non-intermediation by the m-money issuer 
c) Ring fencing the pool account and isolating it from creditors of the issuer 
or its parent MNO.421 
 
In theory, a run-on m-money could lead to an indirect bank-run. This would 
occur if enough m-money customers decided to cash out at the same time. 
Since the deposits on which the m-money is created are intermediated, the 
bank would face a liquidity squeeze. Fear and panic may easily spread within 
the financial system causing contagion. However, because the aggregate 
value of m-money transactions is very low,422 such a run would most likely 
                                                     
412 Di Castri (2013) p8. 
413 Porteous (2006) p37. 
414 Schooner and Taylor (2010) p3-7. 
415 Di Castri (2013) p10. 
416 Porteous (2006) p37. 
417 Reed Jr (1998) p4. 
418 ibid. 
419 Roger E.  Backhouse (1991) 'Money’ in Applied UK Macroeconomics (Basil Blackwell, 
Oxford) p205. 
420 Di Castri (2013) p10. The designation of other forms of money will depend on countries 
and can be from M2 to M4 - Reed Jr (1998) p10. 
421 Di Castri (2013) p15. 
422 Ali and others (2014b) p8. 
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have little impact on the bank. Any fears of a bank-run caused by mobile 
money are therefore misplaced. However, although not highly likely, systemic 
risk is one that still needs to be considered with the m-money service. 
Weakness in security and liability may pose a risk to the financial system. The 
table below summarises the risks associated with m-money. 
 
Table 6: Risk analysis of m-money 
 
3.5. Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an overview of the development of money and what 
qualities need to be satisfied for a commodity to function as money. The 
journey back to the origins of money was necessary to appreciate the evolution 
of money and the emergence of new forms of money, such as m-money. This 
chapter also discussed the evolution of the central bank and the regulation of 
money and the financial system. The development of other virtual currencies 
like Bitcoin has evidenced a shift in the sovereign foundations of money. These 
new currencies also question the importance of state guarantee in the 
issuance of money. Fundamentally, this also raises the question of how these 
emerging forms of money can maintain value independent of state guarantee. 
Furthermore, due to their extra-territorial nature, questions now arise as to how 
these emerging forms of money may be regulated. Will they require cross-
border licences and corroboration by regulators of different countries? Where 
does the fiscal buck-stop lie?  
 
A framework was developed based on the attributes of legal money and 
applied to m-money and airtime as emerging forms of money. It was found 
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that both m-money and airtime are not legal tender but that they generally 
satisfy the attributes of economic money. Of the two, m-money satisfies the 
broad qualities of economic money but airtime is only money in an ancillary 
way. An analysis of regulatory issues involving fiat money and m-money 
revealed that m-money does pose additional challenges because of its form. 
It also raises the question whether, investments of the pool account should be 
restricted? However, if banks were restricted and could not intermediate it as 
they do with other deposits and investments; it may not make business sense 
to hold such money unless they were paid a premium for doing so.  
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4. OPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK OF MOBILE MONEY1 
4.1. Introduction 
To fully appreciate the ingenuity of the development of mobile money (m-
money) as a service, there is a need to start by analysing how the mobile 
phone developed. If the home is an Englishman’s castle, then the mobile 
phone may be said to be a modern person’s sanctuary. In the mobile phone, 
the subscriber identity module (SIM) card may well be said to be its heart, 
memory bank and nerve centre combined. The SIM is used by phones using 
the Groupe Speciale Mobile (GSM) family of protocols.2 It “contains encryption 
keys, secures the user’s personal identification number (PIN) on entry, and 
drives the phone’s menu.”3 Developed in the early 1980s as a European 
standard, the GSM has quickly become a global standard.4  
 
While the developed world has been laying expensive cables for landlines, in 
Africa, the mobile phone has been the solution of connectivity bottle-necks. 
With an exponential increase in usage, the mobile phone has by far 
superseded the landline in Africa.5 Africa’s mobile penetration stood at 67% in 
20156 and is expected to grow to 79% by 2020.7 Aker and Mbiti say, “as 
telecommunications markets mature, mobile phones in Africa are evolving 
from simple communication tools to service delivery platforms.”8 Porteous in 
2006 postulated that the number of mobile phone users may have exceeded 
that of the banked.9 It is submitted, this is now a fact. 
                                                     
1  An overview of this chapter was presented as part of a paper titled ‘Competing regulatory 
and developmental issues for mobile money – financial inclusion and financial stability’ at 
an in-house seminar at the Bank of England, London under the ‘Banking, finance and 
regulation’ Seminar Series on 24 May 2017. 
2  GSMA (2017) 'Brief History of GSM & the GSMA’ (GSM Association) 
<http://www.gsma.com/aboutus/history>. 10 March 2017. 
3  Mas and Radcliffe (2011) p170. 
4  GSMA (2017). 
5    Jenny Aker and Isaac Mbiti (2010) ‘Mobile phones and economic development in Africa’ 
24 (3) Journal of Economic Perspectives 207 p4 
<https://www.aeaweb.org/atypon.php?doi=10.1257/jep.24.3.207>. 13 December 2016. 
6  Adeyemi Adepetun (2015) 'Africa’s mobile phone penetration now 67%’ (The Guardian) 
<http://www.ngrguardiannews.com/2015/06/africas-mobile-phone-penetration-now-67/>. 
12 December 2016. 
7  Anon (2015) 'Why Africa Mobile Phone Penetration Rising to 79% by 2020 Is Good 
News’ (Amgoo Telecom Co., Ltd.) <http://www.amgoo.com/blog/why-africa-mobile-
phone-penetration-rising-to-79-by-2020-is-good-news>. 12 December 2016.  
8  Aker and Mbiti (2010) p3. 
9  Porteous (2006) p3. 
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The proliferation of the mobile phone has led to the introduction of several add-
on services. The introduction of the interactive short messaging service (SMS), 
a data channel available on phones using the GSM platform proved to be a 
game changer.10 Using the mobile phone to access financial services and 
transact was therefore only an event waiting to happen. The emergence of the 
mobile phone also revolutionised the telephone transmission theory, which in 
effect says any transmission system should have an energy source, a medium 
of transmission and a receiving device.11 The introduction of the mobile phone 
introduced a new transmission medium; air. Because air is free,12 and offers 
less resistance, this also contributed to lowering of costs.13  
This chapter opens with a discussion of the development of telephones and 
how this technology gave birth to mobile phones. Using M-Pesa as the 
standard, it analyses how m-money works. This chapter then considers the 
successes of M-Pesa in Kenya and why this success has failed to replicate in 
other markets such as Tanzania. It then looks at Mpamba and Airtel Money, 
m-money services introduced in Malaŵi and conducts a comparative analysis 
of the telco-led and bank-led m-money services.  
 
4.2. Development of the telephone 
Traditionally communication was over telephone lines. A pair of copper 
telephone wires connected houses. In the early times, the line ran from the 
house to the local exchange. There was, therefore, a stream of wires up to the 
local exchange. The figure below shows a typical telephone connection 
system using copper wires.  
 
                                                     
10  Jack and Suri (2011) p7.  
 Mas and Radcliffe (2011) p170. 
11  C. F. Myers and L. S. Crosby (1953) Principles of Electricity applied to Telephone and 
Telegraph Work (American Telephone & Telegraph Company, New York) p154. 
12  Of course, licences must be procured to be allowed to transmit radio signals. 
13  Myers and Crosby (1953) p165. 
- 126 - 
 
 
Figure 2: Telephone lines using wires 
  
It soon emerged that running wires was expensive and unsustainable. The 
initial step was the replacement of long distance copper wires between 
exchanges with microwave radio links. The figure below shows this 
development. 
 
 
Figure 3: Telephone lines utilising radio (parabolic dishes). 
 
Although they travel through the air, radio waves are not sound waves; they 
are electromagnetic waves and can travel at the speed of light.14 Since radio 
signals travel uni-directional, there must be a line of sight between the 
transmitting and receiving antenna to ensure no loss of signal.15 Therefore, 
any obstacle including bad weather affects this form of communication. Where 
available, use of fibre-optic resolves this problem.16 Instead of an energy 
                                                     
14  Christopher Haslett (2008) Essentials of radio wave propagation (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge) p1. 
15  Joel Young (2009) ‘Weird & Wireless: RF “Line of Sight”’  ElectronicsWeekly (21 October 
2009) <http://www.electronicsweekly.com/blogs/electro-ramblings/weird-wireless/weird-
wireless-rf-line-of-sight-2009-10/>. 10 March 2017. 
16  For a comparison between optical fibre and copper see: Anon (2015b) 'Submarine Cable 
Map’ (PriMetrica, Inc) <http://www.submarinecablemap.com/#/>. 12 December 2016. 
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source, fibre-optic uses an optical or light source.17 This light travels through 
the fibre-optic cable and is then received at the other end where the 
information in the light is decoded.18 Despite its competitive advantage, others 
feel that the future of communications in Africa lies with wireless technologies 
because of the continent’s geographical spread.19 Therefore, while the fibre-
optic network may be the backbone for continental and regional connections, 
wireless may be the technology that ensures last-mile connectivity. 
 
4.3. Development of the mobile phone 
The development of the mobile or cell phone seems to have taken place 
simultaneously in the United States of America (US) and in the Nordic 
countries. In the US, the technology evolved from military technology of the 
Handie-Talkie and Walkie-Talkie two-way radios.20 In Europe, the Nordic 
countries teamed up to develop the GSM protocol.21 Starting as a European 
protocol, it is now a global one.22 The key to mobile phone telephony is the 
cell. A cell comprises a base station and mobile phones within its geographical 
coverage.23 Both the base station and the mobile phones communicate via 
radio waves.24 Interconnectivity between cells and fixed lines exchanges 
networks ensures communication among and across networks.  
 
The figure below shows a simplified representation of the multiplying factor of 
the cell technology. While base stations can communicate with each other 
within a reasonable distance, another means of connectivity, usually, fibre-
optic, is used to connect them over long distances or with main stations.  
                                                     
17  John Senior, M. (1951) Optical fiber communications (Prentice-Hall International Inc, 
London) p6. 
18  ibid. 
19  Gabriella Mulligan (2015) ‘Is fibre optic cable key to Africa's economic growth?’ BBC 
Business News (London, 31 March 2015) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-
32079649>. 9 January 2017. 
20  Jon Agar (2003) Constant touch: A global history of the mobile phone (Icon Books, 
Cambridge) chapter 4. 
21  ibid chapter 7 generally. 
22  ibid. 
23  Ofcom (2001) 'Mobile Phone Base Stations - How Mobile Phone Networks Work’ (Office 
of the Communications Regulator, UK) 
<http://www.ofcom.org.uk/static/archive/ra/topics/mpsafety/school-
audit/mobilework.htm>. 12 December 2016. 
24  ibid. 
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Figure 4: Cells comprising base stations and mobile phones. 
 
Comparing the three figures above, it becomes clear that cell technology offers 
the best means of communication. It uses less hardware and allows for 
mobility of the user. For Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), the cell phone was, 
therefore, a godsend. It meant that telecommunications companies could 
forgo the expensive investment of laying down copper cables and having 
exchanges all over the country. By installing base stations in or near 
communities, people who would have otherwise been cut from the telephone 
network are now able to communicate. The mobile phone has become 
ubiquitous, thanks to an influx of cheap phones.25 The mobile phone has been 
warmly embraced in SSA. From 11 million subscribers in 2000 across the 
whole of Africa,26 it was at a staggering 680 million by mid-201527 and 
projected to reach just under 1 billion by 2019 in SSA alone.28 The mobile 
phone revolution has been said to be “an engine for development, inclusive 
growth, and reform.”29  
                                                     
25  David Smith (2014) ‘Internet use on mobile phones in Africa predicted to increase 20-fold’ 
The Guardian (5 June 2014) <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jun/05/internet-
use-mobile-phones-africa-predicted-increase-20-fold>. 10 March 2017. 
26  ITU (2009) Information Society Statistical Profiles 2009 - Africa (International 
Telecommunications Union) p1 <http://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-d/opb/ind/D-IND-
RPM.AF-2009-PDF-E.pdf>. 12 December 2016. 
27  GSMA (2015) The Mobile Economy Sub-Saharan Africa 2015  
<https://www.gsmaintelligence.com/research/?file=721eb3d4b80a36451202d0473b3c4a
63&download>. 12 December 2016. 
28  Smith (2014). 
29  Giridaran Saubramaniam (2013) ‘Mobile money: A Theoretical study of Alternative Media 
of Exchange, and an Empirical study with respect to M-Pesa in Kenya’ (Toulouse School 
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4.4. Mobile money in operation 
The m-money service is essentially modelled on the cell infrastructure. If we 
look at Figure 4, anyone with a mobile phone not only has access to other 
users but can also potentially financially interact with them. One can order 
products within and outside one’s geographical area. When a mobile phone 
user is within a particular base station, the base station detects the user’s 
presence in real time including all communications done and this information 
is relayed to the main station.30 This digital footprint can prevent people from 
denying, for example, liability for debts arising from m-money transactions 
based on a false alibi. 
 
M-money services allow the smooth conversion from cash to electronic value 
(e-value) and back to cash.31  It also allows transfer of e-value between 
users.32 It, therefore, works as a three-step remittance system:  
 Convert cash to e-value;  
 Transfer e-value between accounts;  
 Convert e-value to cash.  
 
Each customer, apart from registering with the mobile network operator (MNO) 
for the mobile service also registers with the m-money service and by so doing 
holds an ‘account’. The transfers are therefore conducted between these 
‘accounts.’ Camner and Sjöblom say MNOs are uniquely placed to run m-
money services “because they have a great number of both banked and 
unbanked customers and an established network of airtime resellers which 
can be turned into … agents.”33 
 
                                                     
of Economics)  p6 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2278679>. 15 
December 2016. 
30  In the recent criminal case of R v Kumwembe et al Criminal Case No. 65 of 2013 
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31  Heeks (2012). 
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So far, the growth phase of m-money is still what Jenkins calls an “emerging 
or chaos phase.”34 He adds, for m-money to emerge as a universal and 
omnipresent service there is a need to develop solid ecosystems since “for 
something to be ubiquitous, the foundations need to be very strong”.35 He 
argues that if m-money is to become the service which every consumer wants, 
there is need first to develop a “critical mass of mobile money” and some 
degree of interoperability is crucial for this.36 Mas and Radcliff call this the 
“chicken-and-egg trap”.37 For it to sell as a viable service to customers, there 
is need to bring on board merchants and utility providers to serve them.38 
However, for these to get on board, they need assurance of a critical mass of 
customers.39   
 
Since mobile payments are made remotely, they require a verification process 
beyond the physical signature. The electronic signature (e-signature) includes 
the PIN and sometimes, biometric data.40 This is important as where an e-
signature is invalid; it may be rejected or if not, challenged, thereby exposing 
agents and payees to the risk of fraud or repudiation.41 The role of agents and 
their ability to act as the front-end of the business is crucial for the ecosystem. 
Heyer and Mas argue that a relaxed regulatory regime on who can be an agent 
is key for m-money.42 Unless the business has attained profitability, imposing 
licensing fees and other requirements on agents may be a hindrance.43 In most 
countries, these agents are also airtime sellers for the MNOs. The advantage 
is that the agents already have the experience in dealing with mobile 
technology, although Heyer and Mas say mobile money does appreciably 
require “higher capital movements and … treasury management expertise.”44 
 
                                                     
34  Jenkins (2008) p11 quoting Fundamo CEO Hannes van Rensburg. 
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The success of the m-money service lies in its simplicity: as an add-on service 
based on the SMS platform. Having the SMS as a forerunner has its 
advantages. On its own, Heyer and Mas, caution that the m-money service is 
one that could potentially “intimidate and confuse people who have only used 
their phones to talk.”45 However, the SMS has already overcome this, thereby 
laying a foundation on which m-money can ride on. The beauty of the SMS 
lies in the fact that it can be used on the most basic mobile phone. Even among 
those already banked the m-money service “overcomes the tyranny of 
distance to banking infrastructure – captured by both distance and time to a 
bank branch.”46 Although m-money has been touted as a positive development 
in most African countries, others have expressed fear that it may have an 
impact on inflation.47 The inflation risk has however been downplayed by the 
Governor of the Bank of Tanzania.48 Indeed unless, the m-money is not fully 
backed up by deposits, it is difficult to imagine how inflation can be triggered 
since the MNOs are not creating money in the traditional banking sense.49 In 
any event, in the greater scheme of things, m-mobile is still insignificant to 
affect monetary supply or policy.50 The Bank of International Settlements says: 
Although e-money has become more important in some countries, 
the impact of these developments on the composition of the 
monetary base is considered negligible thus far... Most central 
banks therefore judge that the influence of innovations in retail 
payments on monetary policy is neutral or of low importance.51 
 
To recap, m-money needs an ecosystem of agents, registered customers, 
MNOs, and a bank. The m-money is usually issued in bulk through a 
cascading system of agents and the agents must deposit cash with the MNO.52 
The MNO records all transfers to ensure that there is always a one-to-one 
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correspondence between the money in the trust/pool account and e-money in 
the system.53 M-money can be used to pay for a wide-range of things such as 
school fees or wages of low-income workers.54 The service therefore helps in 
the following ways: 
(a) Ease of convenience as users can access the service from the comfort 
of their homes or in the case of a farmer, in the field. 
(b) Since the transactions are digital, there is a sense of safety and 
dependability 
(c) Users have greater control of the services and are not limited by the 
normal limitations of the formal banking service such as time of the 
transaction.55 
 
An ethnographic study of the m-money service in Kenya by Mas and Ng’weno 
showed that “customers in town understood that [it] was for sending money 
whereas those in the rural areas understood it was for receiving.”56 The typical 
remitter is the urban businessman or worker living in the city, most likely a 
migrant.57 The typical recipient is a rural-based woman.58  
 
4.5. M-Pesa leads the way 
Safaricom, in Kenya, a subsidiary of Vodafone UK, offers M-Pesa.59 It was 
initially conceived as a DFID60 pilot project61 for microfinance loan 
disbursements and repayments.62 The pilot project proved unsuccessful but 
the service demonstrated potential and Safaricom decided to develop it as a 
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solution to the remittance dilemma.63 M-Pesa’s primary target are the 
unbanked and financially excluded, mainly in rural areas.64 Three years after 
its launch, the Economist described M-Pesa this way: 
IT IS like magic. By clicking a few keys on a mobile phone, money 
can be zapped from one part of Kenya to another in seconds. For 
urban migrants sending money home to their villages, and for 
people used to queuing at banks for hours to pay bills or school fees, 
the M-Pesa … is a godsend.65 
 
Apart from the peer-to-peer (P2P) transaction, M-Pesa also provides a savings 
platform for the unbanked. This in itself is revolutionary because M-Pesa was 
not conceptualised for savings. A study by Morawczynski and Miscione found 
that “customers would often make large deposits and several small 
withdrawals” implying that M-Pesa is “being used not just to send, but also to 
store money.”66 Due to the small amounts of money that are carried on from 
day to day, M-Pesa is still not considered a money saving (deposit) scheme 
and therefore not regulated as such.67 M-Pesa’s four core services are: 
(i) Paying bills 
(ii) Purchasing airtime 
(iii) Transferring money to both users and non-users; and 
(iv) Depositing and withdrawing money.68 
 
Describing the simplicity and ease of using M-Pesa, Mas and Morawczynski 
say: 
 The M-PESA user interface is driven by an application that runs on 
the user’s mobile phone. The menu prompts the user to provide all 
the necessary information, one piece at a time, based on the type 
of transaction requested. Once all the information is gathered, it is 
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sent for processing through the air interface in a single text 
message. This reduces messaging costs, as well as the risk of the 
transaction request being interrupted halfway through… The 
application use[s] security keys in the user’s SIM card to encrypt 
messages end-to-end.69 
 
4.6. Why M-Pesa succeeded in Kenya 
The success of M-Pesa can be attributed to 5 factors. 
 It targeted the unbanked, who were shunned by the banks and 
therefore there was a ready mass of clients waiting for such a service. 
 Low cost of transacting. 
 It has an easy intuitive service design, working on the most basic 
phone. 
 It built on the trust that people have in the mobile phone generally.  
 It quickly expanded to allow business transactions. This allowed the 
making of mass payments.70 
 
M-Pesa also benefitted from the simplicity of registration. All that is needed is 
an acceptable identification (ID), and all Kenyans have a national ID.71 This 
has allowed Safaricom to navigate any customer due diligence (CDD) 
concerns that the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) or others may have 
had.72 In most jurisdictions, the FATF has raised concerns about CDD 
processes in countries without national IDs.73  
 
Even though these factors have all positively contributed to M-Pesa’s success, 
in effect, other key drivers ensured the success of M-Pesa. In summary, the 
success of M-Pesa can be attributed to three key drivers: 
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 Dominance of Safaricom; 
 A permissive regulatory environment; and 
 Customer demand for additional services.74 
 
By the time Safaricom was launching M-Pesa in 2007, it was already a 
dominant player. It had 73% mobile market share and this increased to 84% 
in 201075 but has since dropped to 66% by the end of 2015.76 Safaricom also 
tapped into the already existing high population of mobile phone users in 
Kenya.77 The Kenyan Standard described the regulatory environment as a 
“regulatory free pass” allowing Safaricom and M-Pesa to pretty much have a 
free run by having “3+ years of unregulated growth.”78 The initial conception 
that M-Pesa was not a banking service was key to the service’s initial take 
off.79 The bold decision by the central bank to adopt what Mas and Ng’weno 
describe as an “experiment first, then regulate” later stance was also 
decisive.80 This light-touch regulation facilitated the initial pilot phase in the 
development of the service.81 
 
Safaricom’s dominance may be due to its marketing and business strategy but 
how the company came into being may have had an influence. Safaricom 
resulted out of the unbundling of the state-owned Kenya Posts and 
Telecommunications Corporation.82 From this process emerged Kenya 
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Telkom, which was initially the fixed-line telephone provider.83 Kenya Telkom 
then created Safaricom when the telecommunication market was liberalised, 
with the government, through Kenya Telkom, owning 60% shares.84 Vodafone 
UK bought the remaining shares.85 Eventually, the Government sold 25% of 
its shares to the public through a public issue.86 Safaricom itself maybe be said 
to be the omnipresent operator.87  
 
For most Kenyans, Safaricom is still perceived as a government or at least a 
Kenyan company, notwithstanding Vodafone’s controlling stake. It has been 
argued that the fact that the Government owns a stake in Safaricom, and 
therefore has a financial incentive to ensure it succeeds, may account for the 
lack of regulation by the central bank.88 It has been argued that the same 
latitude was not provided to competitors like Airtel.89 Safaricom may, therefore, 
have benefited from the first mover advantage as it has had the opportunity to 
lock down its consumers and easily wade off any competition.90 Oyebode 
says, unlike most jurisdictions where regulation precedes any rollout or 
“development lags behind regulation”, in Kenya “development led regulation”91 
or “regulation followed innovation.”92 
 
From the day it was launched, Safaricom made an effort to emphasise that M-
Pesa was not a banking service.93 This emphasis was obviously to avoid 
prudential regulation by Central Bank of Kenya (CBK).94 The CBK agreed with 
this but it was not smooth sailing for Safaricom. A year after its launch, the 
Minister of Finance “publicly - and suddenly – requested the CBK to conduct 
an immediate risk assessment audit of the service.”95 The Minister was quoted 
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to have said: “I don’t know whether M-Pesa will end well.”96 The request to the 
CBK followed discussions in the Kenyan Parliament on the implications of an 
unregulated money transfer service.97 This was after the CBK had already 
conducted an internal audit that led to a conclusion that M-Pesa was not a 
banking business and could safely be issued a Letter of No Objection to 
commence operations.98  
 
The CBK engaged on a three-pronged approach to the M-Pesa question: 
(i) Legal status: was M-Pesa a banking business or not? 
(ii) Money laundering: could the system be used illicitly for money 
laundering? 
(iii) Operational risk: what risk could arise from the use of the new 
technology?99 
 
In the end, the due diligence conducted by the CBK demonstrated that M-Pesa 
did not pose a systemic risk to the financial sector and that it was not a banking 
business.100 In its report, the Alliance for Financial Inclusion  found that as a 
company, Safaricom also may have positively affected this because it had “put 
significant effort into self-regulating.”101 In 2009, mainly due to the fact that the 
Minister had made a public request to the CBK regarding M-Pesa, the CBK 
gave out a public notification essentially clearing M-Pesa.102 
 
Since M-Pesa was conceived as an added service, it meant that it benefitted 
from the relationship that already was in existence between Safaricom and its 
customers. It may also have helped that in the initial start off, Safaricom “did 
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not expect an immediate return on its investment”, seeing M-Pesa “as a pure 
value-added service, a way to cement its bond with its customers.”103 
 
4.6.1. A good agent network 
Even before the inception of M-Pesa, Safaricom already had an extensive 
network of agents across the country. However, with the launch of the service, 
this network further expanded such that by 2015 it had grown to 55,000 agents 
compared to 1,000 bank branches.104 Tarrant says that unlike banks, which 
have buildings representing branches, M-Pesa uses agents as branches.105 
He says, these agents “are real people” and “not faceless banks.”106 Having 
an effective and efficient distribution system has therefore been central to the 
success of M-Pesa.107 
 
When M-Pesa customers go to the agent, this does not mean that they trust 
the agent. A study has found out that actually, they trust Safaricom, the 
organisation behind the agents.108 Customers feel as if they are actually 
dealing with Safaricom in their transactions, and much of this trust arises from 
the fact that the company has been in existence since 1997 with a massive 
share of the mobile market.109 Since, M-Pesa is SMS-based, it is susceptible 
to congestion during “peak texting times” resulting in transactions failures.110 
Even where the transaction goes through, the confirmation SMS may not be 
sent.111 The customer does not blame M-Pesa for the failure but instead 
accuses the agent of stealing their money.112  
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4.6.2. The dual system  
Most Kenyans maintain a strong link to their ancestral homes, even though 
they are working or engaged in business in the cities and towns. Mas and 
Morawczynski say one reason, unique to Sub-Saharan Africa is “their wish to 
retire to and be buried on their ancestral land.”113 Krueger says, like most 
African urban dwellers, most Kenyans migrated from the rural areas and 
therefore “domestic remittances, especially from Nairobi, the country’s capital, 
represent a huge flow of money in Kenya.”114 Remittances do not only serve 
an economic function, but they also serve a sociological one as they serve as 
they maintain familial ties.115 
 
Tragic events during the 2007 elections may also have contributed to the 
success of M-Pesa. The elections saw widespread violence and instability, 
effectively putting the country on lockdown.116 Oyebode says this meant that 
urban dwellers had even more reason to remit funds to “relatives trapped in 
the villages and slums.”117 The Economist wrote that M-Pesa was perceived 
as a safer platform to use for remittance as well as save money compared to 
the commercial banks “which were entangled in ethnic disputes.”118 Most of 
the commercial banks were seen as providing electoral money funding to 
politicians based on tribal affiliations of their leaders.119 Safaricom was, on the 
other hand, deemed to be above tribal politics because, in the words of 
Morawczynski and Miscione, “Michael Joseph [then chief executive] did not 
belong to any of Kenya’s tribes.”120 Being political neutral therefore played a 
great role in the trust that the average Kenyan reposed in M-Pesa. Maybe, 
unsurprisingly, after Joseph left his position in 2010, another non-Kenyan, Bob 
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Collymore, who had been working at Vodafone’s South African affiliate, 
Vodacom, filled it.121 
 
Within the urban dwellers, especially in the capital Nairobi, one slum notably 
stands out and may have played a key role in the early adoption of M-Pesa. 
Kibera is a slum in the outskirts of Nairobi. It is the biggest slum in Africa, and 
one of the biggest in the world, with about 1 million people from the total 
Nairobi population of 2.5 million.122 It is also one of the most impoverished in 
Kenya.123 At 83%, it has one of the highest unemployment rates in Kenya, and 
the employed are vendors, casual labours or informal sector employees.124 
Kibera boasts no financial institutions and was, therefore, ripe for the 
emergence of a financially empowering service such as M-Pesa.125 
Morawczynski and Miscione say, M-Pesa benefitted from “demand for both 
banking and money transfer services” and the fact that the population in Kibera 
did not have anywhere safe to put their money. 126 The latter was due to high 
insecurity in the slum.127 These factors propelled M-Pesa as the solution to 
their problems and needs.128 As Morawczynski and Miscione found out, Kibera 
is mostly populated by migrants looking for work.129 When they get money, 
they mostly remit it back home.130 
 
4.6.3. Strong brand, clear message, and optimised pricing 
M-Pesa obviously benefits from the dominant position of Safaricom in building 
a strong brand. The catch phrase that was used to champion the service by 
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Safaricom was simple but effective: ‘Send money home.’131 Once the initial 
takers had established a critical mass, there was a multiplier or rub-off effect. 
The Economist says, the service “benefitted from network effects: the more 
people who used it, the more it made sense for others to sign up for it,”132 
thereby growing exponentially.133 Mas and Ng’weno say, a strong brand and 
marketing strategy also ensured that the service could overcome the chicken-
and-egg trap in that “in order to grow, M-Pesa had to attract both customers 
and stores in tandem.”134 For two years after the launch of M-Pesa, Safaricom 
also used the same television advert to promote the service but also inculcate 
the service in peoples’ minds.135 To ensure the brand’s omnipresence, Mas 
and Ng’weno say, retail outlets or agent shops were boldly “painted Safaricom 
green with a prominent M-Pesa logo.”136 
 
The design of the service, which provided customers with instant confirmation 
of their transaction, proved key in helping customers to learn to use and trust 
the system through their own personal experience.137 One thing that may have 
eased the acceptance of M-Pesa was the pricing scheme that Safaricom 
designated. The scheme was designed so that it provided incentives for both 
customers and providers of services and goods to join.138 Mas and 
Morawczynski say, customers are only charged “for “doing something with 
their money”, such as making a transfer, withdrawal, or buying airtime, but not 
depositing.139 To prevent customers avoiding to pay transaction fees, deposits 
into another user’s account are prohibited.140 The pricing scheme is such that 
if an M-Pesa customer is sending money to a customer without an M-Pesa 
account, the cost is much higher.141 It is submitted that this is deliberate to 
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entice M-Pesa customers to encourage others to join since it is cheaper to 
send if both are on M-Pesa. 
 
4.7. Why M-Pesa did not do as well in Tanzania 
The success of M-Pesa in Kenya seems not to have yielded the same results 
when the model has been replicated.142 As Joseph put it: “there have been 
about 200 of these experiments around the world, and maybe only four or five 
have been successful.”143 There is nothing extraordinary in the concept of M-
Pesa itself. Tarrant adds that the concept of “sending money via a mobile 
platform is not particularly difficult”.144 Therefore, there must be other factors 
that make the service successful in Kenya as compared to other markets.  
 
M-Pesa has been replicated in India, Afghanistan, South Africa, and Tanzania 
but in all these markets it has not achieved the same level of success as in 
Kenya.145  The problems in India and South Africa have largely been regulatory 
in nature.146 The central banks in these countries see M-Pesa as part of the 
banking sector and therefore attempt to regulate it as such.147 This section 
looks at why M-Pesa has not succeeded in Tanzania, which shares a common 
language, border, and population size with Kenya. 
 
Tanzania was perceived as a market ready for the picking because while as 
in Kenya domestic remittances were at 17% at the start of the M-Pesa launch, 
the comparable rate in Tanzania was 28%.148 Camner and Sjöblom say, 
Tanzania had far fewer banks and branches meaning that it had a “greater 
need for a financial service such as M-Pesa.”149 However, when the service 
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was launched, the market take-up was lukewarm and nowhere to the speed 
of growth in Kenya.150 So why was a product based on the same killer slogan, 
‘Send money home’ and launched by a Vodafone affiliate not as successful? 
What were some of the factors that may have been ignored by simply 
transplanting the Kenya’s M-Pesa model into the Tanzanian market?  
 
4.7.1. Economic, political, and social factors 
Although Tanzania and Kenya have a similar population, Kenya boasts a 
stronger economy with twice the gross domestic product (GDP) of 
Tanzania.151 At independence, Kenya embraced a capitalist agenda and 
encouraged urban economic growth while  Tanzania, led by Julius Nyerere 
pursued a socialist agenda.152 Nyerere’s socialist vision was embodied in what 
became known as the Arusha Declaration where he conceived the concept of 
Ujamaa.153 Camner and Sjöblom describe Ujamaa as a “programme of 
villagization” which moved “peasant families into cooperative villages where 
they [could] expressly work together more productively.”154 By the early 1970s, 
80% of the population were living in registered Ujamaa villages.155 
 
Because of this, the population in Tanzania is more evenly distributed than 
that in Kenya leading to a reduced general density.156 By 2006, Kenya had 
achieved 41% urban population while Tanzania was at 30%, although the 
mobile penetration was comparable, at 34% and 30% respectively.157 
Therefore, although Swahili is spoken in both countries, the Swahili slogan 
Send money home did not communicate quite the same message in 
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Tanzania.158 It also meant that unlike Safaricom, which could concentrate in 
the pockets with high population density, Vodacom, the local Vodafone 
affiliate, had logistical and marketing challenges to cover Tanzania.159 
Safaricom also had another advantage in that although both it and Vodacom 
are dominant players in both countries, Safaricom has almost twice the size of 
market share with three times as much revenue.160This meant that Safaricom 
had more funds available for its market budget as compared to Vodacom.161 
Added to this is that Tanzania is twice the size of Kenya.162 
 
As already noted above, most Kenyans treat Safaricom as a Kenyan company. 
On the other hand, 65% of Vodacom’s stake is Vodacom (South Africa), which 
is itself 65% owned, by Vodafone UK.163 It is, therefore, understandable that 
although Vodacom was one of the first mobile operators in Tanzania, it is not 
treated as a home-grown company in the same way Safaricom is. Vodacom 
also suffered from a trust issue in that its products and services were viewed 
as somewhat expensive, leading to further reduction in its market share.164 It 
however remains the largest company in Tanzania.165 
 
The even population distribution in Tanzania may also have played a role in 
how the message of Send money home was perceived in Tanzania. Camner 
says, unlike Kenya where the bulk of remittance are urban-to-rural, in 
Tanzania, there are other corridors of money transfer such as “urban–rural, 
rural–urban, urban–urban and rural–rural.”166 Therefore, while to the urban-to-
rural corridor, the slogan was a hit, it was a dud to the other corridors.167 
 
                                                     
158 ibid p2. 
159 ibid. 
160 ibid. 
161 ibid p4. 
162 Gunnar Camner (2009) p4. 
163 Camner and Sjöblom (2009) p4. 
164 ibid. 
165 ibid. 
166 Gunnar Camner (2009) p4. 
167 Camner and Sjöblom (2009) p7. 
- 145 - 
 
4.7.2. Other local factors 
While Safaricom built up a large base of agents, Vodacom was unable to 
achieve the same success. For example, as opposed to 1,000 super dealers 
for airtime for Safaricom, Vodacom only had six.168 While Safaricom boasted 
of some 40,000 agents, Vodacom only had 1,000 in 2009.169 Agents not only 
facilitate cash deposits and withdrawals, but they also register customers, 
conduct CDD and customer education, especially to new users.170 It must be 
pointed out, as the table below illustrates, Vodacom has over the years 
increased the number of agents considerably. After a year of operation, 
Vodacom’s M-Pesa had only 280,000 users,171 compared to 2.5 million for 
Safaricom after the same timeline, and only reached 4.5 million by the end of 
2008.172  
 
Although M-Pesa uses its own payment platform, it still requires the availability 
of cash to convert m-money. The presence of bank branches is, therefore, 
crucial. In 2006, Kenya had 1.38 branches per 10,000 people compared to 
0.57 in Tanzania.173 Unlike Kenya, Tanzania has no national ID for its 
citizens.174 This presents a problem to people who want to register on M-Pesa. 
To overcome this, voter registration cards are accepted instead.175 Generally, 
the numbers of mobile phone and M-Pesa users in Kenya still trump those in 
Tanzania. The table below provides a comparison of the different mobile 
phone statistics in the two countries in 2016. From the table below, the 
dominance of Safaricom over Vodacom becomes evident. Safaricom has 
twice the number of subscribers with almost 95% of these as M-Pesa users. It 
may also be pointed that Kenya now has almost double the mobile penetration 
rate than Tanzania.  
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Table 7: Contrasting mobile phone statistics in Kenya and Tanzania176 
 
Camner and Sjöblom have cautioned that although M-Pesa is capable of being 
replicated, future models of m-money services “are more likely to resemble the 
development of M-Pesa in Tanzania” with “things happening more slowly but 
still moving in the right direction and picking up pace over time.”177 In 2016, 
Vodacom announced that it would discontinue its South African M-Pesa 
service.178 The service launched in 2010, targeted ten million users but after 
six years only managed one million users, out of which a mere 76,000 were 
active users.179 
 
The pricing of M-Pesa in Tanzania is similar to that of Kenya M-Pesa. It costs 
more to send money to an unregistered user.180 The rationale it would seem 
is the same: to encourage the circulation of m-money within the M-Pesa 
ecosystem. 
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4.8. In the footsteps of M-Pesa: Airtel Money and Mpamba 
Following the popularity of M-Pesa, Airtel and TNM, the two dominant MNOs 
in Malaŵi launched their own m-money services; Airtel; Money and 
Mpamba.181 The two services are modelled on M-Pesa. Therefore, in terms of 
how the services work, the description of the operation for M-Pesa made 
above generally applies. However, although the m-money service in Malaŵi is 
modelled on the Kenyan model, in reality the countries have little in common. 
Apart from having a similar legal system as a result of being former British 
colonies,182 the economic situation in the two countries is very different. In its 
report, the African Development Bank categorised Kenya as one of Africa’s 
largest economies while Malaŵi was in the ‘medium to small’ economy 
category.183 Kenya has more than three times the GDP of Malaŵi,184 just under 
three times the population size185 and almost five times the land mass.186 
These differences may explain why the service reception may different in the 
two countries. 
 
To benefit from economies of scale, Mpamba disclosed that it has engaged 
Airtel Money on developing a joint m-money payment system.187 Although 
competitors, the two m-money issuers seem to have embraced a collaboration 
culture, at least, at the initial phase. Mpamba also works closely with Airtel 
Money towards achieving FI.188 Head of Mpamba, Webster Mbekeani says: 
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Unlike the telco side, where there is a rivalry, with m-money, things 
are different. It’s not the time to compete. I do not even have 50% 
of my client base, why should I be thinking about grabbing Airtel 
Money customers? It’s time to convert the mindset of the people to 
begin to accept m-money as an acceptable way of transacting. 
There and then can we begin to compete. For now, I believe we 
should vest our energies, efforts, and monies into that mindset 
changing, behavioural changing, making people understand. 
Moving from people from becoming aware to becoming active.189 
 
4.8.1. Airtel Money 
Airtel Money was launched in February 2012.190  Initiated in 2009 as an add-
on service; Airtel soon realised that it had financial underpinnings so it 
engaged the central bank for regulatory clearance.191 Being a new service, the 
central bank suggested a pilot phase before rolling out.192 After a successful 
pilot, Airtel received a ‘Letter of No Objection’ in February 2010.193 The ‘Letter 
of No Object’ approach seems to be one that was adopted from Kenya. Airtel 
also soon enough realised that there was no regulatory framework to guide 
operations of m-money. Airtel Money’s Bigboy Mkoloma says: 
Initially, we were tossed around; not knowing which department or 
section of the Reserve Bank is supposed to have control. However, 
later after several engagements, we found that we were pushed to 
the National Payment System. It is there that we got guidance on 
how to roll out the product.194 
 
Mkoloma says it took 2 years before the service was officially launched 
because Airtel was unsure whether it would be given permission to roll out.195 
Therefore, when Airtel run the pilot phase, they used test equipment and only 
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started procuring the main equipment after being given permission.196 The lack 
of a clear regulatory and institutional framework at the time was a huge 
contributing factor in delaying the project.197 Being the first to roll out had its 
challenges. Many initiatives had to be put in place to achieve a good adoption 
rate.198 Most customers and potential customers were skeptical with the new 
service, regardless of the literacy levels.199 Mkoloma says: 
Even the literate could not understand how they can use m-money 
to transact as most are used to dealing in cash. For them to 
understand that the same phone, which they use for talking, can be 
used to transact money, required a shift in the mindset. There was, 
therefore, a low uptake initially.200 
 
Airtel also realised they had a problem at the hands: 
With m-money, you must ensure that you have the right ecosystem 
otherwise you have a challenge. More specially, you must have the 
customers. However, for you to have the customers, you must make 
sure that you have the agents. You can have the agents but if you 
don’t have the customers, the agents will disappear. If you have the 
customers but don’t have the agents, the customers will disappear. 
It is an egg and chicken type of a game. The key is to achieve the 
right balance. It must make a business case for all players.201 
 
Airtel has had a bit of luck that provided them valuable lessons during their 
pilot phase. The first place to be rolled out was in Karonga, the most northern 
district in Malaŵi.  
There was an earthquake in Karonga. Red Cross wanted to give 
money to the victims so they could rebuild their houses and was 
looking for the right channel of sending this money. We provided 
free phones and opened accounts for the beneficiaries. We then 
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had to ensure that most of the key merchants of building materials 
were on board and that they should also open Airtel Money 
accounts to necessitate the payments to happen. We also recruited 
some agents so that those who wanted to cash out to buy something 
somewhere else could do so.202 
 
This proved to be a good experience for Airtel, merchants, and the community, 
although most did not fully understand the service.203 Similar to M-Pesa, tragic 
events may have acted as a catalyst to get the service rolling. Airtel admits 
that building up the ecosystem was not easy. Sometimes people would have 
m-money in the phones but could not find the products they required.204 On 
the other hand, some agents ended up tying their capital waiting for customers 
who never turned up.205 The teething problems, it is submitted, gave Airtel the 
first-mover advantage as it had an almost three-year head start over TNM. 
Airtel characterises the period between 2010 and March 2015 as the 
introduction of Airtel Money in terms of product development.206 This allowed 
the service to start growing with more organisations getting on board.207 Airtel 
says that from then on the service has witnessed a growth period with 
increased rate of growth.208 Even the customer complaints are also different: 
Initially it was, I have my money, I am going around but I can’t find 
an agent. The story this time is different. It is not about I can’t find 
an agent, but I can’t buy electricity units; I can’t buy ABCD.209 
 
Registering for Airtel Money is not difficult. The author’s experience in 2013 
was that it was less onerous than for Mpamba. It uses its offices and agents 
for registration. Airtel boasts of having over m-money 5,000 agents.210 These 
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agents do similar tasks to the M-Pesa agents. Airtel, however, has onerous 
requirements for one to become an agent such as proof of registration of a 
partnership, business or company and business permits or trading licences.211 
It is submitted that though it would make sense if these requirements were for 
super-agents but not for agents who are mainly street vendors or hawkers. 
 
Airtel Money uses a series of interactive steps to transact as well as password 
encryption.212 Airtel boasts, “every transaction uses encryption and password 
that adheres to the highest banking security standards.”213 What this 
statement exactly means is unclear since Airtel Money is surely not a banking 
service. Like M-Pesa, a confirmation message of the transaction is sent to the 
customer upon completion.214 All the information on its website is in English 
although the author is aware from personal experience that there is a Cheŵa 
menu. Airtel Money’s menu is more interactive, utilising a resident menu that 
Airtel has developed and adding m-money service on to it. The user therefore 
just must access the Airtel Money menu to transact. Although the product was 
launched as Khusa M’manja, it is notable that on the menu, the service is 
called Airtel Money. It is argued this is a result of the internationalisation and 
uniformity of the Airtel brand and service. The Airtel menu is, therefore, a 
standard menu, although there is a Cheŵa version, which one can choose. 
Airtel boasts that customers can withdraw money from auto teller machines 
(ATMs)215 but the author’s experience is that this was not yet possible as at 
September 2015. Airtel also states that one of the services it provides as part 
of the Airtel Money bouquet is “mobile banking.”216 This implies 
interconnectivity with an existing bank account.  
 
Airtel also explicitly explains that once their network is down, customers will 
not be able to transact on the m-money platform because it relies on the 
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network for its operation.217 This also invariably implies that one can only use 
the m-money service where a network is present.  
When the network is down on the part of the service or utility 
provider, to the customer, the blame on failure to transact is put on 
Airtel Money since what they have is e-value provided by the 
service. To them, it does not matter whatever happens on the other 
side of the interconnectivity setup.218   
 
Congestion in the network or poor network quality will also have an adverse 
effect on the service. With M-Pesa, it was found that problems in the network 
and lack of a confirmation could be a cause of tension. Airtel has explained 
that there may be cases where a message is not delivered, varying from a full 
inbox or delays in the network.219 Importantly it has provided a number to call 
in case 20 minutes elapse.220 The service also uses the interactive steps 
platform, which allows the complete transaction221 to be sent as one message, 
therefore, saving cost and minimising network congestion.  
 
Airtel has created a growing ecosystem collaborating with service providers, 
merchants, and fuel stations across the country.222 Airtel has also started 
making inroads into cross-borders remittances. Airtel says market research 
revealed that costs of existing cross-border remittances were enormous due 
to stringent foreign exchange requirements of the central bank.223 It, therefore, 
sought to come up with a service that made it easy for the customer. After 
being satisfied with the low risk involved, Airtel was given a go-ahead by the 
central bank. 224 To ensure compliance with foreign exchange regulations, 
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Airtel collaborated with a local bank, FDH Bank.225 This therefore takes care 
of any financial security issues regarding these cross-border remittances. It 
also means that although the central bank gave a go-ahead for the service, 
the central bank prudentially regulates the actual remittances. Transactions 
are US Dollar based.226 The service is however restricted to countries where 
Airtel Money is operational.227 
 
4.8.2. Mpamba 
Mpamba was launched by TNM in May 2013.228 In a way, both the regulator 
and TNM may have benefited from regulatory lessons learnt from the pilot 
phase of Airtel Money. During Mpamba’s pilot phase, the system had to 
demonstrate that it can keep an audit trail.229 Apart from the central bank’s 
own assessment, an external auditing firm submitted a report to the central 
bank. Although TNM found that the m-money market already had an existing 
player, it still faced similar teething problems to what Airtel faced. Mbekeani 
highlights the challenges: 
M-money is a new concept, therefore, there has been a lot of ‘hand-
holding’ of people to help them to understand it. We had few early 
adopters. Most seemed to adopt a wait-and-see attitude. Others did 
not want to be bothered. Others were afraid of leaving an audit trail. 
Now to roll out the service, Mpamba needs agents. That is the only 
way customers will access the service. Some agents do not 
understand the business very well. For those that understand, the 
return is not as big, so it’s been a problem.230 
 
Mbekeani says within the ecosystem, smaller merchants have been difficult: 
When you buy from a merchant, there is no fee charged to the 
customer or to the merchant. So, this opened us up to certain 
transactions where a merchant would cash in a customer.  When 
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they cash in a customer, they get value and a commission paid to 
them. Instead of cashing out so that the customer is charged, they 
would do a merchant purchase with the customer. So, they accept 
a payment from the same customer as if they have bought goods 
and send the money back to the customer as cash in, get a 
commission, receive the money back from the customer as if they 
have bought goods, continuously like that.231 
 
With a cash-out ratio of less than 30%, more than 70% of the e-value is used 
within the Mpamba ecosystem.232 The goal of Mpamba is to help in offering 
financial services especially to the unbanked by utilising the network presence 
of TNM.233 The service also aims to link those customers who have bank 
accounts so they can seamlessly transact between accounts.234 The author’s 
experience, in late 2015, however, was that this was not yet possible. Apart 
from P2P transactions and buying airtime, one can also pay electricity and 
water bills and television subscription using Mpamba.235 TNM touts these as 
the advantages of using Mpamba: 
 Safety - It is safer to transfer funds through m-money than carrying 
physical cash; 
 Convenience – Make payments anywhere, anytime; 
 Cost effectiveness - Cut travel costs and time to make payments; 
 Efficiency and Reliability – Make real-time transactions at less cost; 
 Innovative – Have an enhanced profile and a part of innovative users.236 
 
The user interface is also like M-Pesa’s. The customer is taken through a 
series of interactive steps until the transaction is almost complete and a single 
message is sent, after which a confirmation of the transaction appears.237 
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Mpamba has also adopted the super-agent and agent structure that M-Pesa 
developed. The main duty of super agents is to serve fellow agents and act as 
a direct link with Mpamba.238 Nationalistic sentiments that endeared Safaricom 
to Kenyans have not rubbed off TNM. Granted that Mpamba did not pioneer 
the m-money revolution, but even when Mpamba was launched, there was no 
euphoria of embracing a national brand, as it were. This is despite that TNM 
was a company born out of the unbundling of the Department of Posts and 
Telecommunications.239 Unlike Safaricom, Malaŵians have never fondly 
regarded TNM as a government or national company. 
 
4.8.3. Airtel Money and Mpamba Tariffs compared 
The two tables below show the tariffs for Airtel Money and Mpamba.  
 
Key:  K = Malaŵian Kwacha | £1 = K882.61.240 
Table 8: Airtel Money 2016 Tariffs.241 
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<http://africa.airtel.com/wps/wcm/connect/AfricaRevamp/Malawi/Airtel_Money/Home/Per
sonal/tariffs>. 11 January 2017. 
Minimum
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5,001
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20,001
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Other Transactions K
200
FREE
Utility Bill Payments 
Merchant Payments
200,000 500 6,575 6,500
50,000 200 1,975 1,900
100,000 400 3,825 3,750
10,000 80 455 380
20,000 150 830 755
2,500 50 175 100
5,000 60 275 200
500 10 95 20
1,000 20 115 40
Transaction Range (K) Transaction Type and Customer Charge (K)
Maximum
Transfer to 
Other Airtel 
Money Users
Transfer to 
Unregistered 
Users
Withdrawal from 
Airtel Money 
Agent 
Airtel Money Tariffs Customer Charges
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Table 9: Mpamba 2016 Tariffs.242 
 
Just like M-Pesa, the cost of sending money to unregistered users for both 
services is generally higher. Research still needs to be conducted on the 
effects of having a different fee structure for sending money for the two 
services on service uptake. Airtel Money has a higher threshold for the 
maximum amount one can send, K200,000.00 as compared to Mpamba’s 
K60,000.00. However, this lower limit for Mpamba only applies to transfers to 
non-Mpamba account holders and for cashing-out from an agent.  While 
Mpamba has a flat rate for utility bill and merchant payments, Airtel Money 
only charges for utility bill payments. Mpamba also has a flat fee levied for 
transfer made between Mpamba accounts. The tariff differences aside, Airtel 
Money may have a distinct advantage over Mpamba. It has a much higher 
threshold, of 333% compared to Mpamba, of how much can be sent to 
unregistered users and may, therefore, appeal to higher-end customers as 
well as those who want to send a lot of money. For Mpamba this would imply 
sending the money in four transactions. Having said that, it would still be 
cheaper to send to fellow Mpamba customers, as the sender would pay 
K200.00 for four transactions compared to K500 for Airtel Money. However, if 
                                                     
242 TNM (2016b) 'Mpamba Customer Fees’ (Telekom Networks Malawi) 
<https://www.tnmmpamba.co.mw/index.php/customer-fees>. 11 January 2017. 
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one were to send money to an unregistered user, then the cost difference 
becomes significant. Mpamba users would pay K7,600.00.00 while Airtel 
Money users would pay K6,575.00 to send K200,000.00. Does this reveal the 
different targets that each issuer is aiming at? Is Mpamba targeting the lower 
echelons and looking at making money from repeated transactions albeit of 
smaller amounts? Alternatively, is Airtel Money looking at the higher end of 
this market and charging a premium for its service?   
 
It is still early days to conclude whether the m-money service is a success. For 
now, the indications are that it is growing steadily. Local banker Daud Suleman 
captures the growth very well when he said in 2015 that: 
Since banking started in Malawi, all the banks combined have 
managed a total base of 1.2 million customers, yet in its two, short 
years, mobile money has already registered 1.5 million users.243 
 
By mid-2016, the total number of m-money account holders had jumped to 2.6 
million with annual growth of 96.4% and 126.9% in volume and value over the 
previous year.244 It would therefore seem that the two m-money services are 
on the rise with an increase not only in the subscriber base but also in revenue. 
TNM in 2016 reported a revenue growth for Mpamba of 378%.245 This was the 
highest among TNM’s revenue streams, but nowhere compared in value to 
any of the others.246 Data from Airtel could not be sourced.247 In terms of 
mobile phone use, Airtel has 55.9% share of the market while TNM has 
43.7%.248 Interestingly this share is not evenly spread across the country’s 
                                                     
243 Charles Simango (2015) ‘Mobile money is new fashion in Malawi’ The Nation (3 February 
2015) <http://mwnation.com/mobile-money-newfashion-malawi/>. 11 January 2017. 
244 RBM (2016) Monthly National Payments System Report: July 2016 (Reserve Bank of 
Malaŵi) p1 <https://www.rbm.mw/PaymentSystems/GetContentFile/?ContentID=7870>. 
12 January 2017. 
245 TNM (2016) Annual Report 2015 (Telekom Networks Malaŵi Limited) p10 
<https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B9DwraK-rABVQUlRYnoyTlo0Znc/view>. 11 March 
2017. 
246 Ibid p10. 
247 Unlike TNM which is a publicly listed company, Airtel is a private company.  
248 MACRA (2016) National Survey on Access to and Usage of ICT Services in Malawi 
(Malaŵi Communications Regulatory Authority Blantyre) p12 
<http://www.macra.org.mw/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/MACRA-Survey-Report-
National-Household-and-Individual-access-to-and-usage-of-ICT.pdf>. 11 March 2017. 
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three regions. TNM has a major share in the North and the South.249 Airtel has 
three-quarters of the market share in the Central region.250   
 
Of the 2.6 million subscribers, only 22.8% were active over a 30-day period 
and 34.4% over a 90-day period.251 The current situation between the two 
MNOs and their m-money services can be summarised in the tables below.  
 
 Mobile phone 
users 
M-money 
Users 
Airtel  55.9% 62.2% 
TNM 43.7% 31.1% 
Table 10: Mobile and m-money market share distribution.252 
 
 Mobile phone 
users 
M-money 
Users 
M-money 
Agents 
Airtel  3.5 million253 1.9 million 5,000 
TNM 3 million254 1.6 million 3,800 
Table 11: Mobile and m-money statistics.255 
 
Statics indicate that the premier use of m-money in Malaŵi is airtime 
procurement, which in 2015 accounted for 64.8% of m-money revenue.256 
Remittances only amounted to 27.3%.257 This shows that m-money is 
beneficial to the MNO as it provides a steady stream of revenue through 
airtime purchases. However, when looked at from an urban/rural viewpoint the 
                                                     
249 Ibid. 
250 Ibid. 
251 RBM (2016). 
252 Source of date: MACRA (2016) p12-3. 
253 2015 figures. 
254 2015 figures. 
255 Source of data: 
 Akossa Mphepo (2017) Senior Public Relations Manager, Telekom Networks Malaŵi (30 
January 2017). 
 TNM (2016) p4. 
 Anon (2016g) ‘Airtel leads the way’ The Times (Blantyre, 28 January 2016) 
<http://www.times.mw/airtel-malawi-leads-the-way/>. 11 March 2017. 
 Luke Bisani (2016) ‘Airtel proud of Airtel money’ Malawi24 27 June 2016) 
<https://malawi24.com/2016/06/27/airtel-proud-airtel-money/>. 11 March 2017. 
 RBM (2017) Monthly National Payments System Report: January 2017 (Reserve Bank of 
Malaŵi) p1 <https://www.rbm.mw/PaymentSystems/GetContentFile/?ContentID=12203>. 
10 March 2017. 
256 MACRA (2016) p14. 
257 ibid. 
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picture changes. In rural areas, remittances form most transactions, at 45.3% 
compared to 42.9% for airtime purchases.258  For the rural areas, m-money is 
delivering on its premier goal and may already have started positively to affect 
the attainment of FI.  
 
4.9. Telco-led versus banking led model 
M-Pesa, Airtel Money, and Mpamba are all issued based on deposits in a pool 
account of a bank. There is no requirement for individual customs who hold 
the m-money accounts to have bank accounts. As the telecommunications 
network is the carrier of the service, this model is called a telco-led.259 This is 
the main factor distinguishing the telco-led model of m-money from the bank-
led model where one links their mobile phone to their pre-existing account. For 
the bank-led model, the mobile phone works as an extension of the bank 
account, and in many ways, bears similarities to mobile banking offered by 
banks. Examples of bank-led m-money services are WIZZIT and MTN Mobile 
Money, both offered in South Africa, discussed below.  
 
The end of apartheid in South Africa saw a positive movement in the number 
of the banked from 29% to 39% in by 1994.260 At the time the mobile money 
revolution began in earnest, more than half of the population in South Africa 
was still unbanked.261 However, despite South Africa having many people 
unbanked, the conditions seeming right and having arguably one of the biggest 
slums in Africa, Khayelitsha,262 the service seems not to have picked up as 
expected. WIZZIT was launched in 2005 with links to Bank of Athens SA.263 
The bank provides account holders with access to other e-payments systems 
including use of ATM machines.264 The opening of WIZZIT accounts was done 
                                                     
258 ibid. 
259  Maurer (2011). 
260 Alan Gibson (2006) Developing financial services markets for the poor: FinMark in South 
Africa (Making Markets Work for the Poor: Case Studies Series Schweizerische 
Eidgenossenschaft, Bern) p5 <http://www.value-
chains.org/dyn/bds/docs/614/M4P_case_study_FinMark_april2007.pdf>. 19 March 2015. 
261 Ibid p11. 
262 Tovrov (2011). 
263 Porteous (2006) p27. 
264 By use of a Maestro branded debit card which is part of the account - ibid p27. 
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remotely through agents called WIZZkids.265 WIZZIT targeted 300,000 
accounts in the medium term, 266 but it only attracted 250,000 in more than 
four years of operation.267 Apart from using the mobile banking platform, the 
service also offers a debit card by MasterCard. 268 
 
WIZZIT adopted a similar but somewhat modified slogan to that of M-Pesa: 
‘Send money home to family and friends.’269 Although it is linked to a bank, 
WIZZIT is a virtual branchless banking platform and does not require 
customers to physically visit bank branches.270 WIZZIT has now been 
deployed in nine countries271 and boasts of over six million customers through 
partner banks.272 However, details of the number of customers that it has in 
South Africa could not be obtained. It is also unclear whether these six million 
customers were recruited by WIZZIT or have become customers by its 
association with partner banks. WIZZIT is built to operate across networks and 
not linked to any one operator.273 
 
MTN (Mobile) Money started as a venture between the telecommunications 
company MTN and Standard Bank in 2005.274 Customers are required to 
provide biometric identifiers when opening accounts through an interactive 
process, which takes place remotely.275 In 2014 MTN launched MTN Mobile 
                                                     
265 ibid.  
266 Rabecca Harrison (2005) 'Cell phones plug Africa's poor into mobile banking’ Reuters 
South Africa (1 November 2005) <https://www.mail-archive.com/telecom-
cities@forums.nyu.edu/msg00327.html>. 21 Janaury 2017. 
267 Mas and Morawczynski (2009), p77. 
268 WIZZIT (2016) 'History’ (WIZZIT) <http://www.wizzit.co.za/?q=node/197>. 14 January 
2016. 
269 WIZZIT (2016b) 'Cellphone Banking’ (WIZZIT) <http://www.wizzit.co.za/?q=node/68>. 14 
January 2016. 
270 WIZZIT (2016c) 'Who We Are’ (WIZZIT International) <http://wizzit-
int.com.dedi89.cpt1.host-h.net/who-we-are/>. 14 January 2016. 
271 South Africa, Zambia, Tanzania, Romania, Rwanda, Namibia, Botswana, Honduras, and 
Nigeria. 
272 WIZZIT (2016c). Anon (2014c) ‘WIZZIT CEO: Reflections & Predictionns for The Future 
of Mobile Money’ (Mondato Insight, Mondato,14 January 2016) 
<http://mondato.com/blog/wizzit-founder/>. 14 January 2016. 
273 WIZZIT (2016c). 
274  An entity called MTN Mobile Money South Africa was formed- Cisco (2012) MTN 
MobileMoney Service (Mobile Connected Life Experiences, Cisco)  
<http://www.cisco.com/en/US/solutions/collateral/ns341/ns525/ns537/ns705/ns1058/Cisc
o_MTN_CS.pdf>. 19 March 2015. 
275 Porteous (2006) p26.  
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Money and its catch-phrase is clear in what type of service it is offering: “Mobile 
money is a safe, secure and affordable way to do your banking, and is 
available to customers on all cellphone network” (emphasis supplied).276 MTN 
says, customers are given Mobile Money Visa Cards, which they can use for 
“everyday purchases at any point-of-sale machine.”277 The cards can also be 
used to withdraw money from any ATM.278 Customers, however, need to 
purchase the Visa Card separately.279 
 
Both WIZZIT and MTN Mobile Money are premised on the notion of branchless 
banking. In Sub-Saharan Africa, one of the greatest challenges faced by banks 
is the establishment of branches in rural and far-flung areas. In 2007, Brian 
Richardson, founder of WIZZIT said: 
[I]f you talk to any bank anywhere in the world, banking equals 
branches, and as long as you have that mindset, it becomes 
expensive to bring affordable banking to the mass market. It is 
estimated in South African that about 30 million people have a 
cellphone; about 11 million people have a bank account. So, the 
option is to utilise technology. The challenge we had, was to have 
technology that worked on the lowest common denominator, that 
could work on any phone, any SIM and across all the networks.280 
 
Looking at the bank-led and telco-led models, what comes out clearly is that 
the two models function on different rails. Since WIZZIT and MTN Money are 
bank-led, it is only natural that they are subjected to the more stringent 
prudential regulatory framework for banks. It is submitted this is what may 
have led to the differences in uptake. The fact that WIZZIT and MTN Money 
are regarded as banking services may be a hindrance. There is a good reason 
                                                     
276 MTN (2015) 'MTN Mobile Money’ (Mobile Telephone Network, South Africa) 
<https://www.mtn.co.za/everyday_services/useful_extras/Banking/Pages/mobile_banking
.aspx>. 19 March 2015. 
277 MTN (2016) 'Mobile Money’ (Mobile Telephone Network, South Africa) 
<https://www.mtn.co.za/everyday_services/useful_extras/Banking/Pages/mobile_banking
.aspx>. 20 January 2016. 
278 Ibid. 
279 Ibid. 
280 Anon 'WIZZIT: Banking the Unbanked in South Africa' (World Bank, 2007) (Audio Visual) 
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2SKhCYoF0Lg>. 1 March 2017. 
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why the telco-led models are at pains to emphasise that they are not banking 
services. Bank-led models by their nature are within the clutches of the 
banking regulator. This leaves them little or no room for innovative manoeuvre 
unless sanctioned by the regulator, a process that may be laborious. Heeks 
argues that “tighter regulation” is one of the factors that “has held back the 
expansion of mobile money services in South Africa.”281 As noted earlier, M-
Pesa, which was introduced by Vodacom (South Africa), was withdrawn for 
failure to gain traction.282 The up-take of m-money in South Africa has 
generally stalled over the years.283 
 
 
Table 12: Comparisons of the Mobile Money Services.284 
                                                     
281 Heeks (2012). 
282 Chutel (2016). 
283 Rabelani Dagada (2015) ‘Mobile money stalls in SA’ ITWeb in Banking, 10 February 
2015 <http://www.itweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=141012>. 
19 March 2015. 
284 This figure has been adapted from Proteus Table 3 and table 4, Porteous (2006) p27 and 
29. 
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4.10. Conclusion 
In looking at how m-money operates, this chapter undertook a journey of how 
the telephone developed into the modern day mobile phone and how this has 
enabled the development of m-money. The analysis of the technical aspects 
of m-money is fundamental to appreciate the unique regulatory issues that m-
money poses. By looking at the Kenyan M-Pesa, the chapter looked at the 
factors that contributed to its success. A comparison was made of attempts to 
replicate it in Tanzania and why it failed to achieve the same results. A 
comparative analysis was also done on the telco-led and bank-led models of 
m-money. It was found that the bank-led models have not fared well compared 
to the telco-led model, and one possible reason advanced is a regulatory 
restriction of the former. Now, because of the inclusiveness of its risk-based 
KYC requirements, it can be concluded that the telco-led is the most ideal in 
achieving FI goals.  
 
The main issues that arise in this chapter are how a service like M-Pesa can 
be successfully replicated and what is the best way of regulating it? It was 
suggested that future replications of M-Pesa are more likely to follow the 
Tanzanian model: slow but steady. For Malaŵi, this is a valuable lesson for 
Airtel Money and Mpamba. It is imperative therefore, that the model is not 
simply replicated without factoring in some of the unique and distinguishing 
factors present in Malaŵi. In fact, it begs the question whether the research 
was first done or the service was introduced in a niche market and has had to 
be adapted along the way. As has been highlighted, the economic situation in 
Kenya is very different from that of Malaŵi. For now, both Airtel Money and 
Mpamba seem to be gaining traction. The basic m-money ecosystem 
infrastructure has been laid down and only time will tell how the services grow. 
                                                     
 Aker and Mbiti (2010) p20 say despite M-Pesa being touted as targeting the low income 
and poor and ‘banking the unbanked’, M-Pesa ‘users are wealthier, better educated, 
urban and already banked.’ 
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5. PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND MOBILE MONEY 
5.1. Introduction 
Financial regulation has traditionally worked in an evolutionary and innovative 
manner. It allows the regulator to be an enabler and embrace other forms of 
financial services to come under its supervision. With the advent of new 
alternative forms of money, such as mobile money (m-money), the issue is 
whether this traditional regulatory architecture can adequately supervise these 
alternative forms of payment. Does the regulatory space require a regulator to 
alter the approach as alternative forms of payments come into the market? Is 
it a regulatory dilemma or is it the provision of financial services in a new way? 
Or is it both? The main argument in this chapter is therefore that the traditional 
architecture of regulation which has predominantly been used in banking and 
allied services does not fit the new alternative forms of payment. This chapter 
provides an overview of the country’s payment systems and the m-money 
payment system. It analyses the m-money ecosystem and how this is 
connected to the national payment system.  
 
The legal framework for regulating the financial services in Malaŵi has 
undergone revision. The anti-money laundering framework has been revised.1 
However, a quick look at the Financial Crimes Act (2017) reveals that it still 
does not sufficiently tackle the regulatory issues that m-money raises. 
Following assessment projects by the World Bank/IMF,2 there have been 
many statutory amendments and enactment of new law.3 Part of the 
institutional changes have also seen the setting up of a commercial court.4 The 
Payment System Act (2016)5 provides the overarching statutory framework for 
                                                     
1  Financial Crimes Act (Malaŵi, 2017). 
2  Financial Sector Assessment Project (FSAP), Financial Sector Technical Assessment 
Project (FSTAP) and Business Environment Strengthening Technical Assessment 
Project (BESTAP). 
3  Insurance Act 2009, Banking Act 2010, Finances Services Act 2010, Securities Act 2010, 
Microfinance Act 2010, Credit Reference Bureau Act 2010, Financial Cooperatives Act 
2011, Pension Act 2011.   
4  The World Bank (2008) The World Bank Group in Malawi (The World Bank Group) p11  
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/MALAWIEXTN/Resources/Malawi_Brochure_2008.p
df>. 8 February 2016. 
5  Payment Systems Act, Act No. 15 of 2016 (Malaŵi, 2016) 
<https://www.rbm.mw/Home/GetContentFile/?ContentID=12256>. 15 March 2017. 
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regulating payments systems including the m-money payment system.6 The 
Electronic Transactions Act (2016)7 regulates electronic and online 
transactions and is complementary to the Payment Systems Act. This chapter 
is divided into five sections. The first provides an overview of Malaŵi’s financial 
sector. The next two sections discuss payments systems and the Malaŵi 
payment system. The fourth section looks at the nature of the m-money 
payment system and how mobile network operators (MNOs) have managed 
to provide a solution to the remittance dilemma. The fifth section analyses how 
m-money fits into the national payment system infrastructure.  
 
5.2. A brief overview of Malaŵi’s financial sector 
Malaŵi’s financial sector remains small and dominated by banking.8 Her 
capital markets are not well developed and the only stock exchange is highly 
illiquid.9 These banks offer a variety of services but are mostly located in urban 
areas. Although the country has high lending costs10 this does not translate to 
high yields for savers. For example, in the first quarter of 2015, the central 
bank (policy) rate was at 25%, the (commercial lending) base rate at 33% while 
the savings rate was at a meagre 7%.11 Such low savings returns are not 
conducive to cultivating a saving culture. It may be argued that this leads to a 
vicious cycle. Low returns mean savers would rather hold on to their money or 
invest in other higher yielding investments. This results in a limited pool, which 
banks can utilise for intermediation. In the absence of an injection of cheap 
liquidity by the state, there is a rise in the cost of borrowing with increased 
demand for finance. The other intervening factor that leads to high costs of 
finance is borrowing by the government. The World Bank estimates the fiscal 
                                                     
6  RBM (2015) Payment Systems Annual Report 2014 (Reserve Bank of Malaŵi 
<http://www.rbm.mw/PaymentSystems/GetContentFile?ContentID=5169>. 4 January 
2016. 
7   Electronic Transactions and Cybersecurity Act, No. 33 of 2016 (Malaŵi, 2016) 
<http://www.macra.org.mw/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/E-Transactions-Act-2016.pdf>. 
19 July 2016. 
8   Anon (2017). 
9  It is not unheard of for the MSE to register no trading at all in a whole week. Generally 
trading is low – see MSE (2014) 'Daily Stock News’ (Malawi Stock Exchange) 
<http://www.mse.co.mw/current/daily.pdf>. 17 June 2014.  
10  RBM (2015) Financial and Economic Review (Reserve Bank of Malawi) p10  
<https://www.rbm.mw/Home/GetContentFile?ContentID=7492>. 14 December 2015. 
11  ibid. 
- 166 - 
 
deficit in 2014/15 of 5.9% to continue in 2015/16.12 The government is forced 
to borrow domestically to finance this deficit thereby pushing rates up.  
 
Other players in the financial sector include insurance firms and pension funds. 
Recently there has been an emergence of discount and clearing houses, 
although most of them have since registered as banks.13 Hitherto, the 
country’s payment system has been comprised mainly of the banking service. 
Because of the dominance of the banking sector, it is no surprise that the 
central bank plays a dominant role. Its governor is the registrar of financial 
institutions and the central bank is the single regulator of the financial 
services.14 It also regulates and operates as the gatekeeper of the payment 
system.15 
 
5.2.1. Structure of the central bank 
The country’s President exclusively appoints the central bank’s Governor, 
Deputy Governors, and the Board.16 The Governor chairs the board,17 an 
arrangement that raises accountability and corporate governance issues. 
What this illustrates is that the central bank is de facto and de jure under the 
executive. It brings to question its independence as a regulator. Since 
independence in 1964, Malaŵi has had five Presidents.18 The central bank has 
had twelve Governors since its inception in 1965.19 The longest serving 
                                                     
12  World_Bank (2015) 'Malawi - Overview’ (World Bank) 
<http://www.worldbank.org/en/country/malawi/overview>. 21 December 2015. 
13  First Discount House (FDH) is now FDH Bank and Commercial Discount House (CDH) is 
CDH Bank. 
14  Section 8 Financial Services Act (Malaŵi, 2010). 
15  Section 4 Payment Systems Act (Malaŵi, 2016). 
16  Section 12 Reserve Bank of Malaŵi Act (1989)  
17  Section 11 Reserve Bank of Malaŵi Act (1989). 
18  Kamuzu Banda, Bakili Muluzi, Bingu wa Mutharika, Joyce Banda (who completed the 
term of Bingu wa Mutharika after his death) and Peter Mutharika (younger brother to 
Bingu). 
19  See Lukes Kalilombe (2008) ‘Central Bank Governance, Accountability and 
Independence: The Case of Reserve Bank of Malawi ’ (MA, University of Kwazulu-Natal ) 
p40 <http://researchspace.ukzn.ac.za/handle/10413/575>. 5 January 2016. But add 
Perks Ligoya (2009-2012), Charles Chuka (2012-2017(April)) and Dalitso Kabambe (April 
2017 - present). 
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Governor was John Tembo20 who served during the one-party rule.21 The 
shortest was the first Governor, A.G. Perrin, who only served a year.22 In 2008, 
the average term of a Governor was approximately 4.7 years, almost equal to 
the 5-year post-one-party political cycle.23 An examination of the rate of 
turnover of Governors after the advent of multiparty democracy24 to 2008 
indicates a drop to 4.5 years.25 In 2014, it has further dropped to 3.8 years.26 
Notably, a Governor is replaced within a year after an election27 or change in 
the presidency.28 For example, Mathews Chikaonda replaced Francis 
Perekamoyo as Governor in 1995 soon after the 1994 elections.29 Elias 
Ngalande replaced Chikaonda in 2000 after the 1999 elections whilst Victor 
Mbewe replaced Ngalande in 2005 after the 2004 Elections.30 Perks Ligoya 
replaced Mbewe, months after the 2009 general elections.31 After President 
Mutharika’s sudden death in April 2012, Charles Chuka replaced Ligoya within 
days of Mutharika’s death.32 Chuka would seem to be the only one to have run 
out a full term. Dalitso Kalilombe has since replaced him.33 
 
                                                     
20  (1971-1984) Tembo was until last year President of the Malaŵi Congress Party, a party 
led by Kamuzu Banda. But Kalilombe (2008) at p20 cautions that ‘care should be taken in 
interpreting these values because low turnover sometimes may mean lower 
independence of the Central Bank. A subservient governor may stay in the seat for a 
longer time if he does what the politicians want him to do’. It is submitted this may have 
been the case in the John Tembo governorship, who was Dr Banda’s ‘right-hand’ man. 
21  Kalilombe (2008) p40 
22  He was seconded from the Bank of England - ibid p40. See RBM (2017) 'Reserve Bank 
of Malawi’ <https://www.rbm.mw/>. 24 April 2017.  
23  Kalilombe (2008) p40. 
24  Referendum was in 1993 and first post one-party era General Elections were held in 
1994. 
25  Kalilombe (2008) p40. 
26  12 governors over a 46-year period (1968-2014). 
27  Kalilombe (2008) p41. 
28  Except for Chuka who has been retained by the current President after the 2014 
elections. 
29  Kalilombe (2008) p41. 
30  ibid. 
31  In September 2009 Gregory Gondwe (2011) 'Reserve Bank of Malawi appoints new 
governor’ (Biz Community) <http://www.bizcommunity.com/Article/415/87/40038.html>. 3 
March 2014. 
32  Catherine Snowdon (2012) 'Malawi president axes central bank governor’ (Central 
Banking) <http://www.centralbanking.com/central-banking/news/2170162/malawi-
president-axes-central-bank-governor>. 3 March 2014. 
33  'Public Appointment: Reserve Bank Governor’ (2017) Government of Malaŵi 
<https://www.facebook.com/malawigovernment/?hc_ref=PAGES_TIMELINE&fref=nf>. 21 
April 2017. 
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On average, each post-one-party era presidential term ushers in a new 
governor. It can be inferred that currently, the job of the Governor does not 
provide much security of tenure. The Governor of the Bank of Zambia has 
proposed that ensuring that the central bank Governor does not drink from the 
same poisonous presidential-term chalice would enhance professionalism, 
remove patronage and ensure the security of tenure.34 A solution may lie in 
having asymmetrical or non-coincidental terms between those of the Governor 
and the President. It would also be helpful if it were enshrined in legislation 
that an independent body, such as a non-partisan professional committee, can 
only remove the Governor. However, Kalilombe has cautioned at making linear 
conclusions from these figures: 
Care should be taken in interpreting these values because low 
turnover sometimes may mean lower independence of the central 
bank. A subservient Governor may stay in the seat for a longer time 
if he does what the politicians want him to do.35 
 
5.3. The nature of payment systems  
There is an intrinsic link between money and payment systems.36 For anything 
that performs the function of money to perform as a medium of exchange, it 
requires a secure means of being transferred or conveyed across time and 
space.37 The payment system is the one that ensures such transfer. The Bank 
for International Settlements has defined it as “a set of instruments, 
procedures and rules for the transfer of funds among system participants.”38 
Payment systems ensure that the payment cycle functions to the satisfaction 
of all parties in a payment chain. The parties are typically the payor (payer) 
and a payee using an intermediary, usually a bank. A payment system can be 
defined as a way in which a buyer (payor) and a seller (payee) agree to transfer 
                                                     
34  Kenneth Kaoma Mwenda (2010) Legal aspects of banking regulation: Common law 
perspectives from Zambia (PULP, Pretoria) p82. 
35  Kalilombe (2008) p20. 
36  Ali and others (2014a) p263. 
37  ibid p264. 
38  CPSS (2001) Core Principles for Systemically Important payment Systems (BIS, 
Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems) p14 
<http://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d43.pdf>. 17 February 2017. 
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value in a transaction.39 The thing that is used as money is what distinguishes 
payment systems. Money can include commodities, cash, cheques, or 
electronic value.40 Regardless of the type of ‘money’ employed, the payment 
system operates as a means of clearing and settlement.41  
 
 
Figure 5: Showing the mutual transfer of value.  
 
The figure above illustrates a simple payment cycle. The payor pays money to 
the payee which is processed via the payment system in exchange for goods 
and services. Often, the payor and payee pay little attention to processes that 
occur to ensure that the payment cycle has been completed. As long as the 
payor has received his goods or services and the payee his money, whatever 
happens in between (payment system) is not of prime concern to either. 
However, should the cycle be broken because of some failure in the payment 
system processes, then issues begin to arise. Clearing and settlement will 
depend on the instrument that has been used to transfer value and may not 
be instant, as in the case of a cheque. There are three main elements in a 
payment system:  
(i) Payment initiation by payor (debtor) to payee (creditor);  
(ii) Transfer of payment information among banks enabling the payor’s 
bank to debit the payor’s account and the payee's bank to credit the 
payee's account; and,  
                                                     
39  David B Humphrey (1995) Payment systems: principles, practice, and improvements vol 
23 (World Bank Publications, Washington DC) p3. 
40  ibid p4. 
41  ibid. 
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(iii) Settlement of the transfer of funds between banks, usually through 
accounts held by the banks at the central bank.42 
 
If payment is by cheque, the payee deposits it with his bank which then 
presents the cheque to the payor’s bank for settlement.43 This is usually done 
via the central bank, by debiting and crediting their clearing or reserve 
requirement balances through accounts, which the local banks have with the 
central bank.44 At the close of business, each local bank’s credits and debits 
are grossed or netted.45 To ensure that the system is reliable, the payor is not 
allowed to reverse a transaction.46 If there has been an error, this is rectified 
by initiating a new transaction.47 Ordinarily, the payor’s bank would want to 
ensure that the payor has enough credit funds to satisfy the cheque.48 If 
satisfied, the payee’s bank will credit the payee’s account by transferring “good 
and final funds” to complete the transaction.49 In the event of non-availability 
of funds, the cheque will be returned to the payee’s bank and on to the payee 
(and back to the payor).50 Humphrey defines settlement is the act of 
transferring “good and final funds.”51  
 
Clearing refers to the depositing, presentation, checking, sorting and the 
ancillary processes.52 It is done between banks while settlement is typically 
through the central bank.53 Payment systems are important because the 
instrument transferring value is not typically the value itself. The corollary is 
that where the instrument transferring value represents the value itself, there 
is no need for a settlement or clearing. Payment involving barter trade, 
                                                     
42  Setsuya Satåo and David B Humphrey (1995) Transforming Payment Systems: Meeting 
the Needs of Emerging Market Economies (World Bank Discussion Papers, World Bank) 
p1. 
43  The process of inter-bank clearance and settlement may involve actual delivery of the 
cheque and an inter-bank transfer or indeed transmission of an electronic image. 
44  Satåo and Humphrey (1995) p24. 
45  Grossing is bilateral (real time) and usually while netting is multilateral (end-of period). 
46  Satåo and Humphrey (1995) p26. 
47  ibid. 
48  Or has at least made prior arrangements as in the case for over-draft or other loan. 
49  Humphrey (1995) p4. 
50  Satåo and Humphrey (1995) p8. 
51  Humphrey (1995). 
52  ibid p4. 
53  ibid p7. 
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commodity money54 or cash represents a transfer of “good and final funds” 
thereby removing the need for settlement or clearing.55  
 
The figure below illustrates the payment cycle of a typical transaction involving 
at least two separate banks and using an instrument of value-transfer such as 
a cheque. 
  
 
Figure 6: Showing the complete payment cycle.56 
 
Looking at the above, the central role that the central bank plays in the 
payment system becomes evident. It houses the clearinghouse or process 
centres and ensures grossing or netting of transactions between various 
players. Every country has a payment system reflecting its level of 
“development of money and capital markets and implementation of monetary 
policy.”57 Its main purpose “is to provide low cost, timely, and secure payments 
                                                     
54  Commodity money is money whose value comes from the constitutive commodity of 
which it is made. Unlike fiat money, it consists of objects that have value in themselves 
as well as value in their use as money. 
55  Humphrey (1995). 
56  Adapted from Satåo and Humphrey (1995) p22, Figure 2: Payment cycle for non-cash 
payment. 
57  ibid p1,11. 
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for both enterprises and households.”58 Increasingly now, with technological 
advancements, there is a global acceleration in non-cash transactions, with 
Asia registering the highest growth, and Africa coming second. 59 A growth in 
non-cash transactions depicts that settlement of obligations is increasingly 
being done by payments other than cash.  
Although commercial firms have tried to gain access to the payment system, 
this has always been resisted. The grounds are that banking and other forms 
of commerce must remain apart to ensure the integrity of the banking system, 
to limit possible disruption of the money supply or the payment system itself, 
and to provide a means of protecting deposits.60 This implies that commercial 
firms such as mobile network operators (MNOs) have to approach banks to 
access the payment system platform since banks have a monopoly on the 
provision of payment services.61 However, with m-money, MNOs have devised 
a way, piggybacking on banks, to get on the national payment system platform 
or at least to develop an alternative payment system. 
 
The central bank as regulator must ensure the soundness of the 
counterparties to ensure integrity in the payment system.62 The central bank 
also needs to have a mechanism of firewalling against shocks which may be 
caused by an unreliable counterparty. Ensuring that counterparty hold 
adequate reserves with the central bank is one way of ensuring that mutual 
obligations are settled at the end of the business day.63 Since most 
transactions are now electronic, having a robust and redundant backbone to 
ensure reliability and reduced downtime is vital for the efficient operation of the 
payment system. Apart from the central bank investing in the appropriate 
technology and expertise, it may require a similar investment by the 
counterparts. While every country will have in place institutions to regulate the 
financial sector, Satåo and Humphrey say it is important that any such 
                                                     
58  ibid. 
59  Ganesh Samvaran Vudayagiri and others (2016) World Payments Report (Capgemini 
and  BNP Paribas) p6 <http://www.astrid-
online.it/static/upload/worl/world_payments_report_wpr_2016.pdf>. 10 March 2017. 
60  ibid p33. 
61  ibid. 
62  Padoa-Schioppa (2003) p305. 
63  Goodhart (1988) p85. 
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framework “permit new and cost-effective payment instruments to develop and 
evolve if they meet better the payment needs of households and enterprises 
in a market economy.”64 
 
5.4. The Malaŵi Payment System 
In its Financial Sector Development Strategy for 2010-2015, the Malaŵi 
Government prioritised promotion of savings mobilisation and building an 
inclusive payment system as tenets to achieve financial inclusion (FI).65 The 
Reserve Bank of Malaŵi (RBM), the National Payments Council (NPC)66 and 
Bankers Association of Malaŵi are the organisations behind the operation of 
the National Payment System (NPS). In 2008, the RBM and NPC issued a 
vision and strategy framework with a broad objective “to attain a safe, efficient, 
and harmonised national payment system that effectively contributes to the 
country’s financial stability.”67 Under the law, the RBM has a statutory duty to 
promote a sound financial infrastructure in Malawi, including payment and 
clearing systems.68  
 
5.4.1. Development of the national payment system 
In 1999, the RBM started the Malaŵi Switch Centre (Malswitch) project.69 The 
project was later incorporated into a company.70 Malswitch linked all major 
banks in Malaŵi and acted as a switch as well as a central point for electronic 
                                                     
64  Satåo and Humphrey (1995) p17. 
65  Financial Sector Development Strategy: 2010 – 2015 (2015) (Government of Malaŵi) 
p33-34 <http://www.finance.gov.mw/fspu/index.php/financial-sector-laws/strategy-
documents/55-malawi-financial-sector-development-strategy-2010-2015/file>. 21 
December 2015. 
66  Established in 1993 under the IMF assisted modernisation programme of the financial 
sector - BIS (1997) The Payment System in Malawi (Bank of International Settlements) 
p67 <https://www.bis.org/cpss/paysys/Malawi.pdf>. 20 February 2017. 
67  RBM (2008) Malawi National Payment System Vision Strategy Framework for the period 
2009-2013 (Reserve Bank of Malawi) p4  
<http://www.rbm.mw/documents/payment_systems/NPS%20Vision%20%20Strategy%20
Framework%20December%202008%20Final.pdf>. 10 February 2014.  
 The first one only came out as recent as 2001 - ibid p5. 
68  Section 4(e) Financial Crimes Act (Malaŵi, 2017). 
69  Edwin Saidi (2009) ‘Mobile opportunities, mobile problems: Assessing mobile commerce 
implementation issues in Malawi’ 14 (1) Journal of Internet Banking and Commerce 1, 
p1. 
70 Malswitch Malswitch’ (Malawi Switch Centre Limited) 
<http://www.malswitch.mw/malswitch/>. 10 February 2014. 
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cheque clearing services.71 Malswitch had the goal of linking inter-bank and 
retail electronic funds transfers but the latter never took off nationwide.72 The 
payment infrastructure comprises the Malaŵi Inter-Bank Transfer and 
Settlement System, the Electronic Cheque Clearing House and the National 
Switch (NatSwitch) which has taken the role of Malswitch.73 NatSwitch was 
setup, as a partnership with the Bankers Association of Malaŵi (BAM), with 
funding from the World Bank.74 Its aim was to establish an automated transfer 
system to process real-time transactions settlement on a gross basis.75 Its 
target is to achieve interoperability of auto-teller machines and point of sale 
devices, owned or operated by different banks or financial institutions.76 The 
BAM, through its membership, owns NatSwitch.77 
 
NatSwitch promises reduced transaction fees and overall benefits to 
customers as the interoperability platform will allow sharing of point of sale 
devices and auto teller machines, among others.78 All the commercial banks 
are now connected to the NatSwitch. One can access money at any auto teller 
machine (ATM) irrespective of the owner of the ATM.79 The author’s 
experience is that this has resulted in transactions fees across ATMs of rivals’ 
banks dropping by almost a tenth.80 So far there is still debate on whether 
investing in a completely new switch was wise, with a consumer rights body 
                                                     
71  Saidi (2009). 
72  Ahmed  Dermish, Joel  Phiri and Caitlin  Sanford (2012 ) Mapping the Retail Payment 
Services Landscape Malawi (FinMark Trust) p13 <http://www.finmark.org.za/wp-
content/uploads/pubs/Rep_RPS_landscape_Malawi_2012.pdf>. 10 February 2014. 
73  ibid p10. NatSwitch has replaced Malswitch. 
74  SADC (2013) 'Payment systems progress report to Committee of Central Bank  
Governors (CCBG) for the period April 2011 to March 2012 (Malawi)’ (Southern Africa 
Development Community (SADC) Bankers Association) 
<http://www.sadcbankers.org/subcommittees/PaySystem/media/Documents/Newsletters/
Vulindlela_Nov2012/Malawi.pdf>. 10 February 2014. 
75  ibid. 
76  ibid. 
77  Taonga Sabola (2015) ‘Banks switch on payment system’ Daily Times (17 February 
2015) <http://timesmediamw.com/banks-switch-payment-system/>. 7 October 2016. 
78  Chikondi Chiyembekeza (2013) ‘National switch: A long overdue project or a waste?’ The 
Nation (5 September 2013) <http://mwnation.com/national-switch-long-overdue-project-
waste/>. 10 February 2014. 
79  Grace Khombe (2015) ‘National Switch Connects ATMs to All’ Zodiak Online, 16 
February 2015 <http://www.zodiakmalawi.com/top-stories/national-switch-connects-atms-
to-all>. 15 December 2015. 
80  Before NatSwitch, only ATMs of banks on the Visa platform were interoperable. The 
transaction fee was K700. With NatSwitch it was K75 in August 2015 when I visited 
Malaŵi. 
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lamenting that the interconnectivity benefits are not being passed on to 
consumers of the service.81 
 
5.5. The nature of the mobile money payment system 
The mobile or cell phone was first introduced in Malaŵi in 1995.82 At that time, 
the main means of remitting money was through the postal services network 
(formal), friends, and relatives (informal). There have been infrastructural and 
development changes since 1995, but it is argued that so far, at least, until 
what the author terms the ‘revolutionary solution,’ there was no answer to the 
remittance dilemma. 
 
5.5.1. The remittance dilemma 
Transferring money across geographically spread locations is a problem in 
most developing countries. Ironically as a service, remittances benefit when 
families are split. Ideally, they target the “urban migrant population who seek 
better employment options and send money regularly to rural kins.”83 There is 
a direct correlation between remittances and rate of urbanisation.84 The 
problems faced by migrant workers in sending money home are not unique to 
Africa. In the Middle East and Asia, the Hawala has been used for a long time 
as an informal way of sending not only domestic but also international 
remittances.85 Hawala, developed in India, works as an alternative remittance 
system that transfers money without moving the money.86 Its strength lies in 
its network of members: using family or regional affiliations.87 On its part, 
Malaŵi has had money remittance problems, especially in the rural areas. 
These problems are mainly rooted in the country’s infrastructural and 
institutional bottlenecks. 
 
                                                     
81  Grace Thipa (2016) ‘Banks faulted on Natswicth’ Daily Times (4 May 2016) 
<http://www.times.mw/banks-faulted-on-natswitch/>. 7 October 2016. 
82  Author’s personal knowledge. 
83  Heyer and Mas (2009) p5. 
84  ibid p5. 
85  ibid p10. 
86  Patrick M Jost and Harjit Singh Sandhu (2003) The hawala alternative remittance system 
and its role in money laundering (Interpol) p2  
<https://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/ebooks/files/hawala.pdf>. 14 February 2017. 
87  ibid. 
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Road network  
A World Bank survey done on Malaŵi in 2009 established the following: 
Quality of the trunk road network is not a major constraint but 
differences in the quality of feeder roads connecting villages to the 
main road network have a bearing on transport costs. And costs 
due to poor feeder roads are exacerbated by low volumes of trade 
between rural locations and market centers. With empty backhauls 
and journeys covering small distances, only a few transport service 
providers enter the market, charging disproportionately high prices 
to cover fixed costs and maximize mark-ups.88 
 
All forms of remittances relying on the road network are not only expensive but 
also unreliable. Due to bad or non-existent feeder roads, access to rural areas 
may just be impossible. It is not easy to remit money to remote areas because 
of inaccessibility. Even formal means of remittance are expensive because of 
high accessibility costs.    
 
Inaccessibility of banking services 
Bank charges in Malaŵi are generally high across all platforms.89 Apart from 
bank charges, it is expensive to operate a bank account in Malaŵi because of 
several factors. Most banks are concentrated in the main cities and towns and 
usually have agencies in the smaller towns. People in the rural areas must 
travel long distances to access banking services. Only one bank, OIBM 
operated a physically mobile banking service.90 Unfortunately, this bank was 
facing financial problems and has since been taken over by another bank, First 
Merchant Bank (FMB).91 It is unclear whether FMB will continue operating the 
                                                     
88  Somik . V.   Lall, Hyoung   Wang and Thomas Munthali (2009) Explaining High Transport 
Costs Within Malawi - Bad Roads Or Lack Of Trucking Competition ? (Policy Research 
Working Paper 5133, World Bank Publications)  
<http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-5133>. 11 March 2014. 
89  Chris Chibwana (2010) 'The high and the hidden costs of banking in Malawi’ 
<http://chibwana.com/2010/04/05/costs-of-banking-in-malawi/>. 11 March 2014. 
90  Geetha  Nagarajan (July 2010) 'Money in a Pot: Has OIBM Altered Savings in Rural 
Malawi?’ (Financial Service Assessment) 
<http://www.fsassessment.umd.edu/notes/savings-rural.html>. 11 March 2014. 
91  Kelvin Chaguza (2017) 'Opportunity International Bank of Malawi (OIBM) to trim its staff 
this year’ Face of Malawi (26 January 2017) 
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mobile banking service. Most banks also require a minimum credit balance to 
open and operate a savings account. Some also charge a ledger fee for 
current accounts. Some banks also impose limits per day and per month, not 
only for amounts of money withdrawn but also for the number of transactions. 
All banks have onerous know your customer (KYC) requirements. Malaŵi has 
just embarked on a national identity system and it is difficult for people in rural 
arrears or those in the informal sector to obtain identification papers 
acceptable by the banks.92 
 
Although transferring money may be free when using the same bank, lack of 
holding an account may be a barrier. The banking sector is effectively one 
serving the middle and upper classes. Statistics in 2014 show only 33% (up 
from 19% in 2008) of the population was banked.93 The rural population was 
at 86% in 2014,94 up from 80% in 2010,95 a trend that demonstrates reverse-
urbanisation. Figures for 2016 put the rural population at 84%.96 The banked 
in rural areas, in the absence of local banking services, must trek to urban 
centres to access banking services. On the other hand, it may well be that the 
percentage of those banked does not represent the actual number of people 
but rather of bank accounts. If this is so, then the actual population banked 
may be even less as it is common for most people to hold multiple accounts. 
The current banking services, illustrate the class division in society. The last 
state-owned bank, which had targeted rural communities, was sold in 2015 
thereby reinforcing the private banking system.97 
 
                                                     
<http://www.faceofmalawi.com/2017/01/opportunity-bank-of-malawi-oibm-to-trim-its-
staffs-this-year/>. 10 March 2017. 
 FMB ‘First Merchant Bank to acquire Opportunity International Bank of Malawi’ 27 June 
2017 < http://www.fmbmalawi.com/first-merchant-bank-to-acquire-opportunity-
international-bank-of-malawi/>. 18 July 2017. 
92  Legislation to enable national identification system was passed: National Registration Act 
(Malaŵi 2010), but efforts to operationalise it only started in 2015 – Malaŵi Government 
(2015). 
93  Finscope (2014) p5. 
94  ibid p2. 
95  Anon (2014) 'Rural population in Malawi’ Trading Economics 
<http://www.tradingeconomics.com/malawi/rural-population-wb-data.html>. 19 May 2014. 
96 UNESCO (2016). 
97 Chipiliro Kansilanga (2015) ‘Malawi Savings Bank finally sold ’ Daily Times (2 July 2015) 
<http://www.times.mw/malawi-savings-bank-finally-sold-2/>. 20 July 2016. 
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Expensive remittance services 
There are several remittance services operating in Malaŵi, apart from those 
exclusively offered by the postal services. These include MoneyGram and 
Western Union. MoneyGram charges a fee of K4,200.00 for any amount up to 
K35,000.00, K5,250.00 from then on to K70,000.00 and K7,000.00 from 
K70,001.00 to K140,000.00 and so on.98 These charges are not only high but 
deter remittance of small amounts. [£1= K882.61].99 It may be argued, 
however, that the higher the amount to be transferred, the lower the 
transaction costs becomes. The economies of scale balance out when higher 
amounts are transferred. This however, disadvantages those who transfer 
small amounts. These money remittance services are useful for international 
and regional remittances but not for small amounts. For domestic remittances, 
they are the least ideal because of high transaction costs.  
 
Unreliable but relatively expensive postal services  
One could in the old days, put money in an envelope and post it. Posting 
money, this way was prohibited but this did not stop the risk-takers. Now, the 
risk of an envelope containing money going missing is so great it would be 
foolhardy to even dare. The postal service has, always operated remittance 
services. They now have a service called Fast Cash, and still, operate money 
or postal order services.100 However, there are post offices that do not have a 
sufficiently large enough cash float to enable them to pay out.101 Therefore, if 
one sent money to via a rural post office, chances are that the post office in 
question may not have the money to pay out the full amount.  
 
Unreliable friends and relatives 
It is common for people to send money to relatives living in another village 
using friends or other family members going there. The risk here is that the 
                                                     
98  MoneyGram MoneyGram’ (MoneyGram International Limited) 
<https://m.moneygram.com/mgomobile/site/costEstimator.html#CostEstimatorResults>. 
11 March 2014. 
99 XE (2017). 
100  MPC (2017) 'Financial, Retail & Agency Services’ (Malawi Posts Corporation) 
<http://malawiposts.com/finance.html>. 10 March 2017. 
101  Vince Kumwenda (2012) 'Malawi Posts Corporation's Fast Cash Money Transfer’ 
<http://vincekumwenda.blogspot.co.uk/2012/05/malawi-posts-corporations-fast-
cash.html>. 23 February 2017. 
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friend or relative may not deliver the money, possibly claiming that they had 
lost the money or that it was stolen. They might also claim that the money was 
lost through magic. The local word used to describe this phenomenon is 
chitaka.102 Cases of chitaka seem to be on the decline, and this has been 
attributed to improved financial literacy.103  
 
5.5.2. The ‘revolutionary solution’: mobile money remittance 
Following on from the ground-breaking innovation of M-Pesa by Safaricom in 
Kenya, MNOs have introduced what the author terms the revolutionary 
solution: the m-money service. M-money is not just a money service; it is a 
complete payment system. By addressing the remittance challenges, MNOs 
have devised a unique network of solutions to the remittance dilemma using 
the m-money payment system: 
 Localise everything: MNOs already have agents with an established 
presence in most parts of the country who sell airtime.104 By using the 
same agents as m-money agents, the service will be easily accepted 
by the community. 
 
 Reduce transactions costs: The charges for sending and receiving 
money are low and affordable. In fact, the charges are so minimal that 
the other money remittance services are now in danger to adapt or 
die.105 
 
 Load a new money service on an existing and familiar 
telecommunication services:  
M-money services use the same telecommunication platform already 
built by the MNOs and the same interface that mobile phone users are 
                                                     
102 Chitaka is a collective word (Cheŵa) all forms of magic tricks usually associated with 
stealing of money. 
103  (2012) Study on Informal and Non-Formal Rural Financial Services 2012 (Concern 
Universal Malawi) p13 <http://concern-universal.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/CUMO-
Study-of-Rural-Finance-Summary.pdf>. 7 October 2016. 
104  Although the agent low agent penetration is still perceived as a barrier that needs to be 
overcome. 
105  For example, the remittance fee is K50 regardless of the amount for Mpamba. 
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already accustomed to. It is based on the short messaging service 
(SMS), which is a well-known feature. 
 
 Take advantage of the ubiquitous nature of the mobile phone: The 
mobile phone is now found almost anywhere and everywhere. It is 
trusted too. If one can trust it to send a message across hundreds and 
thousands of kilometres, one may be easily convinced to use the same 
device for other services such as sending and receiving money or 
buying goods and services. It is also a convenient tool. 
 
 Develop a vibrant ecosystem: M-money issuers have collaborated with 
the major utility service providers so that customers are encouraged to 
procure or pay their bills via m-money. The electricity and water utilities 
are some of the utility companies that are part of the m-money 
ecosystem. The inclusion of retail fuel providers and pay television 
services indicates that the target is beyond merely the unbanked.106 
 
One can use the m-money service, just like one uses one’s phone, for regular 
every day (text-based) communication not only to send and receive money but 
also to procure goods and services. It invariably also means that one can use 
the service to receive payments for goods and services sold. The service 
makes it much easier, safer, faster, and cheaper to send money. The user of 
the service need not have a bank account or pass the other stringent KYC 
checks that one may be subjected to before being able to open a bank 
account.107 A noted in the last chapter, this is the main distinction between the 
telco-led model and the bank-led model. It presents the very first, but crucial 
step towards getting those who were financially excluded into the formal 
financial sector. Mas and Radcliffe argue that this has opened a completely 
new way of transacting effectively, replacing methods such as personal trips, 
and using friends as couriers, public courier, postal systems, and public 
transport networks.108 Camner et al found that after M-Pesa was launched in 
                                                     
106  Kihagi (2013). See also TNM (2017). 
107  A customer due diligence of some sort is however done. 
108 Mas and Radcliffe (2011). See also Aker and Mbiti (2010) p20. 
- 181 - 
 
Kenya, there was a “massive reduction in using hand-delivery, bus travel, or 
courier companies for remittances.”109  
 
Malaŵi has experienced a sharp rise in internet and mobile banking. In 2015, 
MNO-led mobile banking registered an annual 141% increase with a 
corresponding 188% growth in value (K48 billion from K16.6 billion).110 The 
popularity of utility bill payments plus aggressive marketing by the two m-
money issuers was attributed to this increase.111 The total number of 
registered subscribers for mobile payment services grew by 156% (12.5 million 
from 4.9 million).112 It is important however to caution that this figure most likely 
is the aggregate of all mobile payments and includes both mobile banking and 
m-money payments. As is seen later, the total figure of mobile phones 
subscribers is way below this figure. The central bank puts the total number of 
subscribers of non-bank mobile payments at 3.6 million as at December 
2016.113 
 
5.6. Mobile money and the Malaŵi payment system 
The linkage between m-money and payment systems can be summarised 
using a Venn diagram and set theory analogy.114 The payment systems may 
be deemed as the “unit set”: the sum of all the different systems within it.115 
Inside it would be other sub-systems such as paper or electronic payment 
systems. Inside the electronic payment systems would be several payment 
systems such as electronic transfer of funds and mobile payment systems. 
While there may be an intersection between mobile payment systems and m-
money payment systems, as in the case of a bank-led m-money model, there 
are also differences as in the case of the telco-led model. One cannot separate 
the m-money payment system from the national payment system because the 
former is an integral part of the latter. The Venn diagram figure below 
illustrates the relationship between the m-money payment system and the 
                                                     
109  Donovan (2012) p2653, quoting Gunnar Camner (2009).   
110 RBM (2015) p14. 
111 ibid. 
112 ibid. 
113 RBM (2017) p1. 
114 Robert R Stoll (1961) Set Theory and Logic (Dover Publications, New York) chapter 1. 
115 ibid p4-5. 
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national payment system but omits other sub-systems not directly related to 
m-money.  
 
 
Figure 7: Venn diagram of the payment system. 
 
Operationally, the m-money platform rides on the telecommunications platform 
of the MNOs. As discussed earlier, once money has been deposited into the 
pool account, m-money can be issued on a one-to-one ratio. Settlement of 
obligations and clearances are done using the pool account within the banking 
system. However, m-money issuers have now adopted an integrated 
approach where transactions are in real-time and clients do not have to go to 
an agent to obtain electronic value (e-value). Clients can transact between 
their bank accounts and m-money accounts and settle their obligations or remit 
money without physically moving.116 This has huge ramifications for the 
agency distribution network. Agents may be cut-off from the transactions chain 
and lose out on commission. Whether it will result in reduced transaction fees 
for customers is yet to be seen. However, it would be too early to prophesy the 
death of the agency relationship, as agents are still needed to register 
customers as well as help customers without a bank account, who incidentally 
were the prime targets of m-money. Therefore, while clearance and settlement 
are still within the banking system, the integration allows the m-money issuers 
                                                     
116  Mkoloma (Interview, 7 August 2015).  
 Mbekeani (Interview, 20 August 2015).  
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to offer new innovative products and to circulate value within their ecosystem. 
This then raises the issue whether this telco-led model is now mimicking the 
bank-led model since a direct linkage to the bank account is the hallmark of 
the latter. 
 
Airtel Money says integration helps to create a seamless web of transactions 
between depositing money into the pool account and creation of e-value to 
match the deposits.117 However, first-tier banks were initially reluctant to have 
a fully integrated system with MNOs.118 Using its first-mover advantage, Airtel 
Money decided to approach the second tier of banks who were more 
receptive.119 It was only when the first-tier banks realised they were losing out 
on the intermediation benefits of trust accounts that they came knocking on 
the door, “wanting a share of the pie.”120 On its part, Airtel money used this as 
an opportunity to negotiate full integration with the bank; as well as negotiate 
higher returns thereby ensuring a win-win situation.121  
 
The ideal situation for m-money issuers would be that once e-value has been 
created, it stays within the ecosystem. This would also mean that the m-money 
issuers would have reduced transactions fees paid to NatSwitch. Appreciably, 
there is a cost to integration. Banks and MNOs use different technologies for 
their operations. Integrating can be challenging and costly. It involves 
procuring equipment and software that can act as a switch between the two 
systems. Where the MNOs wish to integrate with various banks, this 
compound the issues and increases the costs. It is submitted that some banks 
may also feel uncomfortable to have a fully integrated system with a third party, 
which they cannot control, and which is not prudentially regulated.  
 
It must be pointed out however, that although the m-money payment system 
can be linked to the national payment system, the two can exist outside each 
other. The m-money payment system can operate entirely outside the banking 
                                                     
117  Mkoloma (Interview, 7 August 2015).  
118  ibid. 
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system.122 Once e-value is created, the m-money payment system has a life 
of its own. Users can remit funds directly to each other, procure goods and 
services and settle in real time independently of the banking system.123 The 
fact that the system is instantaneous and can by-pass the clearing bottlenecks 
of the banking system gives it an advantage.124 It raises the possibility of 
whether it may start posing a direct challenge to the payment system operated 
by banks.  In fact, were the two m-money issuers to set up a joint system with 
full interoperability, it may well start encroaching into the territory of the 
banking payment system.  
 
5.6.1. Role of the regulator: authorising m-money operations 
Since the central bank is tasked with ensuring that there is financial stability, it 
is always on the lookout for any potential risk posed to the national payment 
system. Central banks are keen to regulate m-money because it: 
 promotes financial inclusion; 
 Expands the range of payment choices; 
 Helps in anti-money laundering and counter-terrorism financing by 
channelling cash into the formal system; 
 Aids national socio-economic development.125 
 
Central banks may also be keen to regulate m-money to avoid danger that it 
may pose to financial stability. Any m-money service must be authorised 
before it can roll out. To allow for the framework of authorisation and 
regulation, the RBM issued Mobile Payment Systems Guidelines in 2011.126 
Chapter 7 discusses these guidelines. What can be said now is that the RBM 
seems to have adopted a light-touch regulatory model on m-money. This may 
very well be a deliberate undertaking to allow the service to grow and gain 
traction. It may also be a learning curve for the regulator considering that the 
m-money service is unique in that it combines elements of a financial service 
and a communication service. It must also be appreciated that the m-money 
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- 185 - 
 
ecosystem is a complex payment system because it can connect with other 
payment systems. However, even where a regulator starts with a laissez-faire 
attitude, eventually the regulator will have to start considering certain pertinent 
questions. 127 For example, who is dispensing cash, what type of transactions 
should be permitted and how can liability be limited or capped.128 Much more 
important, however, will the vulnerable consumer be protected?129  
 
The 2011 Guidelines while providing the building blocks may soon be deemed 
insufficient as the service grows in quantum leaps. This is hardly surprising. 
The technology driving mobile telephony is changing rapidly that the regulator 
is likely to play catch-up for some time. The Guidelines also illustrate a 
common feature amongst regulators of m-money; a certain degree of non-
appreciation of what the system is all about and how to regulate it.130 This 
again is not surprising as m-money is not the usual ‘customer’ that the financial 
service regulator must deal with. The recently enacted Payment Systems Act 
(2016), however, provides the broad framework under which m-money is to be 
regulated. While previously the RBM allowed operations based on a ‘Letter of 
No Objections’ which had no express statutory backing, the law now requires 
a prior application for a licence or authorisation before rolling out.131 Chapter 
7 discusses the regulatory framework in detail. 
 
5.6.2. The mobile money ecosystem 
Kennedy defines the m-money ecosystem as:  
The networks of organizations that must be in place for mobile 
money services to take root, proliferate, and go to scale. Nazerono 
explains, “The objective is ubiquity. The three rules of retail are 
location, location, location. In mobile money, they’re partnering, 
                                                     
127  Tonny K Omwansa (2009) ‘M-PESA: Progress and prospects’ Innovations 107 p121 
<https://profiles.uonbi.ac.ke/tomwansa/files/innov-gsma-omwansa.pdf>. 1 December 
2016. 
128  ibid. 
129  ibid. 
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partnering, partnering. We need to create a mesh of partnerships 
covering various networks of relationships.”132 
 
 
Figure 8: Showing a simple m-money ecosystem. 
 
The figure above illustrates a simple m-money ecosystem looking at a 
closely-knit and localised network. The figure underscores three key points:  
(1) The customer does not need to open and operate a bank account to 
become a part of the ecosystem; 
(2) Customers can remit money to other customers, peer to peer (P2P) 
without having to cash-out and  
(3) M-money is a payment system. Therefore, the m-money ecosystem 
does provide a means of attaining some level of financial inclusion.  
 
The simplified figure omits the fact that providers of goods and services do not 
have to cash out their m-money. They can use it to procure goods and 
services. Therefore, the m-money issuer is not only a subsidiary of the MNO, 
but also acts as an agent and outlet of the MNO. Customers can procure 
goods and services such as airtime and handsets, which can be paid for by 
m-money. The figure also excludes injection of cash via third parties as well 
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as the role of the regulator(s). The regulatory dilemma that m-money presents 
are well summarised by Maurer: 
[T]he evolution of mobile money has led regulators and industry 
professionals to turn once more back to the original infrastructural 
question that animated mobile money in the first place: do mobile 
telecommunications networks represent a new set of rails for 
payments? What else can ride on those rails?133 
 
The rapid growth of m-money presents evidence that the telecommunications 
service is now a multidisciplinary one, embracing finance and commerce. This 
is a result of the communications revolution, which leads to convergence of 
technologies and processes. This in effect is the argument that this thesis 
makes. With this comes unique challenges, different from those faced by 
regulators of the telecommunication or financial services. One challenge has 
been identified by Maurer who wonders how regulators will regulate “cross-
boundary airtime top-up services, which have the potential to offer a truly 
transnational remittance service riding whole separate rails from the traditional 
payment systems?”134  
 
Both m-money issuers are now members of NatSwitch.135 Airtel Money and 
Mpamba have indicated they are considering creating their own m-money 
payment system, linked to NatSwitch.136 Were this to happen, it has the 
potential to minimise transaction costs paid to NatSwitch and allow only 
clearing and settlement to be done using the trust account. Hopefully, any 
financial benefits received from this will be passed on to consumers and result 
in reduced transactional fess. It would mean once created, the e-value would 
circulate within the ecosystem and only the aggregate surplus or deficit would 
be settled with fiat money. An efficient and encompassing ecosystem would 
be a critical element of such a dedicated payment system. Airtel Money and 
Mpamba have also been discussing interoperability so that customers across 
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the two platforms can transact as if they were on one platform.137 This, though 
may require interoperability of the telecommunications platform first. 
Interoperability is however, not a simple issue. It subject to competition and 
corporate political interests. For example, the fact that the two MNOs do not 
have an equal share may hamper such agreement and it may require the 
regulator’s intervention to implement such an arrangement.138 On the other 
hand maintaining the status quo may be good for competition as opposed to 
creating a cartel. Chapter 9 discusses interoperability further. 
 
5.6.3. Mobile money not yet systemically important 
When dealing with payment systems, there is a distinction between services 
that are systemically important and those that are not. The test for the former 
is: “if the system were insufficiently protected against risk, disruption within it 
could trigger or transmit further disruptions among participants or systemic 
disruptions in the financial area more widely.”139 For a payment system to be 
systemically important, its failure must trigger disruptions or transmit shocks 
within the financial system.140 To be systemically important, a payment system 
must satisfy one of the following criteria: 
a) Be the sole or principal payment system; 
b) Handle mainly payments of high value; 
c) Be used for the settlement of financial market transactions or for the 
settlement of other payment systems.141 
 
From the above criteria, the NPS operated through the NatSwitch qualifies as 
systemically important on all three levels. The RBM in fact has stated that the 
Malaŵi’s Interbank Funds Transfer and Settlement System (MITASS) is “the 
sole systemically important payment system.”142 The m-money payment 
system does not meet any of the criteria. In fact, the m-money payment system 
uses the NPS for settlement. M-money values are also limited and low in 
                                                     
137 ibid. 
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139 CPSS (2001) p5. 
140 ibid. 
141 ibid. 
142 RBM (2015) p10. 
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value. For example, the December 2016 report by the central bank shows that 
m-money only formed 2.05% of the daily value settled by MITASS.143 In 2014, 
Ali et al of the Bank of England, concluded that digital currencies do not yet 
pose a systemic risk as “the total value of all digital currencies is too small to 
pose a threat … at present.”144 In his study of m-money in Kenya, Muthiora 
concluded that although it forms “a very important part of the financial system 
… mobile money does not introduce systemic risk to the financial system.”145 
Di Castri agrees that in comparison to banking, m-money does not pose a 
systemic risk.146  Evaluation of data available in Kenya showed that m-money 
only had a 6.59% stake in the national payment system in 2015. If at 6.59%, 
m-money is not considered a systemic risk, a fortiori 2.05% for Malaŵi? These 
low figures may largely be attributed to the fact that electronic money is used 
mostly in the retail payment system.147 Another reason may be that the 
banking system becomes more attractive in terms of transaction costs the 
higher the amount of transfer. When m-money starts attracting wholesale 
payments, the risk assessment is likely to change. Such widespread usage 
could make the mobile money payment system systemically important.148  
 
5.7. Conclusion 
This chapter has discussed Malaŵi’s payment system and its interface with m-
money. It has analysed how the payment system works generically as well as 
how the Malaŵi payment system is structured and operated. It has also looked 
at how using m-money, MNOs have come up with a radical and revolutionary 
business solution to the remittance dilemma. Looking at the m-money 
ecosystem, it becomes clear that m-money is not just a money service but a 
complete payment system. Although m-money is connected to the NPS, it has 
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the capacity to exist outside the system. Compared to the NPS, it has the 
advantage of offering an instantaneous settlement of obligations. Although m-
money has grown in its usage, it is not yet systemically important. This is 
largely because the volume of transactions and value compared to bank 
deposits is still very small. However, with time this may change, especially as 
more people resort to m-money as the premier means of settling their 
obligations or making payments. The fact that it is also now interconnected 
with to the NatSwitch may require a different regulatory approach than the 
traditional light-touch. 
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6. MOBILE MONEY AND FINANCIAL INCLUSION1 
6.1. Introduction 
Financial inclusion (FI) or exclusion usually affects people on the margins of 
society, the so-called vulnerable groups.2 Sarma and Pais say financial 
exclusion is “a manifestation of social exclusion.” 3 Donovan says, “poverty is 
more than just a lack of money.”4 People who are socially excluded may have 
money but their exclusion from the social system exacerbates their poverty.5 
As discussed in the last chapter, mobile money (m-money) has by its nature 
the potential of getting on board such people who would otherwise not be 
covered by services providers within the formal financial system. In solving the 
remittance dilemma, m-money has also introduced an alternative payment 
system, which is virtually unlimited in scope. While traditional models of FI 
have been “credit-led” or “savings-led”, m-money “suggests a third approach 
– focussing on building the payment rails on which a broader set of financial 
services can ride.”6 Chibba found a nexus connecting FI, poverty reduction and 
millennium development goals (MDGs).7 He argues that FI “offers incremental 
and complementary solutions to tackle poverty, to promote inclusive 
development and to address the MDGs.”8 
 
With m-money, the fundamental question is; what should regulation be like 
pre-and post FI? Currently, Malaŵi is dealing with the pre-FI stage. However, 
what happens when FI has been achieved? Lessons from Kenya, where m-
money has been successful, may help in shaping the future regulatory 
                                                     
1  A summary of this chapter was presented as part of a paper titled ‘Competing regulatory 
and developmental issues for mobile money – financial inclusion and financial stability’ at 
an in-house seminar at the Bank of England, London under the ‘Banking, finance and 
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2  Mandira Sarma and Jesim Pais (2011) ‘Financial Inclusion and Development’ 23 Journal 
of International Development 613 p614 
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4  Kevin Donovan (2012) 'Mobile Money for Financial Inclusion’ in Information and 
Communications for Development 2012 (World Bank, Washington DC) p62. 
5  ibid. 
6  Mas and Radcliffe (2011) p172. 
7  Michael Chibba (2009) ‘Financial Inclusion, Poverty Reduction and the Millennium 
Development Goals’ 21 (2) The European Journal of Development Research 213 p214-6 
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framework post-FI. As this chapter will show, the formal financial system has 
left a vacuum. M-money, as an alternative form provides an essential financial 
service to the unbanked. M-money is not just filling in a vacuum left by the 
formal financial services providers but is becoming a desirable service. The 
introduction of m-money has been hailed as a key step towards attaining FI.9 
However, lack of access to formal financial services should never be equated 
with a lack to possess the necessary financial expertise. Demirguc-Kunt and 
Klapper argue that despite most people in rural areas being outside the formal 
financial system, they “juggle complex financial transactions every day and use 
sophisticated techniques to manage their finances.”10 Globally, lack of money 
itself has been cited as the key barrier to FI.11 In this regard, m-money opens 
an avenue where people, especially in rural areas can have access to money, 
largely through remittances. M-money also has the advantage of being 
convenient, cheap, secure, and reliable.12  
 
This chapter provides a critical analysis of the country’s FI agenda. It argues 
that FI cannot be achieved without contextualising the institutional and 
infrastructural problems that have led to many being unbanked. The case of 
local village ‘banks’ is given as a way in which local communities overcome 
challenges associated with access to formal financial services. It calls for a 
redefinition of the concept of FI in the Malaŵian context. It further argues that 
although many Malaŵians remain unbanked and outside the formal financial 
system, they are nonetheless not financially excluded.  This chapter is divided 
into three sections. The first discusses FI, especially in the Malaŵian context. 
The second section uses a case study to analyses the concept of village 
‘banking’. The third section examines m-money as a possible solution to the 
needs of rural people.  
 
                                                     
9  Asli  Demirguc-Kunt and Leora Klapper (2012) Measuring Financial Inclusion: The Global 
Findex Database (Policy Reserach Working Papers, The World Bank) p2 
<https://laomfa.org/wp-content/uploads/formidable/7/Measuring-Financial-Inclusion_The-
World-Bank-2010.pdf>. 20 April 2017. 
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12  ibid p26. 
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6.2. Financial inclusion in the Malaŵian context 
The problem that rural people face is that banks and other financial service 
providers do not extend their services to them because they “do not present 
an attractive business case.”13 Most providers target cities and towns. If people 
in the rural areas wish to access banking services, they must travel to the cities 
and towns. Banks also require a minimum credit balance to open and operate 
a savings account and impose restrictions on withdrawals. The third hurdle is 
the lack of a formalised national identity system, which makes it difficult for 
people in rural areas to open bank accounts, as banks demand a form of 
identification from potential customers. A common problem identified with most 
financial products is a mismatch between service provision and the demand.14 
Dev argues that financial service providers need “to be friendly to small and 
marginal farmers and other vulnerable groups. It requires a specific type of 
organisational ethos, culture and attitude.”15 In regulation language, one would 
say it requires a really responsive approach to this specific group of 
consumers. Therefore, it is not that the people in the rural areas are incapable 
of banking per se but rather the service providers are not servicing them.16 The 
result is that people in these areas remain unbanked and under-banked.17 The 
Reserve Bank of Malaŵi (RBM) has identified the following initiatives to 
achieve FI: 
 Microfinance 
 Agent banking 
 M-money 
 Consumer protection18 
 
Dev defines FI as the “delivery of banking services at an affordable cost to the 
vast sections of disadvantaged and low-income groups.”19 According to 
Mohan, it denotes access “to appropriate, low cost, fair and safe financial 
                                                     
13  CPSS (2012) p33. 
14  Donovan (2012) p71. 
15  S Mahendra Dev (2006) ‘Financial Inclusion: Issues and Challenges’ 41 (41) Economic 
and Political Weekly 4310 p4310 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4418799>. 20 April 2017. 
16  RBM MicroFinance Division (Interview, 19 August 2015).  
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products and services from mainstream providers.”20 Use of formal accounts 
seems to be the indicative measure of FI.21 FI is not only beneficial to the 
vulnerable groups but also avails to the formal system greater resources, 
which can be intermediated for higher returns.22 As such, while fulfilling a 
developmental agenda, FI also simultaneously fulfils a capitalist one, without 
the two agendas being mutually exclusive. FI also leads to empowerment 
brought about by a greater awareness of financial products as well as 
increased financial literacy.23 Sarma and Pais found that there is a direct 
correlation between the index of FI (IFI) and the human development index 
(HDI) although a high HDI does not correlate to a high IFI.24 Allen et al argue 
that this provides “both an economic and a political rationale for policies that 
promote financial inclusion.”25 
 
Provision of microfinance loans was initially seen as one way of not only 
alleviating poverty but also contributing to financial inclusiveness. However, a 
recent study has challenged this approach while acknowledging its usefulness 
as a financial tool in that it allows for greater financial freedom among the 
poor.26 In other words, the bar must not be set unrealistically high.27 While m-
money and other innovations have been hailed as better alternative, 
commentators have warned against any euphoric embrace of these alternative 
services without thorough research.28  
 
                                                     
20  Rakesh Mohan (2008) 'Economic Growth, Financial Deepening and Financial Inclusion’ in 
Manoranjan Sharma (ed) Dynamics of Indian Banking: Views and Vistas (Atlantic 
Publishers, New Delhi) p100. 
21  Franklin Allen and others (2012) The Foundations of Financial Inclusion (Policy Reserach 
Working Papers, The World Bank) 
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/348241468329061640/pdf/wps6290.pdf>. 
20 April 2017. 
22  Mohan (2008) p101-2. 
23  ibid p116. 
24  Sarma and Pais (2011) 619. 
25  Allen and others (2012) p1. 
26  Claire Luke (2015) 'Critique of microfinance raises questions about efficacy, donor 
support of the industry’ (Devex Impact ) <https://www.devex.com/news/critique-of-
microfinance-raises-questions-about-efficacy-donor-support-of-the-industry-85617>. 20 
April 2017. 
27  ibid. 
28  ibid, referring to Esther Duflo of the Abdul Latif Jameel Poverty Action Lab. 
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Lack of availability of financial services however does not mean the poor have 
no sense of finance.29 The growth of m-money and its impact on FI across 
Sub-Saharan Africa is testimony that poor people can embrace new products, 
once they gain trust in them.30 Di Castri says m-money has seen “millions of 
households, mostly low-income, from a cash-only economy into the formal 
financial system.”31 The RBM in its 2014 Payment Systems Annual Report 
says: 
MNO-led mobile payments services have grown at a very significant 
rate, in fact at a much faster rate than the mobile banking services 
offered by the commercial banks, in terms of both transactions 
(volumes and value) and number of subscribers. This development 
confirms the potential for MNO-led microfinance32 service as a 
significant tool in the financial inclusion agenda, as they cater for a 
wider section of the population including the unbanked.33 
 
Malaŵi is a rural-based economy and the primary means of payment among 
individuals remains cash.34 Even among the banked, cash is still the premier 
instrument used for payment.35 In such an environment, m-money has the 
potential of availing to the formal economy, cash held by the unbanked. 
Because of its electronic platform, m-money not only avails to its users an array 
of various services, but it also plays a key role in achieving FI and reducing 
cash dependency.36 In its FI matrix, the RBM looks at three aspects: 
availability, convenience, and access.37 The RBM had targeted to increase the 
adult bankable population from 19% (2008) to 40% by 2014.38 A survey 
                                                     
29  Dittus and Klein (2011) p3. 
30  ibid p3-4. 
31  Di Castri (2013) p7. 
32 A confirmation of the misunderstanding that mobile money is a component of 
microfinance. 
33  RBM (2015) p14. 
34  RBM (2008) p6. 
35  Dermish, Phiri and Sanford (2012 ) p4.   
36  Di Castri (2013) p8. 
37  RBM MicroFinance Division (Interview, 19 August 2015). 
38  RBM (2013) National Payment Systems Annual Report 2012 (Reserve Bank of Malawi) 
p11  
<http://www.rbm.mw/documents/payment_systems/payment%20systems%20annual%20
report%202012.pdf>. 10 February 2014. It may be argued that at the end of 2014, an 
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conducted in 2014 found that the target was not achieved and the figure was 
only 27%.39 The percentage of those financially excluded reduced from 55 to 
51.40 The following have been singled out as challenges hindering Malaŵi’s 
achievement of full FI: 
i. Low penetration of cell phones among the unbanked population; 
ii. Low penetration of m-money agents in rural areas; 
iii. Low financial literacy and awareness among the populace; 
iv. Lack of interconnectivity or integrated national switch through which 
MNOs can integrate with commercial banks’ payment systems, and; 
v. High relative cost of financial services.41 
 
 
Figure 9: Growth in mobile penetration rates  
 
The figure above shows that real increase in mobile penetration has occurred 
in the last decade. Mobile penetration grew rapidly from 1% in 2003 to 28% in 
2012 and was expected to peak at 38% by the end of 2015.42 As discussed 
below, there are indications that the market is saturated.  The figure below 
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provides a split analysis of the numbers of subscribers for each of the two 
dominant MNOs.  
 
 
Figure 10: Subscribers growth of TNM and Airtel and the totals43 
 
Interestingly, the projected peak for total mobile subscribers in 2015 was 7.8 
million, which is almost the 7.6 million that comprises those who are 16 years 
and above.44 This would indicate that the mobile phone market in Malaŵi is 
saturated, a view shared by TNM’s head of Mpamba, Webster Mbekeani: 
The market is small. Malaŵi is a country of 14 million. About 50% 
are adults. That gives you 7 million. Not all of them can afford a 
mobile phone, so that gives you 5.5 to 6 million. That is the 
addressable market. Airtel, and ourselves have already reached 
that number. Therefore, there will not be any new customers coming 
from anywhere.45  
 
The figure below confirms that the growth rate has since 2013 been slow (less 
than 0.4%) although Airtel seems to be on the rise while TNM is flat. However, 
these statistics do not tell the whole story. In fact, although the mobile 
                                                     
43  Source of figures: MACRA (2015). 
44  Finscope (2014) p2. 
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penetration is said to be at 7.8 million, this is not the total number of mobile 
users per se but rather the aggregate of Airtel (4,831,514) and TNM 
(2,979,518) customers.46 It includes customers, like the author, who are 
registered with both networks. It is not, therefore, the total number of 
Malaŵians using mobile phones. Out of the registered subscribers across both 
networks, only 23% are active.47 So Mbekeani’s estimate of 5.5 to 6 million 
maybe more accurate.  
 
Figure 11: Showing growth rates of the two dominant mobile companies48 
 
Andrew Nyirenda of the Malaŵi Communications Regulatory Authority says: 
The data shows Malaŵians have become aware of the exorbitant 
across network charges and are now using more of their own 
network. Ninety-three percent of the traffic is comprised of own 
network calls. They have two SIM cards or phones, one for each 
network. That is why the m-money network operators have 
introduced many promotions targeting own network calls and 
services.49 
 
                                                     
46  MACRA (2015). 
47  Interview with Andrew  Nyirenda Malawi Communications Regulatory Authority (3 August 
2015). 
48 MACRA (2015). 
49  Nyirenda (Interview, 3 August 2015).  
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Turning mobile phone subscribers into m-money users is the key to unlocking 
this potential. TNM has converted only 30% of its customer base into 
registered users while Airtel has a 34% conversion rate.50 Active, not 
registered users are the lifeblood of m-money. Active users are those that have 
been using the m-money service within the preceding 30 days.51 TNM has 
800,000 registered users of Mpamba but only 30-35% are active users.52 Airtel 
has some 1,200,000 registered for Airtel Money but only 400,000 are active 
users (representing 33%).53 Despite these statistics, Mpamba has a target of 
80% active users of the whole TNM customer base.54 TNM has ambitious 
plans to remove registration and offer the Mpamba service as part of the TNM 
bouquet.55 This will entail that once a client registers as a customer of TNM, 
they will automatically also be registered for Mpamba. Airtel Money has a 
similar target; to convert all registered Airtel customers into Airtel money 
customers.56 Product and Development Manager for Airtel Money, Bigboy 
Mkoloma, puts it this way: 
There is a benefit to the mother business: retention of customers. 
The moment they open a mobile money account, the assumption is 
that they will rarely leave the network or search for other networks 
to make calls. Innovation is the way to convert the mobile phone 
customers into m-money customers.57 
 
However, apart from the aspirations of central banks and governments, how 
does m-money fit into the FI agenda? Dittus and Klein have outlined a general 
framework for attaining FI: 
a) Exchanging different forms of money  
b) Storing money (safe-keeping) 
c) Remittances (from one owner to another) 
                                                     
50  Computed using the data provided by MACRA and the two mobile money service 
providers. 
51  Mkoloma (Interview, 7 August 2015).  
52  Mbekeani (Interview, 20 August 2015). 
53  Mkoloma (Interview, 7 August 2015).  
54  Mbekeani (Interview, 20 August 2015).  
55  ibid. 
56  Mkoloma (Interview, 7 August 2015).  
57  ibid. 
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d) Investing money58 
 
It is argued that m-money fits very well into this framework. As a form of book 
entry money, it is easily exchangeable though on commission with cash.59 
Although not designed as a saving, it can function as a saving. Once a person 
converts their cash into m-mobile money, the m-mobile money retains its face 
value until it is used. As noted earlier, m-money was initially rolled out as a 
remittance service. In doing so, it overcomes the problem that had long existed 
of how to transport money, especially to rural areas. M-money which rides on 
the telecommunication backbone has removed the need for physical transfer 
of money.60 In the hands of the customer, m-mobile money cannot be invested. 
The only investing that occurs is at the bank’s end. The bank can invest the 
deposited funds in the pool account. However, even though m-money cannot 
satisfy this category, it is submitted that the use of the service can act as a 
catalyst that can lead to customers trying other financial products, such as 
investments.  
 
With the promise that m-money holds, slow growth in m-money users has been 
noted with concern by the RBM. It says the growth has been generally 
unsatisfactory especially in 2014, with the only noticeable spike in 2013 when 
Mpamba launched.61 It would seem that both m-money issuers are struggling 
to convert registered users into active users. It is also clear that the numbers 
of registered users of m-money are far less than the numbers of mobile phone 
subscribers. This low growth may be attributable to the marketing strategy that 
was employed when the product was launched. Both issuers used a similar 
model, promising agents bonuses and commissions upon registering new 
customers.62 Customers were encouraged to register with an offer of an 
equivalent value of m-money purchased in airtime.63 This was later reduced to 
50% of m-money purchased.64 So most customers registered to access the 
                                                     
58  Dittus and Klein (2011) p7. 
59  ibid p8. 
60  ibid p11. 
61  RBM Headquarters (Interview, 6 August 2015).  
62  ibid. 
63  ibid. 
64  ibid. 
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‘free airtime’ while maintaining their e-value, which was not the purpose of the 
service.65 Both incentives were unsustainable and were soon discontinued.66 
This resulted in the low number of active users as well as a low uptake of new 
customers.67 It would seem the two m-money operators have their work cut 
out for them not only in converting the number of registered users to active 
users but also attracting those who have not yet registered. 
 
As noted above, the RBM had a target to increase the adult bankable 
population to 40% by 2014. However, how realistic was this target? The central 
bank was established in 1965. By 2008, 43 years later, only 19% of the 
population had been banked.68 Malaŵi’s population is young with 46% 
comprising those aged below 15 years.69 These are unlikely to become 
economically active anytime soon. Most people in Malaŵi do not have regular 
incomes and unemployment is very high. Although the official unemployment 
rate was in 2013 estimated at 6.6%, the number of people actually employed 
is very low. 70 The official unemployment rate is based on a measure of the 
number of people actively looking for a job as a percentage of the labour force 
as opposed to the number of people actually employed. 71 Literacy levels are 
very low, and 62% of the population live below the poverty line.72 It is also 
unclear what data is used to compute the percentage of the banked. As 
cautioned earlier, if it is the number of bank accounts then this may be 
                                                     
65  ibid. 
66  ibid. 
67  ibid. 
68  RBM (2013) p11-2. 
69  NSO (2009) 2008 Population and Housing Census (Malawi Government (National 
Statistics Office), Zomba) <http://www.mw.one.un.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/04/Malawi-Population-and-Housing-Census-Preliminary-Report-
2008.pdf>. 29 April 2017. 
70  Anon (2016b) 'Malawi Unemployment Rate  2005-2016’ (Trading Economics) 
<http://www.tradingeconomics.com/malawi/unemployment-rate>. 4 January 2015. 
71  In the 2008 census, 41% of women were illiterate. 36% of the population was illiterate - 
(2009) 2008 Population and Housing Census (Malawi Government (National Statistics 
Office), Zomba) p14. 
 Anon (2014b) 'Malawi Unemployment Rate’ (Trading Economics) 
<http://www.tradingeconomics.com/malawi/unemployment-rate>. 28 May 2014. 
72  Anon (2013b) 'Malawian snapshot: 2013 Quarter 2' (KPMG, Malawi) p1. 
<https://www.kpmg.com/Africa/en/KPMG-in-
Africa/Documents/2013%20African%20Country%20Reports/KPMG_Malawi%202013Q2.
pdf>. 13 September 2016. 
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erroneous as it may be due to double or triple counting where people have 
multiple bank accounts. 
 
These may be some factors leading to financial exclusion. Most Malaŵians 
may be busy trying to make a decent living for themselves and getting on the 
formal financial bandwagon may be the least of their priorities or concerns. 
There does not seem to be anything that would suddenly propel a surge among 
the unbanked. This, sadly, seems an all too familiar story. In Nigeria, the 
central bank’s plan to increase adult inclusion from 30% in 2010 to 70% in 
2020 has been criticised by Ngwu for being too ambitious and reflective of 
adoption of neo-liberal institutions which ignore Nigeria’s fundamental 
institutional peculiarities.73 However, the increase from 19% to 33% within 6 
years illustrates that the RBM’s strategies for FI may be bearing fruit. The 
reduction in the numbers that are financially excluded from 55% to 51% also 
shows, that there is a gradual progression towards financial inclusion. 
 
However, more still needs to be done to achieve higher rates of FI. Without 
addressing the basic structural bottlenecks such as electrification, feeder road 
infrastructure, there is no incentive that would make banks and other formal 
financial service providers invest in establishing their presence in the rural 
areas. Without the creation of jobs, urbanisation is unlikely to increase 
significantly any time soon. Relying on m-money to kick-start and achieve the 
set target may be taking a narrow view of the problem. This is because, m-
money has also started offering added services such as paying bills and 
purchasing car fuel, which would show that the target, at least for these added 
services, may be the very population that is already banked.74 This then raises 
the question whether m-money has abandoned its initial objective as a tool 
aimed at FI of targeting the unbanked in favour of profit maximisation. 
Arguably, there are higher returns among the high-end market users. While 
this service may be lucrative in the short term, it is argued that it may not be 
so in the long term. Once banks become organised, they may offer competition 
                                                     
73  Ngwu (2015) p313. 
74  Kihagi (2013). 
- 203 - 
 
to the m-money service. In fact, the entry of m-money in this market segment 
demonstrates a lacuna, which can easily be filled by banks. The same cannot 
be said for the core m-money business in the rural areas where banks are non-
existent. Maybe instead of spreading themselves too thin, too early, the m-
money issuers should consider deepening their roots and holding the anchor 
in the core business of m-money first. 
 
However, can m-money be relied to lead to FI without addressing the issue of 
low penetration of mobile phones amongst the unbanked?75 Ancillary to this is 
the issue of low penetration of m-money agents in rural areas. As noted above, 
there is a slow growth in m-money users and with an unimpressive conversion 
ratio of registered users to active users. These are challenges that the m-
money issuers are grappling with. The RBM does not provide clear solutions 
as to how the identified challenges cited above will be overcome.  
 
6.3. Village banks 
Any meaningful FI agenda must bring on board the rural population to have an 
impact. As discussed above, banks do not find a business case to establish 
branches in rural areas. On the other hand, the people find it expensive to 
travel long distances to access banking or financial services. So, is all hope 
lost for these people? Maybe not. Village ‘banks’ seem to provide the solution 
to the needs of the rural people in Malaŵi. It is important to clarify at the outset 
that despite their name, village ‘banks’ are not banks per se. They are a 
community saving and lending initiative, which operate as a stand-alone 
financial system. They mimic the banking system but are modelled on the 
concept of saving and credit cooperatives (SACCOs).76 Membership is usually 
drawn from the members of a particular village in the rural areas of Malaŵi. 
Village ‘banks’ are therefore an example of society’s innovation due to lack of 
provision of financial services by the formal sector. In a way, the success of 
                                                     
75  Although the total number of mobile phones indicate a saturation, it must be borne in 
mind that most users have both a TNM and Airtel phone. Therefore, the actual number of 
people with mobile phones may be much less. 
76  Alexander Borda-Rodriguez and Sara Vicari (2014) ‘Rural co-operative resilience: The 
case of Malawi’ 2 (1) Journal of Co-operative Organization and Management 43 p4 
<http://oro.open.ac.uk/40390/1/Rural%20co-
operative%20resilience%20The%20case%20of%20Malawi.pdf>. 13 December 2016. 
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village ‘banks’ can be viewed in another lens as a failure of the formal financial 
system to service the needs of rural people. The following case study is 
representative of the typical village ‘bank’. However, as noted above, despite 
what the villagers call it, it is in fact a savings and credit union. 
 
Occupants of Munthali Village have a village ‘bank’ called Chitemwano77 
Club. At each weekly meeting, members contribute towards ‘buying of 
shares’. Each share is valued at K200.00 and members must procure at 
least one share. Members take loans from the treasury proportionate to their 
shares up to a maximum of 100% of the shares held. Every six months, all 
the club’s proceedings are shared and a new cycle starts again. The interest 
that accrues is not shared under a common pool. In a rather strange but 
interesting scheme, everyone earns their own interest.  
The Club has a treasurer who keeps a record of transactions. This entails 
that for one to be a treasurer; one must be literate and possess numeracy 
skills. The committee works on a pro-bono basis. The idea of accruing 
interest to the borrower is to encourage an entrepreneurial spirit as well as 
to reward those who take the risk. Those who are risk averse are not 
rewarded. There is another type of club, which employs a different system. 
At this ‘bank’ interest accrues to the whole group and is divided 
proportionately to the shares. It is common to have people with multiple 
memberships of these village ‘banks’.  
Most members borrow to engage in business. Most of the business 
ventures involve ordering products from neighbouring villages. The 
consensus, however, is that the level of financing is insufficient and this 
prevents members from engaging in high return businesses. Most members 
are unemployed and lack regular income. This prevents them from 
accessing high amounts of loans as they may be stranded with unsold 
goods. Members decided to set up the village ‘bank’ after realising that it 
was not easy for each person to mobilise savings on their own as well as 
have access to finance. If a member is in financial distress and is unable to 
                                                     
77  Chitemwano is a Tumbuka name meaning Love. Tumbuka is a language largely spoken 
in north Malaŵi. 
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repay the loan, the loan is refinanced but the interest must be paid. In such 
a way, the loans never become delinquent. So, suppose a member 
borrowed K5,000.00 and is unable to repay the loan after one month, the 
member must then pay at a minimum K1,000.00 as interest and the 
K5,000.00 is recorded in the books as a new loan. The member may also 
repay part of the principal if they have the means and only the balance will 
be re-financed. The needs of the Club in relation to what the central bank 
can do are: 
(a) How can they be assisted in terms of financial advice on how to improve 
their village ‘banks’ and make them more efficient? 
(b) How can the village ‘banks’ be strengthened to ensure sustenance? 
 
The members of Chitemwano Club assist each other because they 
realised that if they wait for the formal financial service providers to start 
offering them banking and other financial services, this may take forever.78 
 
Figure 12: Chitemwano Club premises. 
 
The figure above is the ‘bank hall.’ The venue is an abandoned nursery 
school. This club is lucky to have this enclosed venue for meetings. Other 
clubs meet in the open. The figure below is an example of a typical village 
within the area. It is sparsely populated and the main economic activity is 
tobacco growing 
                                                     
78  Personal observation and views from Interview with Chitemwano Club Chairperson; 
NyaMoyo (10 August 2015). Munthali Village is situated in an area called Madise, in the 
District of Mzimba, in the Northern part of Malaŵi. Madise is the author’s rural home. 
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.  
Figure 13: Overview of village setting. 
 
In the greater scheme of things, this village does not exist. When the 
economists and statisticians aggregate the economic performance of the 
country, this village and many like it are excluded. To the RBM, the residents 
of this village and many like it are part of the financially excluded. That in the 
villages, people have a deeper understanding of finance is either unknown or 
ignored. As already stated, this typically accounts for the life of 86% of the 
population.79 Put another way, the formal economy represents the economic 
activity of the 14% who mostly stay in urban areas. Can it be said that the 
inhabitants of this village are really financially excluded? Do they not have 
access to credit; deal with each other economically on almost a daily basis? If 
the definition of financial exclusion or inclusion were contextualised, would 
they still not qualify?  It is submitted they would and that it is because of the 
rather narrow definition adopted by the RBM of FI that they are not. 
 
This does not, however, mean the RBM is unaware of the existence of such 
village ‘banks’. The RBM bank concedes that the village ‘bank’ concept is fast 
growing in Malaŵi and is not restricted to rural areas.80 Several clubs modelled 
on village ‘banks’ have been established in towns and cities but the concept is 
the same; several people with a common bond come together to mobilise 
savings and access finance.81 Protection of members’ savings is a big concern 
                                                     
79  Finscope (2014), p2. 
80  RBM MicroFinance Division (Interview, 19 August 2015).  
81  Ibid. 
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to the RBM.82 Village ‘banks’, however, pose a regulatory challenge. As an 
alternative financial system, the question is what regulatory tools are available 
to the RBM to try to regulate them? How exactly will the RBM protect members’ 
savings? Currently, there seem to be two choices available to the RBM; 
attempt to regulate village ‘banks’ as financial institutions or leave them to their 
own devices. It is submitted both do not address the issue of such an 
alternative system. It is argued that there is a need for new regulatory tools to 
supervise these village ‘banks’. However, is the RBM the ideal institution to do 
this? It is submitted it may not be. This brings the issue of whether being a 
single regulator is healthy for the financial system. It is submitted that it is not 
as it prevents specialisation, especially where you have new services, which 
do not fit the traditional banking structure.  
 
The RBM acknowledges that regulation and supervision as employed in the 
formal financial system can stifle the development of these village ‘banks’.83 
The RBM indicates that it is looking at mechanisms of linking village ‘banks’ to 
the formal financial system.84 This approach manifests the short-term view of 
the issues. The RBM is desirous to link these village ‘banks’ to formal financial 
institutions because it has leverage over the latter. The RBM is looking at these 
village ‘banks’ as agencies of banks or other financial institutions. This, it is 
argued may be a wrong approach. However, even if this was to be realised, 
the biggest hurdle is that these village ‘banks’ are not juridical persons. Under 
the Malaŵian law legal persona is a requirement as banks can only transact 
with legal personalities.85  
 
Setting up agencies for banks may therefore not be a solution. However, is 
there another way of circumventing the barriers presented by company law? 
Would a specialised law, such as the Business Groups Incorporation Act of 
Papua New Guinea,86 not be used to allow these ‘banks’ to incorporate while 
                                                     
82  Ibid. 
83  Ibid. 
84  Ibid. 
85  Ibid. 
86  Business Groups Incorporation Act (Papua New Guinea, 1974) 
<http://www.paclii.org/pg/legis/consol_act/bgia1974365/>. 21 July 2016. 
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avoiding the onerous regulations of incorporating as a company? Another 
possibility is for these ‘banks’ to be allowed to open bank accounts as 
unincorporated associations. Currently, this is not the case. However, all this 
is premised on these ‘banks’ being agents of formal banks. However, is it the 
ideal situation? Would it not amount to boxing them into a regulatory corner for 
the purposes of easing the work of the regulator? What if the village ‘banks’ 
did not want to become part of the formal system? If this can be the departure 
point, then clearly it reinforces the argument that has been made above that 
there is need to develop new regulatory tools for their operation. It is submitted 
that in furtherance of this, the RBM bank may not be the ideal body to regulate 
village ‘banks’. 
 
The handicap that the RBM has is evidenced in its approach to alternative 
systems like village ‘banks’. Although village ‘banks’ offer an avenue for people 
in rural areas to get on the financial bandwagon, there is a reluctance by the 
RBM to include them and other such alternative systems as part of the financial 
system. This is hardly surprising as, according to the bank, FI is measured by 
looking at access to the formal services offered by the financial sector.87 This 
includes microfinance institutions but excludes village ‘banks’ and other such 
informal financial set-ups.88 The bank, however, realises the value of local 
informal institutions in bringing people to participate in financial services and 
appreciate the value of savings.89 This may appear contradictory. In fact, it 
represents the perfect example of a dilemma of contemporary neo-liberalism. 
In one breath, the RBM refuses to accept village ‘banks’ as part of the financial 
system. In another, it looks at the same village ‘banks’ as a window through 
which people in rural areas can start appreciating the opportunities offered by 
the formal financial sector. So, the RBM essentially has a problem of either 
servicing only for the best market players or attempt to connect with capitalism 
those previously unconnected. De Soto has ably analysed the problem of 
transplanting capitalism to local communities in places like Africa. He argues 
that “even in the poorest countries, the poor save. The value of savings among 
                                                     
87  RBM Headquarters (Interview, 6 August 2015).  
88  ibid. 
89  ibid. 
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the poor is, in fact, immense: forty times all the foreign aid received throughout 
the world since 1945”90 
 
De Soto, however, argues that it is the difference in property rights between 
rich and poor countries that determine why capitalism has triumphed in the 
west.91  He argues that it is the form of property that is the determining factor.92  
He says, poor countries: 
[H]old their resources in defective forms: houses built on land 
whose ownership rights are not adequately recorded, 
unincorporated business with undefined liability, industries located 
where financers and investors cannot see them. Because the rights 
to these possessions are not adequately documented, these assets 
cannot readily be turned into capital, cannot be traded outside the 
narrow local circles where people know and trust each other, cannot 
be used as collateral for a loan and cannot be used as a share 
against an investment.93 
 
De Soto may be right that “property documentation fixes the economic 
characteristics of assets so that they can be used to secure commercial and 
financial transactions, and ultimately provide the justification against which 
central banks issue money.” 94 It is accepted that village ‘banks’ demonstrate 
that the system is highly localised and operates on trust. Property rights hardly 
play any role in financial transactions. But is transplanting property rights law 
on to these poor communities the solution? As noted earlier, there are myriad 
of reasons why banks do not operate in rural areas and it is doubtful that a 
change in property rights would make a significant impact on whether they 
expand their services to this sector. Ideally, the solution would lie in embracing 
these alternative forms of financial service provision. But therein lies the root 
problem, the inability of the RBM to regulate these village ‘banks’.  
                                                     
90  Hernando de Soto (2001) The Mystery of Capital: Why capitalism Triumphs in the West 
and Fails Everywhere Else (Black Swan, London) p6. 
91  ibid. 
92  ibid. 
93  ibid. 
94  ibid. 
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One issue that the RBM may need to deal with is trust. It is important to realise 
that people may decide not to use the formal financial system because they do 
not understand or trust it compared to the informal economy.95 Almost all banks 
communicate in written English, which is not even always easy to understand. 
In a population where most cannot read, this presents a problem. There is 
something about keeping one’s money in one’s bank beneath the bed that is 
self-assuring. Those who are slightly less risk averse will keep their money in 
a membership local SACCO or farmer’s club. Depositing money in a bank, 
trusting a distant third party, requires a change of mindset.   
 
Having a FI target without contextualising why people may be formally 
excluded shows that the central bank may be unable to attain its FI goals. The 
assumption that the informal sector is not regulated may not be true. It may 
not be formally regulated, but within its informal setup, there are self-regulatory 
mechanisms that ensure that it works efficiently and is transparent enough for 
people to trust it. The locals trust it and consider it safe. Through it, they can 
access credit, save, and earn interest. For most people in the village who on 
their own volition decide to be excluded from the formal financial sector, the 
‘usual’ strategy of hoping that introducing formal financial products and 
services will make them want to access them may simply not work. 
Furthermore, while remittances provide an injection of liquidity into local 
economies, it is submitted that this on its own is not enough. Dev argues that 
success of any FI intervention will depend on the sustainability of vulnerable 
groups with “viable economic activities.” 96 This requires investment into 
livelihoods and means of production such as irrigation, faming and produce 
market infrastructures.97  
 
6.4. Mobile money: a solution to needs of the rural people? 
The fundamental issue for m-money regarding these village ‘banks’ is; how 
can the service tap into this market? Suppose all members of the ‘bank’ had 
                                                     
95  Ngwu (2015) p316. 
96  Dev (2006) p4313. 
97  ibid. 
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access to a mobile phone, it means they would potentially use the m-money 
payment system to transact. This may mean reduced profits as some money 
would have to be paid as transaction fees. However, would the advantage of 
having a more secure payment system help to balance this? A case whereby 
robbers attacked the house of a village ‘bank’ treasurer at night in Chikwawa98 
and went away with all the money illustrates the risk with keeping cash.99 It is 
submitted that with rising cases of such robberies, m-money could offer a 
viable alternative. Both m-money issuers have lined up innovative services to 
offer to their customers and both issuers argue that once these game-changing 
products roll out, banks will be caught napping.100 This arises out of a gap that 
both m-money issuers have identified in the financial market, which is not being 
filled in, by the banks. In the words of Airtel Money’s Mkoloma: 
In the telecom business, when we go to the market. Compared to 
the banks, we run at a supersonic speed. The banks, they crawl. 
 
Mpamba’s Mbekeani is more forthright and lays down the gauntlet: 
If the banks cannot become innovative, we will. We have 
approached banks to work with us in this, and most have been 
resistant because they think we are in competition. If they can’t see 
that opportunity then they will realise too late that we are not afraid 
to compete with them.101 
 
According to the RBM, m-money is a stepping-stone into the formal economy:  
M-money allows people to send and receive money using the formal 
financial platform. Through this interaction, they appreciate the 
importance of value, and eventually as they appreciate the services, 
they may open a bank account102 
 
                                                     
98  A town in the Southern part of Malaŵi. 
99 RBM MicroFinance Division (Interview, 19 August 2015).  
100 In interviews, both Airtel Money and TNM Mpamba outlined new products. However, an 
undertaking was made that these would not be released as they were still considered 
company secrets. Interestingly both operators seem to be operating on a similar 
wavelength with regards to the scope of the new services. 
101  Mbekeani (Interview, 20 August 2015).  
102  RBM Headquarters (Interview, 6 August 2015).  
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This view seems to be a top-down view of what is happening. It would seem 
the RBM has a tunnel-view, expecting the convergence of services. It may well 
be that divergence may be the way the financial services grow. Granted a 
converging sector would be easier to regulate and supervise, but forcing 
diverging services to converge may also not be the solution. It would be better 
if the central bank recognised that there are various ways of providing financial 
services, each with different regulatory issues.  
 
As noted earlier, the Government has embarked on an FI agenda. However, 
regarding m-money, there are problems. Airtel Money’s Mkoloma laments: 
The Government has a social cash transfer system.103 It never uses 
m-money. We have tried to engage the Government in taking over 
their payments points across the country using the m-money 
platform. We have done our research and the major ones are: 
 Chiefs who receive honoraria but who are in the remote areas 
 Teachers in remote areas far from towns and banking services 
 Pensioners in rural areas 
For these categories to get paid, they must travel long distances 
and incur great expenses to access their pay. Although we may not 
have agents in some of the remote areas, if the Government 
decided to use m-money, a business case would be made to go into 
that area, establish an m-money presence, and mobilise agents. 
The reality is, since Government remains the biggest employer, if it 
cannot come in, then financial inclusion may remain a song. The 
Ministry of Finance has a mobile money Acceleration Programme 
yet the Government does not want to come to the party.104 
 
Although the Government has an FI agenda, it has not shown interest to 
become an active participant. This lack of interest by the Government has a 
huge impact on FI. The RBM has lamented that m-money has not had a 
noticeable impact on FI, but the blame may not be on the issuers alone. The 
                                                     
103 To poor families and girl-headed households. 
104  Mkoloma (Interview, 7 August 2015).  
 See similar views expressed by Di Castri (2013) p8. 
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Government ‘needs to come to the party.’ The lacklustre approach is best 
illustrated by the fact that in the Government’s Financial Sector Development 
Strategy for 2010-2015, m-money is not even mentioned once despite FI being 
a pillar for financial development.105 
 
When one considers the three categories that Mkoloma has cited, this would 
be of mutual benefit to the Government and to the payees. In Malaŵi, chiefs, 
teachers, and pensioners living in rural areas must travel or trek long distances 
to the nearest bank to receive their pay. Often, the pay barely covers the 
travelling cost. The following case study illustrates this. 
Theodose Twea is a pensioner. He lives just outside the Madise area 
in a village called Thela in the northern part of Malaŵi. He is a retired 
teacher. He is also an epileptic. He must travel to Mzuzu, the nearest 
town (city) which is some 22 miles106 to get his pension from a bank. 
He does this every month. Since the pension pay is not enough to 
cover the cost of transport, he must walk some of the distance so that 
he has some money left to use at home. Sometimes he is not able to 
collect his pay and must seek refuge and spend the night in Mzuzu. If 
there was a way to receive money at home, that would save him the 
time of travelling (he spends the whole day travelling) but also ensure 
that he has more money at his disposal.107 
 
As Mkoloma points out, m-money has the potential to help people like 
Theodose Twea and much more like him living in the rural areas of Malaŵi.  
 
6.5. Conclusion 
This chapter has looked at the nation’s FI agenda and how m-money can 
positively contribute to making more Malaŵians financially included. One thing 
                                                     
105  Financial Sector Development Strategy: 2010 – 2015 (2015) Financial Sector 
Development Strategy: 2010 – 2015 (2015). 
106 That is the straight-line distance. The actually travelling distance is most likely much 
higher because of bad terrain and road network - Distance from Galasi Madise to Mzuzu’ 
<http://malawi.places-in-the-world.com/929816-925475-distance-from-galasi-madise-to-
mzuzu.html>. 16 December 2015. 
107 Interview with Theodose Twea Pensioner (19 August 2015). 
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that becomes all too clear is that the FI matrix needs to be contextualised. 
Chitemwano Club is a case in point and represents the bipolar views of FI held 
by the RBM on one hand, and the people in the villages on the other. If access 
to finance is a key ingredient for financial inclusiveness, the FI matrix needs to 
be recomputed.  M-money does offer hope, though. The key issue that arises 
in this chapter is how the m-money platform can be used as a vehicle to put 
on board the formal financial system, people who are in the rural areas. The 
fact that m-money suppliers are integrating with banks is a positive step but 
more needs to be done. A pertinent issue that has been flagged is how the 
lack of active participation by the Government can affect negatively the FI 
agenda. This is because, in Malaŵi, the Government is a key player in the 
employment sector. 
 
So, is m-money a solution to the needs of the rural people? M-money has the 
potential of bridging the FI gap. For example, if m-money can link to the local 
savings and credit unions, the so-called village ‘banks’, then money collected 
could be saved through a more secure system to which m-money is connected. 
Regarding remittances of remuneration of people in rural areas such as chiefs, 
teachers, or pensioners, it would seem m-money is uniquely placed to offer a 
solution to the challenges faced by such groups.  Using m-money would in a 
way circumvent the need for special regulation of village ‘banks’. However, as 
an alternative form of payment, m-money does pose its own regulatory 
challenges. It raises questions as to the suitability of the regulatory framework 
of the traditional financial architecture to regulate this new service. 
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7. EXISTING REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OF MOBILE 
MONEY 
7.1. Introduction 
So far, the thesis has analysed mobile money (m-money) as a commodity, a 
financial service and a payment system. This chapter focusses on the existing 
regulatory framework of m-money.  As has been discussed, m-money is an 
emerging service that straddles between the telecommunication and financial 
services and it is regulated in parts by several agencies. The current regulatory 
framework comprises five regulators, each having different roles. The lead 
regulator is the central bank. The other key regulator is the communications 
regulator. The other ones are the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), the 
Consumers Protection Council (CPC) and the Competitions and Fair Trading 
Commission (CFTC). The multiplicity of regulators has the potential to lead to 
the problems associated with cross sanctioning between regulatory regimes.1 
Although attempts have been made to achieve regulatory coordination, what 
comes out is confirms Teubner’s theory of autopoiesis.2 Each of the regulators 
operates in its own cocoon and although there are cooperating agreements; 
they usually talk past each other because of the different communication 
language they employ. Apart from being distinct sector regulators, they also 
employ different regulatory approaches. As argued in chapter 2, really 
responsive regulation, which continuously responds to the m-money 
environment holistically, is the preferred approach throughout the various 
phases of financial inclusion (FI). To achieve this however requires a paradigm 
shift in the regulatory model. In presenting the current framework, this chapter 
hopes to lay a foundation for the justification for a different regulatory 
approach. 
 
This chapter is divided into two broad sections. The first discusses the 
regulatory framework while the second analyses the regulatory issues that 
arise from this framework. The discussion of the regulatory framework includes 
the financial, communication, consumer protection and fair trading regimes. 
                                                     
1  Scott (2001), p346. 
2  Teubner (1993) generally. 
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The Financial Intelligence Unit is not included because it has already been 
discussed in chapter 3. Incoherencies of the framework, technical issues and 
the regulatory space contestations form up the discussion of the regulatory 
issues posed.  
 
7.2. Regulatory framework 
7.2.1. Financial Regulatory structure 
The country’s central bank, Reserve Bank of Malaŵi (RBM), is the single 
regulator operating as a perfect “monolith.”3 One advantage of having a single 
regulator is that it makes it easier for market participants as they only have to 
deal with one single regulator.4 It also means that there is a “single approach 
to regulation and supervision” compared with a situation where you have a 
myriad of regulators.5 The RBM Governor is registrar of the financial services.6 
As noted earlier, the Governor and the Board of the central bank are appointed 
by the country’s President. There is, therefore, the serious question of whether 
such appointees can be truly independent. Furthermore, by making the 
Governor the registrar, and the RBM the regulator of the financial sector, it is 
submitted, this has led to a situation where both are overburdened. Apart from 
regulating, the Governor or his appointee is responsible for running any 
financial institution placed under statutory management.7  
 
So far, there have been three cases of statutory management, one involving 
a bank and two involving insurance companies.8 In all three cases, the matters 
ended up in court where the Governor was the defendant. In the Re: Citizen 
Insurance Company, the High Court ordered the Governor to reimburse 
expenses on the basis that there was no cause for statutory management in 
                                                     
3  Monolith is used deliberately instead of peak. A monolith is a massive rock and it aptly 
describes a unified regulator laden with many responsibilities. The term ‘monolith’ was 
used interchangeably with ‘peak’ by Richard Parlour (2014) Strategic issues in financial 
markets regulation (2014) Post-Graduate Seminar, University of Warwick, 5 March 2014. 
4  Singh (2007) p25. 
5  ibid p26. 
6  Section 8(2) Financial Services Act (Malaŵi, 2010). 
7  Section 68 ibid. 
8  Finance Bank of Malaŵi, Prime Insurance Limited and Citizen Insurance Limited. 
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the first place.9 The Governor was further ordered to account for all 
transactions undertaken.10 Although the Supreme Court of Appeal later ruled 
to have the company wound up, the matter still had to be litigated for several 
years. The Governor or his appointee is also the statutory liquidator of all 
prudentially regulated financial institutions.11  
 
The RBM employs a silo regulatory structure. It has directorates in charge of 
specific institutions such as banks, insurance, pensions.12 The directors are 
the de facto registrars of the sectors falling under their silo and the directorates 
are the de facto regulators. The bank’s head office is in the capital, Lilongwe 
with a branch in Blantyre, the principal commercial city.13 The main function of 
the branch in Blantyre is currency issue and supervision of financial 
institutions.14 Most banks and financial institutions are headquartered in 
Blantyre.15 This may explain vesting supervisory and regulatory powers with 
the Blantyre branch.   
 
Malaŵi recently enacted the Payment System Act (2016)16 and the Electronic 
Transactions Act (2016).17 These Acts and the Mobile Payment Systems 
Guidelines (2011)18 have attempted to bring some clarity to electronic 
payments. However, none of these Acts was drafted with m-money as the 
focal point. In terms of approach, all the financial service laws seem to adopt 
an approach that is closer to the command and control model. 
                                                     
9  In the Matter of Citizen Insurance Company Limited Exparte The Registrar of Financial 
Services Commercial Case No 55 of 2011 HC (Malaŵi)  
<http://www.malawilii.org/mw/judgment/high-court-commercial-division/2012/5/>. 27 
February 2017. 
10  ibid. 
11  Section 73(6) Financial Services Act (Malaŵi, 2010). 
12  RBM (2017). 
13  The country has only 4 cities, Blantyre, Zomba, Lilongwe and Mzuzu. Zomba was the old 
capital. 
14  SADC (2011) SADC Bankers: Reserve Bank of Malawi (Committee of Central Bank 
Governors in Southern Africa Development Community)  
<http://www.sadcbankers.org/SADC/SADC.nsf/LADV/E4E3EF0D1F5967B842257674004
4D454/$File/Malawi-.pdf>. 10 October 2016. 
15  Among the big banks, only Standard Bank has its headquarters in Lilongwe. About a 
decade or so ago, NBS Bank moved from Lilongwe to Blantyre. 
16  Payment Systems Act (Malaŵi, 2016). 
17  Electronic Transactions Act (Malaŵi, 2016). 
18  Guidelines for Mobile Payment Systems (Malaŵi, 2011). 
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Payment Systems Act 2016 
The Act is the overarching legal framework for the operation, regulation, and 
supervision of payment systems in Malaŵi.19  As a regulator, the RBM has 
been given expansive powers to ensure that there is an efficient payment 
system in place and that the various players abide by the rules.20 These 
powers may be delegated,21 and it is submitted the operation of the national 
switch by the bankers’ association (discussed in chapter 5) is one such case. 
The Act defines the m-money payment system as “a system that enables the 
process of money transfer and exchange of money for goods and services 
between two parties using a mobile phone or an electronic mobile device.”22 
While previously m-money operators were allowed to operate with a ‘No letter 
of Objection,’ the law now requires them to be licenced and authorised by the 
RBM.23 M-money issuers that were operating under the mobile payment 
guidelines24 now have to apply to be licensed or authorised.25 
 
To avoid contagion, the RBM is empowered to issues directions to any 
participant of the payment system.26 Where there is non-compliance, criminal 
proceedings may be brought or the central bank may compel compliance 
through a court order.27 The law also empowers the RBM to issue a prohibition 
order where it feels the “safety, efficient and smooth operation of the payment 
system” is at stake.28 Ultimately, where there is deemed a major risk posed to 
the payment system, the RBM may suspend or even revoke authorisation or 
a licence.29 Although the law has all the hallmarks of command-and-control, it 
seems to encourage self-regulation on the part of system operators. It requires 
them to “implement and operate a payment system in a manner that promotes 
                                                     
19  Memorandum to the Payment Systems Bill  22 of 2015 (Malaŵi) 
<http://www.parliament.gov.mw/docs/bills/BILL22_2015.pdf>. 19 July 2016. 
20  Section 4 Payment Systems Act (Malaŵi, 2016). 
21   Section 5 ibid. 
22  Section 2 ibid. 
23  Sections 4(d) and 12(1) ibid. 
24  Guidelines for Mobile Payment Systems (Malaŵi, 2011). 
25  Section 44(1) Payment Systems Act (Malaŵi, 2016). 
26  Section 10 ibid 
27  Section 11 ibid. 
28  Section 12(2) ibid. 
29  Section, 15(1) ibid. 
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secure, efficient and coordinated execution of payment services.”30 However, 
any rules promulgated by such system operators need to be vetted and 
approved by the RBM.31 The move towards a more self-regulatory framework 
is new, having started with the Financial Services Act (2010). However, even 
in that Act, this is limited to self-regulatory organisations (SROs).32 Although 
there is a sense that self-regulation is encouraged, the RBM retains regulatory 
oversight33 as well as investigative powers.34  
 
All settlements must be final, unconditional, and irrevocable.35 Parties may not 
reverse a settlement instruction, which has been processed. It also implies 
that where a mistake has been made, then a new settlement instruction must 
be issued and processed to correct the mistake. The new law requires system 
participants to retain records of transactions for a minimum period of seven 
years.36 While such a requirement may be normal for banks, it may require 
greater investment in data storage systems for those who wish to enter a non-
bank payment system such as m-money.  
  
The Electronic Transactions and Cybersecurity Act 2016 
This Act not only regulates electronic commerce (e-commerce) but also 
includes broader issues of electronic communications.37 There is an 
acceptance that hitherto; the legal framework has not provided “economic 
actors and citizens with a secure and reliable legal environment despite their 
importance to the development of electronic transactions.”38 The Act is 
complimentary to the Communications Act in regulating the information and 
communication technology (ICT) Sector.39  
 
                                                     
30  Section 16(1) ibid. 
31  Section 16(3) ibid. 
32  Part V Financial Services Act (Malaŵi, 2010). 
33  Section 16(2) Payment Systems Act (Malaŵi, 2016). 
34  Section 18 ibid. 
35  Section 21 ibid. 
36  Section 40(1) ibid. 
37  Memorandum to the Electronic Transactions Bill, No. 11 of 2015  (Malaŵi) 
<http://www.parliament.gov.mw/docs/bills/BILL11_2015.pdf>. 19 July 2016. 
38  ibid. 
39  ibid. 
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The law has clarified message transmission in e-commerce. An electronic 
message will be deemed sent by the sender, if it was sent personally or 
through an agent or programmed system.40 Since m-money uses the small 
messaging service (SMS), it can easily be verified as to the source of the 
message because of the uniqueness of the mobile phone number to which the 
m-money account is tied. With the new law, an electronic message will now 
“be admissible as evidence in court proceedings.”41 Until now, courts have 
been reluctant or inconsistent in their acceptance of such messages because 
of a lack of legal framework to guide them.  
 
For purposes of e-commerce, the new law provides that in the default case, a 
message is deemed sent once it has left the sender’s gadget or information 
system.42 Receipt is also deemed to have occurred when the message has 
been received by the receiver’s gadget or system, even though the message 
may not have been seen.43 This has huge implications. One area that rapidly 
comes to mind is in cases of offer and acceptance or rejection in relation to 
contracts. The law has provisions for disclosure in e-commerce transactions. 
A vendor is required to disclose all material facts such as full name, address 
and legal personality.44 The address must include telephone number, web, 
and email address.45 Considering that online transactions are not physical, this 
is of paramount importance. Consumers need to make a value judgement on 
whether they can deal with the supplier based on the information provided 
online.  
 
The Act has introduced verification of electronic signatures (e-signature) for 
use in electronic transactions. An electronic signature is defined as “data 
attached to, incorporated in, or logically associated with, other data and which 
is intended by the user to serve as a signature.”46 A digital signature is defined 
as “an electronic signature consisting of a transformation of an electronic 
                                                     
40  Section 26(1) Electronic Transactions Act (Malaŵi, 2016). 
41  Section 20(1) ibid. 
42  Section 24(1) ibid. 
43  Section 24(2) ibid. 
44  Section 37(1) ibid. 
45  Section 37(1) ibid. 
46  Section 2 ibid. 
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message using an asymmetric cryptosystem and a hash function.”47 Legally, 
there is therefore, a distinction between electronic and digital signatures. 
Digital signatures can be said to be the means through which e-signatures are 
implemented. Hitherto, the position was that only handwritten signatures could 
validate transactions. E-signatures will be treated as if they were handwritten 
if the requirements of their authentication are met.48  
 
The law will require that such signatures be verified otherwise legal 
consequences may befall on the person relying on such signatures.49 
Verification is on two levels. The first level is to ensure the e-signature’s 
authenticity. The e-signature must be exclusive to the signatory or the 
signatory must have exclusive control of means of creating the e-signature.50 
The second level is to ensure that the e-signature satisfies the authentication 
system designated by the Malaŵi Communications Regulator Authority 
(MACRA). 51 MACRA is the authority, which has the mandate to approve digital 
signatures.52 Any such authentication mechanism must comply with 
international standards.53 Verification is therefore dependent on being 
connected to specific verification systems. That is where things may become 
tricky. How does one verify an e-signature since it can be copied by a third 
party? How does one verify that the e-signature has come from the owner and 
not a fraudster? This is where businesses need to invest in their ICT systems 
and cyber security expertise. Consumer and awareness education is also 
paramount. Consumers need to be careful how to use the internet and online 
including mobile communications. For those using e-signatures, they need to 
be fully aware of who else has access to them.  
 
The law also introduces something relatively new in commerce in Malawi: a 
‘cooling off period.’54 Goods or services procured online can be returned at no 
                                                     
47  ibid. 
48  Section 9 ibid. 
49  Section 14 ibid. 
50  Section 8 ibid. 
51  Section 12(1) ibid. 
52  Section 12(2) ibid. 
53  Section 12(3) ibid. 
54  Section 39(1) ibid. 
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penalty if this is done within 7 days of receipt of goods or formation of the 
contract of services.55 Therefore, those who want to go into e-commerce must 
factor in returns. They must be slow to celebrate sales done until the cooling 
off period has expired. The law provides that the supplier must reimburse the 
consumer within 14 days all sums paid otherwise interest starts accruing.56 In 
the Western economies: this has been lauded by consumers but scoffed at by 
suppliers as the returned goods end up being sold at rock bottom products as 
rejects. Schmidt et al have coined the phrase “deshopping” as the term to refer 
to the propensity to return goods even though they may not have defects.57 
 
The law has also provided some protection mechanisms. The first is a 
consumer’s right to demand cancellation, where there has been fraudulent use 
of his payment and the supplier.58 The second relates to data security. The 
law has introduced a provision that is the closest the country will have to a 
data protection regime. All entities that keep consumer data obtained via 
electronic means now have an obligation to the consumer concerning the use 
of such data.59  
 
Guidelines for Mobile Payment Systems 2011 
These guidelines are the only framework drawn with mobile payments in mind. 
Granted, the guidelines cover all mobile payments but there is no doubt that 
the focus is on m-money. However, in reference to the issuer of electronic 
value, the generic term electronic money (e-money) is used in discussing 
these guidelines.  As guidelines, they are soft-law and not binding, however, 
since the RBM has the powers to grant and revoke authorisation for operation 
of a mobile payment system under them, they are much more than mere soft-
law. In doing so, although on the surface the regulatory approach seems to be 
light-touch, the regulator still uses the ‘benign big gun’60 approach to ensure 
                                                     
55  Section 39(1)(a) ibid. 
56  Section 39(2) ibid. 
57  Ruth A Schmidt and others (1999) ‘Deshopping-the art of illicit consumption’ 27 (8) 
International Journal of Retail & Distribution Management 290 p292 
<http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/pdfplus/10.1108/09590559910288569>. 4 November 
2016. 
58  Section 42, Electronic Transactions Act (Malaŵi, 2016). 
59  Part VII ibid. 
60  Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) chapter 2. 
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compliance. In effect therefore, the RBM may be said to be using a new mode 
of regulation, which combines the two approaches. 
 
To be allowed to participate, an applicant must present at least the following: 
 A copy of a licence issued by MACRA or another regulator in the 
relevant sector. 
 A generic agency agreement. 
 Proof of ICT policies and proposed disaster recovery plans. 
 Description of customer protection procedures. 
 Identity and qualifications of directors and senior managers.61 
 
Although there is no requirement to register agents separately with the RBM, 
the e-money issuer must “obtain verifiable name, address, signature and/or 
bio-data” for individual agents.62 In a country where the national registration 
system has just commenced, this raises the question; how does one verify 
name and signature? The problem of addresses was already highlighted in the 
last chapter. It is submitted that for individual agents, MNOs will most likely 
fall-back on airtime agents. The issuer is prohibited from setting up exclusive 
agreements with agents.63 On their part, agents have a duty to report 
suspicious transactions to the issuer.64 
 
Each applicant must undergo a pilot phase during which a system audit by an 
independent auditor shall be carried out.65 A ‘Letter of No Objection’ will only 
be granted upon the completion of a successful pilot phase.66 Apart from the 
issues highlighted above, the m-money issuer67 is expected to have in place 
measures to ensure system integrity. This includes having a system that can 
leave an audit trail, having a risk management framework, and maintaining a 
                                                     
61  Section 5 Guidelines for Mobile Payment Systems (Malaŵi, 2011). 
62  Section 11.2 ibid. 
63  Section 11.10 ibid. 
64  Section 11.8 ibid. 
65  Section 6.0 ibid. 
66  Section 6.0 ibid. 
67  Called Mobile Payment Service Provider. 
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pool68 account with restricted usage to settling mobile payment obligations.69 
The issuer must also ensure interoperability of its system.70 Although trustees 
set up by MNOs over the issuers have been giving interest earned on the pool 
account to charities,71 this is not enshrined in the Guidelines. They only state 
that any such interest earned shall not benefit the issuer.72 Interestingly, they 
do not also expressly state that it cannot be paid to the m-money customers. 
However, the traditional view is that for now, customers do not earn interest 
on m-money.  
 
The Guidelines also state that there must be a one-to-one ratio between 
deposits in the pool account and any e-money issued such that no e-money 
can be issued more than the credit balances in the pool account.73 As part of 
the regulatory oversight, issuers are required to submit monthly reports to the 
RBM indicated among other things, subscriber numbers and volume of 
payments.74 This does not preclude the RBM from asking for any ad hoc 
information or data.75 
 
Before enrolling customers, issuers must ensure that they satisfy know your 
customer (KYC) requirements as laid down in the Money Laundering Act 
(2006) [MLA].76 However, as noted in chapter 3, the FIU has adopted a risk-
based assessment for KYC and does not strictly follow the tough regime in the 
Act for small value transactions such as m-money. All transactions must 
contain the following information about each transaction: amount, type, date, 
time, and agent identification details.77 For a transaction to be completed, it 
                                                     
68  Called Trust Account in the Guidelines. 
69  Section 8 Guidelines for Mobile Payment Systems (Malaŵi, 2011). 
70  Section 8.6 ibid. 
71  Anon (2016e) ‘TNM Mpamba builds K11m school block in Chileka’ Nyasa Times (19 
December 2016) <http://www.nyasatimes.com/tnm-mpamba-builds-k11m-school-block-
chileka/>. 12 March 2017. 
 Blessings Kamanga (2016) ‘Malawi Junior Queens gets K10mil  Airtel money for Africa 
games’ (19 July 2016) <http://www.nyasatimes.com/malawi-junior-queens-gets-k10mil-
airtel-money-africa-games/#sthash.CdRa3jCd.dpuf>. 12 March 2017. 
72  Section 8.8 Guidelines for Mobile Payment Systems (Malaŵi, 2011). 
73  Section 8.10-2 ibid. 
74  Section 8.1 ibid. 
75  Section 8.15 ibid. 
76  Section 9.1.4 ibid. 
77  Section 9.3.2 ibid. 
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requires a valid payer and payee.78 However, what does valid payee mean 
when m-money can be sent to a non-registered user? Would the same KYC 
requirements for registration be required for cashing-out by such a user? 
Looked at from an anti-money laundering view, it would be argued that similar 
requirements should be applied. From an FI view however, it may well mean 
certain sections being unable to cash-out for not possessing acceptable 
identification. It is submitted, this is where agents exercise daily their own risk-
assessment of the customer before them.  
 
All settlements within the ecosystem of the m-money issuer must be settled in 
real time.79 This is what gives the mobile payment system an advantage over 
other payment systems. Although the RBM does not deal with technological 
issues, as this is the domain of MACRA, in so far as e-money systems are 
concerned, it must “secure and ensure confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, 
and non-repudiation.”80 Where SMS technology is used, it must be encrypted 
end-to-end.81 The system should not allow customer details to be saved on 
the handset.82 The guidelines also require that only secure channels be used 
for e-money payments.83 This would ideally require mobile network operators 
(MNOs) to have at least two separate firewalled channels, one for the normal 
SMS data and one for mobile payments. The MNOs could however just decide 
to have one encrypted channel for both. The system should have at a minimum 
a two-step validation based on both the mobile number and the personal 
identification number (PIN).84 All e-money accounts must be linked to a mobile 
number.85 To protect the system from third party interaction, it must have a 
firewall that ensures that there is no direct connection between the system and 
the internet.86 The issuer must periodically conduct penetration tests to ensure 
that the integrity of the system remains intact.87 Issuers are also required to 
                                                     
78  Section 9.3.3 ibid. 
79  Section 9.4.1 ibid. 
80  Section 10 ibid. 
81  Section 10.1.4 & 10.2 ibid. 
82  Section 10.4.5 ibid. 
83  Section 10.1.5 ibid. 
84  Section 10.4.4 ibid. 
85  Section 10.4.6 ibid. 
86  Section 10.4.10 ibid. 
87  Section 10.4.11 ibid. 
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work with the FIU and adhere to the MLA and any FIU regulations issued.88 
Crucially they must furnish the FIU within 3 days, any suspicious transaction.89 
 
The Guidelines also have a provision that encourages switchovers by users 
from one issuer to another “without any bottlenecks.”90 However, where the m-
money is MNO-tied, it is difficult to see how this can be achieved, unless the 
regulator expressly provides a regulatory regime that allows for this. Chapter 
9 discusses this as a recommendation. These Guidelines are however, set to 
be replaced. E-money Regulations (2015) drafted under the RBM Act (1989) 
were supposed to supersede them. However, this was overtaken by events 
with the enacting of the Payment Systems Act (2016). The draft Regulations 
were withdrawn and are being reworked to be in line with the new Act.91 The 
draft Regulations had two notable changes. First was a prohibition of payment 
of interest. This the raises the question as to whether banks will still be allowed 
to intermediate on the pool funds or that they will be strictly ring-fenced from 
the rest of the bank’s lending portfolio.  If banks cannot make money from the 
deposits, then what will be the motivation for them to keep the funds? The 
other is provision for levies to be collected by the RBM. This is a welcome 
inclusion as it allows for the cost of regulation to be internalised by the market 
participants.  
  
7.2.2. Communication regulation structure 
The establishment of MACRA as a regulator92 came on the heels of a World 
Bank-led privatisation programme of the communications sector. Before the 
establishment of MACRA, the Department of Posts and Telecommunications 
(DPT) was the communications regulator.93 The DPT was later 
commercialised and became the Malaŵi Posts and Telecommunications 
                                                     
88  Section 13.2 ibid. 
89  Section 13.1 ibid. 
90  Section 10.3.3 ibid. 
91  Mbane Ngwira (2017) Spokesperson, Reserve Bank of Malaŵi (10 March 2017) 
(personal communication). 
92  Section 3 Communications Act, Malaŵi (Malaŵi, 1998). 
93  Author’s personal experience of working with the Department of Posts and 
telecommunications: 1991-1993. 
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Corporation (MPTC).94 MPTC was then unbundled into the Malaŵi 
Telecommunications Limited and Malaŵi Post Corporation.95 The discussion 
that follows in this section is limited to MACRA’s role in regulating the 
telecommunications sector, which forms the backbone of not only m-money 
but also the banking system.  
 
Under the law, the President appoints the MACRA Board96 while the Director 
General (DG) is appointed by the responsible Minister, but on the Board’s 
recommendation.97 There have, however, been cases where the President 
has appointed the DG. For example, in 2014, the President appointed Andrew 
Kumbaitra as DG and replaced him as Post Master General (PMG) with 
Godfrey Itaye.98 A year later, the two were swapped in another presidential 
appointment with Kumbatira going back as PMG and Itaye heading MACRA.99 
This would ordinarily be ultra vires the powers of the President under the law 
and it is submitted both appointments were illegally made as the wrong 
appointing authority made them. The reason MACRA and the position of DG 
are considered politically sensitive is MACRA’s control of broadcasting rights, 
especially radio, and television. The national and state broadcaster, Malaŵi 
Broadcasting Corporation (MBC) is monopolised by the “ruling party” for 
political mileage.100 In an election, this can play a decisive factor and although 
there have been calls for reform; each succeeding party has upheld the status 
quo for its own benefit. Like the RBM, although the law stipulates its 
independence,101 MACRA suffers from a serious lack of regulatory 
independence, especially from political forces.  
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Although initially MACRA separated providers of telecom services, the 
regulator has embraced a unified licence regime.102 One telecommunication 
operator can operate fixed and mobile telephone services under one 
licence.103 In terms of regulation, MACRA use the following instruments: 
a. Communications Sector Policy Statement (2013);104 
b. Communications Act (1998);105 
c. Operator licences.106 
 
Unless expressly exempted, it is illegal to operate a telecommunication 
network within the country without a licence.107 As part of its regulatory 
mandate, MACRA is charged with consumer protection, promoting 
competition and promoting open access.108 It also has the power to investigate 
complaints.109 As a regulator, MACRA has the power to suspend a licence110 
or revoke it.111 All these powers are subject to oversight by the High Court 
under judicial review proceedings.112 MACRA is principally financed through 
licence fees.113 It may also issue fines.114 Clarke et al say, although MACRA 
has attained financial independence from its parent ministry, it still is subject 
to interference from the Minister who can “issue written direction to MACRA 
on how the Authority should carry out its duties.”115 
 
MACRA is concerned only with the communication part of the m-money 
service.116 Therefore, if a customer fails to transact because of a network 
                                                     
102 MACRA (2014) p7. 
103 Ibid p7. 
104  Malaŵi Government (2013) 'National ICT Policy' (Malaŵi Government) 
<http://www.macra.org.mw/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Malawi-ICT-Policy-2013.pdf>. 4 
November 2016. 
105  Communications Act, Malaŵi (Malaŵi, 1998). 
106  MACRA (2016b) 'Telecommunications’ (Malaŵi Communication Regulatory Authority) 
<http://www.macra.org.mw/?cat=7>. 8 February 2016. 
107  Section 17(1) ibid. 
108  Section 4(2)(a),(b),(c) ibid. 
109  Section 22(2)(a) ibid. 
110  Section 22(4), (5) ibid. 
111  Section 42 ibid. 
112  Section 22(6) ibid. 
113  Section 12(1)(a) ibid. 
114  Section 12(1)(b) ibid. 
115  Clarke, Gebreab and Mgombelo (2003) p21. 
116  Interview with Thokozani Chimbe Deputy Director - Legal (Consumer Affairs); Malaŵi 
Communications Regulatory Authority (3 August 2015). 
- 229 - 
 
problem, that is within the regulatory ambit of MACRA but if it is to do with 
financial issues then the central bank takes control.117 To the consumer this 
can be frustrating. It entails that the consumer is expected to have discerning 
skills to isolate which aspect is to blame when something goes wrong with the 
system. This seems like pushing the burden from the operators onto 
consumers.  
 
Although MACRA regulates the communication part, it is not concerned with 
the technology of the services being used by the issuers.118 MACRA operates 
under a model it terms “service and technological neutrality.”119 However, 
MACRA and the RBM in 2013 entered into a memorandum of understanding 
(MOU) so that they can try to co-regulate the m-money service.120 Under the 
MOU, MACRA retains the regulation of the telecommunications platform.121 
Since MACRA only comes in when it is an MNO driving the business, the MOU 
is not concerned with money transfer services of banks or other financial 
institutions.122 However, where an operator wishes to provide an m-money or 
similar service before they can be granted an operating licence by MACRA, 
they need to get the RBM prior approval first.123 In practice, before the RBM 
grants any approval to such a service, it consults MACRA, essentially asking 
the question “does MACRA have any issues?”124 
 
In assessing the regulatory framework, MACRA’s Thokozani Chimbe admits 
that the MOU has exposed a gap in the law and regulatory framework of m-
money.125 She states that the situation where two regulators regulate the same 
service, with one looking only at the aspects that they are interested in cannot 
continue.126 Chimbe sums it up like this: 
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 Ideally, if there were one law and regulatory framework to regulate 
m-money, it would make everyone’s life easier. There is a need to 
develop specific laws on how m-money should be regulated.127 
 
The current m-money regulatory framework therefore resembles twin-peaks. 
However, unlike the traditional twin-peaks model which has conduct of 
business and prudential regulation as peaks, this model has financial and 
communication regulation as peaks. Because of the involvement of other 
regulators, discussed below, the model may be rightly considered as multiple-
peaks. However, the various peaks are not all on the same level. Figure 15 
below illustrates the various peaks and their levels of authority (importance).  
 
7.2.3. Consumer protection  
The Consumer Protection Act (2003) is the overall legal framework regulating 
consumer protection.128 However, since its enactment in 2003, the Consumer 
Protection Council (CPC), which is mandated to administer the Act, is yet to 
be appointed.129 The result has been that an otherwise useful legal instrument 
has been rendered useless. With this gap, the task of protecting consumer 
rights has been taken up by a local non-government organisation, the 
Consumers Association of Malaŵi (CAMA).130 This development is in itself 
perplexing as the Act categorically states, “the Government shall in its policies, 
laws and administrative measures ensure that consumers draw maximum 
benefit from national, economic, environmental, social and other 
resources.”131 This does not, however, negate any rights that the consumer 
has, only that the consumer is now forced to use the courts to enforce those 
rights or remedy any wrong.132 In the same way, suppliers are not absolved 
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from their obligation to provide safe and correct goods and services, which 
meet the country’s standards.133 However, as noted above, in the absence of 
the CPC, the consumer has to go to court in the event that suppliers have 
reneged on their obligations.  
 
The law also seems to have a claw-back clause. It calls on the consumer to 
“take initiative to acquire the necessary knowledge of consumer life and 
endeavour to behave self-reliantly and rationally.”134 What this exactly means 
is unclear. What does ‘knowledge of consumer life’ entail? Do rationality and 
self-reliance impose a negative obligation on the consumer to act as the 
reasonable consumer? There is a presumption under the Act to construe an 
ambiguous contract in favour of the consumer.135  
 
In relation to financial transactions, the law states, “a consumer shall have 
access to banking and financial services at affordable or lowest possible 
rates.”136 Once again, this provision seems more like a wish. To start with, 
banks and other financial institutions as private entities are not obliged to offer 
access to consumers. As to offering services at affordable or lowest possible 
rates, this seems again an expression of a mere ambition since Malaŵi is 
known for its expensive banking services.137 Unlike other jurisdictions, in 
Malaŵi there is no capping of the interest payable on loans.138  
 
The law also enshrines the right of retraction within a period of seven days 
provided the contract was “entered into a place other than the ordinary 
premises of the supplier or trader.”139 In the case of defective goods or 
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services, a consumer “may request cancellation of an agreement or a 
reduction of the price, without prejudice to being indemnified for injury, or 
loss.”140 A consumer may also opt for a “free replacement or repair of goods 
or adjustment of the technology.”141 Consumers are entitled to compensation 
for misleading advertising.142 Subordinate courts143 have primary jurisdiction 
of consumer claims.144 
 
7.2.4. Fair trading 
The Competition and Fair Trading Act (1998) regulates competitions and fair-
trading in Malaŵi through the Competition and Fair Trading Commission 
(CFTC).145 The Commission has quasi-judicial powers of investigation, which 
include summoning and examining witnesses as well as administering 
oaths.146 The law requires that unless the circumstances warrant it, all 
hearings conducted by the CFTC be held in public.147 A party dissatisfied with 
any findings of the CFTC may appeal to a Judge in chambers.148 An appeal, 
however, does not stay the decision of the CFTC in itself.149 The Act prohibits 
anti-competitive trade practices which are defined as “any category of 
agreements, decisions and concerted practices which are likely to result in the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition to an appreciable extent.”150 
Rival market players who collude in any way in their trade agreements face 
the penalty of an offence.151 
 
Under the law, before any merger or acquisition can be done, the CFTC must 
give its prior authorisation.152 However, when the Malaŵi Savings Bank (MSB) 
and IndeBank, hitherto state companies, were acquired by FDH Holdings and 
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National Bank of Malaŵi respectively, the authorisation was only sought after 
the deal was already signed. The State House issued a statement in July 2015 
that Government had sold its stake in MSB and IndeBank.153 That the 
statement came from State House was the first sign that something was amiss. 
The CFTC, however, only approved the merger of MSB and FDH on 12 
February 2016154 and that of IndeBank with National Bank on 3 June 2016.155 
This was against a legal provision that renders any merger or acquisition 
without prior authorisation from the CFTC a nullity.156 The fact that the CFTC 
adopted a merger and an acquisition that flouted the law and gave it its 
blessings retrospectively is worrisome. There is no retrospective authorisation 
under the Act. Commenters attributed this to political pressure due to the 
political sensitivity that surrounded the acquisition.157  
 
The Act expressly prevents anyone with “a dominant position of market power” 
from using that power to “eliminate or damage” competitors, prevent new 
entrants or deter or prevent anyone from “engaging in competitive conduct.”158 
Employees of the CFTC, acting as investigating officers have powers of entry 
and search but these can only be exercised upon obtaining a search warrant 
from a court of law.159  
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7.3. Regulatory issues posed by the infrastructure 
An empirical study done by Evans and Pirchio found that “heavy regulation is 
usually fatal to igniting mobile money schemes in a country.”160 Light-touch 
regulation is directly proportional to an ignition in the scheme.161 Evans and 
Pirchio say ignition occurs when there is explosive growth of a service after it 
has “obtained enough participants (critical mass).”162 A service such as m-
money will either ignite or fail to attain critical mass and implode or fizzle.163 
Almost like a zero-sum game, a service will both ignite and explode quickly or 
not at all.164 The research also found that a poor country lacking basic 
infrastructure is likely to have a successful m-money service as the service is 
deemed to create more value.165 Would it therefore be argued that a poor 
country is likely to adopt light-touch regulation out of desperation?166  
 
Lessons can be learnt from the light-touch approach by the central bank in 
relation to M-Pesa in Kenya. However, it must be noted that this did not mean 
that M-Pesa was given a regulatory free pass. As noted in chapter 4, an 
exhaustive due diligence was conducted before M-Pesa could be given a go 
ahead to operate. Evans and Pirchio say generally, countries that do not adopt 
a hard KYC regime and impose “minimal restrictions on who [can] serve as an 
agent” are likely to ignite while those adopting a contrary position are likely to 
implode.167 They add that the success of m-money services is directly 
dependent on a developed agency network and “there is a positive correlation 
between the density of the [agent] networks and mobile money use.”168 
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7.3.1. Incoherent regulatory framework 
The first problem posed is legal and institutional in nature. M-money is a recent 
entrant in the financial market and usually, there is no separate legislation 
regulating it. TNM and Airtel are regulated by MACRA. Airtel Money and 
Mpamba are principally regulated by the RBM.169 MACRA and the RBM have 
sought to co-regulate m-money through an MOU. This ambiguity leads to the 
conclusion that the regulation of m-money is incoherent. So far, the only 
framework that deals with m-money are the RBM Guidelines, which 
unfortunately lack the authority of law. The figure below illustrates the current 
regulatory framework as well as the structural operations of the m-money 
system. The figure does not include the whole ecosystem and excludes other 
regulators such as FIU, CPC and CFTC. 
 
 
  
Figure 14: Regulatory and operating structure of m-money 
  
To ensure that there is a separation between the operations (and assets) of 
MNOs between their telecommunication side of the business and m-money, 
they are required to set up separate companies. These special purpose 
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vehicles (SPVs) are the ones that are subject to regulatory oversight by the 
RBM. Although legally separate, these SPVs are however currently housed 
within the MNOs buildings. As SPVs, it may take time for them to evolve into 
their own distinct brands. As seen with the case of M-Pesa and Safaricom in 
Kenya, it may be argued that there is value in associating with the well-
established, recognised and known brand of the parent MNO. As noted with 
TNM, the contribution of Mpamba to the total revenues of MNOs is still very 
small, although it is the fastest growing revenue stream.170  
 
As indicated earlier, the various regulators involved with regulating aspects of 
m-money are at different levels and the system would therefore be aptly 
named multiple-peaks model. The figure below illustrates the different heights 
(importance) of the various peaks.  
 
 
Figure 15: Different peaks of the m-money regulatory framework. 
 
The figure above illustrates the problems of having multiple regulators with 
different approaches. Despite not written down, each of the five regulators has 
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its own regulatory approach. As submitted in chapter 2, there is need to have 
an approach that responds to the uniqueness of the m-money ecosystem. 
Looking at the above figure, the boundaries of the regulatory space can be 
etched. Figure 16 below offers an insight of the various players within the m-
money ecosystem. The next chapter discusses the composition of the 
participants in the regulatory arena. For now, a holistic approach is needed 
and in this approach, regulation that really responds to the true needs and 
demands of the ecosystem seems the right approach. 
 
7.3.2. Technical issues 
Apart from the issues discussed in the above paragraphs, m-money also faces 
unique regulatory issues because it is a hybrid service and relies on other 
services to operate. For a start, because of the ability of wireless networks to 
reach far flung off areas, population density is no longer of systemic 
importance. By 2013, the MNOs had already achieved 80% mobile 
coverage.171 The main issues that arise from the technical side are mainly 
concerned with the reliability of the network. Service disruption and 
contingency planning are therefore key regulatory issues. The m-money 
service is a service that has two service-strata: the telecommunication service 
as the backbone and the financial service on top. Disruption in either or both 
will directly affect the overall service.  
 
It is because of this reliability on the technical backbone, that separating the 
service into two or several parts for purposes of regulation may be problematic. 
From a service point of view, the services offered by the MNO and that offered 
by the m-money issuer may be different. From a function viewpoint, one is an 
extension of the other. Problems such as interruption of transmission or 
congestion ought to be looked at not only as disruptive to the communication 
service, but also to the financial service as well. In 2015, the performance of 
telecom services, especially by the MNOs was generally dubbed poor.172 
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As was discussed in chapter 3, another issue unique with m-money is that it 
is digital money. This presents a few issues. The first is the possibility of 
double-spending. To avoid this, the system needs to have a validation process 
whereby once a transaction has been authorised, it is given a unique code, 
which prevents double spending.173 The second is fraud perpetuated by third 
parties such as flooding the ecosystem with fake m-money. In such a situation, 
the issuer could face a liquidity squeeze if the system failed to distinguish 
between forgeries and genuine e-money.174 Ultimately, the integrity of the pool 
account would be compromised as there would have been created e-value 
which cannot be backed by deposits. Setting up regulatory guidelines to 
preserve the integrity of the system are therefore key regulator issues. 
 
Regulatory arbitrage may also arise because of the dual nature of the m-
money service. This is not a choice between similar regulators in different 
countries but between different regulators within the same country. Initially 
MNOs tried to pass off the service as an added-on service to their core 
business as telecom operators.175 Why they did this can only be explained by 
regulatory arbitrage. The MNOs were already being regulated by the 
communications regulator. They did not want to be further regulated by the 
financial regulator. It is common knowledge that amongst most regulations, 
financial regulation is the most onerous. Looked at as a cost, it is only natural 
that the rational institution would wish to avoid it unless the cost of non-
compliance was greater.176 In the end, the financial regulator caught up with 
them, but it is submitted there is still regulatory arbitrage at play.  This is so 
because; various parts of the service are still regulated by different regulators. 
Unlike the MNO or the bank, the m-money issuer still must negotiate regulatory 
compliance between the two lead regulators.  
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7.3.3. Regulatory space contestation 
With m-money, the regulation is not only concerned with market participants 
but also the entire ecosystem. The regulatory issues affecting m-money are 
therefore best looked at by analysing the ecosystem. As was noted in Figure 
8 (reproduced below as Figure 16), the ecosystem is comprised of several 
nodes, and each of these presents its own regulatory challenges. For example, 
the bank node represents a whole subsystem. As was discussed in chapter 5, 
this includes the inter-bank payment and settlement system. The MNO also 
has its own subsystem, which includes its agency network. The same applies 
to the m-money issuer. As for the customers, once the mobile money is 
created, customers can circulate the e-value within their own subsystem with 
much ease. The peer-to-peer (P2P) system on which the SMS technology is 
based makes this possible.177 The suppliers of goods and services can also 
create their own subsystem where m-money can circulate. However, as can 
be noted from the figure below, m-money issuer is the central node within the 
ecosystem. 
 
Figure 16: Mobile money ecosystem. 
 
The regulation of the ecosystem is however not as interconnected. That is why 
in the discussion above, it was presented as an incoherent regulatory 
framework. What emerges is a service that does not quite fit into the perfect 
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mould of each of the regulators. If the law can appreciate and recognise this 
unique and complex nature of m-money, then a regulatory strategy can be 
formulated that is responsive to the needs of the service. The regulatory space 
of m-money is under constant re-negotiation.178  
 
 Another issue to consider is what Scott describes as “cross-sanctioning.”179 In 
an arena where there are multiple regulators trying to regulate the same 
industry, albeit over different issues, it begs the question whether a more 
powerful regulator may not impose sanction even though the breach is under 
a different regime?180 Where the issues are common or interrelated, this may 
be a welcome thing. However, there is a danger of one regulator usurping the 
powers and authorities of other regulators and clouding up the regulatory 
space. The other danger that would naturally result from this assumption of 
authority would be that the other regulators might start deferring their authority 
to the one that is more resourceful or has greater power.181 While it may be 
argued that this may have beneficial consequences to those regulated, in that, 
they are essentially dealing with one super-regulator, its lack of expertise in 
the other regimes may have a negative impact on the regulatory framework. 
 
7.4. Conclusion 
The main issue that arises from the analysis of the existing regulatory 
framework of m-money is that it is disjointed and not well suited to coherently 
regulate such a complex service. It is also clearly that even with the best 
intentions, its disjointed nature makes it hard to have a unified regulatory 
approach for m-money. In many ways, countries like Malaŵi have an added 
advantage in that they can learn from what Kenya has gone through. The 
regulatory framework in Malaŵi is similar to what was obtaining in Kenya, 
during the pre-FI phase, allowing regulation to follow invention. This light-touch 
approach is meant to spur growth and ignite the service. In an era where FI is 
the goal, it may even be encouraged. However, what happens when the 
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services take root and attain critical mass? Can the current regulatory 
framework, which is largely based on the traditional financial infrastructure, still 
work? Can it tame a service that has attained a life of its own? It is submitted 
it cannot.  
 
In Malaŵi, the evidence so far points to m-money as a service that has been 
warmly embraced by the people and has come to stay. It may not have ignited 
with the same flame as the Kenyan M-Pesa, but it has not fizzled out either. 
With growth in customer base, transaction values and the aggregate value of 
the pool account, the risks posed by m-money are constantly changing. While 
light-touch was essential to ignite, with FI in mind, the same approach may 
prove fatal should the service become systemically important, especially in a 
post-FI phase. As a service that combines elements of telecommunications 
and finance, m-money requires a different approach which suits its 
uniqueness. Having an approach on its own is however not sufficient. There 
is also a need to have a structure, which can embrace this approach.  
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8. AN ALTERNATIVE REGULATORY FRAMEWORK FOR 
MOBILE MONEY 
8.1. Introduction 
The discussion on regulation of mobile money (m-money) has been based on 
the pre-financial inclusion (FI) and the regulatory issues it poses. The question 
that inevitably must be asked is what happens when FI has been achieved? 
The question whether regulatory intervention is required ought to be answered 
in the affirmative.1  Fundamentally, it is the type of intervention that needs to 
be considered. It has already been argued that the regulatory approach of the 
pre-FI phase where there are a plethora of regulators, is not be ideal to achieve 
FI as well as regulate a post-FI era. This chapter argues that having a coherent 
regulatory framework is important in this FI journey. It further argues in favour 
of a regulator that is focussed, has stability, and has a strong research arm to 
collect information from stakeholders. As posited in chapter 2, really 
responsive regulation is the preferred approach that embraces this evolution. 
Ultimately, it is not the form of regulation that needs to change, but the culture. 
The regulator needs to sufficiently understand the context of the regulatee and 
the regulatory space. As already stated, the regulatory space is contested. In 
such a contested space, resources are the key to power, authority, and 
influence.2 The various participants within the regulatory space have varying 
degrees of resources with those who are well resourced standing at an 
advantage.3 Therefore, where a regulator is poorly resourced, its ability to 
regulate will be limited and may lead to power shifting towards the regulated 
or other actors within the regulatory space. 
 
As has been noted, m-money is principally a financial service and one of the 
developmental tools to achieve FI. Regulation can be an enabler to achieve FI 
as well as define the post-FI phase of m-money.4 An enabling regulatory 
                                                     
1  Córdova-Novion and Hanlon (2002) p62 
2  Scott (2001), p330. 
3  ibid. 
4  Venkatesen Mauree and Gaurav Kohli (2013) The Mobile Money Revolution - Part 2: 
Financial Inclusion Enabler (ITUT Technology Watch, International Telecommunications 
Union) p19 <https://www.itu.int/dms_pub/itu-t/oth/23/01/T23010000200002PDFE.pdf>. 1 
May 2017. 
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environment must be delicately balanced to attract and retain business 
entrants as well as customers. Porteous defines this as “a set of conditions 
which promote a sustainable trajectory of market development in such a way 
as to promote socially desirable outcomes.”5 Creating such an environment in 
the face of a high number of regulators can be a challenge. However, an 
enabling regulatory environment should not be construed as leaving the 
service to its own devices. There is a need to be cautious as an over-liquid 
and under-regulated financial market is a recipe for financial crisis.6 Regulation 
has a task to provide an enabling environment under which an m-money 
ecosystem may develop and take root.7  
 
Regulating a new service is a challenge for all the actors within the regulatory 
space. The problem with m-money is that everyone seems to be in 
unchartered territory. The potential benefits associated with m-money seem to 
be so great that the regulator may be under pressure not to be perceived as 
appearing to frustrate it.8 There is a need to define the role of various actors 
such as the mobile network operators (MNOs), the m-money issuers, and their 
agents, as these were not previously subject to financial regulation and 
supervision.9 The main question that this chapter attempts to answer is what 
would be an effective post-FI regulatory m-money framework for Malaŵi? It 
starts by considering how the regulatory space would be configured, and it 
then looks at whether regulatory homogeneity can be achieved. It presents 
two options: an agency model and one, which consists of streamlining the 
status quo. This chapter essentially argues that from a development 
perspective, an independent agency would best suit the post-FI framework. 
However, because of the local socio-political context, instead of the agency 
being a stand-alone one, it advocates for an autonomous agency within the 
central bank.  
                                                     
5  Porteous (2006) p13. 
6  José Gabriel Palma (2012) ‘How the full opening of the capital account to highly liquid 
financial markets led Latin America to two and a half cycles of'mania, panic and crash'’ 
Cambridge Working Papers in Economics 1201 p2 
<http://www.econ.cam.ac.uk/dae/repec/cam/pdf/cwpe1201.pdf>. 19 May 2014. 
7  Jenkins (2008), p11. 
8  Omwansa (2009) p121. 
9  Lyman (2016). 
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8.2. The regulatory arena  
The first step towards proposing an alternative regulatory framework based on 
a really responsive approach is to delimit the regulatory arena. The reality is 
that resources such as “information, wealth and organisational capacities … 
relevant to holding of regulatory power and exercising of capacities are 
dispersed or fragmented.”10 Power is no longer monopolised by the regulator. 
Although there is contestation for advantage, the “dispersal of regulatory 
authority creates relationships of interdependence negotiated between the 
actors within the regulatory space.”11 Therefore, the race is not to the bottom, 
but rather one which is characterised by a need to have a competitive edge 
while maintaining relationships within the regulatory space.  
 
By its nature, space is rarely unoccupied; the task therefore is to demarcate 
its boundary, and decide which actors should be allowed in. Since it is the 
issues that define what constitutes the regulatory space,12 then with m-money, 
the actors can be determined by looking at the issues. In a way, using the m-
money ecosystem helps to identify the key actors within the regulatory arena.13 
This section analyses the various actors and institutions and their motivation 
for their inclusion of within m-money’s regulatory arena to achieve a really 
responsive framework. To allow for meaningful stakeholder participation, the 
framework must provide deliberate space whereby the actors can contribute 
and take a part in shaping the regulation. A really responsive framework must 
have the process agreed to by the stakeholders from time to time. This 
requires a different approach on the part of the regulator and deliberate 
mechanisms to solicit feedback and information from the ecosystem 
stakeholders. It is submitted that to achieve this, the process must embrace: 
 Different stakeholders including user groups 
 Have an information gathering system 
 Be based on mutual and experiential learning 
                                                     
10  Scott (2001) p330. 
11  ibid p337. 
12  ibid p332. 
13  Jenkins (2008) p7. 
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8.2.1. Mobile network operators and m-money issuers  
Although MNOs are not providing the m-money service, the facts that they are 
the ones that set up the issuers and provide the backbone for the m-money 
service give them a stake within the regulatory space. MNOs have a further 
stake on the basis that a reliable and effective telecommunication service is a 
key regulatory issue for both services. Conversely, where the 
telecommunication backbone is unreliable, the m-money service operations 
will be severely disrupted. Currently, the central bank’s approach is to exclude 
MNOs from its financial regulatory arena. In reality the two services cannot be 
truly separated and any regulatory framework must provide space for both. M-
money issuers are at the centre of issues within the regulatory space. The 
whole regulatory framework is built around m-money and its ecosystem. 
Although the service may have links with other services or ride on other rails, 
its inclusion within the regulatory arena is therefore, a foregone conclusion.   
 
8.2.2. Banks 
Although banks belong to the banking regulatory arena, their role as the 
ultimate recipient of deposits from m-money customers make them central to 
the regulation of m-money. M-money can only be generated on the strength 
of deposits in a pool account.14 Of course, there is debate whether the banks 
are operating the pool accounts following trust law requirements. It is 
submitted they are not. There may be a body of trustees created by the 
issuers,15 but strictly speaking, to the bank, the pool account is just another 
deposit account. Interest is payable to the trustees whose only restriction is to 
use it for charitable purposes.16  Operations of banks holding pool accounts is 
therefore, a regulatory issue. Any crisis that would affect the bank would have 
a domino effect and affect m-money, including bank resolution. This may not 
only affect funds in the pool account, but could affect the stability of the m-
                                                     
14  Maurer (2012) p306. 
15  Mkoloma (Interview, 7 August 2015).  
 Mbekeani (Interview, 20 August 2015).  
16  Mkoloma (Interview, 7 August 2015).  
 Mbekeani (Interview, 20 August 2015).  
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money ecosystem. For a meaningful engagement, banks are a key actor to be 
included within the regulatory arena.    
 
8.2.3. Regulators 
As noted, the m-money regulatory arena has several regulators but they do 
not all regulate the service in unison. Where there emerges a new service such 
as m-money, which interconnects several regulatory nodes, the question is 
who among the sector regulators should regulate it?17 Sometimes these sector 
regulators collaborate depending on the issues.18 Sometimes their work 
overlaps especially where they must deal with consumer protection or 
competition issues affecting their sector.19  
 
Regardless of the structural model adopted, these regulators need to be 
included within the regulatory arena. Currently the Reserve Bank of Malaŵi 
(RBM) is the lead regulator overseeing m-money operations. In its work, it 
mostly collaborates the communication regulator. The Financial Intelligence 
Unit20 (FIU) seems to have only one foot in, as its main concern is monitoring 
suspicious transactions. However, the low values of m-money transactions are 
below the minimum mandatory reporting threshold set up by the FIU, unless 
they are suspicious.21 The Competition and Fair Trading Commission (CFTC)22 
is mainly concerned with competition and fair-trading. As noted earlier, the 
Consumers Protection Council (CPC)23 is not operative. Within themselves, 
the regulators are already cooperating and having memoranda of 
understanding (MOU) guiding their cooperation. The following are the MOU 
already in operation: 
 RBM and Malaŵi Communications Regulatory Authority (MACRA)24 
                                                     
17  Klein and Mayer (2011) p27. 
18  ibid. 
19  ibid. 
20  Established under section 11 of the Money Laundering Act (Malaŵi, 2006). 
21  Phiri (Interview, 7 August 2015).  
22  Established under section 8 of the Competition and Fair Trading Act, Act No. 43 of 1998 
(Malaŵi, 1998). 
23  Established under section 10 of the Consumer Protection Act (Malaŵi, 2003). 
24  Chimbe (Interview, 3 August 2015).  
 RBM Headquarters (Interview, 6 August 2015).  
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 RBM and FIU25 
 MACRA and CFTC 26 
 
The basic rudiments of inter-agency cooperation are therefore, already in 
place. The MOUs can be used as a stepping-stone towards a more formalised 
cooperation arrangement between the regulators. By their nature, regulators 
are central in any regulatory reformulation. 
 
8.2.4. Consumers 
The m-money service thrives on having an active body of consumers who 
regularly transact. Transactional fees finance the m-money service. The RBM 
has already highlighted low financial literacy and awareness among the 
populace as one of the challenges hindering Malaŵi’s achievement of full FI.27 
As was noted earlier, literacy levels in Malaŵi are generally very low, 
especially amongst women.28 Most the population is under the so-called $1.25 
a day poverty line.29 Considering that this is the target for the m-money service, 
it is a rather peculiar clientele. M-money, as a financial service requires some 
level of financial literacy or awareness among its users. Low literacy levels, 
especially on financial issues is therefore an issue of concern. It may be for 
this reason, consumer awareness bodies, such as the Consumer Association 
of Malaŵi (CAMA)30 may prove useful. However, although CAMA regularly 
speak for consumers on topical issues,31 it may be incapable of fully 
representing all consumer interests. There is a need to engage the actual 
users of the m-money service. Setting up user groups and providing them with 
a platform may be one such way of getting users on board as a stakeholder 
with a voice within the regulatory arena. 
                                                     
25  Phiri (Interview, 7 August 2015).  
26  Chimbe (Interview, 3 August 2015).  
27  RBM (2013) p11-2. 
28  In the 2008 census, 41% of women were illiterate. 36% of the population was illiterate – 
NSO (2009) p14. 
29  Anon (2013b) p1. 
30  CAMA (2016). 
31  Anon (2010d) 'Consumers demonstrate over high bank rates in Malawi ’ (21 April 2010) 
<http://maravi.blogspot.co.uk/2010/04/nyasatimes-consumers-demonstrate-over.html>. 
11 March 2014. 
 Khombe (2014). 
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8.2.5. The legal structure 
The current law regulating the various aspects of m-money is fragmented. 
Apart from the financial services laws,32 all the other pieces of legislation are 
concerned with the ancillary aspects of the m-money service.33 This 
fragmentation is not conducive to achieving a really responsive regulatory 
approach.  While it may be argued that codification maybe an easier route, 
considering the diversity of the legislation concerned, this is discouraged. By 
embarking on this route, there is an acknowledgment that the regulatory flux 
will continue. This would be overcome if the legislature passed a law that 
specifically governs the operation of m-money. In the meantime, the legislature 
still has the task and considering reviews of the existing law. The 
Communications Act (1998) is being reviewed.34 The Money Laundering Act 
(2006) Act has been replaced with the Financial Crimes Act (2017).35 It is 
submitted the Consumer Protection Act (2003), the Competitions and Fair 
Trading Act (1998) may also need to be reviewed.  
 
The enactment of the Payment Systems Act (2016) and the Electronic 
Transactions Act (2016) has helped to start bringing some regulatory clarity in 
electronic payments systems.36 However, apart from the Mobile Payment 
Guidelines (2011),37 there is no law or regulations that have been enacted or 
promulgated specifically to address regulation of m-money. The Guidelines 
also lack the authority of positive law. To its credit, the RBM in 2015 drafted 
E-Money Regulations, but these regulations have been withdrawn so that they 
                                                     
32  Such as:  
 Financial Services Act (Malaŵi, 2010). 
 Financial Crimes Act (Malaŵi, 2017). 
 Payment Systems Bill (2015). 
 Electronic Transactions Act (Malaŵi, 2016). 
 Money Laundering Act (Malaŵi, 2006). 
33  Communications Act, Malaŵi (Malaŵi, 1998). 
 Money Laundering Act (Malaŵi, 2006). 
 Consumer Protection Act (Malaŵi, 2003).  
 Competition and Fair Trading Act (Malaŵi, 1998). 
34  Chimbe (Interview, 3 August 2015).  
35  Financial Crimes Act (Malaŵi, 2017). 
36  Payment Systems Act (Malaŵi, 2016). 
 Electronic Transactions Act (Malaŵi, 2016). 
37  Guidelines for Mobile Payment Systems (Malaŵi, 2011). 
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can be realigned with the Payment Systems Act (2016).38 The inclusion of the 
relevant law and legal structures into the regulatory arena is therefore 
neccessary. 
 
8.2.6. The executive and the political establishment 
The power that the executive arm of the government holds in regulatory issues 
is manifested in the power to appoint boards and senior management of the 
regulatory bodies. Furthermore, although the executive holds no express 
legislative powers, under most statutes, ministers can promulgate subsidiary 
legislation. Malaŵi is a constitutional democracy.39 It is governed through an 
elected five-year political cycle.40 The Executive has the constiututional duty to 
initiate legislation.41  In fact, while consumers, m-money issuers, banks, and 
regulators maybe the key actors; it is the political establishment that may make 
all the difference. Politics also comes to the fore when consumer issues are at 
play. After all, consumers, crucially compose the electorate. In the case of 
Malaŵi, the majority of the electorate are in rural areas. 
 
Politicians are rational beings after all, and the theory of homo economicus 
says that all things being equal, a rational being will try to maximise for their 
personal benefit.42 Of course, it could be argued that politicians are also homo 
politicus, and will attempt to consider what is best for society.43 Although homo 
politicus normally stands in contrast to homo economicus, where politicians 
are concerned it is possible to have the two fused in the same personality. 
Politicians are likely to consider what will best benefit them, and if it will benefit 
the society as well, it is more likely to become a priority. Therefore, in a country 
like Malaŵi, where the majority of the electorate are unbanked, financially 
                                                     
38  Ngwira (2017). 
39  Section 12 Constitution of the Republic of Malaŵi 1994) 
<http://www.malawi.gov.mw/images/Publications/act/Constitution%20of%20Malawi.pdf>. 
21 December 2016. 
40  Section 67 ibid. 
41  Section 7 ibid. 
42  Karine Nyborg (2000) ‘Homo economicus and homo politicus: interpretation and 
aggregation of environmental values’ 42 (3) Journal of Economic Behavior & 
Organization 305 p309 
<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167268100000913>. 21 December 
2016. 
43  ibid p310. 
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excluded and living in the rural areas, a service such as m-money which 
targets this very same demographic group may all of a sudden attain political 
priority. In a country where resources are scarce, allocation of resources 
becomes subject to political interests and power play. Although most 
politicians have the economic good of the country as a priority, ultimately the 
question the politician will ask is; will allocating resources to a regulatory 
agency result in a greater chance of being re-elected? It is for these reasons 
that the m-money regulatory arena must include the executive and the political 
establishment. 
 
8.3. Towards regulatory homogeneity 
The regulatory overlap for m-money arises because it is a hybrid service.44 
However, is there a danger of this overlap resulting in the risk of coordination 
and regulatory failure?45 As noted, for the m-money services to grow, it needs 
an enabling environment. It needs to attract and encourage new entrants into 
the market so as not to stifle innovation while ensuring the regulatory and 
policy framework is not susceptible to arbitrary changes, which may prejudice 
prospects of new entrants.46 However, what happens when growth has been 
attained? The issue that needs to be considered next is what would be the 
right regulatory fit as the service evolves?  
 
8.3.1. An independent agency?  
The problems posed by the emergence of electronic and other new forms of 
money to pre-existing regulatory architectures are not new. Lelieveldt in 1997 
said regulators fail to respond because they struggle to understand that they 
are dealing with a different species of payment platform.47 So how would an 
independent agency be structured to really respond to its environment, and 
what would be its function?  
 
Independent agency 
                                                     
44  Porteous (2006) p5. 
45  ibid.. 
46  ibid. 
47  Lelieveldt (1996) p1165-6. 
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The notion of setting up independent agencies to regulate business or some 
aspects of social life comes from the movement away from the welfare state 
to the regulatory state.48 The assumption is that such agencies operate at 
arm’s length from their principles.49 Under the welfare state, there is a direct 
relationship between the state and the citizens through legislative 
intervention.50 Under the regulatory state, the state, as the principal, sets up 
agencies to oversee the needs of citizens, referred to as consumers,51 
McCubbins et al have argued that reduced to its lowest common denominator, 
the principal-agent relationship is premised on the distribution of costs.52 The 
agent takes on a cost on behalf of the principle in return for some benefit 
authorised or provided by the principal.53 The agency has delegated power 
from a principal, typically the legislature or executive branches of government 
and is accountable for how it uses those powers.54 The principals typically 
comprise elected officials and the agencies are a creature of statute.55 The 
oversight provided by the independent agencies is therefore at the core of 
regulatory state governance.56  Scott says such agencies utilise a combination 
of public and private law instruments, like licences and contracts to “enforce 
regulatory norms.” 57 The regulatory state provides a monitoring mechanism in 
a market environment.58  
 
                                                     
48  Colin Scott (2017) 'The Regulatory State and Beyond’ in Peter Drahos (ed) Regulatory 
Theory: Foundations and Applications (Australian National University Press, Canberra) 
p269. 
49  ibid p267. 
50  ibid p269. 
51  ibid. 
52  Matthew D McCubbins, Roger G Noll and Barry R Weingast (1989) ‘Structure and 
process, politics and policy: Administrative arrangements and the political control of 
agencies’ 75 Virginia Law Review 431 p433 
<http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5950&context=faculty_schol
arship>. 20 February 2017. 
53  ibid p433-4. 
54  Quintyn and Taylor (2002) p31. 
 Thatcher (2002) p125. 
55  Mark Thatcher (2002) ‘Delegation to independent regulatory agencies: Pressures, 
functions and contextual mediation’ 25 (1) West European Politics 125 p125 <http://0-
dx.doi.org.pugwash.lib.warwick.ac.uk/10.1080/713601588>. 16 February 2017. 
56  Scott (2017) p267. 
57  ibid p268. 
58  ibid p269. 
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Quintyn and Taylor argue that such agencies “potentially shield market 
intervention from political interference and improve transparency, stability, and 
expertise of the regulatory and supervisory process.”59 Apart from political 
interference, technical complexity in regulatory issues is deemed to be best 
managed by independent experts than government departments.60 Over time, 
the consensus seems to converge that independence regulatory agencies, 
which are accountable to stakeholders, are more likely to lead to effective 
regulation.61 Independent agencies run by experts also instil confidence and 
trust in the regulatory system.62 This independence is much more needed 
when there is a crisis or some complex issue that needs a response.63  
 
Although powers to enforce are crucial, Scott argues that even where the 
agency lacks express powers, it can formulate its own enforcement pyramid 
and utilise tools such as education, advice, warnings with naming and shaming 
as the ultimate tool.64 Baldwin and Black have proposed a “naming and 
shaming league tables” noting that some may fear this more than 
administrative fines.65  The ability to escalate sanctions in itself allows the 
agency to offer advice, which can be seriously taken because they ‘carry a big 
stick.’66 Use of the ‘big stick’ anyhow may result in the agency failing to 
effectively enforce regulations; therefore, a responsive framework must aim to 
strike a balance.67  Where an agency embraces the enforcement pyramid, the 
enforcement must not only respond to the environment,68 but also do so by 
understanding the culture and broader framework of the regulated 
environment.69  
 
                                                     
59  Quintyn and Taylor (2002) p9. 
60  Córdova-Novion and Hanlon (2002) p71. 
61  Quintyn and Taylor (2002) p4, 8. 
62  Córdova-Novion and Hanlon (2002) p73. 
63  Quintyn and Taylor (2002) p9. 
64  Scott (2017) p271. 
65  Baldwin and Black (2008) p32, 34. 
66  Scott (2017) p272. 
67  ibid. 
68 Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) p4. 
69  Baldwin and Black (2008) p18, 19. 
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To be effective, an agency must have the autonomy to set up rules, which 
must be binding on the industry.70 The agency must also have powers of 
oversight, including granting, and revoking licences.71 The agency must ideally 
be detached from the government machinery.72 To be competitive, the agency 
must be able to attract competent expertise. 73 Sources of financing are 
therefore vital for its operation and independence. Unless its budget is directly 
appropriated by parliament, the agency must go through some government 
ministry for financing. The only other way of avoiding this is to raise revenue 
from the industry through levies and fees.74 This may not be easy in agencies 
that are just being set-up. It may also lead to capture.  
 
To avoid an agency becoming too-independent, mechanisms need to be put 
in place as a counterbalance. Transparency and accountability are the crucial 
countervailing measures.75 This accountability must be to the stakeholders 
such as the regulated industry, consumers, the citizenry, the principals, the 
legislature and the judiciary.76 According to Freeman’s stakeholder theory, 
each organisation has a constituency.77 The theory argues that unlike the 
traditional business model where managers owed a duty to the business 
owners, under the stakeholder theory, they also owe a fiduciary duty to 
stakeholders.78 This constituency rarely comprises homogeneous interests, 
but all stakeholders must be considered.79  
 
                                                     
70  Quintyn and Taylor (2002) p22. 
71  ibid p17, 19. 
 Polizatto (1992) p303-8. 
72  Quintyn and Taylor (2002) p20. 
73  ibid p21. 
 Polizatto (1992), p310. 
74  Quintyn and Taylor (2002) p21. 
75  Córdova-Novion and Hanlon (2002) p89-97. 
76  ibid p89. 
77  Robert Phillips (2003) 'Stakeholder Theory and Organizational Dogma’ in Robert Phillips 
(ed) Stakeholder Theory and Organizational Ethics (Berrett-Koehler Publishers Inc, San 
Francisco, California) p3. 
78  Edward R. Freeman (1984) 'Stakeholder Theory of the Modern Corporation’ in General 
Issues in Business Ethics (Harper Collins, New York) p39. 
79  Phillips (2003) p3. 
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The stakeholder theory is not without its distractors. Argenti has called it “an 
idea whose time has long passed.”80 He argues that unlike shareholders who 
are a “homogenous set”, there is lack of certainty with stakeholders.81 
Although Argenti’s criticism is based on the theory’s application to companies, 
the criticism would apply to all corporations. He criticises the theory for treating 
all stakeholders as if they are equal. However, it is submitted that the theory 
does not make this argument. In fact, as noted by Phillips, the diversity of 
stakeholders is embraced.82 The theory advocates for consultation or 
involvement of all stakeholders. How this will be undertaken will depend on a 
myriad of factors, including the type of business the corporation is in as well 
as the array of stakeholders involved.83 His argument that “an organization 
designed to serve more than one set of people will fail to satisfy any” seems 
to be a narrow view and premised much on the profit motive.84 In response, 
Campbell has rightly observed that Argenti seems to miss the fact that 
organisations do not exist in an empty vacuum, but are part of a space which 
is highly contested.85 Campbell argues that organisations that survive are 
those that give all stakeholders a good deal.86 He argues that the theory 
actually takes cognizance that organisations “cannot survive unless they 
deliver value to their stakeholders.”87  
 
It is submitted, that in relation to corporate bodies that are charged with 
regulatory supervision, embracing the stakeholder theory is the only way they 
can truly manage to regulate the market they are in. Stakeholder involvement 
does not only make the regulator more responsive to the environment but also 
entrenches accountability. Accountability is fundamental to ensure effective 
                                                     
80  John Argenti (1997) ‘Stakeholders: the Case Against’ Long Range Planning Vol. 30 (3) 
442, p445 <http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0024630197000046>. 16 
February 2017. 
81  ibid p442. 
82  Phillips (2003) p3. 
83  Andrew Campbell (1997) ‘Stakeholders: the Case in Favour’ Long Range Planning Vol. 
30 (3) 446, p448 
<http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0024630197000034>. 16 February 
2017. 
84  ibid p445. 
85  ibid p446. 
86  ibid. 
87  Ibid 449. 
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agency independence.88 The reason why regulatory independence must have 
accountability, as a countervailing force is to prevent capture, avoid rigidities 
and minimise over-regulation.89 As Stigler argued, institutions naturally are 
aligned with the best-organised and resourced entities.90 Apart from industry 
or state capture, there is also the fear of self-capture, where the agency 
implements its own agenda.91 Such agencies become a law unto themselves, 
essentially becoming the fourth-estate.92 This is much more so, since 
unelected officials usually run the agencies. This risk can however be 
mitigated with deliberate oversight, which while not interfering with the 
operations of the agency, makes the agency accountable to its principals.  
 
Balancing the levels of accountability to the competing interests of 
stakeholders is a task that has to be incorporated in the regulatory institutional 
design.93 In most common law jurisdiction, the process of judicial review is a 
powerful legal process through which administrative actions and decisions of 
public bodies can be brought under judicial scrutiny.94 Allowing appeals to the 
courts is an effective means of ensuring that the agency operates within the 
law.95 Judicial oversight further helps to ensure consistency in the 
interpretation and application of rules.96 When formulating boundaries of 
jurisdiction, it is necessary to specify when the agency’s mandate can be 
overridden, and if so by whom and in what manner.97 
 
Having a financial ombudsman scheme,98 as is the case with the Financial 
Ombudsman Service (FOS) in the United Kingdom (UK), is one way of 
                                                     
88  Quintyn and Taylor (2002) p5. 
89  ibid p3,5. 
90  Stigler (1971). 
91  Córdova-Novion and Hanlon (2002) p82. 
92  Quintyn and Taylor (2002) p9-10. 
 Eva Hüpkes, Marc Quintyn and Michael W. Taylor (2006) ‘Accountability Arrangements 
for Financial Sector Regulators’ 39 p1 IMF Economic Issues 
<https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/issues/issues39/ei39.pdf>. 27 February 2017. 
93  Córdova-Novion and Hanlon (2002) p89. 
94  Public Law Project (2013) An Introduction to Judicial Review (Public Law Project, 
London). 
95  Córdova-Novion and Hanlon (2002) p96. 
96  Quintyn and Taylor (2002) p32. 
97  ibid p32 and Thatcher (2002) p144. 
98  FOSL (2017) 'Financial Ombudsman Service’ (Financial Ombudsman Service Limited ) 
<http://www.financial-ombudsman.org.uk/>. 13 March 2017. 
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entrenching this accountability.99 Singh argues that the scheme provides an 
avenue “for consumers to seek redress against financial firms once all 
procedures at a firm level to deal with the complainant have been 
exhausted.”100 Although, Malaŵi does not have such a scheme, it has an office 
of the Ombudsman, mandated to investigate abuse of power of unfair 
treatment by public officials or bodies.101 Singh has argued that another way 
of ensuring accountability is to remove statutory immunity against such an 
agency or its staff through the Common Law Tort of Misfeasance in Public 
Office.102 This acts as a strong motivation for public officers to act in good faith, 
or at least not to act in bad faith.103 Immunity or indemnity is found in most 
legislation, which creates independent regulatory agencies.104 It has now been 
held in both the UK and Malaŵi that regulators may be sued for how they have 
exercised their regulatory powers.105 Judicial accountability is therefore, a 
powerful way of checking the use of agency power without corroding on its 
independence.106 
 
The principal-agency relationship is not static. Over time, agencies start 
wielding power, sometimes more than their principals.107 The danger of an 
unelected body amassing policy-making, and sometimes legislating power 
needs to be considered.108 Although autonomy is a hallmark of institutional 
independence, one way of making agencies accountable is to retain the power 
to appoint senior staff with elected principals either directly or through 
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appointed boards.109 However, this may cause problems where such 
appointments are politicised. Having the agencies account to the legislature 
through annual reports and attending parliamentary committee sessions would 
be one way of minimising political interference and ensuring accountability.110 
Accountability can also extend to other stakeholders such as consumers and 
regulatees.111 This can include mandatory consultations and publication of 
reports before rules or policies are promulgated.112 Stakeholder meetings 
where the regulator accounts to stakeholders are one of the ways of ensuring 
this autonomy as well as making it accountable. They are also the best forum 
for supporting a framework that really responds to stakeholder concerns.  
 
Setting up an agency does not provide the permanent regulatory solution. The 
regulatory framework must constantly respond to dynamics of the 
environment. Increasingly, where the industry converges through mergers and 
acquisitions or through offering services across the board, regulators also 
need to respond, by either merging or evolving from sector to industry 
regulators.113 A bank may start offering insurance services and an insurance 
company may start offering banking services. An m-money issuer may cross 
the Rubicon and start offering loans. An MNO can decide to acquire a bank, 
set up an insurance company and offer m-money and a horde of other 
services.114 In such a scenario, the regulation would have to evolve and 
respond in real time to these developments.  
 
Ideally with a highly complex and technical service such as m-money, some 
level of self-regulation is required. This is because the MNOs tend to know 
more about the market than the regulators. The problem however is that where 
you have a few dominant players, as is the case in Malaŵi, there is a tendency 
for these players to undertake “oligopolistic behaviour” and dominate the 
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market to the detriment of consumer welfare and competition.115 In such an 
environment, addressing information asymmetry becomes a crucial regulatory 
objective and dominates the regulatory focus.116 While some degree of self-
regulation may be allowed, it is submitted that at least in its early stages, the 
agency must attempt to balance the various regulatory objectives. Really 
responsive or smart regulation, which combines various regulatory 
approaches, would therefore be ideally suited for such an agency.  
 
The prime design feature of the agency is that it must have clear regulatory 
objectives.117 This is important as it delineates the boundaries of regulatory 
authority but also defines the working relationship with other stakeholders. To 
ensure that independence is entrenched, such an agency should ideally be 
instituted by law, with its independence enshrined in statute.118 
Organisationally, the agency would need to have horizontal and vertical 
structures. The horizontal structure would allow for cooperation with existing 
sector regulators and within units while the vertical node would ensure 
streaming of regulatory roles within the agency.  
 
The argument for an independent agency 
As a financial service, m-money needs to meet some basic minimum 
prudential standards notwithstanding that it is not a banking service. As noted 
in chapter 3, there is now a requirement that all dealers in money or value 
transfer service must comply with the relevant anti-money laundering 
frameworks.119 As a service riding on the telecommunication backbone, m-
money’s operation is always dependent on the operation of the latter. 
Therefore, although legally the m-money issuers and the MNOs may be 
distinct, operationally they are intertwined. The current arrangement where the 
communications regulator, only looks at the operations of the MNOs beyond 
illustrates the lack of appreciation of complex operations of the m-money 
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service. Setting up an agency to oversee all aspects of m-money seems the 
ideal situation. 
 
One thing that has been evident in the analysis of the current legal framework, 
in the last chapter, is that it does not provide for adequate protection of 
consumers’ rights and interests. This is not just through a lack of 
comprehensive operational consumer protection scheme, but also a weak 
competition framework. Considering that m-money is one of the RBM’s 
initiatives to achieve FI,120 protection of this vulnerable group is vital. There is 
a need to ensure that once the consumers are locked-in, the duopoly held by 
Airtel Money and Mpamba is not exploited to the disadvantage of consumers. 
According to Simon’s theory of bounded rationality, people or organisations 
will always behave in a way that attempts to obtain a result that best suits their 
interests.121 Within the regulatory space, there is a contest to gain a 
competitive advantage. Those already in the business are keen to monopolise 
and enlarge their market share while new entrants seek to do so at the least 
cost.122 Consumers are, on the other hand, usually only interested in 
affordability, quality and reliability of service.123 The government is interested 
in a stable business environment and tax revenue.124 An agency that 
embraces the really responsive regulation approach seems to be best suited 
to address these competing issues as it can develop coping mechanisms 
faster and in a much more focussed manner. The figure below gives an 
overview of the organisation structure of how the agency would be structured 
and how the various units and sub-units would be connected to each other. 
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Figure 17: Organisation structure of single regulator for m-money 
 
Bearing in mind the independence issues highlighted in chapters 5 and 7 
regarding current regulators, the design of the agency ought to deliberately 
ensure its independence for it to effectively discharge its functions. This would 
have to start with the board. It is proposed that the board should not be 
appointed by the country’s President. The board of the agency, as well as the 
staff contingent should have, at a minimum, expertise in at least the following: 
(a) Telecommunications 
(b) Law 
(c) Economics 
(d) Business 
(e) Finance 
(f) Anti-money laundering 
(g) Consumer rights 
(h) Competition policy 
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the board.125 To avoid changing the process of appointment willy-nilly, this 
should be entrenched in positive law.126 The law should ideally provide the 
framework, which defines the powers, functions, and objectives of the agency. 
This would help the agency to avoid conflicts with the government and guide 
courts when exercising any review proceedings.127 In fact, it is submitted, such 
an independent agency would need the sanction of law to be able to operate 
within a regulatory environment, which is already populated, and which has 
some regulatory overlaps.128  
 
For key staff, where there is a separate board appointed, this may also help in 
hiring staff based on their expertise. However, to ensure that key staff are 
shielded from political pressures, it is submitted that the ideal situation would 
be to stagger their appointments so that they do not coincide with those of 
politicians.129 This staggering of appointments could also apply to the board. 
Staggered appointments do not only ensure continuity but also minimise 
interference from politicians. Another way of ensuring the security of tenure of 
staff would be to have in-built protections so that staff cannot be removed 
without due process.130 Entrenching removal procedures in positive law and 
allowing the legislature to have a say are some of the ways of ensuring the 
security of tenure which has a direct correlation with regulatory 
independence.131  
  
8.3.2. Streamlining the existing regulators? 
The alternative option is to stay with the status quo but streamline the 
operational framework of the existing regulators so that they can adequately 
supervise m-money. As discussed in chapters 5 and 7, most of the current 
regulators involved with the m-money either do not enjoy independence, have 
operation inefficiencies or lack enforcement mechanisms. Apart from 
strengthening the inter-organisational cooperation, there would be a need to 
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streamline each regulator to meet the challenges that a post-FI regulatory 
framework would need. Independence and autonomy are crucial elements 
towards this streamlining. 
 
Reserve Bank of Malaŵi (RBM) 
It has been suggested, that instead of setting up an independent agency, the 
simplest way to achieve independence is to have regulatory authority housed 
within the central bank.132 The agency could piggyback on the autonomy that 
most central banks already possess.133 Having all financial regulation within 
one organisation is cost effective and benefits from economies of scale.134 
Furthermore, central banks usually have within their ranks a range of 
expertise.135 However, therein lie the problems. The problems of regulatory 
independence of the RBM in view of the political context of the country have 
already been discussed. Apart from the manner of appointment of the 
Governor, there is the real question of just how much can one institution 
handle and how much can be laid on the shoulders of the Governor. The trend 
has been to merely expand the powers and regulatory field of the central bank 
with each emerging service. This expansion has not considered that the bank 
may not have the expertise to regulate the new sectors that are evolving.136 
The current regulatory structure has three divisions:137  
i. Banks and other financial institutions 
ii. Micro-finance & Securities Markets 
iii. Pension & Insurance Industry. 
 
Restructuring of the current financial regulatory structure may involve any one 
of these three possible routes: 
(a) Stand-alone unified regulator. 
(b) Triple-peaks structure. 
(c) Imbedded triple-peaks structure. 
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A stand-alone unified regulator implies leaving the regulatory structure as it is 
but uprooting it out of the RBM and setting it up as a separate agency. It would 
be akin to setting up one independent unified agency for the whole financial 
system similar to the defunct Financial Services Authority (UK). Such a unified 
regulator would oversee the entire financial system, including mobile money. 
The triple-peaks structure would require setting up three different regulators 
based on the existing three divisions within the central bank. Such an 
arrangement would be similar to the post-FSA regulatory environment in the 
UK, only that there would be triple-peaks instead of twin-peaks.  An imbedded 
triple-peaks structure would be similar in setup to the triple-peaks but the 
difference would be that it would remain within the RBM. The Governor would 
cease to be registrar and each of the functions would have a registrar heading 
them but the principal regulator would remain the RBM.  
 
Looking at these three options, the stand-alone unified agency is ideal but is 
unlikely attract political and institutional support to be implemented. The 
imbedded triple-peaks structure is the model that would be the least disruptive 
and least costly and the most likely to be considered. It would require 
legislative changes, but these would most likely be amendments other than 
wholesale reformulations. In such a model, m-money would fall into either (a) 
banks and other financial institutions or (b) micro-finance and securities 
markets. Although m-money was at its inception categorised as part of micro-
finance,138  it is not.139 Its significance should require its own structure even if 
within the RBM. The linkage between m-money and banks as evidenced by 
the trust account, which triggers the creation of electronic value, would further 
support such a proposal. The fourth option, maintaining the status quo, has 
deliberately not been discussed as it simply perpetuates the current regulatory 
incoherence.  
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Malaŵi Communications Regulatory Authority (MACRA) 
As noted in chapter 7, the establishment of MACRA followed a World Bank 
privatisation programme of the communications sector. It was therefore an 
externally driven process. At the time the governing Act140 was being enacted, 
the focus was on the regulation of the companies established after the break-
up of the vertically integrated Department of Posts and Telecommunications 
and reconstitution of the state broadcaster.141 Regarding MNOs, the Act is loud 
in its silence, not mentioning them at all. The Act’s focus is on regulating 
communication networks and services.142 Appreciably, at the time the Act was 
being passed, the mobile industry was still in its infant stage. The result is that 
this Act is generally outdated. MACRA has indicated that it is reviewing the 
Act.143 Traditionally Ministry of Justice does such internal reviews.144 However 
as no bill has been presented, access to any reviewed proposals is difficult. 
Normally the task of reviewing the law is given to the Malaŵi Law 
Commission.145 The Commission makes consultations, conducts public 
hearings, and submits a report, usually with a proposed bill appended to it.146 
The Law Commission’s report is a public document. However, where there is 
a review process being initiated internally, as in this case, then such 
information is not publicly available or accessible. 
 
Looking at the current Act, it is obvious that in an era of an unbundled 
communications sector, it has achieved most of its intended goals. At the same 
time, it is ill suited to address the regulatory problems of a post-unbundled 
sector. Regarding m-money, the law needs to expand the scope of the 
telecommunications sector and make a distinction between the various 
telecommunication providers. The telecommunications sector in Malaŵi 
includes fixed telephone networks, MNOs, and a combination of these.147 The 
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regulatory issues affecting each of these is different and unique. Therefore, 
bringing the telecommunications regulation in line with the current state of 
developments would make the law cope with present day challenges. 
However, including all the sub-sectors into an Act would make it voluminous. 
The solution therefore would like in having regulations under the Act, which 
deal with the sub-sector issues. The Act would therefore be a framework one 
providing for the general issues. 
 
Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) 
The biggest hurdle faced by the FIU is that the Money Laundering Act (2006) 
[MLA]148 did not give it the power of enforcement. As a regulator, the FIU’s 
powers were reduced to issuing guidelines and recommendations, analysing 
financial transactions, and reporting to prosecuting agencies. The passage of 
this law was itself fraught with legislative problems. Most Parliamentarians felt 
targeted by the proposed law.149 The bill had to be referred to a committee 
because it was deemed too technical for them.150 Some of the provisions that 
would have given the FIU greater regulatory powers were removed. In the end, 
it may be argued that the outcome was a compromised law. In many ways this 
would reflect why the FIU, as the body entrusted with the operation of the Act, 
was not granted enough regulatory powers under it. In terms of financial 
crimes, the MLA was mostly an extension of the Penal Code.151  
 
The MLA has since been repealed and replaced by the Financial Crimes Act 
(2017). The new Act was not processed through the Law Commission and was 
therefore publicly unavailable for scrutiny until it was passed. The passing of 
the new Act was not without controversy. When the Bill was first presented to 
Parliament, it was deferred.152 Parliamentarians complained of being 
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ambushed.153 Like its predecessor, it was referred to the Legal Affairs 
Committee on the basis that “it was too technical.”154 Although the new Act was 
said to address m-money issues,155 an overview reveals that it has not. The 
regulations that have been promulgated under it have nothing to do with m-
money.156 May be with time, new regulations will emerge. For now, the only 
notable changes are the change of name from FIU to Financial Intelligence of 
Authority and enhancing penalties for financial crimes. The lack of real 
regulatory powers that characterised the MLA remain. Although it has 
enhanced penalties for financial crimes, the role of the FIU as a regulator has 
not changed. The real enforcement will still done by prosecuting agencies 
outside the FIU. It would seem an opportunity to create a special financial 
crimes prosecuting regime was lost. As a regulator, the FIU still lacks the 
necessary tools to supervise money laundering issues. 
 
Consumer Protection Council (CPC) 
As noted in chapter 7, the one fundamental handicap with implementing the 
Consumer Protect Act (2003)157 is a lack of political evidenced by the failure to 
constitute the CPC, the agency given statutory regulatory powers.158  
Considering that the Act was passed in 2003, this failure would count as more 
than a mere oversight. In fact, it is submitted, it is a result of a deliberate policy 
of successive governments159 to disempower the consumers.160 The Director 
of Consumers Association of Malaŵi, John Kapito, put it this way: 
The President and the Ministry of Trade have failed to launch a 
Consumer Protection Council. We need to have a council that will 
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be monitoring the prices of goods hand in hand with the Malaŵi 
Bureau of Standards.161 
 
The rights enshrined in the Act as consumer rights162 can only be fully realised 
when they are litigated. It is trite that in an adversarial common law based 
system as one obtaining in Malaŵi, litigation is not only an expensive 
undertaking but time consuming as well. So, although the Act provides for 
construction of ambiguous contracts in favour of consumers,163 the only 
competent authority in the absence of the CPC to do this are courts. Without 
the CPC acting as a watchdog, there is nothing to compel suppliers to comply 
with any rules. The result is that consumers who have unresolved complaints 
must go to the court for relief.164 If the CPC were operational, it would be the 
one regulating consumer welfare issues. 
 
Where goods are concerned, the Act looks at the Sales of Goods Act165 for 
any undertakings such as warranties.166 The CPC in regulating consumer 
welfare issues is supposed to work with the CFTC over trade practices.167 
Although the Act does not specifically deal with m-money consumer issues, 
the general regulatory consumer framework is still sufficient. Specific issues 
touching upon m-money could be part of subsidiary legislation in the form of 
regulations.168 Therefore, the main obstacle towards streamlining the Act to 
regulate m-money as part of consumer protection would be the fact that the 
CPC only exists on paper. The CPC, as a body corporate has its membership 
drawn from representatives of the main stakeholders in consumer welfare 
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issues.169 So ideally, if appointed, it should be an effective council. However, 
may be that would be the reason the CPC has not been appointed. The fact 
that the Act attempts to give it independence may have been its downfall and 
undoing.  
 
Competition and Fair Trading Commission (CFTC) 
Unlike the CPC, the CFTC was constituted and is operational as a body 
corporate.170 Establishing of the CFTC, however, took some 14 years after its 
parent Act was passed.171 The CFTC oversees regulating competition and fair-
trading.172 The CPC and CFTC are supposed to cooperate and coordinate with 
respect to consumer welfare issues, especially where trading practices are 
involved. Therefore, the failure to constitute the CPC affects both the 
consumer protection and fair trading regimes. The CFTC is a vibrant agency 
and has a presence on the internet173 and on social media.174 It uses both 
outlets to issue press releases as well as alert consumers about fair-trading 
and competition issues. 
 
Regarding m-money, the work of the CFTC is crucial in ensuring that there are 
real competition and fair trading practices between the two-major m-money 
operators. The two operate as competitors but in what is effectively a two-
horse race. As was noted earlier, there is already cooperation between the two 
services.175 While cooperation may be useful in growing the service, it is 
important that the CFTC be on its guard against collision and cartel pricing. 
The regulating Act was passed in 1998, and like the Communications Act, it 
was passed at a time when the country was undergoing rapid privatisation and 
deregulation. Unlike the latter, the former has mostly stood the test of time. It 
is therefore submitted that all that would be required is to promulgate 
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regulations dealing with specific services such as m-money as subsidiary 
legislation.176   
 
However, although on paper, the law gives the CFTC independence and 
autonomy, in the few years it has been operational, the CFTC is yet to pass 
the muster. For a start, Government fully funds the CFTC.177 This presents a 
problem where the CFTC must deal with issues where the Government has a 
stake. As was seen in chapter 7, the CFTC had problems enforcing the law 
when the Government sold the MSB Bank and IndeBank. The sale of MSB 
bank was more problematic because it was sold to persons that were deemed 
to be politically connected. Government concluded the sale in a manner, which 
the local press viewed with deep suspicion.178 The CFTC itself did not help 
matters. The law categorically provides for prior approval of mergers and 
takeovers.179 The CFTC only ratified the mergers a year later.180 Therefore, the 
first step in making the CFTC truly independent is to find another way of 
funding of its activities. This can be through industry levies. 
 
8.3.3. Pros and cons of the two options  
So, which option would be the most effective for regulating m-money in 
Malaŵi? Thatcher has argued that whether a country adopts the 
independence agency model or relies on existing regulators depends on 
whether there exist strong and respected regulators in the first place.181  
 
Problems with setting up an agency 
Lessons from the Payments System Act (2016) are that the legislative process 
is not always smooth. This Act took more than a decade to pass. Drafting a 
technical piece of legislation to set up an agency would require special 
expertise and consultation. If this was done, resource and expertise would be 
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the premier hurdle that the agency would face. For example, MACRA is 
principally financed through licence fees.182 MACRA has been able to attain 
some financial independence, although it is still politically vulnerable183 
because the communication sector in Malaŵi has several active players. 
MACRA oversees the postal and courier sectors, the telecommunications 
sector as well as the broadcasting and frequency allocation sector. In contrast, 
the agency would rely only on the m-money issuers. Now, there are only two 
notable issuers. To overcome this, the agency could expand its supervision to 
other remittance service providers and bring in more revenue but this would 
mean going outside its arena into one, which is regulated by the central bank. 
Considering that most remittances service providers are somewhat linked with 
banks, this route may be financially problematic. Without adequate funding, an 
agency cannot discharge its function effectively as an independent 
regulator.184 Therefore, the agency would need to be initially or permanently, 
depending on the model chosen, funded, fully or partially by the state. Would 
this be a solution that would be politically attractive in a country, which is 
already struggling with balancing its national budget following the withdrawal 
of external aid in the form of budgetary support?185 
  
Setting up an independent agency requires a completely new bureaucracy and 
staff contingent to be created which must interact with the central bank and 
other regulators. Short of poaching staff from competitors, this may not be 
easily achievable in the short to medium term. Coupled with the lack of 
financial resources, poaching staff becomes even more difficult. Resource 
availability is crucial for agency operation.186 Regulatory expertise is “often in 
short supply” so the agency needs to be competitive to attract such staff.187 
The other alternative would be to have staff seconded from other regulators or 
the government.188 Whether the agency would be able to compensate such 
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seconded staff or rely on the regulators to pay them would be a key issue. In 
the case of the latter, it would bring in the question of royalty, allegiance, and 
sustainability. Having its own resources would be key to attracting competent 
personnel as part of the agency’s organisational structure.  
 
Another problem with an agency relates capture. Outside the government 
machinery, an agency is more likely to be captured by the industry.189 To avoid 
this, the design of the agency must deliberately put in place ways of minimising 
capture. Transparency in its operations and being accountable to stakeholders 
is one way of doing this. This would also minimise another fear that an 
independent agency can become too powerful and too independent and a law 
unto itself.190 
 
Advantages of an agency 
The strongest argument for a separate agency is that m-money requires a 
different kind of regulation to that which is currently exercised. As it is dealing 
with fast changing technology, it needs a different kind of regulatory expertise. 
The regulation must not only respond and keep up with these changes but 
also do so in real time while taking on board all stakeholder interests. The 
current architecture lacks this flexibility. The second argument is that it is 
dealing with the promotion of FI of people in rural areas. This requires a very 
different type of understanding and expertise. The regulation needs to involve 
the people in villages and the urban poor in the regulation process. 
 
Setting up an independent agency allows the regulatory framework to be 
established from a clean slate and avoid the problems that are affecting other 
regulators. Such an agency would allow the industry to side step any issues 
related to lack of political will or lack of organisational independence. However, 
this does not mean that setting up a separate agency automatically grants it 
independence and political support. The only consolation may be that m-
money, as a service, is not yet politically charged. In fact, looked at as a 
                                                     
189  ibid p87. 
190  ibid. 
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financial service, it may be argued that it is in the interest of the political 
establishment to support it as it is a vehicle towards attaining FI, reducing 
poverty and fostering development. 191  As noted above, such an agency would 
need to cooperate with existing regulators, but the difference would be that all 
regulatory issues surrounding m-money would be under one roof.  
 
The second advantage of an agency is that it would take some burden off the 
RBM. As noted earlier, the RBM, apart from regulating the financial 
services,192 also must fulfil its core duties as a central bank. For the RBM, the 
truth is that m-money is not a priority because of its low value and risk.193 It 
more likely to wean it off on this basis. An agency would with time gain 
specialised expertise in the service and be able to streamline the regulatory 
framework in response to the industry needs. It would be ideally placed to 
implement a really responsive regulatory approach. 
  
As has been noted in the discussion of regulators above and in the last 
chapter, funding is a crucial issue. However self-funding does not in itself 
guarantee independence, as the example of MACRA shows. On the other 
hand, dependency on the government has been seen to affect independence, 
as is the case with the CFTC. All things being equal, having a source of funding 
that is outside the government is preferable to ensure independence. 
However, this exposes the agency to industry capture. To prevent this, the 
agency could expand its work to cover all forms of electronic money (e-money) 
transactions, which are outside the direct supervision of the banking regulator. 
This would avail to the agency a much broader pool of service providers and 
allow it to raise enough funding through the levying of fees.  
 
Another advantage is time. M-money as a service has been in operation for 
just a few years. While it is admitted that the existing regulators have 
developed some level of expertise, the period has not been unduly long to 
disadvantage a newcomer. Since none of the regulators was created with m-
                                                     
191  Chibba (2009) p214-6. 
192 Section 8 Financial Services Act (Malaŵi, 2010). 
193 Di Castri (2013) p25. 
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money in mind, it would be easier for them to cede any regulators powers they 
may have been allotted because of the emergence of this service. The fact 
that the agency would also be cooperating with other existing regulators would 
also allow it to tap on any expertise or skills that may have been internalised 
by these regulators  
 
Problems with maintaining a streamlined status quo 
The main problem with maintaining the status quo is that it perpetuates the 
existing incoherent architecture. The premier problem of not changing the 
regulatory framework would be that the framework is unlikely to cope or ably 
regulate in a post-FI era. With specialisation, divergence rather than 
convergence is likely to be the end product. Figure 15 illustrates the different 
peak levels of these regulators. The RBM is likely to emerge as the only true 
regulator and may have MOUs with the other regulators. This would further 
amplify the problems that the current financial regulatory architecture faces. 
With time, four tiers of regulators would likely emerge: 
a) Tier 1 – RBM 
b) Tier 2 – MACRA  
c) Tier 3 – FIU 
d) Tier 3 – CFTC and CPC 
 
The second issue that may pose a problem would be that regulatory issues of 
m-money are likely to be pushed aside in favour of the core regulatory issues. 
None of the regulators has m-money as its core regulatory issue. It does not 
even feature in any subsidiary legislation. The fact that the RBM is thinking of 
having E-money (not m-money) regulations would indicate the direction that it 
is looking at. For the service itself, maintaining the status quo may have an 
adverse effect on growth. The m-money service has been the case of 
innovation first and regulation later. Comparing the pace of development 
between legislation and the service, it is self-evident that legislation cannot 
keep up with innovation. Two issues immediately arise out of this. The first is 
that the service would promote self-regulation, but based on a model that is 
on the extreme end of the regulatory continuum. The other is that regulation 
would try to keep up by using old technology tools to regulate a fast-moving 
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service. The result would be the stifling of growth of the m-money service, as 
it gets restricted to what the regulation can address. 
 
Advantages of streamlining the status quo 
The current regulatory framework already has several regulators, each 
regulating a specific aspect of the m-money service. Therefore, streamlining 
existing regulators to make them more effective is more economical and easily 
achievable. For a start, it does not require the setting up of a separate agency, 
and the long-drawn out process to enact legislation. As has been noted with 
the case of the CPC, lack of political will can kill off an otherwise good 
legislative intention. Political buy-in into a new regulatory framework cannot be 
guaranteed. In any event, each of the existing regulators is already regulating 
some aspect of the m-money service. Furthermore, the regulators are 
beginning to work and cooperate with each other through MOUs. Therefore, 
dismantling the status quo would mark a loss of any expertise that may have 
been acquired despite the short existence of the m-money service. 
 
Fundamentally, maintaining the existing regulatory framework would also save 
time and cost. While it is appreciated that having multiple regulators presents 
a regulatory dilemma, maintaining the status quo would be the most cost-
effective and least disruptive solution. As was noted in the last chapter, there 
is already a process of reviewing the legislative framework that governs 
operations of MACRA. For the FIU, this review has been completed and there 
is a new Act in place.194 The reviews are meant to streamline their operations 
and make them more effective and respond to 21st century needs.195 While it 
is admitted that this review is not targeted at incorporating the m-money 
service, any issues that the service presents can still be addressed via 
subsidiary legislation. Subsidiary legislation does not have to go through 
Parliament. It is usually presented for ratification. As has been noted, 
Parliament can be a nasty battleground for fighting various political battles.196 
                                                     
194 Financial Crimes Act (Malaŵi, 2017). 
195 Chimbe (Interview, 3 August 2015).  
 Phiri (Interview, 7 August 2015).  
196 The cases of the Anti-Money Launderings Bills for example - Banda (2007). 
 Gwede (2016). 
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M-money is an emerging and evolving service. It is yet unknown what it will 
finally morph into. It has demonstrated great potential not only as a remittance 
service but also as a payment system. So far, the existing regulators have 
been able to manage the growth of the service. In so doing they have been 
able to adapt and keep up with the growth of the service. Therefore, the current 
regulators may be best placed to understand the growth and development 
patterns of the service and to ably respond to it.  
 
Preferable option: an agency within the central bank 
An analysis of the two options above indicates that the agency would be the 
ideal situation. However, the local context of the Malaŵi situation needs to be 
considered. It has already been noted that apart from the RBM and MACRA, 
the other regulators have operational or financial problems. MACRA also has 
serious independence problems. The RBM, which suffers from a lack of true 
independence from a corporate governance perspective, is nonetheless the 
one that would largely be deemed autonomous. So, would a third option that 
benefits from both options be a possible solution? It is submitted that an 
agency within the central bank may just be the solution to this regulatory 
quagmire. However, how would such an agency be structured, and how would 
it fit within the existing structure of the central bank?  
 
The proposal is to set up the agency as an autonomous unit within the central 
bank structure. This would entail that the agency would have its own staff 
allocation and governance structure. It may also be physically located outside 
the RBM offices. Setting up an autonomous agency under the central bank 
structure is not unique. As was discussed in chapter 5, Malswitch was a unit 
that was set up by the RBM to operationalise the inter-bank switch. It is still 
housed in RBM property. Although it operates as a private entity, its 
shareholding capital is Malswitch Trust (94%), RBM (5%) and Government of 
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Malawi (1%).197 Malswitch Trust itself is an entity created by the RBM.198 
Therefore, in the same way that Malswitch was associated with charging with 
operating interbank settlement switch, so would the proposed agency be 
associated with regulating mobile money. While it would report to the central 
bank governance structure, it would be autonomous in its operations. How 
exactly this autonomy would manifest itself would depend on how much power 
the RBM may be willing to cede. Any regulatory powers of the agency would 
be delegated powers, as the RBM remains the sole regulator of the financial 
services.199 
 
The key advantage of this proposal is that it would not require too many 
resources to make it operational. Currently expertise in m-money operation 
seems to be dispersed. The agency would need to attract staff with competent 
skill-sets to complement the skill-sets that are already available within the 
central bank. In Malaŵi, the RBM is still considered an attractive employer, 
both in terms of remuneration and as a vital training ground. An agency within 
the RBM, does not require a buy-in from other sector regulators since, there 
are already MOUs in operation. What would be required is to streamline these 
MOUs so that the agency is the point of contact within the RBM where m-
money regulation is involved. Fundamentally, such an agency would only 
require administrative and organisational changes other than substantive 
legislative changes. Having an agency with a specific focus on m-money 
regulation would also help bring regulatory clarity. It would for instance, 
recognise that m-money is a service in its own right, and can no longer be an 
appendage or riding on the rails of other services. In fact, it may well be, that 
with time, the service may itself become the rails on which other add-on 
services ride on. An agency would therefore be best suited to manage the 
evolution of such a service, as it would pay its undivided attention to it. 
 
                                                     
197  (2015) 'About Malswitch’ (Malswitch Ltd) 
<http://www.malswitch.mw/malswitch/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3
0&Itemid=140>. 14 December 2015. 
198  ibid. 
199 Section 8 Financial Services Act (Malaŵi, 2010). 
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The argument of creating an autonomous agency, even if within the central 
bank structure is that compared to in-house government departments; such 
an agency is generally seen as an improvement.200 This is because an 
autonomous agency usually has clearer mandates, roles and objectives and 
is also subject to much more scrutiny from stakeholders.201 In fact considering 
that normally the central bank operates as a closed entity, having the agency 
as an autonomous unit would allow it to engage stakeholders without the usual 
bureaucracy that the central bank faces. It is argued that unless the agency 
was given this room, it would be almost impossible to implement the really 
responsive regulatory approach. Considering that so far, the m-money 
regulatory framework in Malaŵi has not been in pursuit of a particular theory,202 
an agency would also help in the formulation of a well-defined theory for m-
money regulation.  
 
Setting up an autonomous agency within the RBM would still require some 
extra levels of funding. However, this funding does not have to be sourced 
from the government and risk the agency to state capture. The RBM is by law 
allowed to impose levies on various regulatory services it provides to the 
financial service.203 It is submitted further that instead of just regulating m-
money, the agency could regulate all e-money transactions. The decision by 
the RBM to introduce e-money regulations to repeal m-money guidelines 
indicates the direction that it wishes to proceed. The proposed regulations 
have a provision for levy collection. Instead of the agency, being one that only 
regulates m-money, it could easily expand its area of operation and regulate 
the whole arena of remittances that are done outside the banking framework. 
The World Bank has put forward the proposal of a single regulatory framework 
to combine remittances and mobile payments.204 The argument is that the 
                                                     
200 Quintyn and Taylor (2002) p3,5. 
201 ibid. 
202 Chimbe (Interview, 3 August 2015).   
 RBM Headquarters (Interview, 6 August 2015).  
 Phiri (Interview, 7 August 2015).  
 RBM MicroFinance Division (Interview, 19 August 2015).  
203 Section 13 Financial Services Act (Malaŵi, 2010). 
204 Massimo  Cirasino and Mariachiara  Malaguti (2012) From Remittances to M-Payments: 
Understanding “Alternative” Means of Payment within the Common Framework of Retail 
Payments System Regulation (Financial Infrastrucre Series, The World Bank) p17 
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risks that both raise are similar and would be addressed under the same 
framework.205 The World Bank argues that this approach is preferable 
because: 
a) It is much more efficient as it reduces “un-justifiable rents in some parts 
of the value chain” and ensures that benefits accrue to the end-users. 
b) It minimises distortion of competition by laying down a level playing field 
c) There is a uniform approached for consumer protection and regulation 
is based on risk-based assessment 
d) It empowers the agency as it has powers to supervise an entire 
payment system.206 
 
8.4. Conclusion 
The regulatory framework in Malaŵi has not followed any laid down theory but 
command-and-control seems the prevalent regulatory approach. Light-touch 
is one most associated with m-money. There are notable shifts towards 
elements of self-regulation based on responsive regulation.  However, without 
a theoretical framework, the shift comes through as having no structural basis. 
Continuing with the status quo would mean that the regulatory framework 
continues to evolve without a structured underlying theoretical basis. 
Formulation of a coherent theory may therefore be the next plan of action in 
the regulatory evolution. One crucial pre-condition that comes out in this 
chapter is that before any regulatory framework can be proposed, it is 
important to delimit the regulatory space arena. In this regard, the regulatory 
issues, which define the regulatory space, are crucial. Which actors and 
participants to keep in and which ones to keep out becomes the challenge. 
However, the task can be depoliticised if the m-money ecosystem is used as 
the analytical framework. A coherent regulatory theory would help in getting 
the various actors on board and ensuring that they all have the same 
regulatory approach. Really responsive regulation is the approach that would 
be best suited to regulate m-money in the post FI phase. The approach not 
                                                     
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTPAYMENTREMMITTANCE/Resources/WB2012
_Mobile_Payments.pdf>. 20 February 2017. 
205 Ibid. 
206 Ibid p18-20. 
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only considers the roles of the regulator and regulatees, but also considers all 
the stakeholder interests within the regulatory arena. 
 
This chapter has outlined two possible regulatory options as solutions to the 
existing incoherent structure, but proposes a third one having advantages of 
each of the two options as one that leads to an effective regulatory framework. 
Establishing an autonomous agency within the central bank to coordinate all 
the regulatory issues of m-money would require a paradigm shift and different 
regulatory approach. However, this must be done if the m-money is to grow 
into a service with established and clear rules of operation. Continuing with the 
status quo, it is submitted is likely to prove frustrating for all parties involved. 
It may appear to be the easier and less stressful route, but is hardly the most 
effective one in the end. The proposal to have an autonomous agency is not 
only one to bring clarity to the regulatory arena but also begin the conversation 
of having a defining regulatory theory of m-money in Malaŵi. Changing from 
the status quo and moving into a new direction is bound to have its challenges. 
However, this chapter has argued that these challenges can be overcome. So, 
what does the future hold for m-money service? Well, the truth is that no one 
really knows. However, having a coherent regulatory framework is a step 
towards a brighter future.  
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9. CONCLUSIONS 
9.1. Introduction 
Mobile money (m-money) has a fertile ground in Africa because of the 
logistical challenges that the continent faces. Despite most of its population 
being financially excluded, there is migration of labour from the rural areas and 
these migrants need to regularly remit money home.1 M-money, for now has 
proved to be the most cost-effective and convenient service of meeting this 
need. Through m-money, millions of Africans are slowly but surely moving 
from a cash-only economy towards one that is linked to the formal system.2 
Furthermore, its ability to operate independently and outside the banking 
system has given it a unique advantage.3 Another advantage is that with m-
money, processes are instantaneous, offering real time settlement. 4 
Compared to the banking system which typically takes a days to clear an 
instrument, m-money offers real time settlement. 
 
As it stands, the regulation of m-money is in a state of flux. The pre-FI phase 
has shown that the unique and distinctive characteristics of m-money have not 
been fully appreciated by the regulator(s).5 M-money is still largely regulated 
first and foremost as a financial service and then secondly as a 
telecommunication service. Two separate regulators look at these services. 
While other regulators such as the Financial Intelligence Unit, Competitions 
and Fair Trading Commission and Consumer Protection Council are ancillary 
to the regulation of m-money, they nevertheless play a vital role. While the 
communication and financial regulation are characterised by command-and-
control, m-money is largely regulated through the light-touch approach.6 
However, for how long can this be sustained? What happens when m-money 
becomes fully integrated into the national payment system? How sustainable 
                                                     
1  Heyer and Mas (2009) p18. 
2  Di Castri (2013) p34. 
3  Klein and Mayer (2011) p27. 
4  ibid p14. 
5  Di Castri (2013) p34. 
6  Skinner (2015). 
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would a divergent approach be? Reforms in both the telecommunications and 
financial sector indicate a shift towards a responsive regulatory approach.7 
 
How can one sum up m-money? From a function viewpoint, it can be said that 
m-money is a financial service comprising a payment system and a remittance 
service. It is based on a telecommunications network but it is not a 
telecommunications service. It targets the unbanked and people in rural areas 
who require consumer protection. It currently poses a low systemic risk but 
requires fairness in the business conduct of the m-money issuers. All these 
elements present different regulatory issues and challenges. This thesis has 
advocated for a convergent framework based on elements of self-regulation. 
It is convergent because it aims to bring in both elements of 
telecommunications and financial regulation. In such an approach, really 
responsive regulation seems to be the most preferable. Having analysed 
available options for regulation of m-money in a post-FI phase, the preference 
has been to set up an autonomous agency, which should not only regulate m-
money but also other non-bank remittances. Establishing such an agency has 
its challenges. This concluding chapter therefore looks at these challenges as 
well as some of the regulator issues that a post-FI phase may pose on m-
money.  
 
9.2. Challenges of setting up an autonomous agency  
The thesis has advocated for an autonomous agency to supervise not only m-
money but all non-bank based remittances. Fears of such an agency 
becoming too independent and too powerful are real. However, this can be 
mitigated by including in the design of the regulatory framework express 
provisions of transparency and accountability.8 The biggest problem in setting 
up the agency would be in having the other regulators cede their power. The 
Reserve Bank of Malaŵi (RBM) has been the main financial regulator since 
the country’s independence.9 Although there have been changes in the law 
                                                     
7  Chimbe (Interview, 3 August 2015).  
 RBM Headquarters (Interview, 6 August 2015).  
8  Quintyn and Taylor (2002) p29. 
9  Section 4(h) Financial Crimes Act (Malaŵi, 2017). 
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over time, the end-effect has been the consolidation of regulatory authority in 
the RBM and its Governor. Although m-money and non-bank remittances are 
not core banking businesses, allowing a third party to supervise these would 
be a challenge that would need to be overcome. The biggest incentive which 
would allow the RBM to cede these powers is that it is already overburdened. 
 
The same problem would also arise from the Malaŵi Communications 
Regulatory Authority (MACRA). Unlike the RBM, MACRA is highly politicised. 
As such, any decision would not only be subject to policy considerations, but 
may be subject to partisan political interests as well. It may well be that in such 
a case; it would all come down to the question of money. MACRA is perceived 
to be a ‘cash-cow’ for politicians who are in Government.10 If detaching the m-
money component would mean the loss of revenue, this may be resisted. 
However, if the parent telecommunication operators were still within the 
clutches of MACRA, it may be possible to let go. It is submitted that so far, it 
is the telecommunications sector that provides the major source of funding to 
MACRA. Therefore, there may be hope yet. 
 
Another issue that would need to be addressed is that raised in the previous 
chapter, lack of enforcement mechanisms. This may require legislative 
amendments if the agency were to be given prosecutorial powers. Alternatively 
the agency could establish MOUs with prosecuting agencies. However, where 
enforcement does not require use of penal law, this may be achieved either 
through administrative arrangements or through subsidiary legislation. 
Ensuring that the agency has powers to enforce its regulations is therefore of 
paramount importance. 
 
Resources would also be a challenge. However, a financing model based on 
MACRA or The Technical, Entrepreneurial and Vocational Education and 
Training Authority (TEVETA)11 models could be a solution. TEVETA, like 
                                                     
10  James Nthondo (2016) ‘Exclusive: New Cashgate in Malawi, how Macra funds are 
abused’ Nyasa Times (12 September 2016) <http://www.nyasatimes.com/exclusive-new-
cashgate-malawi-macra-funds-abused/#sthash.efL9KDSw.dpuf>. 27 February 2017. 
11  Established under the Technical, Entrepreneurial and Vocational Education and Training 
Act, 1999 (Act No. 6 of 1999). 
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MACRA, relies on levies to fund its operations without resorting to state 
support. It regulates quality technical, entrepreneurial, and vocational 
education and training.12 Apart from running the agency, the levy funds 
industry training programmes.13 One way of broadening the revenue stream 
would be to allow greater competition and attract new players into the market. 
The major problem with the m-money service is that it rides on the 
telecommunication backbone, and already the two dominant mobile network 
operators (MNOs) have a service each. Non-bank remittances are however 
broader and can use any telecommunication platform. 
 
As the proposal situates the agency within the central bank, the agency may 
have access to ‘seed’ funds to start operations from the bank. Since setting it 
up only requires administrative changes, legislative bottlenecks may be 
avoided. An agency within the central bank is best suited to handle any risk 
posed should m-mobile become systemically important. Establishing the 
agency would not mean the solution to all regulation issues and problems. 
New and emerging issues would still need to be resolved. However, it is 
submitted, an autonomous agency is best suited to address these challenges 
than remaining with the status-quo. The agency would also take an active role 
in shaping the legal framework affecting m-money. The next section highlights 
some regulatory issues the post-FI phase may face. 
 
 
9.3. Post-financial inclusion regulatory issues 
9.3.1. Network and service interoperability 
The challenge is whether to force interoperability and interconnectivity through 
regulation or allow the market to define itself. 14 Interoperability, if it can be 
achieved, has a way of reducing costs as well as broadening the payment 
system platform. As was noted in chapter 5, the RBM through the Mobile 
                                                     
12  TEVETA (2017) 'About Us’ (Technical, Entrepreneurial and Vocational Education and 
Training (TEVET) Authority) <http://www.teveta.mw/index.php/about-us>. 27 February 
2017. 
13  Jabulani Kamngoya (2015) 'Teveta to Harmonise Vocational Curricula and Certification’ 
(1 June 2015) <http://allafrica.com/stories/201506011690.html>. 27 February 2017. 
14  Klein and Mayer (2011) p22. 
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Payment Systems Guidelines (2011) has encouraged this. It is submitted that 
more can be done so that instead of just being an encouragement, it becomes 
a regulatory standard, which can be enforced. This is on two levels: network 
interoperability and m-money service interoperability. For the former it requires 
a regulatory regime that makes it easy for customers to change networks while 
keeping their own numbers. Currently in Malaŵi, the two major mobile network 
operators (MNOs) do not allow customers to retain their numbers. Airtel has 
numbers that are unique in that they start with 09XXX while TNM has numbers 
that start with 08XXX.15 In contrast, in the UK, one can change networks while 
keeping their number.16  There are no plans by either network to change the 
status quo.17 It would therefore fall upon the communications regulator to 
impose any interoperability rules. Interoperability between issuers should be 
encouraged.18 For now, the regulator is keener to have a technology-neutral 
network than to implement such an interoperable regime.19 Such standards 
would mainly focus on ensuring that the service operates on a single protocol 
for communication, authentication, and verification.20 It is important however 
to ensure that any imposition of interoperability rules does not lead to high 
costs and disinvestment.21 
 
M-money interoperability would mean users of either Airtel Money or Mpamba 
transact as if they were using one service. The regulator could come up with 
“wallet-to-wallet” regulations, which would allow seamless transfers and 
transactions between wallets of either m-money service.22 The problem with 
this is that m-money is not a stand-alone service; it rides on the rail of the 
telecommunication service.23 This would not only require the interoperability 
of the bedrock service, but also uniformity in the pricing structure of not only 
                                                     
15  The author’s experience in Malaŵi.   
16  The author’s experience is that he was able to change 3 different networks while 
retaining his number. This meant he was not locked-in by one telco based on the 
telephone number.  
17  Mkoloma (Interview, 7 August 2015).  
 Mbekeani (Interview, 20 August 2015).  
18  Porteous (2006) p48. 
19  Chimbe (Interview, 3 August 2015).  
20  Klein and Mayer (2011) p22. 
21  ibid p26. 
22  Di Castri (2013) p32. 
23  Maurer (2011). 
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the m-money service, but the data charges of the telecommunication service 
as well. Another option would be for the regulator to develop a revenue 
distribution formula. But this is not as simple as it sounds. Litigation, which the 
two MNOs undertook against MACRA regarding the latter’s decision to 
implement a sender-keep-all (SKA) regime and cap interconnection charges 
is a case in point. The matter having started in 2010 was only decided by the 
Supreme Court in 2015.24 Interoperability would also require that MNOs and 
m-money issuers harmonise their ‘know your customer’ (KYC) requirements.25 
The Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU)26 as the local body mandated to 
implement the Financial Action task Force (FATF) Recommendations could 
help in formulating such rules bearing in mind the low risk posed by m-
money.27 A mandatory scheme for compulsory registration of mobile numbers, 
as is the case of RICA in South Africa,28 could help. The implementation of the 
national identification project that Malaŵi is currently undertaking29 is another 
tool for ensuring that once a customer satisfies the KYC test, there is really no 
reason they cannot take their number across networks. 
 
9.3.2. Allowing competition 
Another regulatory issue that is related to the issue of interoperability is the 
question of consumer lock-in. Competition naturally enhances efficiency 
among market participants.30 This is not only a competition but also a 
consumer protection issue. While the m-money services are growing, and 
recruiting, this may not be a problem. However, after they have attained their 
optimal levels, the services providers may resort to tendencies that lock-in their 
customer bases.31 The regulators overseeing consumer protection and 
                                                     
24  The State v Malaŵi Communications Regulatory Authority (MACRA) Ex Parte TNM and 
Airtel, Misc. Civil Cause No. 4 of 2010. 
 Chikondi Chiyembekeza (2015) ‘Court rbuffs TNM, Airtel over MACRA decision’ The 
Nation (1 April 2015) <http://mwnation.com/court-rebuffs-tnm-airtel-over-macra-
decision/>. 22 February 2017.   
25  Di Castri (2013) p32. 
26  The Financial Intelligence Authority (FIA) from February 2017. 
27  Interpretive Note to recommendation 10 (Customer Due Diligence) para 16: FATF (2012) 
p65. 
28  Jentzsch (2012) p611. 
29  Malaŵi Government (2015). 
30  Herring and Santomero (2000) p56. 
31  Porteous (2006) p35. 
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competition may therefore need to provide oversight to prevent this. Where 
there is an autonomous agency as proposed, collaboration with these 
regulators would be key. Arguably, the MNOs need to recover their investment 
but this must be balanced against consumer exploitation. Locking out not only 
affects consumers but also prevents new entrants. 32 Freedom of choice as 
well as the ability to change networks without great economic cost or loss is 
one way of preventing ensuring anti-competitive behaviour.33 Allowing 
competition also means dealing with arrangements where m-money issuers 
enter exclusive arrangements with third parties.34 While such arrangements 
may be vital at the initial stage, they may prevent other newcomers to establish 
networks. It also leads to limited consumer choice.35 It further makes it difficult 
for newcomers to break into the market. The m-money issuer that had the first-
mover advantage, if allowed to maintain third party exclusivity can easily 
dominate and monopolise the market.36   
 
9.3.3. Collaboration  
Collaboration between m-money issuers and other stakeholders within and 
outside the m-money ecosystem is vital for the growth of the service. Airtel 
Money has collaborated with FDH Bank to start offering cross-border 
remittance services.37 Both issuers are also looking at products that may link 
m-money to provisions of micro-finance loans.38 In Kenya, M-Pesa teamed up 
with Equity Bank to provide a new product called M-Kesho.39 M-Kesho allows 
payment of interest on saving accounts and provision of loans. M-Pesa is the 
channel through which the payments are made.40 Mas referred to this 
collaboration as a “holy alliance.”41 M-Kesho not only allows the payment of 
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34  Di Castri (2013) p28. 
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38  ibid. 
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interest but also interoperability between M-Kesho and M-Pesa accounts.42 
The collaboration was launched as an exclusive one in 2010 and was 
supposed to last for a year.43 Seven years on, the marriage is still on.44 Apart 
from M-Kesho, other products that have been launched in the footsteps of M-
Pesa are: 
 M-Shwari: like M-Kesho, offered in collaboration with the Commercial 
bank of Kenya.45 
 M-Hela: an international remittance service for Kenyans living in Europe 
to send money home to either M-Pesa or Airtel Money accounts.46 
 M-Paisa: launched in Afghanistan. It allows users to receive 
remittances from Western Union globally. 47 In line with the Afghan 
market its market slogan is: ‘It’s Mobile Hawala.’ 48  
 Orange Money which is a collaboration between Equity Bank and the 
MNO Orange, allowing customers to access their bank using the mobile 
phone platform.49 
 Agreement between Airtel Money and Equity bank to allow customers 
who own both accounts to transact between accounts and withdraw 
cash at Equity bank’s ATMs.50  
 
It would seem that both Mpamba and Airtel Money are planning to go a similar 
route of collaborating with banks and other remittance services.51 
                                                     
42  Robert Cull (2010) 'M-PESA: Mobile Payments, Improved Lives for Kenyans’ (The World 
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Collaboration is essential because m-money based on the telco model are 
precluded from intermediating on their funds.52 This would be a better 
approach than competing with banks. However, as Mpamba’s Mbekeani said, 
there needs to be innovation on both sides to maximise on the opportunity that 
both services provide instead of competing. 53 In summing up the regulatory 
dilemma, that has faced m-money, Hayat says, 
Mobile payments [are not] a turf war between the financial and 
telecommunication sectors but as a complement to existing financial 
services. [MNOs] have in a very short span of time reached all parts 
of the countries they operate in, established strong nationwide 
distribution systems, and excelled in handling micro-payments 
worth millions…. In mobile payments, the question is not who is 
keeping the money but who is dealing with the customer... The 
choice is between taking the customer to the bank … or taking the 
bank counter to the customer, wherever he is.54 
 
That there is a turf war is a fact. The resistance that Airtel had from the banks 
to introduce an m-money is a testimony to this.55 However, should there be 
really a war? As Sultana says, maybe it is time banks got “back to basics and 
focus on making money through financial intermediation rather than through 
transaction fees.”56 This demarcation would be a huge step in diffusing tension 
between m-money, which is essentially transaction based and banking. It 
would also clear the way for smoother collaboration between the m-money 
and banking services. The underlying phenomena behind m-money is that of 
money and digital communications convergence. On the other hand, for most 
jurisdictions, including Malaŵi, regulation of banking, payments and 
telecommunications is done on a stand-alone basis.57 While traditional 
banking is premised on the customer coming to the bank, m-money has been 
                                                     
52  Di Castri (2013) p15. 
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emphatic that its approach is to take the service to the customer, and the 
mobile phone is the ideal conduit for achieving this. However, it would be 
foolhardy to ignore the real fears that bank regulators have regarding m-money 
and any regulatory framework must address such fears.58 Consumer 
protection, financial stability and integrity are therefore key regulatory 
cornerstones to be considered when collaborating.59  
 
9.3.4. Paying interest on m-money accounts? 
The creation of products like M-Kesho and M-Shwari indicate that m-money 
issuers realise that providing a return on savings may be one way of ensuring 
the survival of the m-money service.60 Currently m-money has the capacity of 
offering savings products and interest in collaboration with other products, but 
the crucial question is why m-money should not be allowed to go it alone.61 In 
any event, the pool fund already earns interest which is required to be given 
to charity.62 Why can the m-money customers not earn this interest instead? 63 
Tarazi and Breloff outline their argument: 
Regulatory authorities consider … interest a feature of a bank 
deposit and consequently ban interest payments on e-money in an 
effort to clearly delineate between banking activity and payment 
services. However, this distinction … is of questionable legal merit... 
Collecting repayable funds from the general public is arguably a 
“deposit” regardless of [who collects it]. As e-money is increasingly 
used as a savings vehicle, and as there is evidence that customers 
desire to earn interest, regulators may be forced to re-evaluate 
perceived risks and reconsider permitting nonbank e-money issuers 
to pay interest earned on pooled accounts.64 
 
Ehrbeck and Tarazi and argue that paying interest has the following benefits: 
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 Encourages savings and instils (in low-income earners) a sense of time 
value for money; 
 Allows low-income earners to earn a return on their investment; 
 Acts as an incentive for more low-income earners to enter the formal 
economy thereby proving a means to monitor transactions.65 
 
Instituting an interest-paying regime would however, be a novel thing as 
currently there is no jurisdiction where this is done.66 Interest is only payable 
where m-money collaborates with another product, typically a bank deposit or 
savings schemes, such as M-Kesho or M-Shwari. If m-money issuers started 
paying interest, would this not bring them under the more onerous 
requirements of prudential regulation? On the face of it, it may. Would the fact 
that m-money is mainly used for the retail payments negate such a need? 
Considering that pooled accounts are a deliberate device to protect liquidity of 
m-money, it would be argued that is the higher aim, which should offset any 
need to pay interest to individual customers. This is an issue, which obviously 
needs more research.  
 
9.3.5. Scaling up  
The m-money service is currently in its growing phase. However, there will 
come a time when it reaches saturation. The next phase of m-money evolution 
needs to be planned. For a start, the service needs to be more competitive by 
reducing transaction costs.67 This could be achieved through scaling up and 
diversification.68 In Kenya for example, m-money has long been used to pay 
school fees and therefore positively contribute to reducing illiteracy.69 Since 
schools are not restricted to rural areas, Heyer and Mas argue that:  
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[This] reverses the flow of money, from rural households to 
dependents in larger urban centres. Young people may be schooled 
away from home due to a lack of schools in rural areas or due to 
the better quality of educational choices available in larger towns.70 
 
Another opportunity lies in cross-border remittances. The African labour 
market is full of examples of migrant labour and if m-money issuers were to 
collaborate and facilitate such remittance, it would result in a win-win situation. 
It provides a lucrative market to m-money issuers and an important facility to 
the customers.71 Africa already has a group of multinational MNOs who could 
easily facilitate this, such as MTN, Orange, Orascom and Airtel.72 As noted 
earlier, Airtel Money is already offering cross-border remittance but this is 
restricted to Airtel Money customers.73 Mpamba has collaborated with Mukuru, 
an international remittance service with a strong presence in Africa to do the 
same.74 Currently the service is restricted to inward remittances from South 
Africa with prospects of expansion to the UK and Europe.75 The service also 
allows users to invest funds remitted through Mukuru in Old Mutual, an 
international investment and pension house with a local presence in Malaŵi 
through a spin-off service called Mpamba Fesa.76 It would therefore seem that 
although FI has not been attained, the m-money issuers are already planning 
for the next stage in the evolution of the service. The lessons of M-Pesa seem 
to have been embraced even as that service evolves. However, has regulation 
moved at the same pace? It is submitted that the regulatory framework is still 
stuck in the pre-FI phase. Moving towards the next phase, the framework will 
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need to learn quickly and move on. As is discussed in 9.3.10 below, the 
regulatory cycle cannot remain static. 
 
9.3.6. Evolution of telecommunication operators 
Thirty years ago, the mobile phone did not even exist. Today it is ubiquitous. 
With it has come add-on services such as data communication, which has 
enabled the short messaging service (SMS), and m-money services, among 
others. However, who knows where the evolution will next head to? What is to 
stop an MNO from buying a bank or some other business and changing the 
business platform from which it operates? The change of the risk profile of 
MNOs is an issue that regulators need to consider in the future.77 This change 
would not only affect the communications regulator but the financial regulator 
as well. It may also affect competition should it involve mergers and 
acquisitions or display anti-competitive tendencies. This may require 
regulators to either delineate boundaries or expand their own boundaries to 
accommodate changes.78 Currently m-money may not be systemically 
important yet, but may become so in future. If m-money were to gain traction 
it might change, the way people pay for their goods and services thereby 
affecting how the current national payment system operates.79 
 
9.3.7. Government, institutional and bill payments 
As Airtel Money’s Mkoloma observed, m-money is uniquely placed to facilitate 
Government payments to sectors such as teachers, pensioners, chiefs and 
other employees who are either living in rural areas or are far from traditional 
banking facilities.80 Overcoming Government resistance is therefore a key tool 
to not only unlock the potential of m-money but also to avail to the affected 
employees with more disposable income accrued from the reduced costs of 
m- money.81 The reason why Government involvement would expand the m-
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money base is that the Government plays a pivotal and central role not only in 
procurement but also as a major employer.82 
 
Among the middle-income earners, m-money has been embraced more for 
the convenience it offers in bill payments other than remittances.83 However, 
unlike in Kenya where this has gained traction with the Kenya Revenue 
Authority embracing m-money payments for tax purposes, in Malaŵi using m-
money to pay bills still has some ground to cover.84 Currently only the major 
utility service providers are linked to m-money.85 Both issuers have however, 
been active in getting on board merchants and vendors to link them up to their 
customers. Hopefully the passing of the Payments Systems Act (2016) can 
facilitate m-money payments over a wider coverage.86 Heyer and Mas say, 
apart from bill payment, attracting “large-scale institutional payments may also 
comprise significant markets.”87 Considering that M-Pesa was initially 
launched as a microfinance loan repayment scheme,88 this could be revisited 
and expanded to include such regular payments as micro-insurance 
premiums.89 Adapting the m-money platform to interlink with other services 
may require a much more sophisticated ICT infrastructure on the part of such 
third parties, something that cannot be taken for granted.90 Heyer and Mas 
argue that in order to attract government and bill payments, there need to be 
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interoperability of m-money systems nationwide, as there may be resistance if 
the payment channels are fragmented.91 
 
9.3.8. Readiness of individual districts to the service 
So far, most literature has looked at m-money in terms of country readiness,92 
but not much has been done about how m-money has spread within countries 
and the readiness of districts to the service. National statistics are important 
but do not tell the whole story. The next frontier of research requires mapping 
the geographical spread of m-money. For example, within the country, is m-
money more prevalent in some districts compared to others? Is it more 
prevalent among a certain age group or gender? Does it have anything to do 
with district literacy and financial literacy levels? As was noted in chapter 4, 
although Airtel has a slight edge of the market share over TNM, this is not 
evenly spread across the country’s three regions. TNM leads Airtel in the North 
and the South but Airtel trumps TNM in the Central Region.93 But what about 
the districts within these regions?   
 
Research also needs to look at how distributed the telecommunication network 
is and whether this has a bearing on the subscriber base. A study of the 
ecosystems within the district would also be instructive in analysing and 
understanding why m-money may have grown faster or gained traction in 
some districts compared to others.  Although there is migrant labour prevalent 
in the country, is there uniformity among all the rural people who have trekked 
to towns to look for work? Of course, when looking at districts, factors such as 
rural, urban, and peri-urban need to be considered. However, just like Kibera 
in Nairobi, Kenya, Malaŵi also has its ghetto suburbs on the outskirts of most 
cities, which are overpopulated but lack basic services. Most people who 
migrate from rural areas target these as the first step of their migrant life, and 
most never leave them. Researching the impact of m-money within districts 
may therefore reveal more about the adoption patterns.  
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9.3.9. Insurance protection 
Since m-money is not a banking service, the lender of last resort (LOLR) 
facility as a safety net does not extend to it. Campbell and Lastra define the 
safety net as a mixture of several instruments such as a “regulatory framework, 
a deposit protection system, bank insolvency laws and [an LOLR] role by the 
central bank.” 94 Of course, the term safety net in its strictest use refers to those 
institutions, which are susceptible to contagion,95 most notably banks.96 Other 
schemes to protect consumers therefore need to be put in place. Insurance 
protection is one such scheme.97 While such a scheme is ideal, the question 
of who funds it is vital.98 The follow-up question is who bears the cost of setting 
it up and who runs it.99 It must be pointed out, that no known insurance scheme 
provides 100% coverage of deposits.100 Secondly, there is no assurance that 
such a scheme would prevent a bank run.101 Running the bank well from both 
a prudential and conduct perspective remains the best way to appease 
customers. There are two forms of deposit insurance schemes (DIS), the 
implicit one, which is discretionary, and the explicit one, which specifies 
whether participation is discretionary or mandatory.102 When used, DIS refers 
to the explicit one. In summary under the DIS, should there be a bank failure, 
depositors are assured of receiving at least a certain minimum value of their 
money which has been insured.103 A DIS shat can quickly reimburse 
depositors is likely to gain credibility.104 But on what basis is insurance 
extended to customers? After all, bank customers do not own the deposits in 
                                                     
94  Campbell and Lastra (2009) p454. 
95  Schooner and Taylor (2010) p52. 
 Herring and Santomero (2000) p62. 
96  Campbell and Lastra (2009) p462. They argue that the extension of liquidity to non-bank 
institutions on the US has tested this conventional wisdom. 
 See also Polizatto (1992) p296. 
97  Di Castri (2013) p29. 
98 Di Castri (2013),p29. 
99 Samuel H. Talley and Ignacio Mas (1992) 'Prudential regulation and Banking Supervision’ 
in Dimitri Vittas (ed) Financial Regulation: Changing the Rules of the Game (The World 
Bank, Washington DC) p340. 
100 Ibid p325. 
101 Andrew Campbell and others (2009) ‘A new standard for deposit insurance and 
government guarantees after the crisis’ Journal of Financial Regulation and Compliance 
Vol. 17(3) 210 p210 <http://dx.doi.org/10.1108/13581980910972214>. 20 February 2017. 
 See also Herring and Santomero (2000) p62. 
102 Talley and Mas (1992) p323-4. 
103 Schooner and Taylor (2010) p57. 
104 Campbell and others (2009) p215. 
- 296 - 
 
the strictest sense. In fact, the relationship is more of a debtor and creditor.105 
In Foley v Hill, it was held that: 
Money, when paid into a bank, ceases altogether to be the money 
of the principal …  it is then the money of the banker, who is bound 
to return an equivalent by paying a similar sum to that deposited 
with him when he is asked for it.106  
 
It can therefore, be said that the DIS helps to reassure customers that they will 
be paid (subject to any maximum set) which, when it works, can help prevent 
or at least contain a financial crisis. The same concept can be extended to m-
money. The fact that customers have exchanged their cash with m-money, 
means they may have a claim to redeem their cash but they cannot lay a claim 
to the deposits in the pool account. That said, although cash exchanged with 
m-money is not deposits in the banking sense, it is submitted the scheme 
could still be tweaked to produce the same effect. The relationship between 
the m-money customer and the MNO is similarly akin to one of creditor and 
debtor. 
 
The concept of the DIS started in the United States (US). The Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is the oldest DIS to date.107 Most developed 
economies now have a DIS in place.108 The UK has a slightly different model 
using what is termed the ‘paybox’ scheme.109 Under the UK model, 
participating firms pay in premiums to the Financial Services Compensation 
Scheme (FSCS).110 The FCSC compensates those eligible in the event of a 
winding-up or bank failure.111 Di Castri says DIS has been successfully 
extended to m-money in the US.112 Tarazi and Breloff have also argued for an 
extension of the DIS to individual m-money customers.113 This involves placing 
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the m-money into a deposit scheme.114 For deposits in the trust fund, the DIS 
protection passes through to each customer up to a set limit.115 In the case of 
Malaŵi, such an extension may not be possible because there is no DIS in 
place. However, the RBM is in the process of introducing such a scheme.116 
The RBM is overseeing the drafting of a bill to set up a deposit insurance 
corporation.117 Campbell et al have argued that, 
[A] separate, operationally independent, and accountable deposit 
insurance entity … may be the best practice model available to 
provide: 
- the most effective incentives for the control of moral hazard 
affecting a deposit insurer 
- the greatest protection of the interests of depositors 
- more balanced and effective decision making; and 
- the promotion of more extensive monitoring of potential 
conflicts.118   
 
In setting up the DIS, it would be recommended that the RBM consider making 
it an autonomous entity within the above framework. However, it must be 
pointed out, that the scheme being designed by the RBM would only apply to 
bank deposits.119 No thought has yet been made of extending it to m-money. 
Application of the DIS to m-money may therefore be a long way off. It is also 
recommended that the country immediately joins the International Association 
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of Deposit Insurers (IADI), as an associate and become a full member once 
the DIS has been launched.120 
 
9.3.10. Continuous monitoring of the regulatory cycle 
Developing a regulatory framework is not an end in itself. Porteous has 
proposed a phased approach to regulation. Starting with a pioneer phase 
which involves monitoring and engaging and developing a roadmap, a 
breakout phase, which is also facilitation and coordination phase.121 Next is 
the consolidation phase where the regulator can now start supervising.122 
When the service has attained maturity, the regulator needs to ensure that 
there is an ongoing competition.123 Monitoring the outcomes based on the 
regulatory objectives is therefore important.124 Ogus argues that regulation is 
dynamic and good regulatory design needs to feed off the “behavioural 
responses to regulatory obligations” of the regulatees.”125 Looked at this way, 
regulation is a process of continuous evolution. The regulatory outcomes 
operate as inputs, which are then monitored to see if they are being achieved. 
Where there is an achievement, they become the basis of best practices. 
Where they are not achieved, the regulatory framework is re-examined and 
reconfigured to see if it can achieve different outcomes. This could result in 
changes in the environment or the outcomes themselves. The figure below 
illustrates this regulatory cycle. 
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Figure 18: Regulatory cycle  
 
9.4. Conclusion 
To conclude, certain things can be said about m-money and how it has 
developed since its inception. It is an emerging form of money and with time 
may evolve further depending on use and the channels that are used for its 
distribution. For now, it is considered of low systemic risk because it is fully 
backed up by funds deposited in a pool account. Will m-money continue to 
pose a low risk to the financial system or will it explode to something, which 
the regulator must pay special attention to? The quest is to achieve FI, but 
what happens when it has been fully achieved? What next can m-money 
become? As a payment system, can it start to challenge the banking payment 
system? With growth in pool funds, is there a need for regulatory requirements 
for m-money issuers to diversify where their accounts are domiciled as one 
way of minimising risk?126 There is already a requirement to isolate the pool 
funds from the MNO accounts by creating a ring-fence. Should this be a double 
                                                     
126 Tarazi and Breloff (2010) p6. 
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ring-fence, which further isolates the trust fund from the other deposits? The 
only problem with this would be that it would limit the ability of the bank to 
intermediate. It may also mean that instead of the fund making a profit through 
earned interest, the bank may need to be paid as a fund manager.  
 
Although the concept of earning interest looks attractive, the chances are m-
money will not earn interest any time soon. The pool account however 
continues to earn interest and with time, the regulator may need to look at how 
the trustees are using this interest. As a payment system, m-money can 
operate outside the banking system and has the advantage of the 
instantaneous settling of obligations. Increasingly, however, m-money and its 
ecosystem are being embraced by national payment systems and the more 
there is a convergence of these systems, the more the regulations tools of m-
money may need to be revisited. For now, most jurisdictions have adopted the 
light-touch approach regarding m-money. This thesis argues that this may be 
acceptable, and encouraged at this phase where FI is a target. Once FI has 
been attained, and m-money is in the post-financial inclusion era, a different 
regulatory approach would have to be adopted. This thesis advances the 
concept of really responsive regulation as the ideal approach to regulating a 
complex service such as mobile money, which is in a constant state of 
evolution. It embraces the transition from light-touch to a self-regulatory 
framework based on the collaboration of all stakeholders. In terms of 
operation, m-money rides on the rails of the telecommunication backbone and 
is likely to do so as long as it retains the core of its current form and nature. 
Regulation needs to embrace and respond to this reality. 
 
Regarding regulatory models, the thesis has considered either staying with the 
status quo with some changes or adopting the independent agency model. 
The agency model has obviously been preferred. It has its challenges, but 
these challenges can be overcome. Currently m-money is not considered 
systemically important and this may affect how regulators and politicians may 
view the proposal to have an autonomous agency. For now, what can be said 
is that with technology developments, m-money will continue to evolve and 
may pose new regulatory challenges with such evolution. This concluding 
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chapter has highlighted some of the issues that may form the next m-money 
regulatory debate and research. For now, there is need to ensure that 
regulation does not stifle innovation. But this is not enough. As noted by 
Mkoloma, in Malaŵi, the government is a key player in the employment sector. 
So far, it has not joined the m-money ecosystem as a participant. It is therefore 
recommended that the government considers doing so not only as a way of 
giving m-money a boost, but also in ensuring that its payees in rural areas 
have more take-home pay. Whatever the future holds, one thing can be said: 
regulation of m-money under the current architecture, which is based on 
banking, is not ideal. Neither is the architecture of having a plurality of 
regulators who are sector regulators. There is a danger of such regulators 
talking past each other. An agency may not resolve all regulatory problems, 
but it is the first step, it is submitted, towards having clarity from this regulatory 
flux. 
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